Varieties of statecraft and warfare ethics in early China: An overview

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APA Citation
Chapter 1:  
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**Ancient Greece and Ancient China**

It is often said that Ancient Greece, the Classical Period in particular (roughly the 5\textsuperscript{th} and 4\textsuperscript{th} century BCE), was the cradle of Western civilization. The same may be said of the Warring States Period (475–221 BCE) for Chinese civilization. Both were preceded by a long ancient history, and in each case the hallmark of politics of the period was incessant warfare among independent states with a common culture. The contention for regional hegemony was fierce and ruthless. Such periods of upheaval were at the same time, however, golden ages of civilization. Original intellectual ideas emerged that proved to be pivotal for subsequent development of civilization. Both periods ended in the emergence of a regional hegemon. Greeks city-states were defeated, lost independence, and ruled by the foreign kingdom of Macedon and eventually by Rome,\textsuperscript{1} whereas Chinese states were merged into a bigger political entity by force of one state, the Qin.

Though both periods were marked by incessant warfare, the intellectual responses were different. Ancient Greeks produced narratives of war: either poems (e.g., Homeric poems) or prose accounts commemorating particular battles (e.g., the works of Herodotus and Thucydides). “Both prose accounts and poems were intended to record and glorify events” (van Creveld 2005, 24). Philosophical discussions of war were remarkably rare in spite of the achievements of classical Greek philosophy. “Plato…writes surprisingly little about war. Surprisingly, indeed, since the conversations and speeches of Socrates that Plato reports (or invents) are supposed to have taken place right before, during, or immediately after the Peloponnesian War…which shook the foundations of Greek culture in general and Athenian pride in particular” (Reichberg, Syse, and Begby 2006, 18). Aristotle, once tutor to Alexander the Great, did discuss war in his *Politics*, but his views were notoriously confused. On the one hand, he stipulated that war must be fought for the sake of peace. On the other hand, he argued that war for the cause of acquisition of property, “natural slaves” in particular, is “just by nature.” Aristotle was explicit on this topic. “And so, from one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought to practice against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended to be governed, will not submit; for war of such kind is naturally just” (*Politics* I, 3. 1256b23–27; qtd. from Reichberg, Syse, and Begby 2006, 40; cf. Regan 2013, 15).
In contrast, most major thinkers in the Warring States Period in China urgently engaged the topic of war. The cruel reality of unremitting wars was reflected in poems, recorded in historical writings, and above all, intensely discussed and debated by the great thinkers of that age. Concomitant with the struggle for supremacy as well as for survival of the warring states, competing schools of thought, especially on statecraft, arose to meet the needs of the day. Because warcraft was a part of statecraft, the role of warfare was sharply debated, ranging from its aggressive use to its condemnation. Hence there were heated and extensive debates on the need to distinguish justified from unjustified wars in ancient China, as there were not in ancient Greece.

In this chapter I provide an overarching view of five major schools of thought on this subject matter, an endeavor that has not been attempted before in either Chinese or English. In particular, I try to articulate their warfare ethics in the context of statecraft. I first discuss the emergence of such thought in this pivotal period and then briefly examine its development when China became a unified and centralized empire. After briefly describing the historical background in the next section, I will begin the subsequent overview with the school that denies the legitimacy or sensibleness of warfare ethics.

**Background: the Rise of Various Schools of Thought**

As the eminent Zhou Dynasty (1027–256 BCE) was on its downward path in the sixth century BCE, the feudal dukes seized the opportunity to turn the territories entrusted to them into *de facto* sovereign states and declared themselves kings. As there was no common agreement on territorial sovereignty, this development led to anarchy in interstate affairs. State boundaries were in flux and, as a result of a series of military conquests and occupations by the stronger states, the number of states in the region decreased sharply to seven, commonly known as the Seven Powers. This final round of fierce fighting and bloody warfare is now known as the Period of Warring States in Chinese history (475–221 BCE). This was a time of instability, as every state was vulnerable to attack and losing its independence and territorial control. This was also a time of ferocious fighting; killing fields were everywhere.² Hence this period was also a time of competition as well as reform. All state rulers looked for brilliant ideas on managing state affairs and war fighting skills so that their own state could survive and emerge superior to others.³ Accordingly, this was also the golden period of creative and original thought in Chinese history. Many new schools of thought arose that were subsequently generalized as the “hundred schools
of thought” in historical writings. The once shared values during the Zhou Dynasty gave way to pluralistic and conflicting ethical visions.

In this context of competing schools of thought on statecraft, warcraft (the skill of employing the military) was also discussed. The biggest question in that age was “How to govern well so that one’s state can emerge as a great power?” Derivatively the next big question was “How to conduct military affairs so that one’s army will emerge invincible?” Varieties of discussions on the proper use of military force grew out of this bigger debate.

Most of the major thinkers of this age were bothered by the killing fields and their carnage. As Mozi (c. 468–376 BCE) articulated it in the famous third chapter on “Condemn Aggression”:

Today, kings, dukes, great men and the lords of the various states of the world do not act like this…As soon as they enter the borders of the state, they cut its grain and fell its tree, destroy the inner and outer walls of its cities to fill in the moats and ponds, seize and slaughter the livestock and animals reserved for sacrifice, and set ablaze its ancestral temples, butcher its myriad peoples, exterminate its old and weak, and carry off its state treasures. As their troops press forward and repeatedly confront the enemy, they shout at them: “He who dies in the line of duty is the finest soldier; he who kills many of the enemy is next; he who is wounded is only third in rank. (Mo 2013, 182–183)

A few decades later Mencius (or Mengzi, c. 372–289 BCE) echoed the same sentiment, “In wars to gain land, the dead fill the plains; in wars to gain cities, the dead fill the cities” (Mencius 2003, 83; 4A14). Hence most of the thinkers of this age found it necessary to articulate an ethic of the employment of the military.

The Legalist School: All is Fair in Offensive Defense

Articulations in the Pivotal Period

Some thinkers decided to seize this moment of disorder and go with the times. Since the loosely united Zhou Dynasty could no longer exercise effective governance, there was no central authority to enforce order. Given the chronic chaos and warfare, efforts to promote peaceful co-existence of these states were unlikely to succeed, and every state had to secure its survival by augmenting its own strength. Legalism was a school of thought that taught how to best maximize a state’s power vis-à-vis other states. It is difficult to trace its precise origins because the writings of many of its pioneers are no longer extant. Though not founders, Shang Yang (c. 390–338 BCE) and Han Fei (c. 280–233 BCE) are generally deemed the most important thinkers of this school.
There is much continuity between the thoughts of these two novel thinkers, though the former wrote more on warcraft and the latter more on statecraft. Unlike many other thinkers of the time who still respected the ancient sages in previous dynasties, both were forward looking and ignored conventional norms; hence their inclination towards realpolitik. In this age of struggle for survival in which the stronger states survived by preying upon the weaker ones, the goal of interstate statecraft was the same as domestic statecraft for the Legalists, that is, to maximize one’s power and wield it to one’s advantage. Hence both thinkers advocated a strong military supported by intensive agriculture. A “rich country” (fuguo) with a “strong military” (qiangbing) is a motif that was common among most Legalist thinkers. (Even today, the “Chinese Dream” advocated by the P.R.C. government always has these two components. “A rich and strong China” is on the lips of most people living there.)

Accordingly, Legalist statecraft was more than realpolitik; it was machtpolitik, that is, a policy of relentless pursuit and use of power in domestic as well as in interstate relations. The ultimate goal of statecraft was the state’s creation of a world order under its dominion. According to this statecraft, internally, replacing traditional rites, the government was to coerce people into submission through the promulgation and enforcement of new and draconian laws. Externally, the government aimed to coerce other states into submission through brutal wars. Shang Yang, the prime minister of the state of Qin, militarized the entire society and advocated mass slaughter on the battlefield. Han Fei, whose writings were greatly admired by the ruler of Qin, deemed interstate relations a zero-sum game and advocated preventive wars to make sure that one’s state would be the regional hegemon. The state of Qin put Legalism into practice, eventually defeating all other states and becoming the hegemon in China. In the process, much blood was spilled, which prompted responses from other schools of thought.

Legalist interstate statecraft bore much rudimentary resemblance to contemporary offensive realism in international relations theories (Mearsheimer 2014). A Legalist state was proactive in safeguarding national long-term security; it would launch an “anticipated self-defense” military operation against another state, though such an operation would be condemned by others as aggression. Accordingly, such statecraft had little interest in warfare ethics per se. Since one had only oneself to rely on—to ensure long-term national security and to advance national interests—one could not afford to confine warfare within the narrow moral space allowed by any petty moralism. There was no concern for proper conduct in war other than that which guaranteed military success. There were no scruples aiming to restrict violence and human suffering on both sides, and no mercy was to be shown to enemy soldiers, whether captured or
surrendered. There was no self-imposed restraint or limit on the use of lethal violence to serve national interests. This amoral position on warfare was bitterly disputed by other schools of thought, as we will see shortly.

Later Developments

The Period of the Warring States ended with Qin state conquering all other states and establishing an empire dominating the region. This *Pax Qina* (previously known as *Pax China*) was short-lived (221–206 BCE). Rebellions erupted and chaos returned; eventually a dynasty, the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), was established which was stably developed. There would be more dynastic changes to come, but the apparatus of the centralized Chinese imperial empire would remain until 1911.

Ever since Confucianism was established as the state religion in the Han Dynasty, Legalist teaching, along with other schools of thought, was banished from state schools and institutions. This was analogous to the Christianization of the Roman Empire after Constantine, albeit not quite as thoroughly since other schools of thought were still privately taught and not persecuted. Although emperors and court officials in charge were supposed to follow the Confucian teachings, they could not resist the allure of Legalism. It was Emperor Wu, the architect of the Confucianization of the Han Empire, who put Legalist warcraft into practice as a new interstate anarchy emerged in East and Central Asia. The Xiongnu, a powerful nomadic tribe dominating Mongolia and Central Asia, proved to be an annoying neighbor. After conquering neighboring races and occupying their land in the east, south, and west, Emperor Wu attempted to launch distant expeditions to the north to remove this threat to national security once and for all. Though these decades-long campaigns remained at an impasse at the time of his death, the imperial ministers during the reign of the next emperor wanted to renew these offensive campaigns. A large scale court debate on this issue was held in 81 BCE in which the government spokesmen defended and elaborated this strategy of offensive defense. The pro-war party raised arguments that were full of Legalist motifs, praised the achievements of Shang Yang and the Qin state, and even quoted a famous saying of Han Fei (“Thus, whoever has great strength sees others visit his court; whoever has little strength visits the courts of others. Therefore the enlightened ruler strives after might”; Han 1959, 306). This was not an isolated incident; the surreptitious merging of Legalist statecraft into imperial Confucianism became a salient feature of imperial Confucian statecraft for almost two thousand years. In the modern period, Mao Zedong (1893–1976 CE) appreciated Han Fei’s thought so much that he assimilated Legalist statecraft into his rule of the
“New China.” Such an offensive realism may still be found in the official People’s Liberation Army publications on grand strategy. Chapter 11 of this book explains in detail Legalist realist thought, its practice in the Han Dynasty, and its recurrence in the PRC government. Early studies detected the presence of Machiavellianism in this school of thought (Waley 1939) and this chapter elaborates this theme via the theory of offensive realism as articulated by a well-known international relations theorist (Mearsheimer 2014).

The Confucian School: Just War as the Second Best Option
Articulations in the Pivotal Period

The founder of the Confucian school was Master Kong (Kongzi, Latinized as Confucius; 551–479 BCE). Though in the Analects he seldom talked about war, he was adamant that proper statecraft required virtuous politics in continuity with his emphasis on virtuous ethics for individuals. A virtuous ruler, by his personal example, according to Confucius, would have great influence and move everyone to be virtuous. Hence the state would be well governed (cf. Confucius 1979, 63, 138–139; II.1, II.3, XVI.1). A few generations later, Master Meng (Mengzi, Latinized as Mencius), his most prominent follower, elaborated upon this concept of virtuous statecraft and extended it to the discussion of military matters. To begin with, Mencius abhorred the rampant warfare of his time; he condemned aggressive war in very strong terms (Mencius 2003, 83; 4A14). He denied that wars in the previous age were “just/righteous wars” (yizhan) (Mencius 2003, 157; 7B2). He did not permit Shenzi (慎子), probably his disciple, to pursue a career as an army general because that was not the proper aim of Confucian statecraft (Mencius 2003, 140; 6B8). Mencius even disavowed in dismay his alleged expertise in the art of war (Mencius 2003, 158; 7B4). Such repugnance against warfare notwithstanding, Mencius conceded paradoxically that in some circumstances military force was not only morally permissible but morally and politically obligatory. First, he advocated that self-defense against invasion was the responsibility of a head of state (Mencius 2003, 26; 1B13). Second, following Confucius, the key term in Mencius’s political vision was renzheng (benevolent or humane governance). Hence a ruler that had well-cultivated moral virtues would not tolerate seeing people suffer under wicked tyrants in other states. That defined another circumstance for the right use of military force: namely, to slay a tyrant and deliver the people from intense suffering (Mencius 2003, 25; 1B11). Joseph Chan explains this Confucian paradox well, “Martial arts and the use of force are supposed to be the very antithesis of the Confucian ideal of benevolence and harmony, yet they are necessary in the nonideal world and can, and should, be practiced with a view to the ideal” (Chan 2014, 16).
Master Xun (Xunzi or Hsün-tzu, c. 325–238 BCE), another prominent Confucian after Mencius, also prefaced his discussions on military matters with discourses on statecraft. In addition to virtuous statecraft by the ruler himself, a well-managed country was to be based on a robust social ethics, which was defined by a set of formal rules of proper conduct known as “li” (rite). Only when the whole country’s ways of life were regulated by rites would there be a stable social and political order. Rites, as action guides, were expressions of the Confucian cardinal virtues, among which ren (benevolence, humaneness) and yi (righteousness, justice) were the most important. A government that practiced ren and yi would be obligated to use military force to defend the defenseless at times. He argued eloquently, “A person of ren (benevolence, humaneness) loves others, and because of this love he or she loathes whoever harms them. A person of yi (righteousness, justice) acts in accord with principle, and because of this accord with principle he or she loathes whoever disrupts it. The military is for banning tyranny and removing harm, not for fighting for land” (trans. mine; cf. Hsün-tzu 1990, 228; 15.2). In short, for both Mencius and Xunzi, the principal justifications for undertaking military actions were the punishment and rectification of aggression (including usurpation) and tyranny. Such military actions were consistently referred to by both Mencius and Xunzi as “punitive expeditions.”

Logically, a punitive expedition launched in the name of morality (ren and yi) must be executed in accordance with morality. For Mencius, the kernel of ren was the moral sentiment of not bearing to see others suffer. An expedition prompted by humane governance (governance by ren) should be launched to deliver people from suffering; hence there must be proper conduct in such warfare. In particular, the people who are to be delivered from suffering should not be inflicted with further suffering during and after the war. During such a humanitarian expedition noncombatants and their property should be immune from injury. A proper intention to rescue and protect should be manifested by the proper conduct of the army. When the tyrant has been executed, the good ruler (the True King) and his army should continue to exercise humane governance. Mencius told this ruler, you should “take your army out [from the conquered state] after setting up a ruler in consultation with the people” of that state (Mencius 2003, 26; 1B11). Xunzi added that during the war there should not be slaughter, and after the war all POWs should be released (Hsün-tzu 1990, 226–227; 15.1f). In short, in the context of moral statecraft, both Mencius and Xunzi found that in some circumstances the employment of military force was the responsibility of a statesman, and force should be employed morally throughout. Warfare was not amoral.
Chapter 4 of this book explicates in meticulous detail the classical Confucian position on the legitimate use of force and the moral constraints of its proper use as represented by Mencius and Xunzi. Chapter 5 probes this Confucian understanding of punitive expeditions against tyrants further, compares it with contemporary Western models of humanitarian intervention, and argues that the Confucian punitive expedition aligns quite closely with the emerging “responsibility to protect” model in Western discussions. Chapter 6 focuses on Xunzi’s moral analysis of war and his social-political vision vis-à-vis the dynamics of international relations in the context of the late Warring States, and explores their implications for today’s world.

Despite some parallels, Confucian warfare ethics in this pivotal period has two features that are significantly different from Western just war ethics. First, both Mencius and Xunzi argued that the rightful authority to declare a morally justified war belonged to the virtuous True King. Warfare is cruel and consequential; only someone who had a firm disposition to behave morally could launch a war governed by morality. Hence they distinguished between someone who followed the way of a True King (wangdao) and one who followed the way of a hegemon (badao). A True King would practice humane governance (renzheng); he who governed humanitarianly would conduct warfare humanely. Hence, by contrast to most recent understandings of the Western *ius ad bellum* norm, “proper authority” here was not understood legally or politically, but morally. Merely because one was the head of state, or in modern terms, merely because it is the national parliament or the UN Security Council that authorizes a war would not suffice. Those people who were allowed to declare wars just because they were vested with the power to do so were, in terms of classical Confucian thought, hegemons, not True Kings. Only when power is under the guidance of full virtue can there be a rightful authority to declare war. The idealistic tendency of Confucian military ethics is unmistakable.

As explained earlier, one major question which all schools of thought tried to address in the Period of Warring States was, “What is the key to consistent military success?” To this question both Mencius and Xunzi gave the same reply: the ruler needed to be a True King; he needed to practice humane governance habitually. Hence they both reiterated that a punitive expedition led by a virtuous True King, who practiced humane governance habitually and spontaneously, would be invincible everywhere (王者無敵) and would triumph without actual fighting (*Mencius* 2003, 7–8, 41, 79–80, 157–158, 158; 1A5, 2B1, 4A7, 7B3, 7B4; Hsün-tzu 1990, 100, 162, 228; 9.9, 11.8, 15.2)! Such an army of Goodness would be welcome everywhere, and peoples near and afar would, out of admiration, submit to its rule voluntarily. In exaggerated language both Mencius and Xunzi claimed that as soon as military confrontation broke out, the battle would be
over before any blood had been spilled (Mencius 2003, 158; 7B3; Hsün-tzu 1990, 228; 15.2). This was because the suffering people would welcome them as farmers in severe drought welcome rain; these people were in an abyss of suffering consumed by fire and drowned by water and thus were desperate for rescue (Mencius 2003, 24–26, 41; 1B10–11, 2B1). A charitable interpretation of this idealistic claim is that the key to military success is always extra-military; it is the “soft power” of moral admiration that turns the tide. It is the threat of the “hard power” combined with the credible moral promise delivered by “soft power” that guarantees lasting success. As Mencius famously said, “One who uses force while borrowing from benevolence will become a hegemon…One who puts benevolence into effect through the transforming influence of morality will become a true King…When people submit to force they do so not willingly but because they are not strong enough. When people submit to the transforming influence of morality they do so sincerely, with admiration in their hearts” (Mencius 2003, 35–36; 2A3; trans. modified). Likewise, Joseph Nye writes persuasively that hard power might enable a country to win a war, but “soft power is essential to winning the peace,” which is more difficult (Nye 2004, xii). In short, Confucian statecraft and warfare ethics argued that one should never rely on brute force alone. This position was the polar opposite of Legalism. A hegemon could win wars but he would continue to have formidable enemies. A True King would win wars easily and have virtually no enemies. A country with a high moral rating globally, on this view, may still have enemies, but much less than those of the hegemon, and such a country may need to fight hard. But her potential allies would not be turned to the enemy’s fold when she needed them to win.

Later Developments

Confucian ethics is a form of virtue ethics (Ivanhoe 2000; Yu 2007; Angle & Slote 2013), and so was its military ethics. Although there was no shortage of action guidance for ad bellum, in bello, and post bellum issues in Mencius and Xunzi, there has not been much development in specifying concrete norms for such guidance and theoretically systematizing them. This is because in Confucianism the greater emphasis is on whether the person who starts a justified war is virtuous, rather than whether any specific kind of action is justifiable. Hence the language of “just war,” which appeared in Mencius only once, was not picked up subsequently. Rather, it was the language of “just soldier” or “just army” (yibing or yijun) that was developed. This is consistent with Mencius’s insistence that a person of ren is invincible and Xunzi’s claim that the army of benevolence and justice (renyi zhi bing) wins a battle without shedding blood. It is not what one does, but who one is that ultimately matters the most. This way of conceiving military
ethics could easily be abused. In the course of Chinese history the leader of every rebellion, including Mao Zedong in the 1930s and 1940s, would issue propaganda and spread misinformation that he had received the Heavenly mandate to deliver the people from tyranny and suffering and that he had been a very virtuous person who could be completely trusted (cf. Lewis 2006, 193; Graff 2010, 211).

Both Mencius and Xunzi, especially the latter, maintained that both the hard power of the military and the soft power of one’s moral example were needed even though the latter was of greater importance. From the Han Dynasty onward, the Confucian distinction between these two approaches has been described by the terms *wu* (coercive force, violent coercion) and *wen* (civilizing force, moral suasion) (Fairbank 1974, 4). With the ascendency of Legalist influence in imperial courts, there has been a tendency in Confucian political thought that *wen* not only has a moral priority over *wu*, but would also be enough to pacify the enemy all by itself. Hence some historians detect a “pacifist bias” in Confucianism in imperial China. One section of Chapter 11 of this book examines this emergence of Confucian pacifism in detail. However, Confucian philosophers well versed in the Confucian classics continued to maintain a Confucian approach to just war; some of them were even eminent generals. The best example of this was Wang Yangming (1472–1529 CE), the greatest Confucian philosopher in the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 CE), who had also been a military general in his early years. Chapter 7 argues that Wang’s ethics of war was a thoughtful and innovative extension of the classical Confucian position that placed equal emphasis on *ad bellum*, *in bello*, and *post bellum* conditions within a unified framework. This chapter points out in particular how Wang deployed Sunzi’s strategic thinking from the *Art of War*, while also being governed at every step by classical Confucian moral values about the proper ends and conduct of war as a tool of statecraft.

Wang was not alone, and there were a number of famous Confucian generals in subsequent history. Zeng Guofan (previously as Tseng Kuo-fan, 1811–1872 CE) was a very interesting figure who merits future investigation. He first worked at the Hanlin Academy (an elite scholarly institution) in the capital, spending many years interpreting Confucian classics, and was later appointed imperial war commissioner to suppress the Taiping Rebellion. He directed many successful campaigns and crushed the rebels with much bloodshed. His *Zeng Guofan Family Letters* (*Zeng Guofan Jia Shu*) were collected, published, and are still widely read today as a Confucian text for self-cultivation.
Hence from the Han Dynasty onward there have been divergent developments of Confucian warfare ethics, namely, pragmatic pacifism and just war. More work needs to be done in the future to fully grasp this complicated intellectual history.

**The Daoist School: Mournful Skepticism**

*Articulations in the Pivotal Period*

Laozi (i.e., Master Lao; c. 6th century BCE), the founder of the Daoist School, was a contemporary of Confucius. The writing he left behind is the short, poetic treatise known as the *Daodejing*. In addition to advocating a way of life, it also advocated a particular political philosophy, namely that the ruler should “govern with non-activity” (*wuwei*); that is, the government should not force or push things to happen. A state would be strongest when it practiced noninterference in governance by leaving the people alone. Understandably, this statecraft would employ the military the least, as war is the highest form of human coercion.

In the *Daodejing*, Laozi articulated in strong terms the most vocal anti-war sentiment in ancient China: “The military is an ominous instrument and so is generally despised. One who has the Way does not abide by its use. A true ruler gives precedence to the left [the seat that treasures life] when at home, but to the right [the seat that treasures death] when he goes to war. Military force is an ominous instrument, and is not the instrument of true rulers” (*Daodejing* 2003, chapter 31; trans. mine). While denouncing war in general, Laozi was not a pacifist. He understood that there are times that warfare is the lesser evil, and he advocated holding violent impulses in check during war. Hence in the same chapter he said, “When employing the military out of great reluctance, it is best to do so without enthusiasm. There is no glory in victory; one who glorifies it rejoices in killing people. And anyone who rejoices in killing people will never enjoy success in the empire.” Hence the proper statecraft after the war is to mourn. “When great numbers of people are killed, one should weep over them with sorrow. When victorious in war, one should observe the rites of mourning [rather than the rites of triumph]” (*Daodejing*, chapter 31; trans. mine). Laozi’s statecraft strongly opposed coercing others into submission militarily. When employed out of great reluctance, the successful military campaign should be concluded without boasting, bragging, and forcing one’s ways onto others (*Daodejing*, chapter 30). One should not engage in active offense but only in passive defense (*Daodejing*, chapter 69). In other words, Laozi did not support the Confucian idea of the “punitive expedition.” Laozi’s statecraft of non-coercion entailed that one should fight only a defensive war and only as a last resort, that one should fight mournfully, with restraint and without hatred, and that when the war was over
one should stay mournful and not impose one’s will on the defeated state. This military ethics was a humanist voice, not a nationalistic one; hence it tended to not sit well with political leaders. Laozi was the first and the last major Chinese thinker who was so mournful about warfare.

Later Developments

In the first 60 years of the Former Han Dynasty (or Western Han Dynasty, 206 BCE–9 CE) Daoist statecraft was in vogue. This was because the Han court concluded that the Qin Dynasty (221–206 BCE) underwent a quick demise owing to Legalist statecraft. Daoist statecraft, which emphasized non-coercion, was the diametric opposite of Legalist coercionism and was thus embraced as the antidote. For many decades, in spite of frequent border raids by the Xiongnu, the Han court adopted a Daoist, non-coercive, non-military approach to resolve the conflict through interracial royal marriages and annual economic gifts. But this nonmilitary response to the Xiongnu problem took a sharp turn from détente to military showdown during the reign of Emperor Wu (140–87 BCE), and the guiding thought of statecraft changed from Daoism to Confucianism. For the next two thousand years Confucianism played the role of established religion and Daoist philosophy was cherished by intellectuals who were disillusioned with Confucianism. A Daoist religion was founded towards the end of the Han Dynasty which has since had many followers. The Daodejing continued to be read in imperial China and the diatribe “The military is an ominous instrument” from chapter 31 of this book remains the most cited saying concerning war in Chinese history.

Chapter 8 of this book argues that the Daodejing takes an anti-war stance from the perspective of naturalness (ziran) that has onto-cosmological, moral, and political ramifications. While giving harmony and peace an ontological priority, this text has challenged the conventional belief that war is a natural circumstance of human society. It is more important to be engaged in peace-making than to articulate the moral boundary of war-making. Chapter 9 extends this discussion to the topic of humanitarian intervention. Given their skepticism of Confucian ethics and statecraft, classical Daoist thinkers (Laozi and Zhuangzi) are silent on punitive expeditions which classical Confucianism famously champions. This chapter explores the possible Daoist worries about such military interventions and their contemporary relevance.

The Mohist School: Condemning Aggressive Wars and Offering Defensive Assistance
Articulations in the Pivotal Period
Mozi (i.e., Master Mo; c. 468–376 BCE) founded another school of thought and had many followers during his day. He was not related to Laozi, lived about a century before Mencius, but like them was very vocal in opposing the rampant wars of that time. He is well-known, even to this day, for his vigorous condemnation of interstate aggression during his time. Statecraft was the central concern of Mohism (or Moism). (The book Mozi, as we know it, contains teachings by Mozi as well as his disciples.) Some key components are:

advocacy of a unified ethical and political order grounded in a utilitarian ethic emphasizing impartial concern for all; active opposition to military aggression and injury to others; devotion to utility and frugality and condemnation of waste and luxury; support for a centralized, authoritarian state led by a virtuous, benevolent sovereign and managed by a hierarchical, merit-based bureaucracy; and reverence for and obedience to Heaven (Tian, literally the sky) and the ghosts worshiped in traditional folk religion. (Fraser 2014)

We will focus on one key aspect in this section.

Three chapters of Mozi are dedicated to expounding his fundamental moral principle of impartial love (or impartial care, jian ai). In the opening paragraph of the first chapter Mozi says, “The sages, being ones who made governing the world their task, made certain to understand the source of disorder so that they would be able to quell it…Only by knowing the source of disorder can one quell it…What did their investigation show the source of disorder to be? It arises from not loving others” (Mo 2013, 146). Due to this dearth of love, there are family feuds, intrigues in imperial courts, social disorder, and interstate warfare. Accordingly,

If we could induce everyone in the world to love others impartially, states would not attack each other, houses would not bring disorder to each other, there would be neither robbers nor murderers, and every lord and minister, father and son, would be capable of behaving obediently and affectionately. If the world were like this, then it would be well ordered…Thus when everyone in the world impartially loves others there is order, but when they mutually hate each other there is disorder. (Mo 2013, 148)

In short, good political order is an extension of good moral order. In this regard Mohism and Confucianism are similar.

Given this fundamental moral-political principle of impartial love, aggressive wars are severely condemned as contrary to this principle. Mozi even argued that they were not conducive to the aggressors’ self-interests. (Again, three chapters were devoted to this criticism.) Like Confucianism, proper statecraft, when universally followed, excludes warfare. This is Mohist idealism. But the reality is most states do not follow this kind of statecraft and some states
continue to bully other states. Thus, the second best option of inclusive love in interstate relations is humanitarian intervention, to defend the weak states that are under attack. The ethics of interstate impartial caring entails the responsibility to protect the states that cannot protect themselves. Even in such wars, Mozi did not endorse the principle of an eye for an eye because it encouraged violence. Instead, he and his disciples offered practical and innovative advice on the personnel, equipment and strategies to be used in the defense of a besieged walled city so that there would be less bloodshed (Mozi 2010, chapters 52–71).10

There is another aspect of Mozi’s warfare ethics that remains noteworthy. In the opening paragraph of the first chapter on Against Aggression, he provided the following argument based on simple logic. Everyone agrees that stealing fruits from someone’s orchard causes harm, that seizing other people’s cattle causes more harm, and that killing an innocent man and robbing him causes even greater harm. Mozi then said, “Now the superior men of the world all realize this and condemn such actions, calling them ‘improper’ [buyi, or unrighteous]. Yet in contrast when it comes to the even greater impropriety of aggression against a state, they not only do not understand that they should condemn it, but go on to praise it, calling it ‘proper’ [yi, or righteous]. Can they be said to understand the distinction between proper and improper actions?” Similarly, killing one person is wrong, killing ten persons is a greater wrong, and killing a hundred persons is a greater wrong still. Mozi continued,

Now the superior men of the world all realize this and condemn such actions, calling them improper. Yet in contrast, when it comes to the even greater impropriety of aggression against a state, they not only do not understand that they should condemn it, but go on to praise it, calling it proper. This means that in fact they do not grasp the impropriety of attacking another state (Mo 2013, 172–173).

Liang Qichao commented perceptively in 1922 that this argument was probably meant to counter militarism and its thesis of discontinuity between interpersonal morality and interstate morality. Mozi rejected the view that all is fair for the sake of state interests (Liang 1936, 118). I submit that the view refuted by the Mohist text was probably the view of the early Legalists or their like-minded peers; their amoral realism in interstate relations justified aggression by appealing to defending national security.

Later Developments

The school founded by Mozi and the Confucian school were the two most prominent schools of thought in the Warring States Period, yet Mohism faded from history after the Qin unification of
China and had no distinct influence. One reason this happened was because the school was most famous for its defense strategists and counter-siege engineers for small states; thus, when the long period of interstate warfare was over, they were rendered irrelevant. It was only in the nineteenth century that the scholarly interest in Mohism was revived. As Chinese people today are looking outside Confucianism for more native intellectual resources, Mohism merits more consideration in the future and Mohist warfare ethics deserves our close attention. Chapter 10 of this book is a comprehensive study of Mohist warfare ethics. It argues that there is a conception of just war in Mohism which recognizes the justifiability of defensive wars and punitive interventions against rogue regimes when expressly sanctioned by Heaven. There is continuity between this conception and contemporary Western just war theory. This chapter further examines the Mohists’ main arguments against military aggression and discusses how Mohist religious notions are deeply entwined in their just war doctrine.

The Military Strategy School: Just War as Last Resort

Articulations in the Pivotal Period

Unlike the thinkers discussed above, who were all civilians, the thinkers in the Military Strategy School were all professional military commanders. History recorded Sunzi (or Sun Tzu; c. 6th century BCE), and Wuzi (?–381 BCE) in particular, as brilliant strategists and heroes of warfare. That subsequent historians have considered them on a par with other major philosophical schools and that some of them were given the honorary title of “master” (zi), indicate that these authors (Master Sun, Master Wu, Master Weiliao) were considered part of the diverse group of itinerant “wise teachers” of that creative and versatile age. In addition to their military expertise these masters learned from and debated with other schools. Hence there are traces of Confucian, Daoist, and even Legalist motifs in the writings of the Military Strategy School. There are five representative writings from this school, composed in different times during these approximately 250 years: Master Sun’s Art of War (Sunzi Bingfa), Master Wu’s Art of War (Wuzi Bingfa), Sima’s Art [of War] (Sima Fa), Master Weiliao (Weiliaozi), and Taigong’s Six Secret Teachings (Taigong Liutao). They cover a variety of military subject matters, such as organization, education and training, leadership and its virtues, strategy and stratagems, tactics, geography, intelligence, psychology, economics, and logistics. All five books contain some moral comments on warfare, but the authors’ primary concern is to advise heads of states on how to win wars. These moral reflections are offered in different ways by the various authors, with some of them set at the very beginning of the treatise and others spread out in various chapters. With the exception of Master Sun’s Art of War, these treatises also deal with
statecraft; hence, their discussion on warfare is placed in a larger perspective. There is nothing significant about their conceptions of statecraft, though, because they are usually either a watered-down version of an existing school of thought (e.g., Confucianism in Sima’s Art [of War]) or a hybrid of various schools of thought (e.g., Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism in Taigong’s Six Secret Teachings). Hence, unlike previous sections, I focus only on warfare ethics of this school in this section.

Interestingly, two of these treatises qualify their military advice by making a moral confession, citing the famous saying from Laozi, “the military is an ominous instrument” (buxiang zhi qi); they even intensify the saying into “the military is a terrible instrument” (xiongqi). With lament they then go on to say that it should be employed only when it cannot be avoided or when there is no alternative. This moral caution is repeated in other writings of the same genre in subsequent times and so should be treated seriously. They reiterate the same message: military violence is deeply deplorable; it is bad and tragic. It should be resorted to only very reluctantly when there are no better options (budeyi), that is, as a last resort. It is not surprising for moralists “on the sidelines” (for example, Laozi) to lament the tragedy of warfare. The writers of these military treatises were moralists within the profession. They wrote as experienced military commanders and aspiring politicians, and they were willing to acknowledge that their profession is not morally unproblematic.

With the exception of Master Sun’s Art of War, all the other treatises specify the just causes for which the unpleasant task of initiating warfare is needed, and most of them employ Confucian moral language. On the scale of balance of morality, non-violence is outweighed by the needs (i) to restore stability and order for the people; (ii) to relieve people of tyrannical rule; and (iii) to stop an aggressive war. These are the three justified causes for which morality (benevolence and righteousness) can condone the resort to military violence. Causes (i) and (ii) justify offensively-oriented wars, whereas cause (iii) justifies defensively-oriented ones.14

As people’s well-being is at stake in all three just causes, right intention needs to be manifested in conduct during war. Hence it is not surprising to find these treatises cautioning discreet conduct during the military campaign. Such required discretion, sometimes issued in the form of a military command, involves making an effort to not harm the noncombatants in the enemy’s territory and to not destroy or damage their places of worship, their livestock and other means of living, their property, and their environment, and to treat prisoners of war humanely. As the goal of such a military campaign is political (to rectify wrongdoing and to restore proper order), such
discreet conduct is needed to help reach this political goal, that is, to win the hearts and minds of the populace so that order can be promptly restored *post bellum*. Furthermore, given the moral caution that “the military is a terrible instrument,” discreet conduct entails that in the course of war there should be conscious self-restraint to cause as little carnage and destruction as possible. The aim should be to win the war extra-militarily. Hence these treatises advocate the ideal of “victory without bloodshed,” “subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting.” Herein lies the fame of this school. These treatises include extensive discussions of psychological warfare, diplomacy, isolation, misinformation, spycraft, creation of dissension, monetary and sexual bribery, enticing the enemy to indulge in all kinds of pleasures, recruitment of double agents, deceit, etc. By significantly weakening the enemy before military combat one can bring about a swift and decisive military showdown so that casualties can be minimized as far as possible. It is true that these authors offered much advice on how to win bloody wars. The fact that they were willing to say that it is preferable to win the conflict with the least amount of violence possible is therefore all the more noteworthy. Doing so, for them, is not only a matter of cost effectiveness, but also a matter of morality. The various strategies they recommended for reducing casualties should be understood as a continuation of the requirement of last resort. Warfare is *prima facie* morally undesirable and should be avoided as far as possible. When it becomes a justified “necessary evil” due to the failure of other alternatives, the “evil” component should still be minimized as much as possible. This implies a certain sense of “proportionality of means” in warfare. This is not yet the “proportionality of means” of *ius in bello* in contemporary Western just war ethics, as collateral damage is not part of the discussion, but it is heading in the same direction. This is equivalent to the early idea of proportionality in European thought, which urges one to use “the least destructive ways to defeat those forces or render them ineffective so as to achieve those legitimate ends” (Johnson 1991, 31). Hence analogues to the principles of discrimination and of proportionality of means may be found in these writings.\(^{15}\)

It is noteworthy that although these five treatises are famous for being manuals of all kinds of military affairs in ancient China, they consistently heavily emphasize the critical role various virtues and vices play, and they advocate for the development of a strong moral character. In this sense, these treatises are rather Confucian in nature and concern. These writers probably understood that the violence of warfare can turn human beings into monsters. Hence the need to cultivate firm moral dispositions so that soldiers and generals can act spontaneously in a moral manner. Each treatise contains a list of virtues and vices (*Wu ching ch'i shu* 1993, 62–64, 135, 137, 141, 167, 207, 243–244). There is an unmistakable emphasis on the primacy of the moral character of generals over systematic, exhaustive, and well-specified moral rules or military
instructions. Superior generals are described as those who have superior dispositional traits rather than those who have only fierce fighting skills and beastly courage. Moreover, character flaws of enemy generals should be found out and targeted in tactics (*Wu ching ch’i shu* 1993, 62–63, 218–219). In other words, in the idioms of virtue ethics, a virtuous ruler and commander wage unavoidable wars out of great reluctance, since war fighting is not part of their disposition. In waging wars, one’s non-belligerent moral character and pure intention in combat need to be shown by not intentionally harming noncombatants, not damaging their property and means of livelihood, and treating prisoners of war humanely. Minimal violence to render the opposing force ineffective is much preferred. Assistance should also be given to restore a stable and prosperous social life of the defeated state, since that is what a virtuous person would do (cf. Lo 2013).

*Later developments*

With the Period of Warring States coming to a close these itinerant military advisors could not remain freelance teachers. They were absorbed into the imperial government and common people were forbidden to read their treatises. Hence in the entire Han Dynasty only one more military treatise with an emphasis on strategy was composed, *Three Strategies of Huang Shigong* (*Huang Shigong Sanliüe*). It is more of a summary of the teachings of the Military Strategy School than a presentation of new ideas. In the Tang Dynasty (618–906 CE) another treatise was composed for the easy reference of the emperor, *Questions and Replies between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong* (*Tang Taizong Li Weigong Wendui*). In the Song Dynasty (960–1279 CE) the five Military Strategy treatises discussed above and the two works just mentioned were collected as a set and canonized as *The Seven Books of Military Classics* (*Wujing Qishu*, or *Wu ching ch’i shu*) for prospective generals’ study and examination (1078 CE).16 This took place on a par with the designation of *The Four Books* (a simplified Confucian canon) as a textbook for civil servants. Each of these seven books has a long tradition and history of commentary, especially *Master Sun’s Art of War*, and the collected set has its own commentary tradition. The discussions on the moral passages in these commentaries show that awareness of military ethics is very much alive. However, unlike the case of just war thinking in the West, these ethical discussions were never systematized and presented as a sub-discipline within ethics.

Chapter 2 of this book investigates the analogues of Western just war norms in *The Seven Books of Military Classics* and their commentaries, provides some historical illustrations, and explores the extent to which the Chinese People’s Liberation Army subscribes to them today.
distinctiveness of this set of ideas vis-à-vis the western just war tradition is also explored. Chapter 3 is an in-depth study of a military text that is very familiar to English readers, Master Sun’s Art of War. It attempts to refute a long-standing interpretation of this text as advocating amoralism in warfare, and argues that the alleged amoral Machiavellianism is more appropriate for ancient Qin military thought than for Sunzi. Indeed, the nascent moral ideas in this text can provide an important resource for the People’s Liberation Army of China to construct full-scale just war ethics similar to Western understandings.

Conclusion

In the most formative period of Chinese thought, the Confucian, Mohist, and Military Strategy schools all distinguish just from unjust wars and provide basic discriminating criteria. The Legalist school abuses the language of just war, whereas the Daoist school expresses mournful skepticism about this very idea. There are significant parallels between the just war ethics of these three schools and the just war idea of pre-modern Europe. The Military Strategy school and the Confucian school, in particular, developed into two robust traditions in imperial China. Though the relevant texts were continually read and commented on, these early military ethical ideas have not been developed, elaborated, refined, systematized, and popularized in modern Chinese thought. Hence an average Chinese today does not know much about them.

One distinctive hallmark of the military ethics of these two traditions is their idealism. They advocate that the best way to employ the military is to subdue the enemy without a fight. This is to be attained, for the Confucians, by the soft power of moral suasion or, for the Military Strategists, by all kinds of non-violent strategies. Their fundamental belief is that conflicts among peoples should not be resolved by brute force, even if one finds it justifiable to resort to the military. Military force is not value neutral; hence casualties and destruction for both sides should be held to a minimum.17

Another salient trait of these two traditions is their heavy emphasis on the critical role that various virtues and vices play and their advocacy of the development of a strong moral character. They insist that wars are won by commanders with critical character strengths and lost by commanders with major character flaws. A superior military commander defeats the enemy within before defeating the enemy without. Many legendary military stories substantiate this claim.
About This Book

Much has been written on the just war tradition in the West. Work on the analogous traditions in world civilizations, especially Islam, has been rapidly catching up. Research into the Chinese traditions, though, has not developed at the same pace. In some recent anthologies of comparative ethical perspectives on war, the Chinese traditions either are absent (Sorabji & Rodin 2006; Popovski, Reichberg & Turner 2009), are treated rather briefly and sketchily, albeit broadly (Kane 2003; Paul 2004; Palmer-Fernandez 2004; Graff 2010), or are handled rather one-sidedly (Lewis 2006). A few independent publications appear, but they either suffer from hasty generalizations and inconsistency (for example, Yao 2004), lack sophisticated depth (for example, Gong 1999; Ryden 2001; Godehardt 2008), or are too narrow in scope to give us a broader picture (for example, Bell 2008; Yu 2010). Lately a number of fine books on warfare in Chinese history have appeared (van de Ven 2000; Di Cosmo 2009; Graff & Higham 2012; and various works by Ralph D. Sawyer), and some of them are written with ethical sensitivity (Wang 2011). However, these works cannot substitute for a full-fledged study of Chinese ethical thought on war and peace.

Recently some Chinese military scholars both in the PRC and in Taiwan have begun to use the term “just war” (zhengyi zhanzheng) to discuss ancient military thought (Kang 2006; Li 2009), and some other scholars use the expression to discuss Confucian perspectives on war (Bell 2008; Yu 2010). However, these writings have neither treated the topic in-depth nor compared it with the Western tradition adequately enough. We need to know whether there is a just war tradition in China rather than simply whether one or two philosophical texts have addressed this topic. By the same token, however, there is a noteworthy consensus in this recent scholarship, namely, “just war” is not a category alien to Chinese thought. What urgently needs to be done is to articulate and analyze the detailed content of this mode of thinking in major Chinese intellectual traditions. This book is a modest, but important, step to fill this gap. We examine five major intellectual traditions in the pivotal Warring States Period and trace some of their developments.

This book examines warfare ethics in general, and just war ethics in particular, in the pivotal Warring States Period and their subsequent developments. Hence Buddhism and Islam, which arrived in China many centuries later and were assimilated into Chinese culture, are not within the scope of this book. Even within the confines of the Warring States Period there are other important intellectual traditions that this book does not cover, for example, the Eclectic School (za jia; e.g., the Guanzi, The Annuals of Lü Buwei), historical narratives such as the Zhuozhuan
(Commentary of Mr. Zuo [on the Spring and Autumn Annals]), the Zhanguoce (Strategies of the Warring States). Much more work needs to be done so that this enormous intellectual heritage can be transmitted to our world today. With all due respect to the brilliance of the ancient Greek intellectual traditions, it is the ancient Chinese traditions that we should turn to in order to have access to nuanced and rich discussions on warfare in the so-called Axial Age. We have more to learn from them on this subject than from Plato and Aristotle.19
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**Notes**

1 According to Herodotus, the Greek city states “shared blood, shared language, shared religion, and shared customs.” “However, the Greeks of the classical period never managed to translate their psychological awareness of their ‘Greekness’ into political unity. The history of the classical Greek city-states is a history of failure to achieve unity: Sparta would not, and Athens could not, impose it indefinitely by force as Macedon and Rome were to do” (Hornblower 1988, 122).

2 According to a historian’s calculation there were less than 100 years in these 254 years without warfare, and wars in this period tended to be longer, larger, and more intense than before (Hsu 1965, 62–65). Accordingly, “[t]hese wars had two major consequences: the absorption of small states and non-Hua peoples into the expanding territorial powers, and the formation of a balance of power in which each state acted independently to further its own interests through the selective application of combat and diplomacy” (Lewis 1999, 616).

3 For a very interesting comparative study of China in this period and early modern Europe, see Hui 2005.
4 For a short introduction to the major competing schools of thought in this period, see Nivison 1999.

5 Joseph Chan submits that Confucian political thought as well as other comprehensive political philosophies have a dual character. “[A] political philosophy needs to develop two tracks of theorizing—one track that explains or justifies an ideal conception of social and political order, bracketing off practical questions about feasibility and compliance, and another that develops a nonideal conception that addresses these practical questions” (Chan 2014, 1).

6 兵不血刃，遠邇來服. This kind of ideal language is prominent in the Military Strategy School as well.

7 The first person to abuse this idea of yibing is the king of the Qin state, who bloodily conquered other states and slaughtered approximately 1.5 million soldiers of theirs. After he ascended to the throne of emperor he was eulogized for raising yibing to punish the other states (cf. Lewis 2006, 192).

8 Fairbank is the earliest American advocate of Confucian/Chinese pacifism. As he puts it, “The superior man...should be able to attain his ends without violence. This was because of the optimistic belief that virtuous and proper conduct exerted such an edifying attraction upon the beholder that he accorded moral prestige to the actor. Right conduct thus gave one moral authority, a kind of power...Herein lies the pacifist bias of the Chinese tradition” (Fairbank 1974, 7).

9 This policy was also partly based on a pragmatic consideration, that is, the Han Dynasty was relatively weak after the series of wars to claim the throne whereas the Xiongnu was at the peak of their power.

10 The authenticity of these chapters has been disputed; they are probably the work of Mozi’s disciples.

11 Sunzi, like Kongzi (Confucius) and Laozi, was active in the closing days of the previous age, the Period of the Spring and Autumn. But the treatises that embody their thought exercised great influence only starting from the Warring States Period.

12 It is difficult to date the compositional times of these writings as many of them were compiled by their disciples and expanded by followers.

13 *Sun Bin’s Art of War (Sun Bin Bingfa)*, which was excavated in 1972, is not included in this study because it did not have any influence—as the other five treatises did—on account of its two-thousand year disappearance.

14 Unlike Confucianism, especially *Mencius*, in this school of thought there is no insistence that the rightful authority to declare war must be a virtuous True King; the *de facto* ruler would suffice.
In the past some classified this school as a sub-school of Legalism. As I explained previously, this is inaccurate in that Legalism contained no warfare ethics.

There are actually more than four thousand premodern Chinese military manuals extant today. Most of them deal with the nuts and bolts of military operation. Only these seven treatises are rich in strategic thought and stand above the others.

Clausewitz obviously disagrees with this point, as he famously writes in the beginning of his book, “Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect” (Clausewitz 1993, 83).

This gap in scholarship exits not only in the English language, but also in Chinese scholarship. Besides the academic need, there is a practical need as well, as to be explained in several chapters of this book.

Plato wrote very little about war. As to Aristotle, who had a lifelong association with the Macedonian Court which eventually conquered all neighboring countries and established a large empire, his views on war are not well-regarded. The author of a recent book on Western just war theory writes, “More controversially, Aristotle thought it alright to go to war to gain an empire, provided: 1) this empire would benefit everybody, including the conquered; and 2) this empire would not become so large and rich that it would attract attackers and hence result in more wars. Most notoriously, and appallingly, Aristotle did allow warfare to gain slaves for one’s community—providing that such slaves were ‘naturally servile’ to begin with. Not a single just war theorist would today endorse these last two propositions…” (Orend 2013, 11).