Document Type

Journal Article

Department/Unit

Department of Finance and Decision Sciences

Title

Helping hand or grabbing hand? central vs. local government shareholders in Chinese listed firms

Language

English

Abstract

We analyze related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their state-owned shareholders to examine whether companies benefit or lose from the presence of government shareholders and politically connected directors. Minority shareholders seem to be expropriated in firms controlled by local governments, firms with a large proportion of local government directors on their board, firms without central government directors, and firms in provinces where local government bureaucrats are less likely to be prosecuted for corruption. In contrast, firms controlled by the central government (or having central government affiliated directors), benefit in related party transactions with their government parents. © 2010 The Authors.

Publication Date

2010

Source Publication Title

Review of Finance

Volume

14

Issue

4

Start Page

669

End Page

694

Publisher

Oxford University Press

DOI

10.1093/rof/rfp024

Link to Publisher's Edition

http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfp024

ISSN (print)

15723097

ISSN (electronic)

1573692X

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