Document Type

Journal Article

Department/Unit

Department of Computer Science

Title

On achieving group-strategyproof multicast

Language

English

Abstract

In computer networks, multicast models a class of data dissemination applications, where a common data item is routed to multiple receivers simultaneously. The routing of multicast flows across the network may incur a cost, and such a cost is to be recovered from payments by receivers who enjoy the multicast service. In reality, a group of potential multicast receivers exist at different network locations. Each receiver has a valuation for receiving the multicast service, but such valuation is private information known to itself. A multicast scheme asks each potential receiver to report her valuation, then decides which subset of potential receivers to serve, how to route the multicast flow to them, and how much to charge each of them. A multicast scheme is stragegyproof if no receiver has incentive to lie about her true valuation. It is further group strategyproof if no group of colluding receivers has incentive to lie. We study multicast schemes that target group strategyproofness, in both directed and undirected networks. Our main results reveal that under group strategyproofness, a compromise is necessary in either routing optimality or budget balance. We also design multicast schemes that pursue maximum budget balance while guaranteeing group stragetyproofness and routing optimality. © 1990-2012 IEEE.

Keywords

game theory, mathematical programming/optimization., Multicast, network coding

Publication Date

2012

Source Publication Title

IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems

Volume

23

Issue

5

Start Page

913

End Page

923

Publisher

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

DOI

10.1109/TPDS.2011.197

Link to Publisher's Edition

http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPDS.2011.197

ISSN (print)

10459219

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