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The Ethics of Reciprocity in Translation: The Development of a Cross-Cultural Approach

XIN Guangqin

A thesis submitted with partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Principal Supervisor:
Professor TAN Zaixi

Hong Kong Baptist University
May 2017
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the thesis represents my own work which has been done after my registration for the degree of PhD at Hong Kong Baptist University, and has not been previously included in a thesis or dissertation submitted to this or any institution for a degree, diploma or other qualifications.

I have read the University’s current research ethics guidelines, and accept responsibility for the conduct of the procedures in accordance with the University’s Committee on the Use of Human & Animal Subjects in Teaching and Research (HASC). I have attempted to identify all the risks related to this research that may arise in conducting this research, obtained the relevant ethical and/or safety approval (where applicable), and acknowledged my obligations and the rights of the participants.

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Abstract

As a highly complex area, translation ethics involves issues of texts, languages and cultures as well as individuals, collectivities and larger communities like nations. Good and evil can be done to them by translation and translators. Though efforts to undertake translation ethics have been intensive, a critical examination of the existent models and views finds that they are not comprehensive or effective enough to address the complex issues involved.

The dissertation attempts to overcome this insufficiency by striving to formulate a more comprehensive model, a model with greater explanatory power, named the ‘Ethics of Reciprocity in Translation’ model. Reciprocity presupposes pairs of entities and parties while any translation project involves such pairs. In a translation project, there is the translator the agent, translating the process and translation the product, and the model of ‘Ethics of Reciprocity in Translation’ sees the undertakings of translation from the perspective of harm and benefits incurred in and by translation to the pairs of entities and parties involved in or affected by a translation project, covering all these three dimensions.

Taking into account the general approaches to ethics in the West, i.e. virtue ethics, deontological ethics and consequentialist ethics, aimed respectively at the agent, the act and the consequence, the study draws on Ricoeurian and Confucian concepts of reciprocity as the theoretical foundation for the development of the model. Ricoeurian reciprocity is employed for its theoretical strength in stressing reciprocity between equal parties while Confucian reciprocity is strong for its position on reciprocity between unequal parties, since translation tend to involve both equal parties and unequal participants. Confucian reciprocity is given more prominence because it does not preclude the possibility of a junzi-type role (junzi=君子/gentleman[-like]) on the part of the agents to work for larger missions or higher values even between unequal inter-actants for a higher reciprocity.

The study argues that the ethics of reciprocity in translation centres on a translation project, whereby active parties such as individual persons, collectivities and nations, and passive entities including texts, languages and cultures ought not to be harmed but rather mutually benefited. They constitute the content of the ethical reciprocity. To achieve such reciprocity, translators and other agents are faced with three general alternatives: not-translating, ‘equivalent’ translation and manipulated translation, depending on the text type and quality as well as the value the translation project aims to establish. The model thus developed is therefore dynamic, integrated and multi-layered, combining virtue ethics and principle ethics to cover a wider scope of whether to, what to and how to translate.

This model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ is tested to three sets of cases for its validity and possibilities: cases of ethical reciprocity in translation, cases of ethical non-reciprocity in translation and cases where the model is not relevant. In each set, three examples of literary, semi-literary and non-literary texts are analysed respectively. Though not intended to apply in all translation projects, the model would hopefully make a valid and comprehensive one on the ethics of translation in general contexts.
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List of Abbreviation

ST=Source Text;
TT=Target Text;
TS=Translation Studies;
DTS=Descriptive Translation Studies;
trans=my translation;
n1=note 1;
fn1=footnote 1;
p1=page 1;

*TTR=Traduction, Terminologie, Redaction;*
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Why ethics¹?

Anthony Pym begins his introduction ‘The Return to Ethics in Translation Studies’ to the special issue of *The Translator* [*The Return to Ethics*] with “Translation Studies has returned to questions of ethics” (2001: 129), and concludes that “few would now argue that there should simply be no ethics of translation” (2001: 137). By “return” we can easily infer that ethics as a topic is not new but has simply been out of fashion. The fact is that the field of TS witnessed the emergence of DTS during the 1980s and 1990s, which stresses value-free description of translations for the development of a “scientific” discipline (see Toury 1980, 1995; Hermans 1999; and Brownlie 2009), and as a consequence, “ethics was an unhappy word” in those days as observed by Pym (2001: 129). Ethics is really not a new topic in translation studies. Just as Myriam Salama-Carr asserts, rightly, “[t]o claim that the translator and the interpreter are constantly confronted with decisions that are essentially ethical in nature is not new” (2007: 6, my emphasis). Rosemary Arrojo (1997: 5) even argues that “[t]he study of translation has always been, for the most part, a speculation about ethics”, despite her not having been able to clarify what ethics means. All these show that ethics is indispensable to translation and TS.

In fact, the term “the ethics of translation” was used to discuss pertinent issues as early as 1895 in the UK and USA (Nollen 1895 and Anon. 1895). Because these two essays were not well-known or widely read, it would not be until 1984 that translation ethics began to be formally and seriously addressed after Antoine Berman published his seminal book *L’Épreuve de l’étranger: Culture et traduction dans l’ Allemagne Romantique* (The book was translated into English by S. Heyvaert in 1992 as *The Experience of the Foreign: Culture and Translation in Roman Germany*), in which Berman put forth his well known notion of “respecting

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¹Any publications in TS involving the term ‘ethics’ will be within the scope of the survey without my initially having to consider how the term is defined or meant so that as many publications as possible would be included. But due to the limits of my languages (some Japanese, very tiny German and French besides Chinese and English), the above “any” basically refers to publications in English and Chinese or those originally written in other languages but translated into these two. Even so, the survey cannot be claimed to be exhaustive because of my various limitations including time.

²Throughout this introduction the concepts of ‘translation’ and ‘translator’ are used presumably as if with a transparent and universal meaning, detailed elaboration of which is to be made in Chapter 2.
the foreignness of the foreign” (1992: 4). Still between 1984 and 2001, partly owing to the sweeping influence of DTS, translation ethics was only limitedly discussed in a couple of elaborations. One such elaboration was made by Douglas Robinson in 1991. He advanced his vertical ethics of translation in his monograph *The Translator's Turn*, aiming at introducing “an alternative paradigm” (1991: xxi) for translation studies. Then in 1995 and 1998 respectively Lawrence Venuti published his two provocative books *The Translator’s Invisibility* and *The Scandals of Translation—Towards an Ethics of Difference*, both of which touch on translation ethics. The year 1997 saw four important publications on translation ethics: Pym’s French lectures on translation ethics *pace* Berman in the same place as *Pour une ethique du traducteur* (which was translated into English, revised, updated, and republished in 2012 as *On Translator Ethics*), Andrew Chesterman’s Chapter 7 ‘On translation ethics’ in his monograph *The Memes of Translation*, Rosemary Arrojo’s article ‘Asymmetrical relations of power and the ethics of translation’, and Gillian Lane-Mercier’s essay ‘Translating the untranslatable: the translator’s aesthetic, ideological and political responsibility’. Then in 2000, Kaisa Koskinen published her PhD thesis *Beyond Ambivalence: Postmodernity and Translation Ethics*. But it was in 2001, in the West\(^3\), that translation ethics really “returned”.

Translation ethics in the West has since become the focus of concern for many TS scholars and a heated topic as can be seen in the availability of an increasingly growing corpus of researches. In addition to the special issue of *The Translator*, *TTR* also published a special issue on ethics: *Antoine Berman Today* (Nouss 2001). In 2002, Jenny Williams and Chesterman co-authored *the Map: A Beginner’s Guide to Doing Research in Translation Studies*, where they listed the major approaches to translation ethics, a comprehensive summary and guide for further research. In 2004 *TTR* published another special issue on translation ethics: *Translation, Ethics and Society* (Fiola 2004). This was followed by an important collection on translation ethics in 2005, i.e. *Nation, Language, and the Ethics of Translation* (Bermann and Wood 2005). In 2007 Maria Tymoczko published her monograph *Enlarging Translation, Empowering Translators*, a book primarily on translation ethics. Then in 2008, Chesterman interviewed Mona Baker, which resulted in the publication of

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\(^3\)As a “mythical construct” (Sakai 2000: 789) and unable to cover all areas beyond China and other third world regions, the concept “the West” is taken as a general term here to chiefly designate the European-North American areas.
“Ethics of renarration” (Chesterman and Baker 2008), in which they expanded the topic of translation ethics.


The situation concerning translation ethics in China from the late 1990s to 2010s was equally encouraging. In 1998 Xu Jun published his essay ‘On the three levels of translation activity’, which seemed to be the first work during this period in China discussing the ethical issues in translation in a systematic fashion. In 2001, Lü Jun published his monograph 跨越文化障礙: 巴別塔的重建 [Crossing the Cultural Barriers: Reconstruction of Babel], in which he argues that Habermas’ communication action theory is also communicative ethics or discursive ethics,
which can contribute to the development of translation ethics (2001: 268ff-281). But his research went largely unnoticed until 2005, when Western developments on translation ethics were introduced and discussed in China. Since then, China has witnessed a dramatic burgeoning of research on translation ethics in the form of journal essays, MA theses, PhD dissertations and book publications.

More evidence of this development can be obtained from CNKI, the largest Chinese online database of academic resources. For example, a search of “translation ethics” in Chinese as the subject word made on 17 February, 2014 resulted in 429 hits. Of all these hits, apart from a total number of 303 journal articles, conference presentations, newspaper items and 100 MA theses, there were also 26 PhD dissertations produced in the past decade. Of these PhD theses, 13 addressed, in one way or another, the issue of translation ethics (at least two more are not listed in this database). When the horizon is expanded beyond the Chinese mainland to include Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, more explorations into translation ethics in various fashions are also found (see e.g. Liao Chaoyang 2005, 2010; Li Yulin 2009; Liu Suxun 2010).

When a resurvey of the subject was conducted on CNKI on 1 March, 2017 for research updating of translation ethics, 1824 hits resulted, about more than tripled compared with the findings three years ago. But a closer scrutiny of the data reveals that there is no major progress in terms of novel ideas or theorising. Except for one PhD thesis (Li 2016), only 6 journal essays (Liu & Xu 2016, Shen 2016, Wang 2016, Hao 2016, Xu Hong 2016, Ren & Zhang 2016) are serious study on the topic among the large number of publications, MA theses included, with Hao Junjie (2016) and Xu Hong (2016) addressing the ethical issues in crowdsourcing translation and translation of non-literary or applied materials respectively while Ren & Zhang (2016) discussing ethical issues in national translation programmes.

This above-cited research can be divided roughly into five classifications: (1) introductions and critiques of Western ideas or models of translation ethics, such as Shen and Tong (2005), Liu Yameng (2005), Qiao Ying (2007), Chen Ying (2008), Jiang Tong (2008), Kang Ning (2008), Liu and Zhang (2009), Zhang Jinghua (2009), and Chen and Lü (2011); (2) applications of Western models in Chinese translation contexts, such as Tang Pei (2006), Zang Xiayu (2012), Xu Hong (2012), and Liu and Xu (2016); (3) comprehensive reflections on translation ethics, including Xu Jun (2004, 2007), Wang Dazhi (2005, 2009), Chen Ying (2007), Ge Lin (2007),

In addition to these researches, there have also been efforts to study the key concepts concerning traditional translation ethics. For example, Gao Yu (2004) and Zeng Ji (2008) both explored the concept of “fidelity”/“faithfulness” as an ‘ethical notion’ in translation. Other scholars have addressed the responsibilities on the part of the translator, such as Sun Zhili (2007) and Zhu Chaowei (2010), while still others have focussed on the issues of “ethical rules” in translation, e.g. Wu and Wei (2006).

All these efforts are telling evidence of the heatedness in discussion, the richness, complexity, and of course the importance of translation ethics. But at the same time, they also manifest that this is an area of confusion and disorder. The reasons for this confusion and disorder are manifold. First, a large portion of the above seemingly ethical discussions, especially some by Chinese scholars (e.g. Peng 2008, Wang 2012, Tu 2013), belong to what Pym calls studies of “descriptive sociology” (2012: 2) rather than ethical studies. This results from a misunderstanding of ethics per se, as ethics can be approached descriptively, prescriptively, and metaethically or analytically. Ethics is by no means an easy issue in any sense, especially when connected with the equally or even more complex human phenomenon, translation.

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4As will be dealt with in Chapter 2, the classification of ethics is a controversial subject, but generally it is agreed that ethics can be approached in this three ways (see Xia and Chen 2011: 2898). Metaethics is also called analytical ethics, metanormative ethics, scientific or theoretical ethics (Wan 1993: 41).

5I. A. Richards’ statement is well known now in the field: “[w]e have here indeed what may probably be the most complex type of event yet produced in the evolution of the cosmos” (Richards 1953: 250, my emphasis).
In Chinese, the concept *fanyi* (翻譯) designates simultaneously four matters: translation the general concept, translating the process, translation the product, and translator the agent. Of the four, the latter three all have to do with ethics. Thus if ethics and translation are not properly understood, the kind of translation ethics formed cannot be sound.

Closely related to this problem is the issue of terminology. Van Wyke also asserts, rightly, that “our view of translation ethics is inseparable […] from broader questions of ethics” (2013: 555-6). Yet a lack of real understanding of the key terms like ethics and translation ethics is apparent. It is commonplace today for TS scholars to encounter such expressions as an *ethics* of translation, the *ethics* of translation (Koskinen 2000), an *ethics* of difference/sameness/location (Venuti 1998, 2011), or *ethics* of representation/service/communication/commitment and norm-based *ethics* (Chesterman 2001), translator *ethics* (Pym 2012), translatorial *ethics* (Wolf 2011), *ethics* (and politics) of translating (Meschonnic 2011), (professional) code of *ethics* (McDonough Dolmaya 2011a), *ethical* translation, and *ethical* implications (Salama-Carr 2007: 6). In all these expressions, the term *ethics* or *ethical* has been used by scholars or translators as everyday vocabulary as though their meaning is obvious and already understood and taken for granted. In other words, the term *ethics* or *ethical* does not seem to require defining or explanation for its meaning to be clearly comprehended.

Another problem is that there is no serious definition of the subject: different scholars just emphasise the importance of translation ethics without making efforts to clearly define it (cf. Yuan & Zou 2011: 211). For Lawrence Venuti, for example, translation “clearly raises ethical questions that have yet to be sorted out” (1998: 6), stressing that “ethics is central to translating” (quoted in Zhang 2009: 218) probably because it can have “far-reaching social effects” (1998: 6), like “forming cultural identities” and “contributing to social reproduction and change” (ibid: 81). For Annie Brisset (2003: 126), “[there is] the inequality of languages and the groups that speak them, translation as a relation of power. It is around this issue that an

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6Here all italics of “ethics” or “ethical” are mine for emphasis.
7Pym (2001: 130) asserts definitively that “[a]lthough many translation scholars now agree to discuss ethics, most would disagree about how to define the field”. But as an acknowledged field a lack of definition constitutes a problem for the scholars. Many translation theorists, for example, Douglas Robinson (1991), have touched on the topic earlier without giving a definition to it. The lack of definition for translation ethics has also been explicitly pointed out by Wang (2009: 61, 2012: 15), Xu (2012: 37-52), and Luo (2012: 30).
ethics of translation must be developed”. Similarly, Chu (2009: 12, trans\textsuperscript{8}) holds that “it is the very inequality between languages and cultures that renders translation ethics fundamentally important”. The ethics of translating is extremely important to Henri Meschonnic because it “holds everything together” (2011: 54). For Sandra Bermann, language itself is not transparent (2005: 4) and the translator’s task is inevitably an ethical one, especially in an age of accelerated globalisation (ibid: 6). For still others, translation ethics comes to the fore because of the negative effects translation can engender in general (see, for example, Inghilleri 2012: 127; Sakai 2009). This is well summarised by Moira Inghilleri in her statement: “we have not by any means reached a clear understanding of or agreement about what an ‘ethical’ approach actually means in the context of translation theory or practice, or the construction of the field itself” (2009: 100, my emphasis). More thorough efforts are thus urgently needed in this connection.

Owing to the confusing use of the key terms and an absence of definition of the subject, we would inevitably encounter some difficult questions. For example, in what sense can we confidently and convincingly say a judgment is ethical, rather than, for example, customary, aesthetic, or otherwise in general? And, what criteria can we apply to decide whether someone is an ethical translator or a given text is an ethical translation in a given time and society concerning a given translation project\textsuperscript{9}? Or on what criteria can a translator be guided to make a decision that is ethical? In sum, concerning translation ethics, what does it mean in the first place? Aren’t all the available codes of ethics for the ‘professional\textsuperscript{10}’ translators and interpreters sufficient, just like in other practices or professions such as medicine, law and journalism? Or, with respect to translation and translators, is it the case that ethics may mean different things?

\textsuperscript{8}Chu’s essay is in Chinese and the English translation of the quotes here are my doing. Unless noted otherwise, all English translations of citations from works originally written in Chinese are done by me throughout the thesis, marked by ‘trans’ in the brackets following the cited author and time.

\textsuperscript{9}This term “project” is different from what Antoine Berman means. For Berman, a translation project is a translator’s articulated purpose or goal when deciding to undertake a translation and it will affect how the translation turns out, as for example practiced by the feminist translators such as Barbara Godard, etc. (See Berman 2009: 60, Simon 1996: 24-26, 34). Here, used for description, it refers to the whole situation concerning a translation, covering from whose choice of the ST, to the translator, through the final translation and its prospective readership and all the paratexts, if any, around the translation. It will be used as the study unit and judging object to contextualise all the parties and relationships concerned for the desired model to apply. More details are given in Chapters 2 and 4.

\textsuperscript{10}That translation as a profession is at once in the making and in the breaking state will be dealt with in detail in section 2.3, Chapter 2. Worldwide many translations are done by non-professionals, especially so with the popularity of online crowdsourcing and volunteer translations (see for example O’Hagan 2011, McDonough Dolmaya 2011b).
With such questions left unanswered, this fledgling field can by no means be said to have been sufficiently explored. Indeed more thorough and systematic efforts have been urged to be made by many translation scholars. For example, Mary Snell-Hornby has observed that, “[t]he vital question of ethics has by no means been exhausted” (2006: 164) and “the ‘ethical turn’ in Translation Studies has yet to be taken” (ibid: 78). For Christopher Larkosh, “[g]iving importance and space to the subject of ethics in translation studies remains a decisive move in the often divided present-day environment of the discipline” (2004: 28, my emphasis). Yuan and Zou (2011: 213) argue that the study of translation ethics will contribute to the change and development in the perception of translation as a concept and to the construction of an ecological environment of translation as an activity. Shen Lianyun likewise points out that the ethical issues in translation are still very much under explored, and an appropriate model of translation ethics has yet to be established (2011: 15, my emphasis; see also Yuan & Zou 2011: 210). Maria Tymoczko even states that “it is time to turn directly to the question of ethics” and “questions of ethics in translation need to be approached in a concrete manner and with specificity” (2007: 316).

Not only has it not been sufficiently explored, but translation ethics must be further studied also because translation itself is ethical in the descriptive sense. Wang Dazhi asserts that “ethicality is an essential property of translation” (2012: 9, trans). Kathleen Davis argues that, “[t]o raise the question of ‘ethical translation’ is in a certain sense redundant” as translation “enacts the ethical relation” (2001: 93). With advances in the field it has been generally acknowledged that translation is not always transparent and neutral, but can do both good and harm (Wang 2012: 2). Michael Cronin rightly claims that translation is “both predator and deliverer, enemy and friend” (2010: 251) and it is “never a benign process per se and it is misleading to present it as such” (ibid: 252) (cf. von Flotow 1997: 2).

Finally, another factor inducing translation ethics to be studied in a new light is that translation practice today is undergoing new patterns and situations. We are in an era of globalisation, mobile internet and communications in which fansubs translation and volunteer translation are all on the rise around the world. As a result, the doubtful profession is in the process of making and breaking simultaneously (see McDonough Dolmaya 2011b: 106-7). Such changing conditions render it necessary to overhaul the existent approaches and models of translation ethics and
Given all these reasons, I conclude that the field of translation and TS needs new and more embracive models of translation ethics.

1.2 Why the ethics of reciprocity?

To formulate new and more embracive models, the two central concepts, ethics and translation, have to be examined carefully, so as to better delimit the field of translation ethics. In this connection, a whole chapter, Chapter 2, will be devoted to this topic. What is given here is just a brief, initial, introductory discussion of the issue.

In general terms, with regard to the issue of ethics, I take the argument of moral philosopher He Huaihong who sees ethics in two major branches: normative ethics and non-normative ethics. The former consists of general normative ethics and applied ethics and the latter is composed of descriptive ethics and meta-ethics or analytical ethics (He 2008: 47, my emphasis). Normative ethics is regarded as the main body of ethics (ibid: 78; Singer 1994: 10) because it embodies the essence of ethics, dealing with the most basic principles or rules of human behaviour. Normative ethics “seeks to influence our actions” (Singer 1994: 10) by evaluating and judging the act, agent, motive, and/or consequence (Furrow 2005: 44). According to He, normative ethics boils down to two major schools: deontological theories like Kantian ethics, teleological theories including utilitarianism/consequentialism and virtue ethics/perfectionism (2008: 78). Deontology works in the form of principles to be observed concerning acts; utilitarianism works by seeing whether the consequence of an act is the maximised benefit for the largest population; and virtue ethics works by seeing whether the agent has the excellence or virtues needed. When it comes to translation ethics, it can be approached descriptively, prescriptively and metaethically. But since normative ethics is the main body of ethics, i.e. offering principles and values to help ethical decision-making, evaluation and explanation, the model of translation ethics I aim to formulate will be largely normative, having descriptive and analytical functions as well although to a lesser degree.

To help make ethical choices and evaluations, a precondition is the distinction between ethical judgment and judgments otherwise. In this respect, moral
philosopher Julia Driver has underscored the standard clearly. In our encounters with others, whether individual or collective, if we do something that could bring harm or benefit to the parties concerned, then this constitutes a moral matter (Driver 2007: 1; also see He 2008: 22 and Wang 2003: 6, my emphasis)\(^1\). Harm and/or benefits incurred in an act or event are in fact the key parameters against which to distinguish between ethical judgement and other kinds of judgements like customary, aesthetic. According to American philosopher Richard Rorty, ethics as a theory is to help us see clearer “what will cause harm and what might do good” (2011: 23). Rorty’s key terms are also “harm” and “good”, by which the ambit of ethics is delimited.

Following this line of thought about ethics, it is my view that translation ethics should be about what benefits/good\(^1\)\(^2\) or harm are engendered by translation to certain people(s) concerned, including the translator and other (prospective) participants, individual or collective, rather than the linguistic fidelity or equivalence, which in certain cases also counts. The benefits or harm are principally the result of the choices and decisions made by the translators, or the conscious and conscientious exercise of their agency after interaction with other possible agents, although they are in some circumstances under powerful constraints.

In terms of benefits, there is no denying that translation can do, has done, and will do good to individuals, communities, peoples or nations on different levels politically, economically, linguistically, culturally, and so on. A typical observation of this is made by George Steiner when he said: “[…] translation is probably the single most telling instrument in the battle for knowledge and woken consciousness in the underdeveloped world” (1998: 284); and, “intellectual history, the history of genres, the realities of a literary or philosophic tradition, are inseparable from the business of translation” (ibid: 285)\(^1\)\(^3\).

\(^1\)Here ‘moral’ is taken as equal to ‘ethical’ as an evaluative term rather than a descriptive one. ‘Ethical’ can designate for both evaluation and description. Details will be proffered below in the second chapter. Meanwhile the distinction between ethics and morality is not made, the reason for which will be given in chapter two as well.

\(^2\)Kant and Kantians will oppose this for their deontology, i.e. duty and rule ethics which will not take into account any consequences of an act at all, instead, accord duty itself topmost priority. But because of the fact that translation is also a largely translator-generated process, both duty and virtue are indispensable to the consideration of benefits and harm produced in and by translation via the major agent, i.e. the translator. Chapter 2 will give more details.

\(^3\)Cf. Goethe’s well-known positive comment on the role of translation in his 1827 letter to Thomas Carlyle: “Whatever you may say about the deficiencies of translation, it is and remains one of the most important and dignified enterprises in the general commerce of the world” (in Lefevere 1992b: 285).
When it comes to harm, although a consensual opinion is hard to obtain, it is perhaps not incorrect to say that, on the macro level, as the postcolonial and feminist approaches to TS have revealed, translation has participated in the conquest of peoples and the constitution of empires (see Cheyfitz 1991; Niranjana 1992; Robinson 1997c) or, in the complicity of “colonialism, imperialism, and gender inequality” (Inghilleri 2012: 127; see also Simon 1996). On the micro level, the individual parties including the author, the translator(s), the client/commissioner/publisher, and the prospective readership may also suffer from some harm in multifarious types and degrees. For example, the author may suffer from distortion of his/her intention14 by the translator or translation. A case in point here is the Chinese author Lao She, who was no doubt harmed by his English translator Evan King because King in his translation changed the ending of Lao’s novel Luotuo Xiangzi at will, which, along with other factors, led to Lao’s lawsuit against him15 (Hu 1977: 114). Conversely, translators could also suffer from exploitation by authors and/or other participants, or be harmed otherwise, as was not infrequently recorded in the literature of the field (see Venuti 1998: 5; Pym 2012).

Thus, seen from the perspective of benefits and harm incurred by translation to the parties involved and affected, almost all the major models of translation ethics are found somewhat deficient16 in that an overemphasis is often inappropriately placed on one element while other equally important factors are ignored or overlooked. For instance, Venuti’s well-known “ethics of difference”, intended to valorise “greater respect for linguistic and cultural differences” (Venuti 1998: 6) and undermine the dominating situation of the Anglo-American language/culture via foreignising translation, when subjected to close scrutiny, is found in essence target-culture-serving, i.e. American-culture-serving. Because his expressly stressed “foreignizing or resistant translation”, if exercised by all translators in the United

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14The term is used in its commonest sense despite discussions of “intentional fallacy” in literary criticism (see Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946, Burke 1998). Intention is also regarded by Sean Burke as an important category in discursive ethics if “responsive and accountable” (2008: 114).

15A more detailed examination of this case tested to the formulated model is made in section 5.2.1, Chapter 5 as a case where reciprocity is not achieved ethically.

16The claim will be briefly touched on in section two of this chapter but fully argued in Chapter 2 during the critical examination of the major models. The perspective of benefit and harm is found only in Chesterman (2001) and Xu (2012), where it is just mentioned in passing without a detailed tackling.
States, will consolidate and even enhance the inequality between English and other “minor” languages rather than weaken the dominating position of the English language.  

To see clearly and tackle the issues of harm and benefits incurred by translation and translators, novel approaches are needed. As a human activity, translation entails at least one pair of parties, sometimes more than one. Their relations are not of an unswervingly unilateral nature. The benefits or harm engendered by translation and translators can be unidirectional, i.e. to just one party or entity, but they can also be two-directional or mutual. This possibility of mutual effects incurred by translation to/by the parties in question raises fundamentally ethical questions and the concept of *reciprocity* seems to fit in very well. Etymologically, according to the *OED*, reciprocity means: felt or shared by both parties; mutual. And for American philosopher Lawrence Becker: “[t]he concept of reciprocity that I shall defend may be summarized in the following maxims: that we should return good for good, in proportion to what we receive; that we should resist evil, but not do evil in return [if so, negative reciprocity will occur, and it is not ethical]; that we should make reparation for the harm we do; and that we should be disposed to do those things as a matter of moral obligation. Reciprocity is a ‘*deontic*’ virtue” (1986: 4, my emphasis).

Reciprocity is in fact of paramount importance as a general concept, a practice and a state of mind. Despite minute nuances in its definition, the importance of reciprocity is acknowledged almost worldwide in the sense that it constitutes the basis of civilization. For example, in ancient China, “[r]eciprocity is the basis for all human relations in the Confucian social order” (Schultz 1974: 144). In the following citation from the French scholar Serge-Christophe Kolm (2006: 376) we get a better view of the importance of reciprocity in the West.

In his *Essay on the Gift* (1924)—one of the most influential founding works of the social science—Marcel Mauss calls reciprocity “one of the human rocks on which societies are built”. L.T. Hobhouse (1906) sees in reciprocity “the vital principle of society”, while, for Richard Thurnwald (1921), “the principle or[f] reciprocity is the basis on which the entire social and *ethical* life of civilizations rests” (my emphasis).

Even Aristotle discussed this. For Aristotle, reciprocity is a form of justice, a form of corrective justice, and correction of a social imbalance (Aristotle 2004:

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17Concerning Venuti’s model more details will be given in the next chapter.

18It will be elaborated at much greater length and depth in Chapter 3, what is discussed for now is therefore preliminary.
Reciprocity is also important in our daily encounters with others. It is acknowledged that “otherness is not a given: it is constituted by our dealings with each other, and is therefore bound up with identity and reciprocity. Human interaction involves identity as well as difference” (Eagleton 2009: 237, my emphasis). Moreover, philosophically and ethically, according to French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, the most profound ethical request is that of reciprocity (1999: 46, my emphasis). In sum, ethically, reciprocity both as a practice and a concept figures prominently both in the West and in the East.

Insofar as translation is concerned, it can thus be reasonably argued that the activity of translation is or can be a reciprocal one. For it not only engenders an intertextual, interlingual and intercultural relationship between the static ST and TT, but also involves dynamic pairs of parties that may be benefited or harmed either unidirectionally or mutually. Therefore reciprocity may well be an easily accessible approach to the complex ethical issues in translation and interpreting because it can help us see in brighter light what may constitute benefits/good and harm/evil in and of translation. And an ethics of reciprocity in translation can be hopefully built as a more comprehensive, nuanced, and powerful alternative to the existing models of ethics.

Attention to reciprocity in translation is not scarce. Many theorists, translators and TS scholars, from Walter Benjamin through George Steiner and Wolfgang Iser to Bonnie S. MacDougall, have entertained it one way or another although with varied focus or purpose (see, for example, Iser 1994; Benjamin 1923; Steiner [1975]1998; Brisset 2003, 2010, 2011; and MacDougall 2012). As Annie Brisset points out, “for Iser, linguistically and translationally, reciprocity is inherent in the operation of translation, which puts two alterities into contact” (Brisset 2003:125, my emphasis; see also Iser 1994: 5-13). However, such attention to reciprocity in translation is not altogether ethics-oriented. It is Annie Brisset (2003: 127) who explicitly proposed applying “ethics of reciprocity” to translation but her notion of it is confused with politics. Her notion is like this:

\[\text{It is Andrew Chesterman who pointed out to me during 2011 CETRA, Belgium that, Benjamin and Steiner discussed reciprocity. Goodwin (2010) argues that Steiner’s hermeneutical model of translation contains an ethics of translation, but I will argue in Chapter 4 that my notion of reciprocity is different from Steiner’s. Benjamin’s and MacDougall’s notion of reciprocity in translation will also be discussed at length in Chapter 4 for the formulation of the model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’}.\]
From both her field work for UNESCO in the former Soviet republics of the Transcaucasus region and her study of “World Translation Flows” for the UNESCO world report on cultural diversity, Brisset found “some 90% of all recorded translations in the world are done from about 15 European languages”. It is to address this huge imbalance that she proposed to apply an “ethics of reciprocity” in translation. In practice, what Brisset means is that, literary masterpieces and major social science works of the West should be translated into minor languages, and meanwhile, “the literature and knowledge of many developing nations” (2003: 127) should be translated into the major languages of the West as well. She stresses that “the ethics of reciprocity in translation” is “a concept to be understood within the framework of globalization” and it would be part of specific translation programmes and policies. For her, “the ethics of reciprocity”, contrary to Venuti’s “ethics of difference”, which works on the level of the individual translator, would rather work on an institutional, i.e. national or international level. Moreover, for her, the two are in fact complementary to each other, rather than mutually exclusive (personal email communication: July 2011, my emphasis).

In the strict sense of ethics, however, Brisset’s argument is more of “politics” than “ethics” for what she advocates is beyond the terrain of ethics into the arena of politics. As can be seen, her notion of “ethics of reciprocity” places emphasis on translation flows and the operational level on the institution, in her terms, national and international. The institutional level is approaching the political level since she stresses that applying her “ethics of reciprocity” entails specific programmes and policies. Indeed, she did mention that the translation imbalance “calls for ‘a politics FOR translation’” (ibid, her capitals). Although it is inherently hard to split ethics from politics and it is also believed that “[…] ethics without politics is empty” (Critchley 2007: 120), the two cannot be the same because politics, according to Iris

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20 In an insightful collection of essays, *Translation Translation*, edited by Susan Petrilli in 2003, Brisset published “Alterity in Translation: An Overview of Theories and Practices”, where she proposes applying an ethics of reciprocity “defined by Levi-Stauss, Ricoeur and especially Levinas”, which, “[i]n the field of translation, would contribute greatly to preserving and promoting the languages and cultures of the world” (2003: 127). However, after some in-depth reading of the mentioned thinkers, especially Levinas, what is found is that there is no clearly given definition of “ethics of reciprocity” at all. Instead, in the case of Levinas who is given the most stress, “reciprocity is excluded from Levinas’s conceptual framework” in the first place (Tatransky 2008:293). For further clarification I emailed to Brisset as suggested and encouraged by the late professor Martha Cheung. From what Brisset replied to me together with what she has written in her essay, a picture of what she means by “ethics of reciprocity” is formed here.

21 Meylaerts (2011) gives a thorough review of translation policy, the political dimension of which is explicitly discussed.
M. Young, concerns all aspects of institutional organization, public action, social practices and habits (1990: 8, my emphasis). In other words, politics “is the realm of the decision, of the organization and administration of the public realm, of the institution of law and policy” (Critchley 1999: 275). As such, Brisset’s proposal is more political than ethical.

Irrespective of the politicised dimension in her notion, Brisset’s “ethics of reciprocity in translation” does raise an important issue for translation and ethics studies. In both translation and ethics, reciprocity is of paramount importance, especially in terms of benefits and harm. Closely related to this basic premise is a whole series of other issues that has not been raised, let alone solved. One may ask, for example, as such an important concept, can the “ethics of reciprocity in translation” mean more than what Brisset has touched on? Can it be redefined to cope with problems that the existing models or approaches cannot in terms of benefits and harm? What key parameters are needed for it to work effectively?

The ethics of reciprocity as a crucial issue concerning translation therefore is worthy of an in-depth, systematic scholarly exploration, a task I have now embarked on.

1.3 Research questions and research scope

1.3.1 Research questions

By definition, translation ethics as conceived in this way is concerned with: (1) the relationship between ST and TT, a relationship that ensures a translational relation and will irreducibly affect the parties concerned, i.e. author, translator, reader, commissioner, etc.; (2) the relationship between people and text, for example, the relationship between the translator, or the reader, etc. and the TT; (3) the interpersonal relationship, i.e. that between translator and author, translator and reader, etc.; (4) the translator’s subjectivity, agency and responsibility, including his/her “complex local and global allegiance” (Inghilleri 2012: 124); and (5) the code of conduct in regard to professional, as well as non-professional/amateur, translators. When a certain party, whether professional or amateur, whether collective or individual, decides to or not to take up a translating job, they are involved in an ethical relationship because their decision to act or not act and the
result thereof will exert impact on the parties pertaining to the translation project, including themselves. The translator’s task, in addition to being an interlingual and intercultural one, is basically an inescapably ethical task, as Bermann (2005: 6) has also stated.

Given these factors and the problems regarding translation ethics discussed in the previous sections, this study seeks to address the following research questions:

1. Is translation ethics principle-oriented concerning translation, the act; consequence-oriented concerning translation, the product; or virtue-oriented concerning translator, the agent; or is it all of them?

2. What are the major parameters constituting an ethics of reciprocity in translation in terms of benefits and harm to the parties concerned regarding a translation project?

3. How does the ethics of reciprocity operate in translation projects? How does it solve, or not solve, problems related to translational ethics? What implications it may have with regard to TS research at large?

In answering these questions, a model of the ethics of reciprocity in translation will be formulated with three components, i.e. a principle/deontic ethics concerning translating practice, a virtue ethics concerning translatorial behaviour and the behaviour of other translating agents, and a consequentialist ethics concerning the effects of the product of translation. Retrospectively, it is a model that can be used to describe and judge translation the product and the agents involved, and prospectively, it may work as a principle for action and a virtue on the part of the agents. The model will be based on the following hypothesis.

In general, any relationship involved in a translation project is reciprocal, be it between texts, languages and cultures, or between individuals, collectivities and nations. When there are benefits, they are reciprocal, and when there is harm, it is also reciprocal. This reciprocal relationship is a dynamic relationship, dynamic in the sense that it is not the realisation of concrete ethical principles, but largely the translator’s prioritised decision-making in a context of conflicting values and competing relations. When the ethically reciprocal relationship between the pairs of parties involved in a translation project is maintained, at best, all pairs of parties mutually benefit from the project and from each other and the harm engendered to

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22It is used here in its evaluative rather than descriptive sense because reciprocity can be negative, i.e. returning evil in kind, and such an act itself by definition is not ethical at all.
any party during the course of translation is minimised or compensated for at the very worst; and when the reciprocal relationship is not maintained, i.e. when only one party benefits and the other(s) suffer(s) one way or another, the translation itself suffers, and a potentially ‘lose-lose’ situation arises, where no party benefits and a retranslation is called for. To maintain this reciprocal relationship, the translator, among other parties, exercises his/her agency to play a pivotal but not sole role in helping realise mutual benefits on the one hand and avoid or minimise harm on the other.

To answer the research questions and test the hypothesis, the study will draw on the Confucian ethics which feature reciprocity in the form of *wulun* 五倫, and on two other Confucian concepts, i.e. *ren* 仁(*shu* 恕 and *zhong* 忠) and *junzi* 君子; on the other hand, it will draw on the ethical notions proposed by Paul Ricoeur. A translator is responsible to the extent that s/he knows when to translate and when not to, when to be faithful to the ST and when not to. To put it in another way, benefits do not necessarily always come from faithful translation in the traditional sense, and harm from unfaithful translation, because in some cases benefits can be produced by refusing to translate or by deliberate misrepresentation on the part of the translator, depending on the kind of text and context of the translation project (See examples in Chapters 4 and 5). Every element, linguistic or cultural, can be employed or manipulated to strengthen or weaken a given ideology, or narrative in Baker’s terms, thereby resulting in benefits or harm to the parties and entities concerned.

### 1.3.2 Research scope

Focused on written translation, this model differs from what Moira Inghilleri has developed for interpreting (2012), in that interpreting, although overlapping with translating in many aspects, is special in terms of face to face encounter and the fact that the linguistic act is done immediately without much time for the interpreter to deliberate for long, and no time either for the interpreter to consult other parties in the field; whereas it is another story in translating, where when in doubt or where there is a problem, the translator can turn to the source text producer, if available, or other experts or anybody who can supply help in any form, especially in an era of digitized globalisation when more and more resources are available for free and
many people are willing to lend a hand with the help of the internet.

Translation in this study refers to what Roman Jakobson describes as “interlingual translation” (2004: 139) in the written form because written interlingual translation figures prominently despite current appeals to enlarge the territory of translation (see Tymoczko 2007) and the macro- and micro-turns of translation studies (Gentzler 2011). Therefore audio-video translation, another important area, will not be covered as it poses such different ethical issues that it constitutes a separate research topic although the intended model may, hopefully, also be applicable to it as well as to the topic of interpreting. In a similar vein, by narrowing the research down to written interlingual translation in its strict sense, the study will not address the issue of adaptation, for its inclusion will render the study boundless.\(^\text{23}\)

With the scope sufficiently narrowed to interlingual translation, within written interlingual translation, the model invokes the agents, the process and the final product of translation. The process starts from whether to take up a translating job on the part of the translator where a decision not to undertake a job is also an option. Here the translator equipped with the sense of reciprocity as a deontic virtue is expected to be more apt to make an ethical decision. Once a translator decides to undertake the job, the ethical relation starts because s/he will interact with other parties concerned, and his/her discursive choices will in turn generate consequences with effects on the parties and entities concerned. In this process reciprocity as a principle comes into play. For instance, in terms of the translating process, a translator will not translate in such a way that his/her translation will give rise to a false perception by the target audience of the source culture represented in the ST, other things like power and ideology considered (see, for example, Baker 2011: 289). Otherwise the source language community will suffer from a misunderstanding or misrepresentation incurred in the target language, and then in the long run, the translator may suffer from an undermined reputation or symbolic capital. As for translation as product, which concerns the use and effect of the translation, reciprocity is of vital importance too because a translation should not be employed just for the benefit of the source or the target side when higher values like national interests are not a priority.

\(^{23}\)Though the demarcation between translation and adaptation is not clear-cut, the discussion of adaptation by John Milton (2010: 3-6) will be taken as the benchmark, see also Bastin (2009).
In the light of the harm and benefits engendered in and by translation, the categories affected are classifiable into two types: passive and active. The first category includes text\textsuperscript{24}, language and culture\textsuperscript{25}, whilst the second includes individual persons, groups of people, and nations or ethnicities, with matching correspondences between the pairs involved. For example, revolving around a “text”, there are such individual persons like the author, the translator, the reader, the client/commissioner/publisher; around ‘language”, there are the people represented in the source and target texts; concerning “culture”, there are the donating culture and receiving culture of respective nations, etc. The following sketch illustrates these relations and matching correspondences:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Text} & \text{Language} & \text{Culture} \\
\downarrow & \downarrow & \downarrow \\
\text{Individuals} & \text{Collectivities} & \text{Nations}
\end{array}
\]

Of course, such factors will not appear in all translation projects simultaneously. Their occurrence depends on the text type and the translation values. For example, in the translation of an instruction manual, the factor of “culture” will not be as salient as that in the translation of an advertisement. Moreover, the parties affected also weigh differently in changed situations and contexts. For instance, the translation of the annual report of a listed company will affect chiefly the stakeholders or those who wish to invest in the company in question, whilst the translation of a literary masterpiece will affect a much larger population both from the originating culture and the receiving culture, for such translations will construct cultural images and affect the target reader’s perception of the donating culture.

In this ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ model, benefits and harm can both be trivial and substantial, immediate and lasting, visible and invisible. To see the benefits and harm clearly incurred by and of a specific translation project, they must

\textsuperscript{24}Here text is defined as any piece of writing in its common sense rather than the one designated by Derrida (1986). More details will be available in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{25}Different from Homi Bhabha’s definition of “culture” (Bhabha 1994), constitutive of and constituted by translation, it is used here in the traditional sense, dynamic but relatively recognisable for a period of time by the people embedded within and those beyond. In fact, as “an extremely complex concept and an enormously subject” (Tan & Shao 2007: 206), culture witnessed its 165th definition by the American anthropologists Alfred Louis Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn (1963: 66), but here I will follow Tan Zaixi and Shao Lu’s definition: “a system of values associated with specific human groups which consists of their ideology, socio-politics, and customs and habits, in addition to the language they speak” (2007: 206).
be contextualised because any translation project is inevitably situated in a spatiotemporal context.

At the same time, in spite of us being in a postmodern era of poststructuralist thinking, my ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ will be, by definition, of a general nature because that is a property indispensable to normative ethics. This model of ‘the ethics of reciprocity in translation’ concerns consequentialism when it comes to the consequence of the translating act. It involves deontology and virtue ethics as well when the translating agents, especially the translators, are concerned. When the ethics of reciprocity is applied in specific contexts, it will be manifested in different forms in the same way as law, seemingly abstract in and of itself, can be applied to different specific contexts by law practitioners.

So, for ‘the ethics of reciprocity in translation’ to function as a guiding and evaluation model, its validity and possibilities will be tested on real translation projects (Discussions in this connection will follow in Chapter 5).

### 1.4 Methodological considerations

#### 1.4.1 Integrated interdisciplinary work

With TS being interdisciplinary, the ethics of translation will naturally not just draw on the discipline of ethics, nor just the discipline of translation studies. In addition to these two fields, adjacent disciplines to TS, such as philosophy, sociology, literary theory, will be utilised whenever necessary in the course of the research. The developing model will, based on an integration of different approaches to normative ethics in the West, chiefly Kantian deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics, draw on Ricoeurian and Confucian ethics as the main theoretical framework. The research is also integrated because the model is aimed to cover the translation of not just one genre, but different text types, from the highly personal literary works to the extremely impersonal scientific and technological ones.

#### 1.4.2 Cross-cultural perspective

Taking just one single angle or perspective to look at the complex issues of ethics in translation is clearly insufficient because in doing so other equally important factors will be neglected or overlooked. In translation and TS, like in other fields, “ethics
has become a cross-cultural concern” (Pym 2001: 130). As a result, an East-integrating-West cross-cultural approach will help bring about deeper insights. Hence, this “East”-integrating-“West” approach will constitute my principal method of study by which to carry out this research. Adopting this integrated cross-cultural approach, I have the following considerations to reckon with:

Translation often, if not always, involves linguistic and cultural inequalities and asymmetries of power among the parties or cultures concerned. Because of these inequalities and asymmetries, the weaker sides are prone to be harmed or deprived of their otherwise deserved benefits. It is precisely here that traditional Chinese ethics, i.e. Confucian ethics of reciprocity 儒家互惠倫理, will be of use as it is able to provide the basis of human relations in the Confucian social order, where a relation of inequality is often prevalent, (e.g. the relation between father and son, between the ruler and the ruled, etc.), but reciprocity is maintained and mutual respect prevails. For this, traditional Confucian ethics will be employed to cooperate with the modern idea of ethics from the West. For, as Brisset (2010: 78) has observed based on Liu’s argument, “[i]n a reciprocal way, there has been a recognition of the need to move away from a tendency to borrow models made in the west and superimpose them on to one’s own history, traditions and practices (Liu 2008)”. Therefore, I will not only draw on modern Western thought on ethics, in particular, Paul Ricoeur’s ideas of reciprocity, but also the long traditional Chinese ethical practice, especially Confucian role-related ethics, consisting of “shuzhong 恕忠”, “wulun 五倫”, and “junzi 君子”, among other influential ideas (ref. section 1.3.1). So, the ethical issues in translation arising from inequalities and asymmetries can be sufficiently addressed.

As a matter of fact, when Tymoczko argues for “empowering translators” by saying that “[…] thinking about responsibilities to self, family, community, nation, and the world open up wider and wider ethical issues for translators” (2007: 318, my emphasis), she is possibly unaware that she is reminding Chinese readers of the so familiar to them Confucian role ethics, especially the idea conveyed in the Confucian classic The Daxue 大學 [The Great Learning], which has been promoted by Confucius’ followers and practised by ordinary Chinese people for over two thousand years. It means, one plays positive roles in one’s capacity, for example, as a father, a son, a teacher, or an official in relation to other people.
whether in one’s own family or in society. In such capacities, by self-cultivating, one can run the family, govern the state and even bring peace to the world/tianxia (see Ames 2011: 159-206, and Translator Figure 3 in section 4.3.1.1). Equipped with such awareness, translators and other agents may give more prominence to larger missions in their ethical choices and decisions towards a higher-level reciprocity.

1.4.3 Case studies

To illustrate and test how this model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ works and how meaningful such a proposition can be to the field of translation, case analyses will be made with regard to three different kinds of situations: cases of reciprocity, cases of non-reciprocity, and cases where reciprocity is not relevant. Although ethics is concerned first and foremost with people, the situation is somewhat different in translation. Regarding translation, apart from people, texts are also indispensable and taken as the static starting point for any translation project. As such, for each case, three examples will be employed from the most personal and complicated literary texts to the impersonal informative, objective scientific texts. Meanwhile, in the case studies, textual, paratextual and contextual analyses will be made concerning the relevant translation projects.

1.4.4 Epistemology and my stance

Fully aware that no theory is tailor-made and ready to serve in all situations and contexts, Ricoeur’s theoretical ideas and Confucian ethics of reciprocity as the methodological framework for my research, like any other theoretical apparatus, will therefore be reflected over and adjusted. In the process of doing this, Maria Tymoczko’s observation is a useful reminder: “[i]n conducting research, […], it is essential to adopt a habit of mind in which there is continual interrogation of the data and self-reflexive scrutiny of one's own interventions, suppositions, interpretations, and theoretical commitments” (Tymoczko 2007: 163). As such, self-reflection is exercised throughout the study.

Also, another issue is important to consider. Partly because of the influence of

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26Cf. Koskinen’s three kinds of visibility: textual visibility (translator’s hidden/covert voice), paratextual visibility (translator’s overt voice), and extratextual visibility (the voice of those other than translator’s on the status of translation, like review of translation on newspaper) (2000: 99-100).
postmodernism, especially deconstructionist views and post-Nietzschean as well as Foucauldian notions of knowledge, some scholars in the field have increasingly argued that knowledge of the humanities is of local and mediated nature (see Tymoczko 2007: 18-24; Cheung 2012: 156). My position and perspective on translation ethics are in many ways local too, but this does not mean relativism, especially in the case of ethics. The study of translation ethics, like any other academic endeavour, is to seek truth. It is my hope that the findings from this current research can have “the potential” to be made general “as long as it can be proven” (Tymoczko 2007: 4; cf. also Chesterman 2013: 2).

1.5 Structure of the dissertation

Besides this introduction, i.e. Chapter 1, this dissertation comprises another four major chapters, followed by the conclusion in the last chapter, Chapter 6.

Chapter 2 first provides a broad discussion of the concept of ethics to pave the way for developing the concept of ethics for translation, or translation ethics, addressing such key issues as principal normative ethical theories, i.e. consequentialism, Kantian deontic ethics and virtue ethics; the distinction between morality and ethics, between ethical universalism and relativism, and ethical situationism. It then examines the concept of translation as agent, as process and as product. In this examination, focus is placed on the translator’s agency, his/her responsibility and his/her pivotal role, as well as the problems of translation as a profession. Based on the understanding of these various issues, i.e. ethics and translation, including translators and the so-called profession, the chapter proceeds with a critical review of the major models and views of translation ethics in the West and China, and ends with my defining translation ethics as an answer to the first research question: ethics in translation in general.

The following two chapters, 3 and 4, are the core of the thesis. Chapter 3 deals with the key concept for this study, which is the ‘ethics of reciprocity’, and the theoretical foundation of the research: Recoeurian ethics of reciprocity and Confucian ethics of reciprocity. In the first section, reciprocity in various fields and disciplines such as etymology, philosophy, anthropology, sociology, and economics

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27Relativism in ethics will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 2.
is studied, and then as a norm, value and virtue examined respectively. The second section addresses Ricoeurian ethics of reciprocity. The third section discusses Confucian ethics of reciprocity. Finally, the chapter concludes in section four by reciprocally joining the two (the second and third section) to prepare working towards the model proposed in this research for Chapter 4.

Then Chapter 4, the formulation of the model, is made up of three sections. The first section discusses the existing views of reciprocity in translation between texts, languages, persons, cultures and nations. Section two then deals with the reciprocity-oriented three relations concerning a translation project, arguing that the interpersonal/intercultural relation outweighs the person-textual relation, which further counts more than the intertextual relation. In this connection, the three key passive entities of text, language and culture, and the three major active parties of individual persons, groups of people and nations are examined so as to pave the way for the formulation of the model. What follows is the third section, in which the model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ is built in three subsections. Being single-translation-project-based, it is a dynamic, integrated and multi-layered model to allow any translator to exercise his/her agency to minimise harm and maximise mutual benefits to the key passive entities and major active parties via the alternatives of not-translating, ‘equivalent’ translation or manipulated translation. The two chapters are arranged so that they address the second and focal research question: the ethics of reciprocity in translation.

As an integral part of the thesis, Chapter 5 studies specific cases, aimed at answering the third research question: how the ethics of reciprocity operates in translation projects. In other words, it looks into the possibilities as well as the limitations of the model. The illustrative examples are grouped into three sets of cases: cases of reciprocity, cases of non-reciprocity, and cases where reciprocity is not relevant. For each category, three examples are given, covering respectively a literary, a scientific or non-literary text, and a text that is neither distinctly literary nor scientific, but somewhere in between, termed semi-literary text.

Lastly, Chapter 6 provides the findings and conclusion of this study, followed by a brief summary of the constraints and limitations that the study has encountered and a look ahead at some of the possible areas where continued work could be undertaken (technology and translation ethics, etc.).
Chapter 2 ETHICS, TRANSLATION AND TRANSLATION ETHICS

As introduced in Chapter 1, there are immense problems regarding translation ethics. Not only are there disagreements about how to define the field of translation ethics (Pym 2001: 130) and no “clear understanding” of “what an ‘ethical’ approach actually means” (Inghilleri 2009:100), there is also the problem of terminology: ‘ethics’ as the key concept is taken for granted. The definition of translation ethics is either absent or simplistic (Wang Dazhi 2009: 61, 2012: 15; Xu Hong 2012: 37-52). As an integral part of this study and a prerequisite for the formulation of the model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’, my first research question, i.e. ‘what is translation ethics’ in general, aims at addressing whether ethics is principle-oriented concerning translation, the act, consequence-oriented concerning translation, the product, or virtue-oriented concerning translator, the agent/character, or all of them. To answer this question, we will first discuss the basic concept of ethics. Then we will provide a close deliberation of translation the concept, the practice, the agent, and the profession. After that, we will conduct a critical examination of the major models or views of translation ethics in the West and in China.

2.1 Ethics for this study

Vast as a field, ethics qua ethics is beyond the compass of this study. What follows is therefore only a discussion of some of its basic aspects regarding its definition and typology in general, coupled with my reflections on some of its crucial issues and a description of my approach to it for the present study.

2.1.1 Definition and typology of ethics

I begin with the definition of the concept of ethics by looking at established dictionaries. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2012 online version, hereafter OED, my emphasis), ethics in the plural form has the following senses among others: “2a. (after Greek τὰ ἠθικά). The science of morals; the department of study concerned with the principles of human duty. 3a. The moral principles or
system of a particular leader or school of thought. 3b. The moral principles by which a person is guided. 3c. The rules of conduct recognised in certain associations or departments of human life”.

In *Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary* (11th edition, hereafter *WCD*, my emphasis), ethic as a noun means: “1 pl: the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with moral duty and obligation 2a: a set of moral principles: a theory or system of moral values<the present-day materialistic ~><an old-fashioned work ~><Christian ~s>2b pl: the principles of conduct governing an individual or a group <professional ~s>2c: a guiding philosophy 2d: a consciousness of moral importance <forge a conservation ~>. 3pl: a set of moral issues or aspects (as rightness) <debated the ~s of human cloning>”. Ethic as an adjective, “also spelt as ethical, is etymologically from Greek word ἕθος, meaning custom or character”. In *WCD*, it has the following senses: “1: of or relating to ethics <-theories>2: involving or expressing moral approval or disapproval <- judgements>3: conforming to accepted standards of conduct <- behavior>.”

From the above definitions, it can be understood that ‘ethical’ or ‘ethic’ denotes three things: first, it is of or relating to ethics the discipline; second, it is used to describe something that can be evaluated from the perspective of ethics, i.e. moral approval or disapproval; third, it denotes its evaluative usage, a term used to judge whether some act or behavior is moral or not. Meanwhile, likewise, ethics first denotes the academic discipline that is the science of morals, dealing with the principles of human duty and what is good and bad. Apart from the academic discipline, the concept can also designate FOUR other things: first, a set of moral principles or moral values; second, the principle of conduct governing an individual or a group; third, a consciousness of moral importance; and fourth, a set of moral issues or aspects. All four senses presuppose certain agents involved, i.e. a certain party exercising agency and/or being affected in each sense. In all those senses, the core is ‘moral’. Ethics as a discipline therefore is also called moral philosophy (Mackinnon 2012: 2).

As a related term, it may help to look at the meanings of the word ‘moral’. “‘Moral’ is etymologically from Latin moralis which is from mor-, mos, meaning custom”. It has the following senses: “1a: of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior=ethical <- judgements>1b: expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior<a ~ poem>1c: conforming to a standard of right behavior1d:
sanctioned by or operative on one’s conscience or ethical judgement <a ~ obligation>1e: capable of right and wrong action<a ~ agent>”’. ‘Morality’ is then defined as: “1a: a moral discourse, statement, or lesson 1b: a literary or other imaginative work teaching a moral lesson 2a: a doctrine or system of moral conduct 2b pl: particular moral principles or rules of conduct 3: conformity to ideals of right human conduct 4: moral conduct; virtue” (WCD, my emphasis). ‘Virtue’, an important aspect of ethics is mentioned here near the end of the entry of ‘moral’, without elaboration at length.

From the above definitions in these two dictionaries, it can be seen that ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ can mean the same thing in the sense that they are both “of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior”28. Ethics and morality in this sense can be used interchangeably. One apparent difference is that ethics can denote the academic discipline while morality does not. So in most cases because of this, TS scholars choose to use ‘ethics’ or ‘ethical’ instead of ‘morality’ or ‘moral’ when dealing with the ethical or moral issues in translation.

As an academic discipline, ethics is defined in the Encyclopedia Britannica (EB) as: “ethics, also called moral philosophy, the discipline concerned with what is morally good and bad, right and wrong. The term is also applied to any system or theory of moral values or principles” (Singer 2012, my emphasis). In this definition, the terms ‘moral’ and ‘morally’ are taken for granted.

In Ci Hai 辭海 [Word Sea], the largest and most comprehensive dictionary in Chinese, ethics as a discipline is defined as “a field of study that studies moral phenomena to reveal the essence and evolving patterns thereof, answering the questions of ‘ought to’ on the part of an individual and a society” (Xia and Chen 2011: 2898, trans, my emphasis). In this definition, the dimension of society, in addition to individuals, is included.

In regard to typology, ethics commands various taxonomies. In Ci Hai, ethics is first classified into two levels: theoretical and applied; and three types, according to research object and methodology, i.e.: metaethics, descriptive ethics, and prescriptive or normative ethics. By different evaluating principles, ethics is divided into virtue, deontic and utilitarian ethics (Xia and Chen 2011: 2898, my emphasis),

28It seems that a circular interpretation is unavoidable here as what is “right” and “wrong” constitutes a major issue in ethics per se metaethically (e.g. Mackie 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong), and therefore it is not unequivocal but mostly controversial. My stance on this is given at the end of the section.
which are generally understood to refer to the major approaches to ethics as practice.

When it comes to specific philosophers or moral theorists, such taxonomies vary even further. To Peter Singer, a contemporary Australian moral philosopher, there are only two types of ethics: metaethics and normative ethics, with applied ethics falling into the latter (Singer 1994: 10, 13, my emphasis). In Singer’s view, meta-ethics, concerning the nature of ethics, “asking questions about ethics” (Singer 1994: 10, original emphasis), is the sub-discipline that chiefly expounds the reliability and verifiability of the concepts and propositions employed in the field of ethics. In contrast to meta-ethics, normative ethics constitutes the main body of ethics as it deals with the most basic principles or rules of human behaviour. Normative ethics “seeks to influence our actions” (ibid). For Noel Stewart, a contemporary British ethics scholar, there are three areas in ethics, viz. normative ethics, practical ethics, and metaethics. Under normative ethics are utilitarianism, deontological theories, and virtue ethics (Stewart 2009, my italics).

He Huaihong, as mentioned in Chapter 1, groups ethics into two major branches: normative ethics and non-normative ethics, the former consisting of general normative ethics and applied ethics while the latter composed of descriptive ethics and meta-ethics (He 2008: 47, my emphasis). For He, like Singer, normative ethics is the main body of ethics, boiling down to two major schools: deontological theories like Kantian ethics and teleological theories including utilitarianism and perfectionism (aka virtue ethics) (ibid: 78ff). Since teleology approaches ethics from the perspective of the consequences of acts, another term, ‘consequentialism’ has been increasingly used instead of teleology in the field of ethics, for clarity purposes (ibid: 78). For Wang Haiming, ethics has three basic areas, i.e. metaethics, normative ethics, and virtue ethics (Wang 2004: 17, my emphasis). Wang’s approach gives virtue ethics a higher position parallel with metaethics and normative ethics rather than placing it under normative ethics as Stewart does. Evidently, in the field of ethics, there is no definitive agreement about its definition and taxonomy. What seems to be the consensus among the various approaches is that normative ethics is regarded as the core.

Under normative ethics, there have traditionally been three fundamental and influential approaches in the West: utilitarianism, typically represented by John
Stuart Mill (1806-1873)\textsuperscript{29} ; deontological theories, with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)\textsuperscript{30} being the foremost apologist; and virtue ethics, represented by Aristotle (384-322BCE)\textsuperscript{31} in ancient Greece and Alasdair McIntyre (1929- )\textsuperscript{32} today. Respectively they all have developed important ethical ideas. For deontology and utilitarianism, Michael Boylan’s explanation is succinct:

Deontology is a moral theory that emphasizes one’s \textit{duty} to do a particular action just because the action, itself, is inherently \textit{right} and not through any other sorts of calculations—such as the consequences of the action. Because of this non-consequentialist bent, deontology is often contrasted with utilitarianism that defines the right action in terms of its ability to bring about the \textit{greatest aggregate utility}. In contradistinction to utilitarianism, deontology will recommend an action based upon \textit{principle} (Boylan 2009: 171, my emphasis).

While both are “rule-governed, action-centred systems of ethics” (Stewart 2009: 54), deontology is duty-based and concentrates on the “\textit{nature of the action itself} as well as its \textit{motive} in order to determine whether it is right or wrong (ibid: 35, original emphasis) and “[u]tilitarianism is \textit{consequentialist}, or in other words, forward-looking. It looks to the effects or consequences of actions in order to assess them” (Blackburn 2001: 86-87, original emphasis). Both are centred on \textit{actions}.

Different from deontology and utilitarianism, virtue ethics emphasizes the \textit{agent} or \textit{character}. Boylan’s succinct summary, with slight modification, is highly clear: “Virtue ethics is also sometimes called \textit{agent}-based or \textit{character} ethics. It takes the viewpoint that […one] should try to cultivate \textit{excellence} in all that [one] do[es] and all that others do” (Boylan 2009: 133, my emphasis).

Each of the three, of course, has its respective strengths and weaknesses. Utilitarianism is simple and clear (He 2008: 89) but is often criticised for overlooking \textit{justice} and \textit{rights} (Furrow 2005: 46, my italics). In other words, it might be abused in the sense that any means will justify the “right ends”, and the “ends” here might be interpreted freely by the party who has the right to make the interpretation (He 2008: 83). Meanwhile, Kantian deontology is criticised for its rigidity and high demand as Terry Eagleton, for instance, argues:

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{29}Mill’s key ethical work is \textit{Utilitarianism} (1863); see Mill, John Stuart (2002) \textit{Utilitarianism and On Liberty}; Oxford: Blackwell.  
\textsuperscript{30}Kant’s major ethical work is \textit{Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals} (1783); see Kant, Immanuel (2003) \textit{Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals}, ed. Thomas E. Hill, Jr. and Arnulf Zweig, Oxford: OUP.  
\textsuperscript{31}Aristotle’s most influential ethical text is his \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} (see Aristotle 2004).  
\textsuperscript{32}McIntyre’s key virtue ethics works are \textit{After Virtue} (1981) and \textit{Whose Justice Which Rationality?} (1988).}
Kantian ethics is modelled on the superego, whereas virtue ethics is not; and though this does not of course free us of this disagreeable power, it remains true that virtue ethics recommends a mode of human conduct which at least does not reinforce it. With virtue ethics, we are in a world of contexts rather than sibylline commands, social institutions rather than transcendent states of being. (Eagleton 2009: 302)

Eagleton, a Marxist literary theorist, apparently advocates virtue ethics over Kantian ethics. Stewart also takes virtue ethics as the most “adequate” theory among the three (2009: 8). In his view, virtue ethics is “holistic” whereas the other two are “atomistic”. With a checklist below Stewart illustrates the differences between virtue ethics and the other two (ibid: 54, original emphasis):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtue ethics</th>
<th>versus</th>
<th>The utilitarians and deontologists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Agent centred</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>1 Action centred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Being</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>2 Doing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Virtues</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>3 Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Community</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>4 Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Life as a whole</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>5 Moment to moment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Agent benefits</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>6 Agent’s benefit irrelevant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The holistic feature of virtue ethics is also reflected in Gong Qun’s statement: “the concept of virtue embodies the unification of the ethical subject’s subjectivity, autonomy, and heteronomy” (Gong 2010: 284, trans). Virtue ethics also allows the agent’s emotion and motivation to work in ethical decision-making, while the former is denied in Kantian ethics and the latter in utilitarianism. Spence and Van Heerkeren have, quite rightly, made this observation: “[i]t is because of the importance of motivation in ethical decision-making and action that the virtues of character […] play a crucial role in enabling individuals to act ethically even under difficult and challenging circumstances” (Spence and Van Heerkeren 2005: 4, my emphasis). Another more important reason why virtue ethics returns to the fore is, as McIntyre claims, “[t]here is however another crucial link between the virtues and law, for knowing how to apply the law is itself possible only for someone who possesses the virtue of justice” (McIntyre 2007: 152). Yet no doubt virtue ethics alone cannot do the entire job. True, “virtue ethics must be an essential part of any adequate moral theory, but cannot be the whole of such a theory. […] if a virtue

33Virtue ethics in the West has a long history since Aristotle but gave way to deontology and utilitarianism in the past couple of centuries. In the last century some moral philosophers were unsatisfied with the incommensurability of various ethical schools, hence have since tried to revive virtue ethics. Among those are typical ones like E. Anscombe and A. McIntyre (see Stewart 2009: 54).
ethics is not supplemented by some universal principles, like the Ends Principle, it is threatened by relativism or ethnocentrism, since tables of virtues may differ from society to society and era to era, as MacIntyre’s own works show” (Kane 1994: 222-3, n14, my emphasis).

In fact, “[w]hen we evaluate an action, we can focus on various dimensions of the action. We can evaluate the person who is acting, the intension or motive of the person acting, the nature of the act itself, or the consequences” (Furrow 2005: 44, my emphasis). Thus, a comprehensive workable definition of ethics can be borrowed here: “Ethics can simply be defined as a set of prescriptive rules, principles, values, and virtues of character that inform and guide interpersonal and intrapersonal conduct: that is, the conduct of people toward each other and the conduct of people toward themselves” (Spence and Van Heekeren 2005: 2, my emphasis). In this definition, Spencer and Heekeren give prominence to the normative aspect of ethics by the term “prescriptive”, which aptly captures the essence of ethics.

Still, what has just been discussed so far is chiefly from the view of ethics as a discipline in the West. Insofar as Confucian ethics is concerned, it does not fit into such a classification very well, although some moral philosophers regard Confucian ethics as virtue ethics (e.g. He 2008: 90, Gong 2010: 359, Luper 2002: 83ff). However, others see it as deontological ethics (Li Minghui 2012: 116). I follow Liu Yuli’s argument that “Confucian ethics is neither normative ethics, nor virtue ethics, but the combination of both” (Liu 2011: 7, trans). This combination gives it the superseding power over the three Western fundamental normative theories for Confucian ethics is more comprehensive in the sense that it contains all such key parameters of ethics: principles, values, and virtues. As such, it will be employed by the present study to serve as the main theoretical framework. A detailed expounding of Confucian ethics will be made in the next chapter.

2.1.2 Some key issues with respect to ethics

To begin with, regarding ethics, some crucial issues merit attention. The first
concerns the two concepts of ethics and morality and their relationship. As discussed in the previous section, they originally share meaning. It is Hegel (1991) who first makes a distinction between them in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. For Hegel, ‘ethics’ is higher than ‘morality’, and ‘morality’ is subjective whereas ‘ethics’ is the unification of the abstract objective will and the equally abstract but personal subjective will in the concept. The British philosopher Bernard Williams continues this distinction (1993: 6, 104): ‘ethical’ is used as the broad term and ‘moral’ or ‘morality’ for the narrower system. According to Fan Hao, morality, in the West, is based on individual liberty while ethics involves interaction, the two thus being in conflict all the time: in terms of philosophical manifestations, there is the conflict between virtue theory and justice theory; in moral life, the conflict between one’s moral liberty and ethical identity, and in the life-world, the conflict between eudemonism and deontology (Fan 2011: 10). Further, morality features subjectivity and particularity while ethics objectivity and universality (ibid: 13). Put otherwise, ethics is used more to refer to the public rules and principles, whereas morality refers to the personal embodiment of such rules and principles and one’s autonomous agency to choose to internalise such rules and principles. In Confucian ethics, however, there is no such distinction, as any agent is always social and his subjectivity is established in relations (Fan 2011: 10; see also Gong 2010: 375-81).

This distinction between ethics and morality will lead to the distinction between social and personal ethics (Shaw 1993/2014) or the distinction between the personal religious ethics and social public ethics (Li Zehou 2010). According to William H. Shaw, questions of personal ethics are concerned with “personal values and individual moral choices” while questions of social ethics deal with “the assessment of social norms, public policy, and the institutional rules of morality” (Shaw 2014: vii, my emphasis). I think personal or religious ethics is strictly speaking not ethics but best understood as personal belief, or ideology or worldview. Such a belief or ideology of course plays a vital role when one interacts with others but they

37 Fan Hao has not given a definition of his concept “the West”, but from his essay it can be inferred that his notion of “the West” refers to the Western society starting from Hellenistic tradition of ethics from Aristotle, developing to Kant and Hegel. Also see note 3 in Chapter 1.

38 The most influential work on justice in the West is the 1971 monograph *A Theory of Justice* by John Rawls, philosophy professor from Harvard University. See also Ricoeur (2007), a book on the just, Ci (2006), a book on the two opposite faces of justice, and Sen (2009), a critique of Rawls’ above work.
themselves are not ethics. In my view, a person in any capacity, be it working as a teacher, translator, doctor, or lawyer, if s/he stays alone, divorced from anything related to his or her job, is not in any ethical relation, thereby ethical issues will not arise at all. Thus, informed by Confucian ethics, I take ethics and morality as interchangeable because ethics is at once subjective and objective, personal and public; principles have to work via the agents, and the agents have to make decisions and judgements according to certain values and principles and virtues.

Closely related to the above question is the second issue: is ethics personal, social or professional? My answer is all three, personal, social and professional at once, depending on the moment when the moral decision is made: when in a role, one is largely expected to be restricted by the morality in the field, i.e. the professional ethics, but beyond the role, one is likely to be affected by or behave on social ethics and personal ethics, and as often as not, it is hard to distinguish between them because it is not easy to discern when one is ‘beyond’ the role. Thus, the term ‘personal ethics’ is problematic. I choose to use personal values instead. The distinction between personal and professional ethics is therefore also doubtful, since “the truth is rather that morality is first and foremost a social institution, performing a social role” (Walsh 1998: 17). We admit, meanwhile, that the decision to be ethical or moral in an act or to be a moral agent all the time is made by the individual at issue.

A reason for some scholars to stress the difference between personal and social or public ethics is the worry about the supremacy of a society over the individual agents. For example, Robert Kane argues: “[t]he fact is that societies in which the distinction between public and private morality entirely collapses are totalitarian—they are societies in which some person’s or some group’s morality is imposed on others and made the public morality. This, in fact, is the essence of totalitarianism, which seeks total control over the actions, minds, and consciences of citizens and amounts to collapsing public and private morality” (Kane 1994: 102, original emphasis). Kane’s worry is justifiable judging from human history, especially that of the 20th century, but, in a way, it reflects a difference between the general Western ethics and the Confucian ethics; in the West, as is known, individual liberty has reigned supreme for a long time while in China a collective turn of mind has prevailed even longer, thus the two in fact may supplement each other in a reciprocal fashion.
The third issue of concern is: Is ethics universal or relative? Is it relative to
temporal, national, cultural, and historical context? As a highly complex question in
ethics per se, it actually has much to do with how ethics is approached. When
approached descriptively, observed outside real situations from a neutral,
third-person standpoint, just as Steven Lukes (2008)\(^39\) clearly points out, there are
truly many different kinds of ethics: Greek ethics, Indian ethics nationally or
culturally speaking, ancient ethics, modern ethics temporally, and religious ethics,
military ethics, bioethics, etc. Seen from this perspective, ethics is relative. But if
approached from a first-person internal standpoint, concerning an act or issue or
character that is to be judged ethically or when a moral decision is to be made, there
is simply just one single ethics for the agent(s) at issue: universal normative ethics
(see also He 2008, Wan 2002). And what is worth stressing is that the relativity of
ethics does not equal to ethical relativism (see Nie Wenjun 2008).

Partly owing to postmodernism\(^40\), partly owing to increasingly acknowledged
cultural differences, relativist thinking seems to have pervaded almost all of the
humanities in the past recent decades. In the field of ethics, ethical relativism, “the
view that there are no universal moral standards, no standards of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’
that apply across all times and cultures” (Driver 2007: 5), constitutes a huge
challenge to the discipline (see Benn 1998: 1-29). But, universality is indispensable
because, as Richard Bernstein argues well, “[e]ven those who celebrate plurality and
difference – like Lyotard and Rorty\(^41\) – make an implicit appeal to universality –
when, for example, they advocate a world in which there is a universal ‘letting be’
where difference is allowed to flourish” (Bernstein 1991: 222, original emphasis).
The harm of ethical relativism thus has been frequently criticised by moral
philosophers\(^42\).

\(^{39}\)Lukes (2008) is a lucid text on ethical relativism. Nie (2011) is an in-depth exploration of the
Western ethical relativism.

\(^{40}\)According to Robinson and Garratt (1999: 172), “[p]ostmodernism may well have destroyed ethical
certainty, but paradoxically it is this destruction that may help us to make moral progress.” In fact,
postmodernism cannot destroy ethical certainty at all but has just revealed the difficulty involved in
making ethical progress.

\(^{41}\)Richard Rorty is a self-claimed ethical relativist, who contrasts relativism with fundamentalism
rather than absolutism, defining fundamentalism as “the belief that ideals must be grounded in
something already real”, and relativism as “denying that claim” (2011: 17,19), but “Rorty’s morality
is a private one, not much concerned with group welfare (Robinson and Garratt 1999: 118).

\(^{42}\)For example, to Blackburn, “once a relativist frame of mind is really in place, nothing – no claims
to truth, authority, certainty, or necessity – will be audible except as one more saying like all the
others” (Blackburn 2001: 26). Moreover, “[r]elativism taken to its limit becomes subjectivism: not
the view that each culture or society has its own truth, but that each individual has his or her own
Lastly, related to the above is another crucial issue: is ethics situational? My answer: It is both yes and no. It is situational in the sense that any event or interaction occurs in its spatiotemporal context with moral significance. It is not in the sense that it must have commonality with other similar events in terms of ethics. Ethics is both general and specific (see also Eagleton 2009: 111). The problem of situational ethics\(^{43}\) has also been exposed by many theorists. Johannesen et al, for instance, aptly assert: “‘[w]hen the matter of ethics’ is reduced to pure situationism, argues John Merrill, ‘it loses all meaning as ethics.’ ‘If every case is different, if every situation demands a different standard, if there are no absolutes in ethics, then we should scrap the whole subject… and simply be satisfied that each person run his life whims or “considerations” which may change from situation to situation’” (Johannesen et al. 2008: 71, my emphasis).

So ethics is not relativist, not situational, but universal, which is an indispensable nature of normative ethics. Yet concerning this universality, misunderstandings often arise, as pointed out by He Huaihong. He (2008: 115) argues that it is wrong to assume that only when a rule of act can be obeyed by everyone can it become an ethical principle. In other words, it is not absolutely necessary for everyone to abide by it before it can claim its universality. Robert Kane likewise claims that “[l]ike absolute truth, absolute value does not require universal consensus” (Kane 1994: 78). The misunderstanding lies in the equalising of “universality of fact” to “universality of principle/argument”. He further points out that a principle thus supplies a criterion against which an agent can make the judgement of right or wrong without falling prey to relativism (2008: 115). The ethical decisions in general work in the following manner: universal principles help establish general rules which in turn lead to specific criteria. He meanwhile makes clear that, because any principles, rules and criteria will not automatically solve any ethical problem, it is in the end the agent in question who draws on his or her reason, wisdom and conscience to make the ethical decision based on an analysis of the concrete situation. Yet this does not mean it is a situational ethics, because he further clarifies that commonality figures in ethical decision in similar situations (He 2008: 119).

\(^{43}\) There are apologists for situation ethics, and Joseph Fletcher’s monograph *Situation Ethics* (1966) is a case in point, where he offers no systemic ethics but “a method of ‘situational’ or ‘contextual’ decision-making” (Fletcher 1966: 11): “calculating love in the objective situation” (ibid: 2).
2.1.3 Ethics for this study: harm and benefits

Now it is clear that the ethics this study aims at is not meta-ethics, nor descriptive ethics, but normative ethics. Regarding normative ethics, Julia Driver’s point is easy to follow. She asserts that, “[m]oral norms primarily concern our interactions with others in ways that have significance to their well-beings” (2007: 1). Specifically, as mentioned in Chapter 1, “if we do something that could harm or benefit someone else, then arguably this is a moral matter. Someone who wrongfully harms another does something that he or she ought not to do in the moral sense of ‘ought.’ It is this sense that is the subject of normative ethics, and it is an understanding of this sense of ‘ought’ that is at the heart of normative ethical theories” (ibid: 1-2, original italics, my bold).

Driver’s approach to normative ethics from the point of view of harm and benefits sets into sharp relief the very essence of ethics. Teleologically speaking, ethics is a discipline about how to promote benefits and obliterate or alleviate harm among human interactions. To study ethics is in fact to find out what constitutes benefits and harm in the interactions (cf. Russell 1967: 167; Wang 2003: 17). Without an appropriate understanding of harm, there is no real understanding of ethics, which constitutes my basic stance towards ethics.

As regards harm, therefore, I contend that there is no substantial difference in any practice, be it business, medicine, translating, advertising or law. The difference lies in the degrees and types of harm to the parties involved. In translation, the parties interact mostly via the medium of text, and the harmful effects are mostly not immediate, but often lasting, sometimes invisible, unlike in other practices or fields. In those other fields, the parties usually interact directly without the intervention of other media, and the effects are, often immediately visible and perceivable, even often one-trip. But in translation, the parties affected are not immediately available, maybe even far away in time and/or space. The parties affected are not limited to the individuals and institutions directly involved only, but also include the larger...
intangible entities like nations and cultures embodied in and around the texts over a long period of time.

Therefore, although language does play a key role, especially when translation is concerned, I will not take ethics as “a form of language”, “a story” or “a form of allegory” as advocated by Paul de Man (see Miller 1987: 50), but rather as “a practice” (Eagleton 2009: 237), a “common material practice” (ibid: 302). I follow the traditional approaches to ethics in the West and China while keeping in mind the influence of postmodernist thinking and postmodern ethics (e.g. Bauman 1993). My contention is indeed that ‘alterity’ has been given too much prominence in the Western thinking of ethics in the past century, especially since the 1960s up to now (e.g. Levinas’s notion of ethics). This study therefore attempts to counteract the overemphasis of ‘difference’ and ‘otherness’ in Western as well as in Chinese approaches to translation ethics (e.g. Venuti 1998; Tymoczko 2007; Shen 2008, 2014; Xu 2012).

2.2 Translation for this study

With respect to translation, I. A. Richard’s statement is well known: “[w]e have here indeed what may probably be the most complex type of event yet produced in the evolution of the cosmos” (1953: 250, my emphasis). In Chinese, the concept fanyi (翻譯) designates at once four matters: translation the general concept, translating the process, translation the product, and translator the agent. In order to define what translation ethics is as the main task of this chapter, it is important to define or delimit what I mean by translation, now that ‘ethics’ the key term of the phrase ‘translation ethics’ has already been dealt with. The following section is hence devoted to this other term, ‘translation’.

2.2.1 Definition and conceptualisation of translation

As noted in Chapter 1, this study addresses ethics of written interlingual translation,

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47For example, Terry Eagleton aptly argues that “[d]ifference in itself is simply not a sound enough foundation on which to construct either an ethics or a politics” (2009: 320) and Niranjana claims that “I am trying to question the withholding of reciprocity and the essentialization of ‘difference’ (what Johannes Fabian calls a denial of coevalness) that permits a stereotypical construction of the other” (1992: 10). See also Weller (2006: 56), which is against taking ‘alterity’ as the foundation for translation ethics. Badiou (2002) mentioned above is also a powerful example against ‘ethics of alterity’ in moral philosophy.
one of the three types Roman Jakobsen ([1959]1966: 233, my italics and bold) classified with respective definition\(^{48}\) in his short essay “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation”. He defines “interlingual translation” or “translation proper” as “an \textit{interpretation} of verbal signs by means of some other language”. This approach is apparently linguistic and from the perspective of seeing translation as a process. The linguistic dimension apart, translation is by nature also cultural and social as has been well illustrated in the cultural and sociological turns in TS (see Bassnett & Lefevere 1990 and Wolf 2007).

It is therefore generally agreed that translation as an act and process is not just the transfer of message from one language to another. In fact, translation entails diverse variables like passive material factors including language, text, culture and active immaterial participants including individuals (translator, author, client/commissioner/publisher), institutions, and nations, the former subject to the work or manipulation of the latter. As a process, besides entailing interpretation, translation also concerns truth/representation, appropriation, intervention, relation of self and other, and identity construction.

Aside from translation as a process, it, as a product, has drawn increasingly more attention in the field, especially since the development of DTS (Toury 1980, 1995; Hermans 1999). And since the cultural turn of TS (Bassnett & Lefevere 1990), including the effect of postcolonial approach to translation (Bassnett & Trivedi 1999), the function of translation as a product has come to the fore. In the same way as language in general\(^{49}\), translation can be used by translators to do anything, both good and evil\(^{50}\). As is known, translation can help transmit information and ideas in a neutral manner, but it can also help build cultural identities or images in a positive or negative fashion. Michaela Wolf argues that “translation can both foster asymmetrical power relations between languages or cultures and offer a form of resistance as can be seen in the postcolonial context, among others” (2011: 21). For Jessica Yeung, “[t]o translate is to represent. To \textit{represent something} in a certain way so that it can comfortably fit into another mental framework, or prison house of

\(^{48}\) Intralingual translation or \textit{rewording} is an \textit{interpretation} of verbal signs by means of \textit{other signs of the same language}; Interlingual translation or \textit{translation proper} is an \textit{interpretation} of verbal signs by means of \textit{some other language}; Intersemiotic translation or \textit{transmutation} is an \textit{interpretation} of verbal signs by means of \textit{nonverbal sign systems} (Jakobson 1966: 233, both italics and bold mine).

\(^{49}\) A detailed discussion of language will be made in Chapter 4 when the three major passive entities involved in a translation project, i.e. text, language and culture are addressed.

\(^{50}\) When a translation is used improperly by others, it may have nothing to do with translation ethics.
language, is *appropriation*” (2009: 99, my emphasis). Robert Young’s summary concerning the dual functions of translation seen from the postcolonial approach to translation is more revealing: “[w]here the indigenous culture is being opened up for *appropriation* by the conquering culture, any act of translation thus involving an act of treachery, the necessary, traditionally lamented failure of translation becomes a positive force of resistance, resisting the intruder” (2003: 141-2, my emphasis).

All these new understandings show the complexity of translation. With too many variables\(^{51}\) involved (Carlson 2001: 21-22), some TS scholars even argue that “the term ‘translation’ has no fixed, inherent, immanent meaning” (Hermans 1999: 144), and “the nature of translation is not eternal” (Chang 2004: 40, fn 2, trans). Its complexity is thus also manifest in the various attempts to give it a definition throughout history. It has been defined differently covering distinct types (Tymoczko 2007: 100-6; cf. Cheung 2005: 41). For example, it has been defined from the perspectives of linguistics (Jakobson [1959]1966: 233; Catford 1965: 20; Nida and Taber 1969: 12; Bell 1991: 5; Barnstone 1993: 226-227; Boase-Beier 2011: 13, etc.), culture (Bassnettand Lefevere1990: ix; Bhabha 1994: 212), function (Vermeer 1987: 29; Nord 1991: 28), descriptive studies (Toury 1995: 29), and deconstruction (Derrida 1985), among others. Such diverse definitions of course are made along the progress to establish translation studies into an academic discipline in its own right\(^{52}\).

With new approaches available, more and more dimensions and aspects of translation having been explored, a result is that some inherent limitations in the traditional definitions have been exposed. For example, the parameters such as faithfulness, meaning and equivalence\(^{53}\) traditionally used to define translation are found insufficient because they are unable to cover the entire process of the activity. TS scholar Der Jagt claims expressly that, “[i]n the past, definitions of translation focused on text and meaning”, but they sound “static”, do not “suffice to cover the entire process of translation”, and “leave out two key elements: communication and

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\(^{51}\)Text as a variable in translation will be dealt with at length in Chapter 4.

\(^{52}\)In the field of TS, it is generally agreed that since the year 1972 when James Holmes published his famous essay “The Name and Nature of Translation Studies”, which “constitutes translation studies’ declaration of independence” (Hermans 1999: 30), the discipline has been established.


The most serious limitation is that many definitions have neglected the agents, especially the pivotal one, the translator, although some definitions do have the translator involved, such as Robert de Beaugrande’s (1978: 13), Jiri Levy’s (1989: 38), and Lawrence Venuti’s (1995: 17, 2008: 13). Theo Hermans argues that “the translator was implicitly commenting on the nature of translation” (1999: 144). The philosopher Paul Ricoeur, in David Pellauer’s translation, argues that, “[s]cience cannot be defined apart from the scientist, as a human being” (2007a: 15). Similarly, translation cannot be defined apart from the translator, as a human being. In fact, translator and translation cannot be separated; they are by default mutually defined. “No translator, no translation” (Shan Dexing 2007: ix). As is known, even machine translation has to be supervised by human beings. “An overlook of the translating subject is bound to affect the definition of translation per se” (Yuan & Zou 2011: 111, trans).

Even one of the traditionally most important concepts concerning translation, equivalence, is in fact a result of translators’ exercising their agency in their interpretation, interaction and rewriting. It is now taken not as a prescribed property, but an a posteriori claim and creation, as Gideon Toury has convincingly argued: “Rather than being a single relationship, denoting a recurring type of invariant, it comes to refer to any relation which is found to have characterized translation under a specified set of circumstances” (1995: 61, see also1980: 28, 1995: 23-6). Douglas Robinson also argues, “[t]he translator acting may strive for equivalence—but that striving is only one of many goals of his or her activity, and its relative success or failure need no longer define the translator in the abstract as, among other things, a traitor” (Robinson 1991: 135, original emphasis). For Lydia Liu, “[o]ne does not translate between equivalents; rather, one creates tropes of equivalence in the middle zone of interlinear translation between the host and the guest languages” (Liu 1995: 40, my emphasis).

Translators’ agency thus has come to be recognised as important in defining translation, but it does not mean that translators always reign supreme in all translation projects. Another unavoidable element many translations entail is power. Hermans, for example, raises this question of “who decides what translation is” (1999: 136). Pym also expresses a similar idea: “[t]he essential problem of translational ethics is not how to translate in any given situation, but who may
decide how to translate” (2010b: 160, original emphasis; see also Tymoczko & Gentzler 2002). As such, definition of translation ineluctably has something to do with power and politics.

In sum, besides linguistic transfer, other aspects and dimensions of translation have been recognised as equally central in almost all translation projects. Of such aspects, the function and role of translation, as noted previously, have captured much attention as manifested concretely in the Skopostheorie (see Nord 1997; Reiss 2013), postcolonial approaches to translation (Niranjana 1992; Robinson 1997c; Bassnett and Trivedi 1999, etc) and feminist approaches to translation (Simon 1996; von Flotow 1997)\textsuperscript{54}. The role and function of translation directly concern the harm and benefits done by translation, and it is largely here that translation ethics comes in. Accordingly, the function/role of translation (what can do) rather than its nature (what is) is of more significance to the formulation of translation ethics (cf. Xie Tianzhen 2014: 19; Shan Jigang 2010).

Meanwhile, one more word is needed here. That the two notions of equivalence and fidelity are problematic in defining translation does not mean that they can be jettisoned completely. Still of importance to the nature of translation, they are just not sufficient conditions for judging a translation act or project ethically. In many cases, faithfulness\textsuperscript{55} still means being ethical, but there might also be cases where betrayal is ethical. The well known Italian aphorism Traduttore Traditore shall thus be understood in a new light. In the meantime, in some cases it is not an either/or situation, i.e. either ethical or unethical, but may be that doing one act is more ethical than another in degree, that is to say, possibly a choice “between gray and gray” or “between the bad and the worst” (Ricoeur 2007a: 243). In fact, the decisions around a translation project are taken to be along a continuum rather than between a binary opposition without any grey area in between. These will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 4 when the model is formulated.

With all the discussions above, a reconceptualisation of translation is ready. In the dynamic interaction of all such parameters as text, language and culture as well as individuals, institutions and nations, the major agent, the translator, more often than

\textsuperscript{54}Regarding TS, Clifford has observed, rightly: “[o]ver the course of its history, the discipline has witnessed a movement away from technical concerns about language forms and towards the use of forms by individuals in a social context to achieve certain aims” (Clifford 2004: 95, fn4).

\textsuperscript{55}Faithfulness or fidelity, as a key parameter in translation, is a central issue in Fang Wei (2012). It will be addressed in detail in Chapter 4 when the model of reciprocity is formulated.
not, plays a pivotal, although not sole role in that it is he or she that decides whether to, what to, and how to translate despite possible external constraints like the ideology, patronage and poetics of a certain time in Lefevere’s terms (1992a). Thus, I propose, starting from the translator and based on his/her interpretation and potential interaction with other parties, translation is a prioritised rewriting of a source text in the language of the target text. In the final analysis the translator constitutes the dynamic starting point and the key to translation ethics.

But questions immediately arise here: who is the translator? Do we have a universal translator\textsuperscript{56} in the abstract sense? The next section tackles such questions.

2.2.2 Translator: agency, pivotal agent and responsibility

For any translation project to be implemented, despite the potential participation of other agents such as the author, the client/commissioner/publisher, the reader, the translator is pivotal because, while interacting with other participants, it is mostly, in the end, the translator, who makes the final decisions. But who is the translator? Who can be called a translator? Do we have a universal translator that can be defined \textit{a priori}? Is there a clear-cut demarcation to tell a translator from a non-translator? Pym claims that “from the outset, we cannot engage in the talk about what ‘the (universal) translator’ is or does” (2012: 4). I agree with Pym because translation is different from other practices or professions. In other fields the professionals usually must pass a stern set of procedures before they can practice the business, but in the practice of translation, although ‘professional translators’ do exist, anyone can set up to translate.

Andrew Chesterman is also aware of this issue. When developing his ethics of commitment for the ‘professional’ translators, he asked this question: “When we speak of an ethics of translation, do we mean to include amateurs as well as ‘professionals’?” (2001: 146). He answered this question by first “distinguishing between one ‘who is a translator’ and someone ‘who does translations (sometimes)’”, and then focussing on “the practitioner rather than the practice” (ibid, my emphasis). The problem here is that, first it has been presupposed that what are “translations” is clear, and second the “practice” and the “practitioner” are separable. His question also implies that amateurs can be easily differentiated from

\textsuperscript{56}To address his “translator ethics”, Pym has not started from \textit{a priori} definition of translation and ‘universal’ translator (2012: 4-5), but from what translators do in concrete situations.
‘professionals’. But as argued in the previous section, translator and translation are mutually defined. No one is a born translator. One is established as a translator after he or she has finished some recognised translation, or one is accepted as a translator by clients, users, readers, or society at large. Maybe the users at first will not care whether someone is a translator or not; what they care more about is the quality of the translation.

Although it is hard to demarcate professional translators from amateurs, in the history of TS, various attempts have been made to define translator, like the efforts to define translation. For instance, Juliane House once gave her definition of translator as a ‘bilingual mediating agent between monolingual communication participants in two different language communities” (1977: 1). House’s stress is on the “agent”. Others choose to define the translator as an expert. For Hans Vermeer, for example, the translator is “the professional expert of transcultural communication” in his skopos theory who “decides whether a commission can and should be carried out in a specific way (form) and for a specific purpose under the given circumstances or not” (1996: 31). Christiane Nord (2011: 25), Holz-Mänttäri and Snell-Hornby (Snell-Hornby 1995: 5), Hermans (1996: 38), Simon Chau (1998: 31), Yang (2000: 103) have similar ideas. Salama-Carr (2006: 124) uses “scholars” to express the same viewpoint. Such definitions or views of translators as experts are of course given with a view to emphasising the important role translators play or can play. This is right in view of promoting translation into a real profession, focussing on the specialised qualifications and skills of the translator. But with respect to translation as a profession, some immanent problems stand unresolved, which are to be addressed in the next section.

Other scholars do not define but just delimit some qualities for one to qualify as a ‘professional’ translator. For example, Robinson frames such qualities from the external and internal perspectives of the practice: reliability, high efficiency and reasonable charge of fee in the eyes of the translation users or commissioners, and professional pride, income and enjoyment in the eyes of the practitioners themselves in his textbook Becoming a Translator (2012: 26). Such qualities actually can be applied to almost all other professions like journalism and law. What makes translators distinct from other professionals is not given.

As discussed in the previous section, in fact, anyone’s decision or choice to do some rewriting of a text from one language to another is inclined to result in what is
called translation. Such a decision or choice is principally a conscious and deliberate act, i.e. exercise of one’s agency, according to Michael Boylan’s definition of it. For Boylan, “Agency is the capacity of a person to perform a conscious, deliberate action” (2000: 38, original italics, my bold type). In TS, Kaisa Koskinen gives a similar definition of agency: “the willingness and ability to act” (2010: 165). It is due to the exercise of this agency that one might develop into a translator or in Robinson’s term a “becoming translator” (2012: 212, my italics). So, whether to be a translator, in the end, depends on the agency of the party concerned. The fact is that a ‘translator’ can choose to develop himself or herself into an agent or subject of a ‘translation event’ with social, political effects (cf. Venuti 1998: 82), even against the mainstream ideology of his or her society57.

Despite this difficulty in defining translator, the importance of translator closely related to his or her agency has been increasingly recognised by TS scholars. Daniel Gouadec’s point is typical. He, in a broad sense, states that, “[h]e [the translator] is in fact an extremely powerful and critical agent facilitating and even at times enabling economic, strategic, cultural, technical, literary, legal, scientific and ideological exchanges throughout the world” (2007: 6).

Specifically, the power of a translator is crucial in shaping the final product of a translation as shown in abundant findings. For example, Rosemary Arrojo claims, “it is the translator’s first inescapable task and responsibility to be as fully aware as possible of the kind of interpretation of the original he or she produces and brings to the translated text” (2005: 240), and “the notion that translators shape the text they translate, no matter how invisible or powerless they would like or claim to be, has been the most groundbreaking insight to emerge from translation studies in the last decades” (2013: 126). For Gillian Lane-Mercier, as regards literary translation, the translator’s agency means his or her “conception of translation, the corresponding translation project and the ‘horizon’ which determines the conditions of possibility of such a conception and such a project” (1997: 64, my italics). Connected to this and no less revealing is Tymoczko’s idea. For her, “[t]ranslators must make choices about where meaning lies in the source text and where meaning to invest in the target text. Translators both define the meaning of the source text and construct the

57According to Jiang Xiaohua (2003: 28), the translator Mu Dan (穆旦) exercised his agency against the mainstream ideology of his time by choosing to translate the poetry of those poets whose ideology is counter to the dominant ideologies.
meaning of the target text. In both roles translators are meaning makers” (Tymoczko 2007: 304, my italics)\(^{58}\). Translators’ role and agency are thus clearly manifested.

Another important issue related to translators’ agency is whether the translator should take the initiative to intervene in a translation project. Although the traditional answer is no, as can best be seen in Eugene Nida’s assertions that a translator “should never tack on his own impression or distort the message to fit his own intellectual and emotional outlook”, rather, “he must exert every effort to reduce to a minimum any intrusion of himself which is not in harmony with the intent of the original author and message” to avoid the “dangers of subjectivity in translating” (1964: 154, my italics), Nida’s statement in fact can only be accepted with certain preconditions, like when the ST is regarded as perfect or sacred, or when it is a political text, or when the translator consents to suspend his or her ideology. For example, regarding the issue of whether ‘improving’ or ‘correcting’ the ST, which is a typical instance of intervention, the fact is that many translators have done it and acknowledged it, some even think it is their “right and duty” to do so (Chang 2004: 252-3).

Clearly, the translator’s intervention is unavoidable, even “inherent” (Chesterman & Baker 2008: 16). The critical point is what kind of intervention and to what extent the intervention is exercised, and for whose good. The issue of ‘to intervene’ and ‘how to’ is primarily dependent on the translator’s agency and allegiance. In view of such understanding, to judge a translator’s choices or decisions ethically has a precondition, that is, they must be first and foremost made in situations where s/he can exercise his/her agency. In other words, when an act is done subconsciously or without autonomy\(^{59}\), it cannot be judged ethically\(^{60}\). Of course translators will not be in full autonomy or completely powerless in all situations. The exercise of their agency also has something to do with the interaction with other participants concerning a translation project. The details will be left in section 4.3.3.1, Chapter 4 when the formulation of the new model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ is done.

\(^{58}\)This is in contrast with the idea of Peter Newmark, who states that “the translator has to establish priorities in choosing which varieties of meaning to transfer, depending on the intention of the translated text and his or her own intention” (Newmark 1991: 28, my italics).

\(^{59}\)Autonomy’ is defined by Dwight Furrow as “the ability to make one’s own decisions, to be a self-directed person” (Furrow 2005: 8).

\(^{60}\)American translator Jeffrey M. Green’s words are to the point, “Choice is inevitable, and if it isn’t conscious, it can’t be conscientious. Evading choice is an effort to avoid committing oneself to a conception” (2001: 149).
Also because of their agency, translators may assume different roles and hence different responsibilities. For Martha Cheung (20110725, trsshk; 2014: 181), for example, the translator as a social actor can assume a range of identities: mediator, negotiator, ideological gatekeeper, activist, etc. For Shan Dexiong (2007: vi), a translator can assume varied roles like mediator, communicator, representor, intervener, manipulator, converter, traitor, subverter, revealor/concealer, agent, replacer, contextualiser, and even dual-contextualiser. Thus in terms of degree of agency, three types of translators can be classified: mouthpiece (faithful technical representer), those choosing to suppress their own agency or ideology in the translation; self-reflexive autonomous ones, those willing and able to wield their agency; and heteronymous ones with zero autonomy. With varying agency, the translators in question are supposed to assume corresponding responsibilities to do good but not evil.

Meanwhile, in terms of ‘profession’, ‘translators’ fall into three types: (1) non-professional or acting translators, who have limited knowledge and skills both in the languages/cultures at issue, like fansubs, or anyone who knows something of the two languages/cultures concerned, or who knows how to use the latest hi-tech aids such as Google Translate; (2) professional translators, i.e. those making a living from it and usually certified; and (3) paraprofessional translators in Pym’s term, i.e. x-cum-translator like teachers, professors and engineers. A translator may belong to various communities with fluid identity or interests, I acknowledge all these three types as ‘translators’: acting/paraprofessional/professional.

With this classification it can be seen that translation will be continuously produced in different qualities in the era of the internet and mobile communications. More acting or non-professionals will attempt to produce poor or ‘workable’ translations.

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61 I assume Cheung meant “roles” here by her “identities” like Shan below. And two things are worth attention here: one, ‘translator’ does not enjoy an exclusiveness of the title because many ‘translations’ are done by some people who are not socially acknowledged as translators or by those who do not want to be recognised as such; two, when one doing a translation job, whether professional or otherwise, he or she may adopt many diverse roles via the job as illustrated by Shan. Zhou Lingshun (2014) makes a distinction between the translator’s identity in terms of “seeking linguistic truth” and his or her roles in terms of “attaining social utility”, the former deciding the linguisticity of the translator and the latter his or her sociality. But I don’t think they can be clearly demarcated as Zhou argues, rather, they are intertwined and mutually decided and influenced.  
62 Cf. Liao Chaoyang’s classification of translators. For him, besides the ordinary translators providing technical language service, there are also those conspicuously “irresponsible” translators who, taking advantage of the language barriers to the parties concerned, undertake translation for other interests and those “impotent” ones, who fall prey to the invincible cultural gaps involved. Besides, there is a third type of translators, who, because conditioned or controlled by external factors, cannot establish his or her stance or, wish to but cannot take a stance (Liao 2010: 281).
translations; paraprofessionals may produce classic or influential translations; massive professionals will do the translation of increasingly available practical documents (see Gouadec 2007: 4). For anyone out of these three types, deciding not to take a job can be a very ethical act, depending on the context. Analogically speaking, a surgeon knows when and when not to undertake an operation, depending on the condition of the patient and the surgeon’s expertise and his or her morality. Similarly, ‘translators’ are also expected to know better than to take any ‘translation’ job offered so as to avoid the avoidable harm, be they acting, paraprofessional or professional, individual or collective. Thus the ‘ethics of not-translating’, to be elaborated in Chapter 4, will be the starting part of the model of the ‘ethics of reciprocity’.

For the wellbeing of the translators as a whole, however defined, they should develop their praxis into a truly established ‘profession’ like medicine and law, but the fact is that translation as a ‘profession’ has innate problems in view of ethics, which are not simple and few, thereby deserving another section below.

2.2.3 Translation as a profession and its discontent

Seen from different perspectives, translation is a social activity (O’Hagan 2011), and it is “clearly a practice” (Chesterman 2001: 145) or a profession (Gouadec 2007). As a practice it has existed since antiquity, but as a profession it does not enjoy a long history because ‘profession’ per se is a modern concept. According to Keith M. Macdonald, “[t]he origins of any profession lie in the existence of an area of knowledge which those who possess it are able to isolate from social knowledge generally, and establish a special claim to. As important as retaining control of it, is its development and presentation to society as the special province of the members, who alone can be trusted to use it in an ethical manner” (1995: xiii, my emphasis).

Against this definition of ‘profession’, it is hard for translation to fit in as a profession. First, translation has not been exclusive but instead open to almost anyone as long as their rewritings are regarded as translation by or usable to the parties concerned, as argued above. That now is an era of globalisation and mobile internet has obviously worsened the situation. While translation as a ‘profession’ is

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63According to Peter Newmark (1991: 19), translators as a profession hardly existed before WWII; evidence is the fact that FIT was founded in 1953.
still in the making in many parts of the world (e.g. in China), the extraordinary
development of “democratizing technology” (Pym 2012: 11) has rendered the
threshold of translation further wider and lower, and what is more, not all
translations are required of the same high quality.

Secondly, a unified identity for translators is absent. What prevails is a fluid identity. Many translators are not translators only. They may be at the same time teachers, professors, doctors, engineers, and writers, namely ‘paraprofessionals’ in Pym’s words. “Except for a minority of translators, translation is usually not the principal occupation of a translator” (Yuan & Zou 2011: 114, trans). Instead of pursuing translation as a life career, they may choose to finish but one project sporadically. And not all parties taking up the job of translating would like to be recognised as translators either.

In the case of the so-called professional translators, the situation is no better. It features “high mobility” (Pym 2004: 166) and high turnover because it is easy for them to move into other fields or ‘higher’ positions. But in law, medicine, etc., once the practitioners have passed the stern qualification tests and qualify as an expert in the field concerned, they will not change to other fields as easily. Instead, generally, most will stay in the community through life.

Thirdly, the issue of low status and low pay for translators remains against the background of the remarkable growth of TS as a discipline and a great demand for translation in the globalising world (cf. Snell-Hornby 2006; Paloposki 2009). Lawrence Venuti’s “victimology” of translation (Koskinen 2000: 47) is widely known. In China, as Xu Jun’s research finds, it is not feasible for translators, especially literary translators to be professional (2007: 278) because they cannot make a living. The situation is equally discouraging in the United States and Canada.

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64For example, Sherry Simon once pointed out that “[t]o translate is not necessarily to ‘be a translator.’ Many individuals may re-write a text in a new language without wishing to be identified as a translator” (1996: 40).
65Hans Vermeer (1984) and Holz-Manttari (1984) along with others view translator as linguistic experts, but that is an ideal state of the practice. Compared with the non- and para-professionals, the professionals are in the minority especially with the advent of online “collective translation” (Pym 2012: 4). According to Pym, there might be 333,000 who would acknowledge themselves as professional translators across the world, an estimate “significantly lower than the 700,000 professionals hypothesized in Beninatto and DePalma (2008)” (Pym 2012: 6 and ibid: n1).
66Chesterman states expressly that “[t]he professional status of translation is still so vague, so unprotected, that there are no adequate formal criteria separating competent professionals from incompetent amateurs: both groups can call themselves translators” (2002:37, my emphasis) and, “[o]ne of the most serious problems in the real translation world, is the prevalence of poor translations, coupled with poor working conditions and low pay” (2010: 222, my emphasis).
according to Jeffrey Green (2001), although we know associations for translators and interpreters do exist in all those countries. Meanwhile, I am not alone in doubting translation as a profession. Koskinen has earlier expressed the same view: “It is debatable whether translation can be seen as a ‘pure’ profession or maybe rather a semi-profession” (2000: 80). She argues that “[t]o become a translator, one is not required to give oaths or commitments”. Additionally, different from, for instance, doctors (healing) or lawyers (justice), translators as a professional group do not have their own specific goals but (similar to, e.g. engineers) rather adapt to the aims of the organization or client they work with” (ibid; cf. Jiang Hong 2013).

However, maybe we can say translation is a profession because admittedly some people in the world do earn a living from it. Even if we recognise translation as a profession, compared with other equally old practices or professions like medicine and law, the many apparent differences merit close attention in terms of ethics.

The most striking difference is that translation is cross-temporal, cross-linguistic and cross-cultural. That is to say, unlike in other practices, translation concerns itself with two different languages/cultures. Not only the individual translator(s) and/or author(s) are affected, but the peoples or nations concerned/embodied in STs and TTs as well. The impact of translation can be interpersonal, inter-institutional, interlinguistic, intercultural and international, depending on the different texts to be translated. Other fields are much simpler: the agents in question as individuals or institutions generally face their clientele and the society at large directly and hence are affecting and affected directly. In translation, the interaction is mostly indirect and the impact of the consequences of translation might be long and lasting, as manifested in the cases of Bible translations in the West and Buddhist sutra translations in China. The effects engendered of and by translation can be via texts, languages, power and ideology, where information, ideas, cultures and civilizations are all involved although such factors may not be present at once. Specifically, Sergio Viaggio’s summary of the difference between translation and other professions is worth an entire quote:

The difference between translation and better established professions is that in the latter case expectancy norms have become based on professional norms rather than the other way round, so that no patient will question, for instance, the surgeon’s ‘right’ to amputate, provided that he – and eventually his peers – think it is the best alternative under the circumstances – best for the task at

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67Partly for recognizing this lack, Chesterman developed his “Hieronymic Oath” in 2001 (see Appendix I), but to my knowledge there has not been much response to this comprehensive oath.
hand, i.e. doing what is best for the patient. [...] Translators, on their part, have not yet collectively succeeded in theorising their praxis, and have yet to establish themselves and the profession to a similar extent, which makes them feel much more at the mercy of their users than other professionals. This is an objective vulnerability: Although recognised practitioners do normally have the linguistic and thematic competence necessary for effecting most ‘meaning’ (i.e. basically semantic) transfers adequately, many generally lack the theoretical competence to ensure and/or defend the communicative validity of their options. (Viaggio 1999: 126, my emphasis)

Thus it is clear that the usual professional codes of ethics or deontology in Pym’s terms (2001: 133) are just prepared for the minority of so-called professionals with the majority of ‘acting translators’ excluded, whereas “we recognise that many kinds of work and workers become invisible when we focus our attention on just those who typically count as professionals” (Cheney et al 2010: 7, original emphasis; see also McDonough Dolmaya 2011a). Even for those professionals the codes are insufficient, in that a code of ethics cannot guarantee ethical translations as Koskinen has argued (2000: 11, 121, n36).

Meanwhile, such codes are in fact very easy to become a pretext for the professional translators’ ineptness or failure to take necessary measures in stringent situations. The so-called professionals, taking the codes as a straitjacket, tend to turn into “faceless professionals” in Edward Said’s terms (1994: 11). Kevin Gibson has argued very well too: “[t]he simple truth is that, ultimately, individuals are responsible for their actions whatever the pressures, circumstances or heuristics at work. Professional codes and bosses’ demands alike do not, by themselves, make difficult decisions easy or immoral actions moral” (2003: 28). In this light, professional codes of ethics for the translators are necessary but not sufficient conditions for ethical translations. As such, a single translation project becomes the suitable study unit for translation ethics, as those choosing translation as a career are in the minority compared with the large majority of the non-professionals and the paraprofessionals. I thus contend that, when any individual or group decides to take or not to take a translation project, regardless of whether they work alone, in a team, in an agency, as a freelancer, whether s/he is acknowledged professional or not, the ethical relation starts68. In so doing, the distinction between an amateur and professional is blurred. One works basically as a human being with the necessary skills or expertise as long as the work is accepted as a workable translation by other parties concerned. The one(s) undertaking the job will be responsible for what has

68Cf. Kathleen Davis’ view: “translation enacts the ethical relation” (2001: 93), as has been mentioned in Chapter 1.
been agreed with other participants and at the same time, the other parties are responsible to him/her or them. As observed rightly by Gibson again, “it might be more correct to think of individuals not so much as professionals in role, but rather as people who are able to manifest power” (2003: 28, my emphasis). So, I choose to approach translation ethics from the perspective of single translation projects, taking into account all the factors on different levels in terms of harm and benefits.

So far, the two key concepts for translation ethics, ‘ethics’ and ‘translation’, including those of ‘translators’ and their ‘profession’ have been discussed. With these new conceptions, I will now proceed to examine the major translation ethic models and views in the West and China in the following section, with a view to developing a new definition of translation ethics.

2.3 Translation ethics

Traditionally, as Ben van Wyke, author of two entries on ethics for the TS handbook (2010, 2013) has summarised, translation ethics is approached in terms of fidelity, equivalence, invisibility, hence ethics of sameness. This traditional view is still prevalent as can be seen in various codes69 for the problematic profession the world over. Along with the discipline’s development, opposite to the ethics of ‘sameness’, ethics of ‘difference’ has come to the fore, especially since Lawrence Venuti voiced his view in the 1990s. Venuti’s model, despite its being endorsed by some theorists in the field (e.g. Tymoczko 2007: 323; Brisset 2011), including feminist translators and scholars, has been criticised by many scholars (Robinson 1997a: 99ff; Koskinen 2000; Tan 2004: 245ff; Liu Yameng 2005, He Xianbin 2008; Wang Dongfeng 2008; and Zhang Jinghua 2009).

Although taken as the latest summary on translation ethics in the West, van Wyke’s depictions unfortunately pose too many problems, which seem to have derived from lack of thorough understanding of the core concept of ethics, especially virtue ethics, and an overdosed influence by the postmodernist thinking. Apart from his relativist stance to translation ethics, his overvaluing of Venuti (2013: 552) is poorly grounded (Venuti’s views on ethics I will criticise below as being

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69For example, the American Translators Association’s “Code of Professional Conduct” requires translators swear: “I will endeavor to translate or interpret the original message faithfully” (ATA website).
one-sided and single-issue-oriented). What is more, he seems to have seriously misread Pym and Chesterman. Most of his arguments, if not all, are not ethical in the descriptive sense of the term. Meanwhile, as Fang Wei rightly points out, “the concepts of fidelity or infidelity, sameness or difference, invisibility or visibility, prescription or description do not constitute the ‘sufficient reason’ for the ought-to” concern about translation (2012: 76, trans).

In fact, both the ethics of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ fall into what Chesterman has termed “ethics of representation”, of which there are innate problems (Chesterman 2001: 142). Included in this representation model are also, in Goodwin’s term (2010), the single-issue ethics that focusses merely on the ethical issues in literary translation, including translation ethics developed by Berman (1992, 2000, 2009) and Henri Meschonnic (1975, 2009). Another approach to ethics qua ethics focusses on the behavior of the translator, or more accurately, on the responsibilities of the translator to the parties involved in a translation project (see Nord 2001; Chu 2009; Sun 2007; Chen and Lü 2011; Yuan & Zou 2011: 94). This line of thinking indeed has a long history. In China over 1500 years ago, Buddhist sutra translator Shi Yancong (557-610CE), in his influential essay on translation ‘Bianzheng lun’ [On the Right Way], regarded as the first systematic exploration of the translator’s responsibilities, discussed eight prerequisites for good Buddhist sutra translators (Shi Yancong 2009: 62; see also Cheung 2006: 142, and Appendix II). But as Terry Eagleton argues, “responsibility to others, pace Levinas and Derrida, is not absolute and infinite, but must be tempered by justice, prudence and realism” (Eagleton 2009: 324). In the case of translation, it is no exception; the translators interact with other potential participants for a translation project.

In sum, translation ethics is often taken to be equal to the ‘should’ of ‘how to translate’, as can be seen from many theorists’ arguments like Arrojo (1997), Xu Jun (1998), van Wyke (2010, 2013), Shen Lianyun (2014), and Li Zheng (2016). But translation ethics, in fact, entails a series of decisions on the part of the translator and other participants covering a much broader sphere than just the process of ‘how to translate’: first, whether to, then what to, and then how to. All these decisions have ethical significance. Since translation is a special kind of practice in the sense that almost anyone can set up to translate, I choose to take a translator and his or her agency as the starting point, approaching translation ethics from the translator’s agency, including one’s initial decision to be a translator or to take up a translating
job, and the harm and benefits that result. From this perspective I will examine the major Western and Chinese ethical models and views below.

2.3.1 Major models in the West


2.3.1.1 Translator-agency-limited model

In his essay ‘Ethics of Translation’ (1995: 147-157), Andrew Chesterman designated the scope of his notion of translation ethics to be between the translator’s decision to take up a translation task and his or her submission of the translation as product, focussing on the translator, excluding other potential participants like the initiator, cultural constraints. In his book chapter ‘On Translation Ethics’ (1997: 169-194), his views can be summarised as this: “translation is a form of action, describable in terms of strategies, which are themselves governed by norms” (1997: 172, my emphasis), like expectancy norm, relation norm, accountability norm, and communication norm. Such “norms are [in turn] governed by values” (ibid, my emphasis), largely four fundamental ethical values: clarity (textual clarity) corresponding to the expectancy norm, truth (“true” to the original) to the relation norm (ibid: 179, original quotation marks), trust (between all parties concerned) to the accountability norm, and understanding to the communication norm. Chesterman sees translation ethics as falling into two kinds: macro and micro ethics,
the former concerning the relation between translator and the world while the latter
the relation between translator and the text (ibid: 170). In his book, Chesterman
focusses on the latter, i.e. the micro level of ethics, arguing that “[a] translator
should act in such a way that the demands of loyalty are appropriately met with
regard to the original writer, the commissioner of the translation, the translator
himself or herself, the prospective readership and any other relevant parties” (ibid:
68). Here it is clear that Chesterman recognises the importance of keeping balance
of the stakes among all the stakeholders.

But Chesterman’s main stance on translation ethics is reflected in his 2001 essay
‘Proposal for a Hieronymic Oath’ (2001a: 139-154), a further elaboration of his
views in his 1997 book. In this essay, he first summarises in a descriptive manner
the four ‘current’ models of translation ethics, i.e. the ethics of representation,
ethics of service, ethics of communication, and norm-based ethics. Chesterman
admits that there are problems in these models. To him, they are “only partial ones
[models of ethics]” as “each covers only part of the general ethical field of
translation”, and hence each is “inadequate on its own” (ibid: 144). Owing to such
innate problems, Chesterman turns to place his focus to the “qualities of the
decision-maker” (2001a: 146)—the translator. This, in my view, is right. Drawing
on the latest development in virtue ethics represented by the British philosopher
Alasdair MacIntyre, Chesterman advances his own model of commitment ethics for
professional translators.

In this model of his, an ethical professional translator should be in possession of
some virtues like “fairness, truthfulness, and trustworthiness” (2001a: 147) and he
or she should not just seek after values because conflicts often arise among such
values. Meanwhile, an ethical translator must strive for excellence all the time, i.e.
he or she should “want to be a good translator” (ibid: 146, original emphasis). The
key here consists in how to define “a good translator” and a translator of
“excellence”. Chesterman does not explicitly define this, but implies it in his
proposal of the “Hieronymic Oath” (see Appendix I)—his model of ethics of
commitment. In it he includes nine virtues: commitment, loyalty to the profession,
understanding, truth, clarity, trustworthiness, truthfulness, justice, striving for
excellence. I understand that Chesterman means a ‘professional’ translator with
such virtues can be called a ‘good’ translator or a translator of ‘excellence’. Of these,
the virtue of “understanding” is granted an overriding priority. He takes
understanding as “the highest value for translators” and “the defining limit of a translator’s professional ethics” while “all other relevant values such as truth, clarity, loyalty, trust are subordinate to understanding” (2001a: 152). But this emphasis on understanding is obviously too narrow-minded and is especially criticised by Pym as “a very naive view of professionalism” (2004: 177, see also 2012: 149). For it seems as if translators are required to be just responsible for ensuring that understanding is realised between those who do not understand each other in an interaction, as if translators are passive machines without their own judgement, without any need to care whether the parties concerned are good or evil. The harm Chesterman explicitly stresses ethical translators should seek to reduce is “communicative suffering” (1997: 184-86, 2001a: 151-52). Apparently this is insufficient.

The major problem of the model lies in Chesterman’s distinction between ‘personal’ ethics and professional ethics (2001a: 147, 152). He argues that a translator’s “political engagement lies outside the realm of professional ethics” (ibid: 147) as it belongs to his or her personal ethics. “Professional ethics”, “thus understood, govern[s] a translator’s activities qua translator, not qua political activist or life-saver” (ibid). This argument shows clearly that Chesterman wishes to limit the translator’s agency within the technical linguistic sphere, excluding the possible larger missions (e.g. the benefits to a nation) a translator may choose to achieve via his or her translation. Maria Tymoczko explicitly criticised this by saying that he “eviscerate[ed] the translator’s agency” (2007: 320). This narrowing of “professional ethics” within the micro level is also refuted by Jean-Marc Gouanvic in the same volume of the 2001 special issue of The Translator (Gouanvic 2001: 209).

Chesterman’s model of ethics has been well received in China but has been

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70 As argued previously, I prefer to call this ‘personal values’ instead of personal ethics since ‘personal’ is misleading in that ethics is at once personal and social, or both subjective and intersubjective, like both sides of a coin, unable to be separated. Chesterman himself has used a term “translational ideology” in his 1997 book (1997: 191). See also (Chesterman 2009: 17) where he uses “translators’ ideologies”. As for the application of his model of commitment, it is not found applied in his recent essay on the analysis of a case of ethical decision (2009). In this essay, Chesterman states the representation model as “classical” (ibid: 351) without relating to any virtues on the part of the translator he proposed in 2001. But as argued previously, accurate representation can only be a necessary but not sufficient condition of ethical judgement in some cases; it falls into the realm of translation science rather than ethics.

71 A survey on CNKI with Chesterman’s ethics in Chinese as the subject on Feb. 17, 2014 produced 104 hits, including MA, PhD theses and journal essays, ‘his’ five models of translation ethics being
criticised as well. For example, for Fang Wei, “the concept of ‘translation ethics’ is not synonymous with professional ethics or the translator’s responsibility” (2012: 22, trans). Chen Zhijie and Lü Jun, after criticising it, offer a good supplement (Chen and Lü 2011: 62).

Chesterman’s exclusion of the freelancers and the large number of non-professionals makes his argument insufficient for the changed situation of translation in the world. Not only in China but also in other parts of the world, many translations are done by teachers, professors or teacher-cum-translators, rather than by “full” professional translators, let alone the increased internet crowdsourcing translations. Meanwhile, ‘professional’ may mean impersonal, detached from personal values. But in the case of translation, the translators, as argued also by Robinson (1991: 131, 260), are human, and humans have emotions, attitudes and values. Chesterman himself acknowledges that “[a] translator is never totally neutral. All translation is also an intervention” (2009: 353). Intervention has much to do with the translator’s agency and autonomy as discussed above. This has actually been acknowledged by increasingly more translation theorists and practitioners, as opposed to Chesterman’s narrowing of the translator’s agency. With regard to translation ethics, this recognised intervention gives rise to the translator’s agency-enhancing (interventionist) model, as examined below.

### 2.3.1.2 Translator-agency-enhancing model

Unlike the translator’s agency-limited (profession-oriented) model above, which is largely represented by Chesterman, this translator-agency-enhancing model is embodied in many translation scholars’ views on translation ethics, including Douglas Robinson, Lawrence Venuti, Mona Baker and Maria Tymoczko. The views of Moira Inghilleri (2009, 2012), Gayatri C. Spivak (2004) and Sherry Simon (1996) also fall into this model, but their thinking will not be examined at length for their lesser significance compared with those of the aforementioned scholars. This model is first seen in Robinson’s views on translation ethics. Along with his two major focusses on translation: the somatics and performatics of translation, Robinson is also concerned with the issue of translation ethics. Back in 1991 in his book *The Translator’s Turn*, Robinson advanced his ideas on *people*- or translator-centered

in particular popular with postgraduates’ MA theses.
translation ethics, trying to bring out the agency and autonomy of the translator from the traditional slavish shackles in the Western tradition. He suggested eight different ethics of translation.

In his own words, Robinson wants to “explore some of the ways translators can act, out of increasingly idiosomatic responses to ideosomatic programming, to create—successful TL texts, perhaps, first of all, but ultimately, and more importantly, to create themselves as (more) fully alive human beings” (1991: 131, original emphasis). To him, translators are by no means “neutral, impersonal transferring devices” but human beings with “emotions, motivations, attitudes, associations” (ibid: 260). He aims at developing a new “dialogical” model of translation theory from which he can generate “a variety of practical models for the translator’s dialogical engagement with the SL or original writer and text [in the manner of six tropics] and TL receptor [in the manner of eight ethics]” (ibid: xxvii).

By “the ethics of translation”, Robinson means “specifically ethical growth out of ideosomatically programmed restrictions, out of controlled obedience to cultural ideals, out into the world, into a liberating confrontation with and openness to diversity” (ibid: 201, original emphasis). Clearly his wish is to enhance the translator’s agency to effect changes in oneself and the world (see esp. ibid: 217). But when reflecting on the legitimacy and validity of certain ethics he advocates like the “subversive ethics”, Robinson seems doubtful of translators’ exercise of their agency or the risks involved in such exercise as seen in the following questions he raises:

Who am I to force my ethical sense on the dialogue between the SL writer/speaker and the TL reader/listener? Who says my sense of responsibility is truer, more highly developed, than theirs? What do I believe, and why? What are the consequences of my beliefs for my own actions, and of my actions for other people? Do I have the personal strength to stand behind a subversive ethical decision that runs counter to the ritualized (and legalized) ethics of all Western translation? Can I withstand censure and blame if my subversive translation backfires, if I am hounded out of the profession, fined, jailed, whipped and scourged? What is my character, and what do I want it to be? (ibid: 231, original emphasis).

Such doubts or self-reflexivity indicate surely the liminality and limitations of any single person’s capacity. But Robinson’s such self-reflexive questions seem to have been answered by Simon Chau optimistically in his book Translation and Life (1998): translators should grow out of slavish puppets to be confident watchdogs for the latest productive information (137), pioneers of civilization transformation (106), “prophets” of new eras (109), and wellbeing promoters of one’s communities, or of
human beings as a whole (122). Chau’s ideas may not be enough to relieve Robinson’s anxiety steeped in the Western ethical tradition, especially due in part to the postmodernist undermining of subjectivity. Yet according to Confucian ethics, especially the Mencian line, anyone can or has the potential to be a sage in theory in terms of his or her free will despite one’s discounted autonomy in practice. A junzi-like person (gentleman-like or righteous/exemplary man) can be confident to do what he thinks is right for his family, country and even the world, without fearing loss or suffering [e.g. “I’ll go despite the objection of tens of thousands”72 (Mencius, 2.2A, Lau 2003: 32]. From the perspective of Confucian ethics, a junzi-like translator will be ready or willing to suffer or even sacrifice in the form of risking one’s job, career, even life for the sake of a much larger mission or benefits. (More details are given in Chapter 3.)

By arguing that “[s]ome of the worst persecutions in the history of the Christian church have come out of attempts to universalize Jesus’ response to a specific situation to cover all situations” (Robinson 1991: 209), Robinson advocates “situational ethics” (1991: 208-9). Anticipating reader’s criticism of his ‘responsibility’ as relativism, Robinson stresses that it is, but not “relativism as randomness, doing any old thing, whatever pops into your head. It is the responsibility of an appropriate response to a specific situation” (ibid, my emphasis) or “an ethical commitment to diversity” (ibid: 209). But as argued in the previous section on ethics, any situation is specific, and to decide how “appropriate” is appropriate still needs a criterion. Situational ethics, therefore, as stressed previously, cannot go far.

Seeing the under-exercise of agency on the translator’s part, Robinson accordingly observed that “the professional ethics of translation have traditionally been defined very narrowly” (Robinson 2012:27, my emphasis). He thus argues sensibly that, apart from the traditional self-effacing translation, a translator can also choose to do self-asserting, self-expressing translation with sensitivity. But possibly owing to his position of ‘situational ethics’, he has many tricky questions left unanswered:

72 “雖千萬人吾往矣” (“Gongsun Chou 1” 公孫醜上, Mengzi 孟子), also see note 105 in Chapter 3.
In such situations, professional ethics will not work, neither will the ‘situational ethics’—an appropriate response. Instead, a higher-level ethical demand is needed, like the value of life/survival, value of justice, which will definitely outweigh a “professional” translator’s ‘personal ethics’. That is to say, if it is good or beneficial to a larger mission, even if it is against one’s own political and moral beliefs, one ought to do it. This is the force of the Confucian ethics.

Although disparaged by Chesterman as ‘too free’ (1997: 191-2), yet just like Tymoczko (2007), Robinson is in a way trying to encourage translators to empower themselves to do good. Self-empowering is encouraging, but Robinson’s relativist stance is easy to slip into ethical subjectivism.

Another translation scholar who also applauds the enhancement of the translator’s ethical agency is Lawrence Venuti74. Venuti’s views on translation ethics are chiefly found in the introduction to his 1992 anthology *Rethinking Translation: Discourse, Subjectivity, Ideology*, his first monograph *The Translator’s Invisibility: A History of Translation* published in 1995 (revised and republished in 2008), and his second book *The Scandals of Translation: Towards an Ethics of Difference* in 1998. In this decade there is a slight, but not remarkable change in his views, conveyed in several recent articles (Venuti 2009, 2010b, 2011), especially ‘The Poet’s Version, or an Ethics of Translation” in 2011.

Venuti’s views have been acclaimed by many people in the field because he has, allegedly superseding Antoine Berman, extended or enriched translation ethics by widening it to cover the larger cultural-political issues and consciously counter the inequalities between cultures, politics and economies in the world (e.g. Wang Dazhi 2012: 36). They think Venuti developed resistant discourses against Eurocentrism or American-centrism with his “ethics of difference” (e.g. Yang 2013: 113-116). But such are misreading. Just as Liu Yameng comments, “as far as translation-related ethical issues are concerned, Venuti’s discussion raises more questions than it has answered” (Liu 2005: 40). Other criticisms are also found in Robinson (1997a),

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73In comply with Pym’s glossary: professional translators refer to “people who do translating for a living” (Pym 2011: 89). Cf. Drugan’s quoted *OED* definition of profession: a paid occupation, especially one that involves training and a formal qualification (Drugan 2013: 6).

74Theo Hermans explicitly claims that Venuti’s stance (and Spivak’s) “may be described as interventionist” (Hermans 2009: 100).
Then how indeed do we view Venuti’s “ethics of difference”? Is it really able to realise the goal of respecting the “linguistic and cultural differences” as great benefits as he claims (1998: 6)? Let us take a close look at what he has to offer.

Venuti approaches ethics from the perspective of what translation can do. In other words, he tries to look at the socio-political and cultural effects of translation. This is no problem, as we know judging the consequence of an act falls into the consequentialist ethics in general. Venuti argues, quite rightly, that translation can have “far-reaching social effects”, like “forming cultural identities” and “contributing to social reproduction and change”, and “such effects should be evaluated” to see “whether they are good or bad” (Venuti 1998: 81). But the most problematic about his influential model of “ethics of difference” is that it takes only the target side as the reference point. For him, the criterion against which to judge whether a translation project is good or bad is whether the translation can supply a difference to the void or insufficiency of the receiving language/culture, or whether the translator is one that can change or renew the target language/culture/society (Venuti 1998: 81). For Venuti, a version75 can be good if it meets such conditions76.

Here we need to further unpack his “ethics of difference”. By “ethics of difference”, Venuti means several things at once. First, the translator should choose different or minoritised texts in the source culture for translation; second, the translator should employ different discursive strategies both in terms of lexicon and syntax in translating, even “abusive” discursive strategies (Philip Lewis’ term), so as to make TT distinct from the ST or other, non-translated texts in the same genre in the target language/culture; and third, in so doing, the translator should make a difference to the target language/culture. Thus, clearly Venuti’s ethics in fact pays less attention to the differences on the source side than those on the target side and the “difference” displayed by the TT. But Venuti is often mistaken as following

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75A ‘version’ is “[a] term commonly used to describe a TT which in the view of the commentator departs too far from the original to be termed a translation” (Shuttleworth & Cowie 1997: 195). More details about the term are available in the dictionary.
76Jiang Tong mentioned that he obtained Venuti’s confirmation of this stance from his email correspondence on June 12, 2009 (Jiang 2010: 82). Jiang, student of translation, finished his PhD on Venuti in 2008 at the Capital Normal University in Beijing: From the Establishment of Foreignizing Translation to the Deconstruction of the Ethics of Difference: A Study of Lawrence Venuti’s Translation Theory (see Jiang 2008). There is no fundamental change of this stance as I see it even after Venuti has expanded his theoretical source to Badiou’s truth-based ethics (also see Liu Wei’s 2013 interview of Venuti and Venuti’s 2011 essay).
Berman, who attached importance to “respecting the foreignness of the foreign” ([1984] 1992: 4). Baker also points this out by saying that Venuti’s “focus is on the target culture, and his aim is not to ‘preserve’ the source text as such but to disrupt dominant values and patterns in the target context” (2010: 65).

To promote the differences as he conceived them and informed by his conception of translation as an interpretation (2008: 13; see also 1998: 81; 2009: 162), Venuti therefore argues that the translator should have more autonomy and agency. He claims that “[t]he process of translating shows that invariants do not exist, that the features of the source text must be fixed in an interpretative act, and that any such fixing can only be provisional. A translation can only communicate an interpretation, never the source text itself or some form or meaning believed to be inherent in it” (2013: 192, my emphasis). This is true only when a translator works alone with a literary or religious text without any external constraints. Privileging the translator’s agency of interpretation, Venuti seems to have gone too far to pay heed to external constraints over the translator. His ‘ethical translator’ thus has such subjectivity that s/he can work independently. Over this both Koskinen (2000: 56-58) and Pym (2012: 10ff) take issue with Venuti. Pym regards Venuti’s stance as being too idealistic, even calls Venuti’s translator a “revolutionary subject” (Pym 2012: 10ff, 106).

Here Pym’s criticism of Venuti can be seen from another perspective. When Venuti claims that “a translator can choose to redirect the ethnocentric movement of translation so as to decenter the domestic terms that a translation project must inescapably utilize. This is an ethics of difference that can change the domestic culture” (Venuti 1998: 82, my italics and bold), he is not being “idealistic”, for translation in a way really can help “change the domestic culture”. In fact, in Confucian ethics, a junzi-like translator can strive to be a ‘revolutionary subject’, the key point being that the interests or benefits to be considered should not be limited to only one side. Venuti is, in a way, as Tymoczko proposes (2007), also encouraging the translator’s self-empowerment, because we know that he is so overwhelmed by the unfairness, injustice, scandals on translation and translators in his environment, i.e. the United States that he wishes to change all this, so much so that he even entitles his latest book Translation Changes Everything (2013). One of his ultimate goals is to promote the status of translation and translator, a goal he has incessantly pursued since his 1995 book. In this respect, great credits must be given
to Venuti.

The problems of Venuti’s model of “ethics of difference” lie also in other aspects. First is his methodology. To advance his “ethics of difference” he polarises the ethics of sameness and ethics of difference according to the effects of translation on the target culture. He argues that “[i]nstitutions, whether academic or religious, commercial or political, show a preference for a translation ethics of sameness” (1998: 82, my emphasis). By “sameness” he means: “translating that enables and ratifies existing discourses and canons, interpretations and pedagogies, advertising campaigns and liturgies – if only to ensure the continued and unruffled reproduction of the institution” (ibid, my emphasis). In other words, translation that maintains the status quo of the receiving language and culture follows ethics of sameness. This brand of ethics of sameness is obviously unlike what van Wyke (2010) has summarised in his two entries on translation ethics, where the ethics of sameness refers to the traditional dominating notion of fidelity or equivalence between the ST and TT, as noted previously.

This dualism results from Venuti’s vision of translation. For him, translation is always homebound work, initiated by the target language, with the source-side initiated translation cast aside (e.g. see Venuti 2004: 483, 499). Venuti therefore argues that ethnocentrism “lies at the heart of translation” (2008: 19). Because of this ethnocentrism, translation is fundamentally domesticating, which leads to the translator’s invisibility and the scandals infringed on translation. To fight such ethnocentrism, Venuti advocates foreignising translation in the form of choosing marginalised source texts and employing various discursive strategies in the target language for “difference” as noted above. As a result, Venuti implicitly leaves an impression that he is strongly against ethnocentrism and in turn against cultural imperialism (cf. 2010a: 78).

But the seemingly adamant objection to ethnocentrism cannot conceal Venuti’s hidden ethnocentrism as has been exposed by many translation scholars. For example, Li Feng and Tian Debei argue that “the core of Venuti’s theory is to facilitate the cultural change and innovation in the translating language and culture; what underlies his ethics is the tendency to place the domestic interests first” (Li & Tian 2012: 36, trans).

Aside from the problem in Venuti’s methodology regarding his ethical model developing, his overemphasis of foreignising in terms of discursive strategies
employed from the translating language may also give rise to the negative effect of ossified stereotypes of certain source cultural image or identity, as has been convincingly illuminated by Shamma (2006) and Selim (2009). Such negative effects no doubt constitute harm to the source side. Criticisms of this overemphasis of foreignising strategy are also available in Tan (2004: 245), Tymoczko (2007), Cronin (2010: 250), and Garzelli (2011: 178).

Partly because of possible negative effects on the source image incurred by over-emphasising foreignising translation, Venuti’s “ethics of difference” cannot really realise his goal of respecting the “linguistic and cultural differences” as great benefits as he claims (1998: 6). There is another reason. His proposed and practiced discursive strategies to implement his model, in the long run, will not undermine the cultural imperialism or hegemony embodied in the Anglo-American language/culture as he intends to. In contrast, it will consolidate the language and culture (see also Wang Dongfeng 2008) because, it is well known that a language will go stagnant if it is not injected with new blood or introduced with anything new. That is the way the English language has evolved into what it is today (see McCrum et al 1992).

To conclude, Venuti’s flagging of difference is really problematic. “The issue of difference forms the essence of Venuti’s ethical stand” (Koskinen 2000: 54), but we know difference itself primarily is not an intrinsic value to be a base for ethic formulation. Jones (2004), Weller (2006), Eagleton (2009) and Boase-Beier (2011) all identify this problem. It is true that the difference of different cultures should be given due respect and fair representation, but difference per se cannot be essentialised just for the sake of being different and taken to constitute an ontological condition of benefit. As Eagleton (2009) and Chesterman (2013) have argued, in human encounters there must be also similarity and commonality involved.

Nevertheless, there is no denying that Venuti as a translator cum theorist has contributed significantly to the field of translation ethics. Venuti’s views on the evaluation of translation are undoubtedly sound. He claims that “no agent of a translation can hope to anticipate its every consequence, the uses of which it is put, the interests served, the values it comes to convey” (Venuti 1998: 3). And, “[a]ny evaluation of a translation project must include a consideration of discursive strategies, their institutional settings, and their social functions and effects (Venuti
1998: 81-82). More importantly, he asserts that “[t]he value of any translated text depends on effects and functions that can’t be entirely predicted or controlled. Yet[,] this element of contingency increases rather than lessens the translator’s responsibility to estimate the impact of a project by reconstructing the hierarchy of domestic values that inform the translation and its likely reception” (1998: 189, my emphasis). In a word, like Robinson, Venuti generally advocates interventionist translation, i.e. enhancing translator’s agency.

Besides Robinson and Venuti, this translator-agency-enhancing model is also found in the notions of Mona Baker. Baker’s views on translation ethics are largely conveyed in her 2006 book *Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account*, the 2008 interview by Chesteman, and the chapter on ethics “Beyond Equivalence: Ethics and Morality” in her 2011 updated textbook *In Other Words*. First, as a partisan theorist-cum-activist, taking translation as renarration, Baker makes it clear that she is keen on “commitment and reflexivity” on the part of the translators and interpreters (2008: 13). In other words, espousing a committed approach to translation and translation ethics, she calls on translators and interpreters to take a more active role in social change and be more self-reflective in the profession and discipline (2006: 6). She asserts that “we must reflect on our behaviour and be ethically accountable to ourselves and others in our work as translators and translation scholars, as we are in other walks of life. To cease to be prescriptive in this sense would be to cease to make moral and ethical judgements, which would amount to becoming a non-person!” (2008: 12, my emphasis). This is no doubt a clear sign of recognising and heightening the importance of the translator’s agency and the benefits that may result thereof (see also 2008: 16).

Second, Baker also rightly proposes ethics of not-translating. For example, she affirms that in some cases “not to translate” or “interpret” is more ethical because inaction may generate more benefits than action. She claims:

> Sometimes the most ethical thing to do (judged from a particular narrative location) is not to speak on behalf of another at all – it depends on who this ‘other’ is and what they want you to say on their behalf; or what kind of ‘narrative’ a source text elaborates and whether you want to give that narrative currency and legitimacy in a different environment; or whether even if you agree with what the speaker or text says, in your judgement it would be unproductive to repeat it as is, because it would be misunderstood in the target context, or would cause unnecessary hurt and offence, or could be unfairly used against one party in the interaction, etc. (Baker 2008: 18)

Different from ‘not translating’ owing to one’s incompetence as prescribed in usual
codes of profession, Baker here is advocating the ethics of not translating from the perspective of the object of translation service. I will also, as noted above, propose ethics of not-translating in my model but for different reasons; what I will look at are the reciprocal effects or mutual benefits or harm-eliminating/reducing to all the parties and entities involved, which are to be dealt with in Chapter 4.

Lastly, Baker is also fully aware of the various levels involved in translation ethics aside from the linguistic. Baker argues that, “mutual respect” between translators and clients apart (ibid: 20), “[i]f you do end up having to work for a client you do not trust or respect, especially a client who is invading your country and killing and torturing your people, then in my view it is perfectly legitimate to use your linguistic (and other) skills to undermine him or her, or their collective institutions” (ibid). This is a powerful case to show that national interests outweigh the individual translator’s or other minor interests, and that the usual intertextual relationship is given way to the higher relationship between one’s community, nation and other threatening forces. The two examples she cites illustrate that, values of trust or trustworthiness should give way to higher-level values such as life and survival of larger communities as well (2008: 20).

But because of her activist commitment, Baker seems to give too much prominence to the translation’s function in reality construction. She claims that “[I]like any other group in society, translators and interpreters are responsible for the texts and utterances they produce. Consciously or otherwise, they translate texts and utterances that participate in creating, negotiating and contesting social reality” (Baker 2006: 105, my emphasis). I agree that translators are not different from other language users in the sense that they should be responsible for the texts they reproduce (2008: 28). But Baker seems to have failed to consider the elements of time and genres in her discussion here. Not all texts, or in her term, “narratives”, are about social reality. For instance, mathematical textbooks like the Euclidian geometry or Chinese classics like The Daodejing. In regard to the translation of such texts, what counts may be not political engagement or commitment, but the traditional requirements of accuracy and equivalence or the value of ‘truth’. When accuracy and equivalence are realised, mutual benefits can be said to have been achieved as well in the sense that knowledge is shared and beneficial to both the
donor and donated\textsuperscript{77}. She is keen on more “politically-aware terms” to address the ethics of translation profession (ibid: 31), especially regarding political engagement, but a translator can choose to be committed not only to “political agendas” (2008: 14), but also to cultural, environmental agendas etc. insofar as such agendas are good to the largest number of people on both sides.

Although a self-reflexive researcher herself and aware of the degree of intervention between the source and target cultures as she asks, “[h]ow far should we go to mediate the distance between the source and target cultures, to ensure that members of the former are understood and respected by members of the latter?” (Baker 2011: 288), Baker is still perceived as having a touch of ethnocentrism by Juliane House (2009: 90) in Baker’s stress of the translator’s responsibility to the audience for whom the translation is produced (see Baker 2006: 105). House in effect hints at the translator’s responsibility to the author of the ST (2009: 90), or the benefits of the source side that deserve similar attention in theory.

Further, to my mind, like with Moira Inghilleri (2008, 2009), more politics seems at work with Baker than ethics, as is seen in her frequent stress of “political engagement” for “political change” in “political conflicts” (2008: 13) on the part of translators and interpreters as both individuals and collectivities. True, ethics and politics inherently intersect and translation does play a vital role in numerous political situations. But that cannot be the entire scenarios regarding translation. Translation itself can be a political act surely, but it also should be employed to help alleviate conflicts and facilitate cooperation and harmony. To her, the metaphor of translation as a bridge-building is “romanticizing” (2008: 16). The fact is that translation can be bridge and barrier, depending on whether the exercise of the translator’s agency and the efforts of other potential participants are for good ends or not.

Like Mona Baker, Maria Tymoczko is another TS scholar whose views on translation ethics fall into this model. Her views of translation ethics are found chiefly in an array of articles (2003, 2006, and 2009) and her 2007 book \textit{Enlarging Translation, Empowering Translators}.

First, Tymoczko approaches translation ethics from the macro level by flagging the importance of translator and translation in cultural exchange in an era of

\textsuperscript{77}Seeking ‘equivalence’ in translation as an alternative of reciprocal ethics in translation will be dealt with in detail in the model formulation in Chapter 4.
globalisation where colonial or neo-colonial practice may manifest in various forms. To her, the translator cannot work in a space that is in-between (2003), but “in fact all too committed to a cultural framework” (2003: 201). Moreover, a translator can “easily become the traitor from within or the agent from without”, depending on his or her loyalty to “dissident ideologies internal to a culture, or to affiliations and agendas external to a culture” (ibid). Thus how translation is defined and how translators conduct their translation exert great influence in the era of globalising and globalised cultural exchange. Her following questions illustrate well her deep thinking of the issue:

To what extent will cultural exchange be multidirectional in the age of globalization, and to what extent will asymmetries of power, resources, and technologies mean that ‘cultural exchange’ will become a euphemism for the acculturation to Western or dominant international standards of many peoples around the world who have heretofore led their lives within local frameworks of knowledge, belief, and values? To what extent will ‘cultural exchange’ become a banner for opening up and exploiting new markets around the world? What roles will translators and translations play in all this? Will translators be instrumental in defining culture and empowered to initiate and shape cultural interface? Or will translators and their translations be implicated in the destruction of the local by the global and serve primarily as instruments of dominant interests and powers? How we define and think about translation will have much to do with the answers to these questions. (2007: 4-5, my emphasis)

Tymoczko proposes enlarging translation and empowering translators to address such thorny questions. As for the specific responsibilities of translators, Tymoczko stresses that, reference points for them to make ethical decisions are of vital importance because, for her, so to speak, the ethical agency of translators’ might be limitless. She argues possibly unawares in a Confucian line of role ethics:

It is also ethically empowering for translators to think about their circles of affiliation and responsibility⁷⁸. What reference points does a translator use for making ethical and ideological choices and, hence, translation choices of all sorts? The larger the frameworks within which translators situate themselves, the broader their ethical awareness and senses of responsibility will be. Thus, thinking about responsibilities to self, family, community, nation, and the world open up wider and wider ethical issues for translators. (ibid: 318, my emphasis)

As noted in the introduction of the thesis, here Tymoczko seems to have been informed by Confucian ethics that one can become responsible for much wider communities than are immediate, especially when it comes to the cultural exchange in a globalised and globalising world.

Tymoczko’s proposal to empower translators partly results from her insightful

⁷⁸In other words, their ‘local and global allegiances’, in Inghilleri’s terms (2012: 124).
conception of translation as a metonymic process. Because of this metonymic process, for Tymoczko and I agree, in the translating process the translator has to prioritise what or whose interests or values to promote or silence, i.e. whose benefits to augment and what harm to eliminate or reduce. Translators are not always slavish at all, but, “like other human beings – are rarely totally submissive to dominant thinking or totally resistant to it. In most circumstances translators accept and buy into some cultural norms and restrictions, but oppose and challenge others” (Tymoczko 2009: 36). Translators’ agency is recognised explicitly here. Elsewhere she also rightly observes that:

Translation always entails large ethical issues. A central question pertains to affiliation: where do one’s allegiances lie? On what level should a translator focus ethical and ideological concerns? If we use Augusta Gregory as an example once more, we can imagine complaining to her manipulations of the plots and the form, and her erasure of the humour, the sexuality, the scatological elements and so forth. We can also imagine that she might respond in kind, asking: how can you be so concerned about the ethics of translating these details of the texts? What about the ethical issues pertaining to the lives of the Irish peasants, their poverty and their subjugation? What about the necessity to build a national culture and achieve Ireland’s independence? (2009: 41, my emphasis)

Here, obviously, Tymoczko is arguing that the translator’s priority cannot be on the linguistic aspect but rather on the national interest on a much higher level like what Baker has also argued. Further, similar to Venuti’s emphasis of translation’s function in cultural identity formation (1995: 22ff, 1998: 81ff), Tymoczko employs the term “image”, as she claims: “[b]ecause translations construct images that are taken as realities in the receptor culture, the ethics of those images are important considerations, particularly because images are manipulated as a result of social constraints” (Tymoczko 2009: 41).

Aside from translators’ ethical agency, Tymoczko also realises the vital importance of their self-reflexivity in making ethical decisions. She makes it clear that:

Kathleen Davis observes that in virtue of the necessity of decision making in the process of translating, translations are always ‘ethical-political acts’ (2001: 51; cf. Lane-Mercier 1997: 60-65, 79 She argues that “it is not possible for a translator to capture all aspects of a source text. Because of anisomorphisms of language and asymmetries of culture, because meaning in a text is both open and overdetermined, because texts make contradictory demands that cannot all be simultaneously satisfied (say, the demands of complex content and spare form), and because the information load associated with a source text is excessive, among other reasons, translators must set priorities for their translations and they must make choices about what they will translate” (Tymoczko 2009: 36, my emphasis). For details on the metonymy of translation see Tymoczko (1999: 41-61, 278-300).
A translator’s empowerment is greatest when the translator is conscious of the implications of the various levels of choice to be exercised in translation and when the translator is self-aware and deliberate about making those choices. Indeed self-awareness is almost a prerequisite for ideological, political, and ethical agency. Self-reflexivity about the translator’s place of enunciation and affiliation is the guide to actual choices in translation – from choice of text to transpositions of language and of culture. Self-reflexivity guides the construction of representations, transmissions, and transculturations (Tymoczko 2007: 219-20, my emphasis).

Closely related to this self-reflexivity, Tymoczko argues that “[t]ranslators can mobilize themselves more easily and exercise their agency more effectively when they understand that there are always contradictions and interferences in any ethical, ideological, or cultural system and situation” (ibid: 318).

Proposing empowering the translator, Tymoczko naturally takes issue with the professional codes of ethics because the translator’s agency is often dispersed in them. She argues that “[o]ne form that the dispersal of ethics, ideology, and translator agency takes is the focus in professional codes of ethics on the microlevels of textual fidelity and immediate obligations to the employer, effacing larger spheres of geopolitical responsibility to communities and the world (2007: 320, my emphasis) and that the view of translation as transfer “totally effaces the relation between translation and power” (ibid: 324).

In brief, Tymoczko is right in encouraging to take power, asymmetries of power in particular, into account when dealing with translation ethics because in the context of nation building or cultural identity formation, ethics and politics do get intertwined and complicated. But in other cases, as noted previously, close linguistic transfer is still top priority for those who wish to import important and latest knowledge, information or values. In such cases, if the ST is not closely translated, the victimised is the translating party (culture or nation) rather than the source side.

In her 2009 essay on translation ethics, Tymoczko also poses unanswered some key questions: “Where is morality a question of individual behaviour and where is it a question of responsibility for social conditions and the nature of society at large? Where are the boundaries between external constraints and internalized values” (2009: 45, my emphasis)? Such questions may not have ready answers but will be addressed partly in the model to be developed in the present study.


80Koskinen denies herself and her study in terms of ethics in her concluding chapter “Awakenings” by stating that “[t]he task of ethical theory is not to give instructions” (2000: 113, my emphasis). It is undoubtedly wrong as moral philosophers have announced clearly: “[e]thical theories are supposed to provide us with decision procedures and/or criteria for evaluation of actions and character. They
Kathleen Davis (2001) all take a deconstructionist approach to translation ethics. Their common conclusion is that translation ethics boils down to the stress of the importance of decision and self-reflexivity on the part of the translator. Different from all of those discussed above is a seeming academic maverick in Western TS, Anthony Pym, who casts doubts about almost all the major views of translation ethics in the West.

2.3.1.3 Translator-entry-free-agency-limited model

As can be seen from the frequent references made in the various sections above, Anthony Pym is a very important figure in translation ethics in the West. From 1994 to 2012, Pym has published a host of essays on various aspects of translation ethics, with his major views on the subject being largely expressed in the following writings: ‘On Cooperation’ (2000), ‘The Return to Ethics in Translation Studies’ (2001), ‘Ethics and Technology’ (2003), Translation and Text Transfer (1992/2010b), and On Translator Ethics (1997/2012), and touched in passing in other writings or talks (1996, 1998, 2004, 2009, 2010a, 2011b)

In the past two decades, taking translation as a major mode of intercultural communication, Pym approached translation ethics chiefly from the perspectives of cooperation and interculturality without fundamental change. His key question has been “why to translate” rather than “how to translate”. In this vein, he also proposed alternatives to translation like learning a foreign language on the part of the client, and giving advice, reviewing or teaching on the part of the translator (2012: 153-156, 157) for intercultural communication. But in his updated monograph on translation ethics On Translator Ethics (2012), in terms of translator agency, Pym shifted his stance for translator agency to cover all translators instead of only ‘professional’ translators. The following is a synthesis of his views based on all his major works, including this 2012 monograph which contains his latest ideas on translation ethics.

Firstly, to Pym, translation ethics is translator ethics. By translator ethics, he means ethics that addresses not only the so-called professional translators but also

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are, in that way, practically oriented” (Driver 2007: 9, see also Singer 1994: 2, Spence and Van Heekeren 2005: 2).

81As a matter of fact, he confirmed to me face to face that “translation ethics” is “translator ethics” (August 2011, personal communication at Leuven).
the paraprofessionals\textsuperscript{82}. He claims that “we have to recognise that the translator is often not a ‘professional translator’” and that “we have to address a far wider range of translation activities” (2012: 4). This shift from focusing on just the profession (Pym 1992:166; also 2004: 179, 2010b:172, 179) to ‘professionals’ and those “acting as” translators is the most attractive part of his views. This stance change resulted from his observation of the popularity of the “democratizing technology” (2012: 11, also see Pym 2003) in the field of translation\textsuperscript{83}. Pym thus rejects the idea of talking about what “‘the (universal) translator’ is or does” (2012: 4), insisting instead that “the translator” be looked at in specific situations. This is like what I have argued previously: a certain party becomes a translator after s/he decides to undertake an accepted ‘translating’ job, by exercising his or her agency. But of course it does not mean the kind of ‘situational ethics’ as meant by Robinson.

Meanwhile, Pym observes that, translation is not only done for economic value, but also for social, symbolic and cultural values on the part of the translator. Accordingly, “[w]e must consider all the things that translators can do” (Pym 2012: 171, original emphasis) because they can do both good and evil (ibid: 172) whether in terms of professional or volunteer work, whether as ‘parrots’ or “revolutionary subjects” (ibid: 11, 97, 100).

By equaling translation ethics to translator ethics, Pym tries to answer not the traditional, “fundamental and inevitable” (2012: 5) question “how to translate”, but “why to translate” on “the most general level” (ibid), covering all kinds of written and spoken forms, both inward and outward. In Pym’s view, if a translation can be exchanged for something, it can be undertaken; otherwise, it is better not to do it. For him, exchange\textsuperscript{84} is a key issue in an era of globalisation where economical gains define almost everything (ibid, my emphasis).

Second, Pym insists that one “should translate in order to promote cooperation” (ibid: 9, my emphasis). Against the “ethics of content”, or “abstract philosophical ethics of the translator”, Pym advocates a role-oriented situational translator ethics by which “[w]e should translate in certain circumstances only, investing variable effort, in order to promote long-term cooperation between cultures” (2012: 12, my

\textsuperscript{82}“Paraprofessionals” for Pym refer to those with expert skills in a field, related to particular translation projects (2011: 97), such as scientists in chemistry, medicine, etc.

\textsuperscript{83}Actually, before the “professionalisation” of translation, translation had always, and still is, done by many people who are “acting” as translators” in many parts of the world.

\textsuperscript{84}For a discussion and critique of translation as exchange, see Behr (2004) and Cheung (2005).
emphasis). By “we”, Pym means ‘all translators’. Otherwise, it is better not to translate, seek other alternatives for the task of communication instead. Elsewhere Pym repeats this view: “What is the knowledge-use value of a translation? For me, it is the degree of cooperation facilitated: a translation has a functional value insofar as it helps people to produce shared benefits from their interactions. Cooperation is the ultimate goal of all the negotiations, dialogue, and involvement. That is my whole answer” (2012: 134, my emphasis).

Aiming at cooperation and mutual benefits is part of the highlight of Pym’s views, which is also taken as an important component of my model of translation ethics in this study. But some problems arise. For example, I don’t think cooperation can be the “ultimate goal” of any translation; it is doubtful that the translation of great literary masterpieces, like Shakespeare and Lu Xun, will facilitate a high degree of cooperation between the British culture and the Chinese culture, while such translation will undoubtedly do further the mutual understanding between the two cultures. In terms of “interactions”, insofar as the translation of literary masterpieces is concerned (Shakespeare for instance again), not many interactions are necessarily involved between the two cultures during or after the translation. Because a translator alone can do the job as is manifested in the cases of Zhu Shenghao, and Liang Shiqiu in China (Jiang 2014).

Another problem concerns the extent to which Pym’s model can be applied. Pym asserts, “[t]he key element in the cooperation model is the point beyond which no mutual benefits are likely to ensue. Beyond that point, translation is wasted, and some other means of communication, or silence, should be sought” (2012: 139). Clearly, to Pym, the various functions of translation have been reduced to only one, i.e. communication. His model thus seems most suitable for business translation projects, but not for projects involving the translation of literary or philosophical works. The translation of literary works cannot be looked at just from the perspective of transaction cost, as the effect or value of the translation of a great work cannot be judged immediately or in a short term.

By taking translation chiefly as a way of communication, Pym’s view is ineluctably reductionist85. What is more, in this model of cooperation, not to

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85Henri Meschonnic candidly critiqued Pym’s model as “market reductionism” (2011: 41). Venuti, in his reply to Zhang’s email on October 7, 2007, also takes issue with Pym’s notion of “cooperation” and other proposals: “Pym’s notion of ‘cooperation,’ like Vermeer’s ‘skopos’ theory, too easily
mention possible evil parties like ‘Hitler’ and ‘Mussolini’ for cooperation, the translator is expected to facilitate cooperation between cross-cultural clients and enhance the mutual benefits thereof, but s/he is excluded from the mutual benefits despite Pym’s arguing for basic justice and protecting the translator’s interests (see 2012: 151ff, 156, 165).

Third, Pym’s model places too much emphasis on the so-called intercultural space. Pym argues that “[i]f you think about it, translators tend not to belong to just one national or confessional culture. Does not the very nature of translation imply that numerous translators operate in several primary cultures at once, or in an intercultural space, understood as an overlap or intersection of cultures? From this point of view, is it not naïve to presuppose that all translators by definition belong to one culture or another” (2012: 9, original emphasis)?

Here Pym’s questions pose other questions. For instance, has anybody really claimed that “ALL” translators “by definition belong to one culture or another”? Judging from the situation at least in China, the vast majority of translators do belong to what is known as ‘Chinese culture’ rather than an imagined intercultural space. In other words, they do not work in an intercultural situation; most of them as a matter of fact work in a mono-cultural circumstance. Martha Cheung (2011: 81) summarises, rightly, that “[w]e are not in a post-nationalist era” yet. With respect to Pym’s intercultural space, Koskinen also casts deep doubts:

Depicting the translator as an impartial inhabitant of a mystical no-man’s-land-in-between, Pym produces an aura of innocence and moral disinterestedness (see Siebers 1988, 11-12). At the same time, a truly intercultural space is a dream, a paradise to come. The problem of Pym’s ethical stand is, therefore, that translators should base their decisions on the norms and goals of a space which is largely hypothetical and whose ultimate aims have yet to be formulated (see 1992a, 168). (Koskinen 2000: 74)

As noted above, I agree with Koskinen on this (see also Yang 2013: 128-130). Pym seems to have chosen to forget the “complex local and global allegiances” (Inghilleri 2012: 124) on the part of the translators or interpreters. Tymoczko’s opposition to the idea of ‘in-between’ also runs counter to this interculturality. Moral philosopher Dwight Furrow’s insight constitutes another counter argument against Pym’s imagined intercultural space for the translators: “Without deeply held attachments and commitments, there is nothing for me to be – no identity conferring

devolves into a business ethics that simply maintain the status quo. It lacks any rigorous ethical or political thinking” (quoted in Zhang 2009: 8, fn1, my emphasis).
commitments that I must honour” (2005: 89), and “[f]or most people, though not all, their racial and cultural identities are fixed facts that are not open to modification” (ibid: 123).

In sum, Pym shows his doubts about almost all the prevalent translation ethical stances in the West: “the elitism of foreignization, the ethical status of non-dialogue, the lingering resistance to democratizing technology, the ever-hopeful bets placed on translators as revolutionary subjects, and the widespread theoretical acceptance of translator interventions strangely without calculations of the many risks involved” (2012: 11). Pym thus adopts a framework of cooperative cross-cultural dialogue or communication to develop his translator ethics. He rejects “ethical principles based on **simple representation**”, “ethics of mercenary service to masters”, human rights relevant ethics, “approaches based solely on **subjective hermeneutics**”, and “**existentialist ethics**” (2012: 166, my emphasis). Having criticised and excluded such “widespread approaches and principles”, Pym put forward a few “general principles of a translator ethics” (ibid):

1. **Translators** are responsible for their **product** as soon as they accept to produce it;  
2. **Translators** are responsible for the **probable effects** of their translations;  
3. **Translator ethics** need not involve deciding between two cultures;  
4. **Transaction costs** should not exceed the total **benefits** ensuing from the corresponding cooperative interaction;  
5. **Translators**, insofar as they are more than simple messengers, are responsible for the capacity of their work to contribute to long-term stable, cross-cultural cooperation (ibid: 166-7, my italics, bold and underlines).

In essence Pym’s model boils down to an effort/effect or cost/benefit ratio where if the effort invested in the translation by the translator outweighs the effect or knowledge-use value (2012: 134), the translator should not translate. For him, all can translate, but with limited agency. At the same time Pym makes no distinction between text types and mingles translation with interpreting; he treats translation of all works in the same way. Strongly against an ethics of “content” (2012), he leaves the impression that all translations are business exchanges.

Despite such problems in Pym’s model, his shift from the profession to ‘all being translators’ is revealing. The alternative of not-translating is also a way to widen the otherwise narrow sphere of translation ethics. I will, as mentioned above, take not-translating as the starting part of my model, but for different reasons.

To conclude, in the West, Chesterman’s translator’s agency-limited model is narrow and inadequate, especially in terms of its exclusion of the non-professionals and insufficient attention to the harm done by translation; the translator’s
agency-enhanced model mainly represented by Robinson, Venuti, Baker and Tymoczko is problematic in one way or another, as it is often too politics-oriented, or one-sided in terms of benefits and harm; as for the translator-entry open model as represented by Pym’s views, in spite of its having a cutting edge in emphasising translation’s mutual benefits and cooperation among “all translators”, it is, however, reductionist in terms of seeing any translation as “exchange”, and is deeply problematic with the notion of interculturality. Major views or models on translation ethics in China are similarly ample, but not lacking in problems either. They will be critically scrutinised in the following section.

2.3.2 Major views and models in China

Ethics is an issue inherent in the practice of translation. It is no exception in China. The issue in fact has drawn attention since the times of Buddhist sutra translations. The most typical example is Shi Yancong’s (557-610CE) discussion of the eight prerequisites on the translator as mentioned in the beginning of this section on translation ethics.

However, in modern times, explicit discussions on the issue of translation ethics were rare; what available was the “keen observers who understood the importance of morality concerning translation” (Mao [1954]2009). But since the opening up of the Chinese Mainland in the 1980s and with the development of TS as a discipline, the issue of ethics has drawn increased attention from translation scholars. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 1, significant work has been done in Xu (1998) and Lü (2001).

It was around the turn of this new century that research into translation ethics began to expand rapidly in China, in much the same way as in the West. Of the large body of literature on translation ethics, as discussed in Chapter 1, a big proportion falls into the realm of sociological study of translation like Peng (2008), Wang (2012), and Tu (2013). Some efforts are introductions, applications or critiques of Western ideas or models, e.g. Liu (2005), Jiang (2008), Zhang (2009), and Xu (2012). Still other efforts are reflections on translation ethics like Wang (2005, 2009), Tang (2007), Chu (2009), Chen (2011, 2012), and Fang (2012). Attempts at ethical model formulation in the sense of normative ethics are only limited to the

86Here “China” is taken as a concept referring to the grander China, covering the Mainland, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.

Ge Lin’s work (2007, 2008) is an attempt to establish a model of “intercultural ethics”, according to which, as she stresses, translation ethics should not be equated with the responsibilities of the translator. Her stress is of significance but a weakness in her argument is also striking: she gives no clear definition of what she means by her “intercultural ethics” throughout the book. For this lack of definition, it would not be meaningful to examine her work any further. In the following examination, I will therefore only focus on the work by the last three scholars, Yang, Luo and Liu but Li, whose work is comprehensive but the data against which to test his model is too special and narrow, i.e. English translation of Chinese classics in today’s world, and the view is not universal or general as ethics requests.

2.3.2.1 Shoujing-daquan (守經達權) model of translation ethics

In his recent book A Study of Translation Ethics (2013), Yang Zhenyuan develops his model of translation ethics. This model goes like this: in the context of cultural globalisation, drawing on Humean distinction between fact and value, plus traditional Chinese ideas “shoujing and daquan" [acting flexibly in concrete tactics while sticking to principles as strategies], he proposes the ethical principle of shoujing daquan for translators and interpreters, where Berman’s and Venuti’s proposal of “respecting the difference” is taken as the fixed foundation of value, i.e. the jing or principles, and Pym’s and Chesterman’s translating methods as the flexible tactics, i.e. the quan. For any translators and interpreters, the principle they should follow is to respect the linguistic and cultural differences, but how to respect the differences is left to the translators and interpreters to decide. I term it the model of “shoujing daquan”.

While it cannot be denied that there is some truth in the model in terms of normative ethics, there are some undeniable problems. The truth of the model lies in the fact that it complies with the core of normative ethics, i.e. some principles to be followed in one’s act. Meanwhile, the Chinese notion of “shoujing daquan” is a very influential and useful notion too, as Yang has convincingly argued. Other

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87Fang Wei also rightly claims that “the concept of translation ethics is not equal to professional ethics or the translator’s responsibility” (2012: 22, trans).
contributions of the model will be summed up at the end of this section.

Now we will focus on the problems. First, as noted above when dealing with ethics per se, the Humean issue itself has been a controversial topic in ethics because, whereas many agree with David Hume that the ought cannot be derived from the is (e.g. Furrow 2005: 3), there are also scholars who insist that the ought can be embodied in the is (see Warnock 1967; Kovesi 1967). In translation, for example, Andrew Chesterman (1993, 2001) expresses the idea that a qualified practitioner of a field such as translation should know what is good and right in his or her behaviour. But I agree with Yang that values and facts should be treated differently or, following Hume, the is cannot result in the ought directly. Nevertheless, I don’t agree with him in the sense that he takes ‘difference’ as an absolute value, although we know difference in translation as a product is absolute while sameness is relative seen from the perspective of the relation between ST and TT.

Second, there is a more serious problem. That is the issue of difference. Concerning difference, we have to keep in mind that difference as a general concept is also relative. As Jane Flax notes, “[d]iscourses of difference cannot be understood outside their specific historical contexts and purposes. They represent attempts to theorize and undo relations of domination” (1998: 436). While respecting difference, we must also seek and develop commonalities. Richard J. Bernstein argues convincingly that “[i]ndeed, commonality and difference are themselves historically conditioned and shifting. The search for commonalities and differences among incommensurable traditions is always a task and an obligation – an Aufgabe” (1991: 66). As a consequence, “[w]e must cultivate the type of imagination where we are at once sensitive to the sameness of ‘the Other’ with ourselves and the radical alterity that defies and resists reduction of ‘the Other’ to ‘the Same’” (ibid: 74, original emphasis). In the field of TS, it has also been argued that difference itself cannot be the foundation for ethics at all (see Weller 2006; cf. Eagleton 2009).

Also related to difference regarding translation ethics is the issue of asymmetrical relations of power between different languages and cultures as noted frequently in the present study. For a minor language, when translating from a major language, e.g. the English language, if too much respect for the difference in the major language is accorded, the minor language at issue is apt to end up losing its identity (cf. Cronin 2006).
Third, insofar as the stance of Berman and Venuti regarding translation ethics is concerned, their problems have been revealed to a large extent. In section 2.3.1.2, when discussing the translator-agency-enhancing model, I pointed out the problem of Venuti’s flagging of difference at length (see pages 60-61). As for Berman’s stance, as Pym has argued, it is of “the academic, abstract nature” and might produce “a narrow, marginal ethics” (2012: 3). Besides, “[r]especting the foreignness in the foreign” or the pure/ethical aim of translation (Berman 1992: 4) is actually Berman’s earlier thinking. It has been proven untenable in many circumstances and given up by Berman (see Berman [1995]2009: 75; also see Simon 1996: 34, Venuti 1998: 81). Berman’s later position on translation ethics is the “play it open” proposal (2009: 75). But it cannot stand firm either as has been criticised by Koskinen (2000: 103) and Fang Wei (2012: 36). Taking Berman’s and Venuti’s problematical ethic models as his jing/principle, Yang’s formulation is rickety at the base.

Fourth, in developing his model, Yang has not made it clear why ethics is important for translation first and foremost. In other words, it seems that he is not clear that it is not only the linguistic and cultural differences that give rise to the ethical issues in translation, but also the inequalities between languages and cultures (see also Chu 2009: 12 and Brisset 2003: 126). Ethical issues arise also and largely because translators and translations might do harm to the active parties and passive entities involved in a translation project, including the languages/cultures.

Lastly, Yang presupposes that translation ethics is equal to translation criterion, which obviously is not the case (cf. Chu 2009: 5-6) since the former concerns far larger a sphere than the latter, which is chiefly concerned with the intertextual relationship between ST and TT. By focussing on four key figures in the West to explore translation ethics: Berman, Venuti, Pym, and Chesterman, he leaves behind other equally prominent scholars like Mona Baker and Maria Tymoczko, whose widely read activist ethical stance is as insightful.

Despite such problems, the model is a significant contribution. Some ideas are even highly insightful. For instance, when he discusses the weaknesses in explorations of translation ethics by Chinese scholars, Yang points out three major problems: an insufficient exploitation of Western ethical theories; a lack of deeply tapping traditional Chinese ethics; and an under-research into the characteristics of current translation ethics in China (2013: 227-30). To my mind, the first two are
sharp observation and in fact are also applicable to the discussion of translation ethics in the West. That is in part why this study will draw heavily on both Confucian ethics and the key ideas in Western ethics.

2.3.2.2 A model combining institutional ethics and translator’s minimal ethics

This model was developed by Luo Xianfeng in his PhD ‘A Study of the Translator’s Ethics in a Postmodern Context’ defended at Hunan Normal University in 2012. It tries to combine institutional ethics with translators’ minimal ethics under which four ethical regulations are proposed for translators.

In Luo’s account, in the context of postmodernism, various approaches to translation such as cultural studies, feminist, postcolonial, deconstructionist have given rise to many paradoxes in understanding the essence of translation and hence translation ethics. As a consequence, he argues, the translator has been allowed too much subjectivity, even the heightened latitude of exercising “creative treason”. In the light of such views, Luo proposes four ethical “regulations” (Luo 2012: iv) to guide and constrain the translator’s behavior. They are “sincerity, responsibility, normalization, and justice” (ibid), which are supposed to help the translator mediate “correctly” the interpersonal, intercultural relationships, and “negociate [negotiate] properly different interests” (ibid) as regards any translation event.

To guarantee that such principles are practiced by translators, Luo further argues that “institutional ethics in the form of laws and institutions” […] “to control accreditation for the profession and translation market access, to enhance honesty and good credit as a general practice, and to promote translation legislation” (ibid) should be established serving as heteronomy for the translator. In addition, translators’ “minimal ethics” as autonomy should also be strengthened so that translators will consciously practice the above advocated principles and “improve their ethic attainment and respect the Other” (ibid).

In essence, although the agency of the translator is recognised in the model in the form of autonomy, Luo’s exploration is conducted from the perspective of the translator’s improper behavior, as can be seen from the examples he cites. The examples are mostly taken from contemporary China, focussing on issues like plagiarism and stark pursuit of economic capital at the cost of translation quality. His model thus boils down to the following three points: (1) reversion to or adherence to fidelity/faithfulness to the source text; (2) development of institutional
ethics of the practice; and (3) cultivating of minimal ethics on the part of the
translator.

Specifically, Luo argues that fidelity is the translator’s minimal ethics (Luo 2012:
187, 190, 209, 212) and by “fidelity” he means fidelity to the ST and the “original
writer” (ibid: 96, trans). He further elaborates that, to realise this minimal ethics, the
translator should respect the other (i.e. reader, author, and the other culture). But
regarding how to respect and how to measure the fidelity no detailed elucidation is
given. Moreover, as noted above in reviewing the major models in the West, fidelity
can mean ethic translation only when no other conditions like ideology or higher
level values intervene in a translation project. Luo’s way of argument is obviously
still in the traditional line of thinking about translation ethics; reciprocity between
the translator and other parties, between the passive entities is not perceivable in the
least. As such, it is no wonder that throughout his argument, elements like
asymmetries of power between languages and between cultures (cf. Chu 2009,
Brisset 2003), between various translating subjects, including the translator in many
translating events, are not touched upon as if they were non-existent.

When it comes to the institutional translation ethics, i.e., in his words, the
unification of ethicalised translation institutions and institutionalised translation
ethics, the transformation of various ethical principles into normalised, legalised
systems (ibid: 211-212), I contend that Luo’s focus seems not on translation ethics
in general but chiefly on the situation in contemporary China. Furthermore, once
ethical principles have been legalised and become external enforcible laws (Luo
2012: 146), the issue is no longer in the terrain of ethics but into the realm of
politics.

The last problem of the model is its generality and validity. Judging from the title,
it should be a study addressing the general issues of translation ethics in a
postmodern context, in other words, chiefly a theoretical exploration. But the
concept of “postmodern” itself is problematic because it is not made clear whose
postmodern context it is. The main examples Luo gives in support of his
argument are largely taken from contemporary China. Whether contemporary China

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88Andrew Chesterman in his revisit of “shared ground” questions the casual usage of the concept of
“postmodernity” by certain translation scholars. In his own words, “Simeoni (in12: 2, p.338) says
that “Postmodernity is indeed our current condition”. I wonder who “we” are here? Mankind? The
West? The rich and educated segments of the West? Only some of the segments? Some other
segments of humanity?” (Chesterman 2002: 147).
is really in the postmodern context is open to question. And whether the problems he finds among the Chinese translators are a result of the influence of postmodernism is doubtful too. His delineation of the so-called “paradoxes of translation ethics” (Luo 2012: iii) is however based on his general discussion of all the major schools to approach translation, like the translation studies school, the feminist school, the postcolonial school, and the deconstructionist school in TS in the past two decades. Such paradoxes constitute the starting point of his research because, in his view, the translator informed by such schools has been granted more subjectivity and allowed too much latitude for “creative treason”. Luo attempts to find out what “ethical regulations” translators should “have” (ibid) so that they will not flag their subjectivity and exercise too much “creative treason” in translation. An obvious discrepancy is perceived between his theoretical framework and the data in his research. As such, the model may have trouble in being applied widely.

2.3.2.3 A Habermasian (Western-source-based) model of translation ethics

Liu Weidong’s model can be said to be a Habermasian (Western-source-based) model, which he developed in his PhD thesis ‘A Way to the Reconstruction of Translation Ethics’ defended in 2011 at Shanghai International Studies University. His conceptual apparatus is the notion of reason/rationality. He argues that

The traditional ethical notion of *faithfulness* related much to the evolution of reason/rationality in the earlier days, centering on the supreme authority of the *author*. The modern ethical concept of *sameness* was based on instrumental rationality in modern times, laying stress on the scientific, objective, and systematic analysis of the *text* within the self-enclosed and autonomous linguistic system, and completely excluding the translator’s *subjectivity* and the author’s intention. When the anti-rational postmodernist train of thoughts swept over the field of translation, the notion of translation ethics cleared away and became ‘an unhappy word’. (Liu 2011: 111, my emphasis)

In his imprecise language, Liu attributes the ethics of “faithfulness” in “earlier days translation practice” to the so-called “reason in the earlier days”, the ethics of “sameness” to “instrumental rationality in modern times”, and ‘no-ethics’ to anti-rationality of postmodernism. In a farfetched manner Liu tries to marry various notions of translation ethics and evolving notions of reason in the West. He pays scant attention to the heated “ethics of difference”, which is, in contrast, highlighted by van Wyke (2010, 2013) in his two entries as noted above. Concerning Liu’s classification, a question immediately arises: is there any real difference between the ethics of “faithfulness” and that of “sameness” distinguished by him?

Defining translation ethics as “the moral principles or standards that coordinate
the interpersonal, intercultural, and intertextual relations in the process of translation, with the translator as its core” (2011: 35), Liu, echoing Chesterman’s 2001 discussion, argues that “the current approaches to translation ethics in the west” [i.e. Chesterman’s (2001) 4+1 models] are “incomplete and incompatible to varying degrees” (Liu 2011: 145). Therefore, by drawing on Jürgen Habermas’ communicative rationality which prioritises intersubjectivity, Liu tries to reconstruct a general framework of translation ethics from three dimensions: the objective, the social, and the subjective (my emphasis), three terms borrowed from Habermas’s notion of three actor-worlds. Liu asserts that,

In the objective dimension, the ethical relations between the translator and the objective world (i.e. the source and the target texts) will be built. In the social dimension, the ethical relations between the translator and the social world, including those between the translator and other participants (i.e. the author, the reader, and the initiator) and of the source and the target cultures, will be constructed. And in the subjective dimension, the ethical relation of the dual identities of the translator (i.e. the self one and the other one) will be investigated. (Liu 2011: iv)

In this model, as Liu claims, the ethical relations between the translator and the source and the target texts; between the translator and the source author, the target reader, and the initiator, between the source and the target cultures; and between the translator himself (the self and the other), are governed by such ethical notions as equal dialogue, mutual understanding, reciprocal respect, general consensus, and harmonious coexistence (my emphasis). He states that his reconstruction is a “united one and a new system” (ibid: 145).

However, there is a weakness in his argument. Apparently, it is an ideal formulation that takes into account the benefits on the part of all the potential participants and the equilibrium between them. But he fails to take into consideration the often de-facto unequal relationships in reality between the translator and the other parties concerned. The problem lies in Habermas’s communicative rationality and the author’s flagging of rationality. First, the assumption of intersubjectivity presupposes that the subjects involved are equal, but the fact is that human interactions rarely happen between equal parties, whether individually or collectively, whether in terms of economy, politics or power. In translation, Bassnett and Trivedi (1999: 2) have aptly pointed out that, when considering the cultural as well as the linguistic boundaries translation crosses, translation in fact “rarely, if ever, involves a relationship of equality between texts, authors or systems”. Theoretical equality cannot defy the de-facto inequalities (cf.
Furrow 2005: 95). Second, according to Zhao Yifan, Habermas’s communicative rationality is embedded in the web of languages, rather than in the political and economic systems (Zhao 2009: 730). In other words, language, definitely paramount in most cases, has been afforded so much power that his communicative rationality in essence amounts to a fetishism of language. Third, whether the deciding factor of ethical acts lies in emotions or reason constitutes the well-known focal argument between Hume and Kant in the field of ethics. According to Li Minghui, both Confucius and Kant acknowledge the unification of emotions and reason in a rational ethical subject (Li 2012: 116).

Apart from the problems concerning his theoretical framework, there are other problems in Liu’s model. For example, Liu argues that, for Habermas, “rationality in communication aims at achieving equal dialogue, mutual understanding and general consensus, instead of one side prevailing over the other” (Liu 2011: 123, my emphasis). This seems no problem, and really closer to my way of thinking, but he does not elaborate on how, according to Habermas, for the translator and other participants to achieve such a noble aim. Liu also argues that the translator “must be responsible for the source text and others as well. His responsibility determines that his understanding is exact and objective” (ibid, my emphasis). But his own words several lines below refute the above statement: “the best understanding of the text” (124, my emphasis) rather than “exact and objective”. From this “exact” or “best” understanding of the text it can be seen clearly that his so-called new model is still largely in the realm of the traditional notion of ethics, i.e. the one stressing the interlingual and intertextual relationships between ST and TT.

Another problem of this model is that he does not explain either why first and foremost ethics is important in and to translation. This is because he is confused in a way about descriptive and prescriptive ethics like many others in the field. As a result, he commits large portions of his research to addressing the so-called ethics of “sameness”, which is, as argued when reviewing the models in the West previously, no ethics at all, but principally the study object of translation science.

The last major problem is the highly confusing discussion of translation practice and translation studies. For instance, he argues that “[t]he translator becomes the creator of the target text and the destructor of the source text, while the source text is reduced as the dependent to the target text; in turn, the target text is the product of the translator’s manipulation” (ibid: 126, my emphasis). Regardless of this touch of
exaggeration, the fact is that the development of TS, especially DTS, or the “manipulation school”, has revealed that in translation history, the allegedly faithful translations often turn out to be manipulated rewritings (see Hermans 1985, Lefevere 1992a). Take another example. Liu claims that “[c]ontemporary translation started in the 1980s when the Cultural Turn occurred in the field of translation. With the successive introduction of critical theories and postmodernist thoughts, which are marked by anti-tradition, anti-rationality, and criticism, contemporary translation challenges and subverts the previous well-established system and shifts its emphasis to external factors outside the linguistic system” (ibid: 108). Apparently he is discussing translation studies, but the language he uses is about translation practice.

In sum, regarding translation ethics in China, the major models are inadequate or insufficient in one way or another. Yang’s definition of translation ethics is sound but his model is reductionist for translation ethics cannot be pinpointed to only one concept of difference, which itself does not constitute a value for ethical formulation at all. Luo’s translator ethics is paradoxical as seen in the discrepancy between the postmodern background and the Chinese reality; it is narrow and traditional, not comprehensive nor general. Liu’s reconstruction of ethics is abstract and hard to apply in real practice on the part of the translator and interpreter.

2.3.3 Defining translation ethics

As seen from the above examination, in the West and China, translation ethics has been approached from various perspectives and on different levels: In the West, there are the translator’s agency-limited professional ethics represented by Chesterman; the translator’s agency-augmented more personal ethics deeply involving politics and ideology typically in Robinson, Venuti, Baker, Tymozko, Inghilleri, Simon, and Spivak; and the more comprehensive translator entry-open but agency-limited ethics represented principally by Pym. In China, there are the model of shoujing and daquan that draws on both Western metaethics and traditional Chinese ethics proposed by Yang Zhenyuan; the model of combining translator ethical principles with institutional ethics and translator’s minimal ethics advocated by Luo Xianfeng; and the Habermasian communicative action theory-based ethics advocated by Lü Jun and Liu Weidong.

However, in spite of the importance and insights of these various views and models, there are also, sometimes rather serious defects and weaknesses about them.
Of the major Western models, Chesterman’s, seemingly comprehensive, is in fact narrow and incomplete in many ways because it first fails to give prominence to the agency of the translator and second neglects the nonprofessionals and paraprofessionals. It falls into the realm of virtue ethics centring on the major agent of translation, i.e. the translator and interpreter, with translation’s potential ‘harm’ under-addressed. Robinson’s vertical ethics declines the possibility of universalism but embraces a situational and relative position which falls on the verge of ethical subjectivism. Venuti’s ethics of difference is mainly concerned with the effect or consequence of translation, hence belonging to consequentialist ethics, and becoming a one-sided model biased in favour, rather than disfavor as it professes to be, of Anglo-American culture. In the case of Baker and Tymoczko, though they both stress the ethical agency of the translator, their proposals seem to exaggerate the role of ideology, power and politics, because in my view not all translation situations must entail politics, ideology and power. Although Pym advocates the translator’s agency for intercultural cooperation and recognises the importance of mutual benefits, he is reluctant to acknowledge the translator’s allegiances. His notion of interculturality is therefore too ideal to be true.

Different from the varied approaches to translation ethics in the West, those influential models of translation ethics in China are basically the same in kind: the three major models I have examined above can all be said to belong to the same category, i.e. that of deontological ethics. Yang’s model is deontological since it explicitly promotes the principle of *shoujing* (守經) and *daquan* (達權); the *jing* (經) being respecting the linguistic and cultural differences while the *quan* (權) exercising flexible tactics in any translation project on the part of the translator or the interpreter. Luo’s is one in which the translator’s agency is to be restricted as it advocates ethical regulations that translators should follow. Liu’s, by advocating communicative rationality and intersubjectivity, stresses a harmonious relationship between the translator and other participants. According to him, these other participants fall into three categories: the objective, social and subjective. As this model emphasises such ethical notions as equal dialogue, it can also be called a deontological model.

In sum, concerning translation ethics, what counts is not sameness or difference that concerns chiefly the intertextual relationship. Nor is it domesticating or
foreignising, which are just two means of translation, although means also involves ethics. Visibility or invisibility of the translator cannot make sufficient condition for translation ethics either. Translation ethics concerns the agent, the process and the result of the process—translation the product, so it has something to do with deontology as it entails principles during the process of translating, to do with virtue ethics as the major agent the translator, has to interact with other participants and exercise much agency in most cases, and to do with consequentialism because translation the product will exert great effect on the parties and entities on both sides in terms of harm and benefits.

Meanwhile, translation is largely translators’ performance in language. What is important in their deliberation relating to a translation project should be conscious and conscientious, because their decisions will certainly generate benefits or harm to the parties involved or affected. At the same time, while there is common ground between the ethics of translation with ethics in other practices or professions, such as medicine, law and journalism in the sense that all the practitioners should not do harm to others or gain benefits at the expense of other parties, it is different from other professionals in that the consequence/effect of translation can be immediately or lastingly cross-linguistic/cultural while the effect of other practices or professions is usually easily felt in the vicinities of the practice. This difference renders translation ethics more complex.

In the light of such situations, translation ethics should be a combination of principle ethics regarding translation the process, translation the product, and virtue ethics regarding the major agent the translator, and other prospective participants. But this combination is too general for a practical model of translation ethics. Translation is by definition an activity that always involves pairs of active parties and passive entities. To formulate a model that can help deal with such active parties and passive entities in terms of harm and benefits, a more specific ethical notion is needed. This notion is reciprocity. Reciprocity and ethics of reciprocity from the West, both those proposed by Paul Ricoeur and those from the East, i.e. those related to Confucian philosophy, for their efficacy and explanatory power, will be brought to the fore and discussed at great length in the following chapter, to lay the theoretical foundation for the formulation of my model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’.
In Chapter 2, the major models and views of translation ethics in the West and China were examined, and my conception of translation ethics was given: as translation entails the agent, the process and the product, ethics in general is approached as a virtue to guide the agent and/or as a principle to guide the act and evaluate the consequence, translation ethics is a combination of principle ethics and virtue ethics to address harm and benefits to all the interconnected entities and parties.

This chapter attempts to provide the theoretical foundation for the formulation of my model, i.e. it will focus on the key concept of the study, the ‘ethics of reciprocity’. The first section starts with an examination of ‘reciprocity’ as a concept in various fields and disciplines like etymology, philosophy, anthropology, sociology, and economics, and then, in the second part, it proceeds to discuss it as a norm and practice. The third part of the section examines reciprocity as a value and virtue.

The subsequent section is an examination of one of the two chief notions of reciprocity, Ricoeurian reciprocity from the West. Ricoeur argues that anyone acting might also be suffering or be the recipient of other people’s acting, in other words, a man of capacity is also a man of vulnerability. He also holds that anyone and everyone wishes to live a good life, with and for others, in a just institution. Finally, in Ricoeurian reciprocity, the universal and the historical are also reciprocal.

The last section studies Confucian reciprocity. In Confucian reciprocity, anyone is a relational self in different capacities, presupposing corresponding roles or capacities on the part of others, whether the relation being equal or unequal as embodied in the concept and practice of wulun, featuring mutually other-regarding. Meanwhile, one is able to help others stand up and put oneself in others’ shoes represented in the concepts of zhong and shu. And then, one is not necessarily always in a fixed role or capacity as embodied in the concepts of junzi and junzi buqi, establishing the subjective and intersubjective ethical agency.

These two different-sourced notions of reciprocity will be analysed and adapted to join and enhance each other to provide the theoretical foundation for the formulation of my reciprocal ethics model for translation in Chapter 4 further below.
3.1 Reciprocity as a concept, a practice and a virtue

Reciprocity as a concept and practice is found in different domains of the social sciences and humanities, including TS. In social sciences such as sociology, anthropology, economics, social psychology, and international relations, it figures in an important manner. In philosophy and ethics, especially in contemporary French philosophy, it is prominent as well. In translation studies, as noted in Chapter 1, it is also drawing attention of TS theorists.

3.1.1 Reciprocity as a concept

For a clear understanding of reciprocity as a concept, it may be useful to go with its etymology first. In *Webster 3rd New International Dictionary* (2002: 1895, original capitals, my underline), reciprocity is defined as: “1: the quality or state of being reciprocal: mutual dependence, action, or influence: GIVE AND TAKE, MUTUALITY; 2a: a mutual exchange of trade or other concessions or privileges; b: a mutual exchange of courtesies between two states or institutions.” Etymologically, the adjective ‘reciprocal’ comes from Latin *reciprocus* or *reciprocitate*, which means ‘returning the same way, alternating’. In ‘*reciprocus*’, *reci* is from *re cus* (from *re-* ‘back’ + *-cus*, adjective formation), and *procus* (from *pro-* ‘forward’ + *-cus*, adjective formation). Thus it is chiefly defined as: “2a: mutually existing: shared, felt, or shown by both sides; b: expressive of mutual action or relationship; 3: serving to reciprocate: consisting of or functioning as a return in kind; 4a: corresponding to each other: being equivalent or complementary; b: marked by or based upon reciprocity.”

In the *OED* (3rd edition, June 2009; online version December 2011 at [http://0-www.oed.com.hkbulib.hkbu.edu.hk/view/Entry/159546](http://0-www.oed.com.hkbulib.hkbu.edu.hk/view/Entry/159546), accessed 09 January 2012, my underline), ‘reciprocity’ means: “1. the quality, state, or condition of being reciprocal; reciprocal action or relation, esp. reciprocation of cooperative or altruistic behaviour; an instance of this. 2.a. mutual recognition by two parties of certain rights and privileges, esp. as the basis for commercial relations. b. in Kantian philosophy: the mutual action and reaction of coexistent substances; (also) the disjunctive judgement identified with this”. The entry of ‘reciprocal’ is clearer:

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89Luigino Bruni mentions that the verb ‘reciprocate’ means ‘to return, requite’ and it has been recorded in English from the first quarter of the 16th century (2008: 124, n3 of Introduction).
“1.a. Of the nature of, or relating to, a return (in kind); made, given, etc., in response; answering, corresponding; b. Relating to, or of the nature of, a mutual or simultaneous exchange; given and received mutually; traded, exchanged; c. Of a person or thing: sent or given by each party to the other, esp. as a formal exchange. 2. Existing on both sides; felt or shared by both parties; mutual. 3.a. Moving backwards and forwards alternately; characterized by (a) movement of this type. b. Alternate, alternating (now rare). 4. Interchangeable, synonymous, equivalent in meaning or force; 5. Interacting with, referring to, or depending on each other mutually; interdependent; complementary; correlative. 6. Opposed or opposing, contrary; inversely corresponding, converse”.

From these two dictionaries, it can be seen that the concept of reciprocity presupposes two sides or two parties and a mutual relationship between the two, with the basic meaning “return in kind or the same way”: forward and backward. In addition to this basic meaning it has a wide range of usages, hence David Schmidtz (2006: 82) calls it a cluster concept90. Seen from the adjective ‘reciprocal’ especially, it typically features mutual dependence or interdependence of the two parties or sides concerned.

Following this examination of reciprocity in terms of its etymology is the exploration of it as a concept in the humanities. In philosophy and ethics, reciprocity is a very important concept. For Aristotle, reciprocity is important because it holds communities together (2004: 1132b31-34, 1133a1-2, 11, 24, 26-28, 1133b5-8, 15-16). For Martin Buber, “[r]elation is reciprocity. […] Inscrutably involved, we live in the currents of universal reciprocity” (1970: 67, 58). He also recognises the dominance of reciprocity in human society as he says that “[i]n the beginning is the relation” (ibid: 69)91. John Rawls, in his discussion of social justice in A Theory of Justice (1971), elucidates the importance of reciprocity to moral sentiments and ethical order at the individual and social levels. Schmidtz, as noted above, in his Elements of Justice gives extensive attention to this important notion as well (2006: 73-103).

In contemporary French philosophy, the concept of reciprocity has drawn

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90In TS, Tymoczko, informed by Wittgenstein, discusses ‘cluster concept’ at length in her monograph Enlarging Translation Empowering Translators (2007: 83-90). To her, translation per se is a cluster concept as well. 91Buber’s assurance of reciprocity as against Levinas’s denial of it is a heated topic as found in the collection Levinas and Buber (2004), especially in Gordon’s essay “Ethics and the place of the Other” (2004).
different, even opposite, views, though. For example, to French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, the most profound ethical request is that of reciprocity (1999: 46, my emphasis). His notion of reciprocity, examined in detail below, will be taken to join Confucian reciprocal ethics as the theoretical foundation for this study. But, holding an opposite position to Ricoeur is French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, who completely denies the existence of reciprocity as an ethical relationship\textsuperscript{92}. Levinas’ ethics has been highly influential in the field of TS in the past two decades (see Laygues 2005; Eaglestone 2005; Inghilleri 2009, etc.), yet this influence in TS cannot conceal the problems immanent in his ethical stance.

His ethics is too radical and does not adequately describe the relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘Other’ in that he overemphasises the Other at the expense of the Self. As Tomas Tatranský sums well, “in Levinas’s view, I perceive the Other’s order (which is even independent from the Other’s initiative) to take on his or her suffering or even guilt, but he or she simultaneously remains a stranger who does not enter the relationship of reciprocity with me” (Tatranský 2008: 294). It is not “an ethics of sacrifice in general, but an ethics of exclusively and inalienably my sacrifice” (ibid: 296, original emphasis), “pure self-sacrifice with no return or communion. It is a radical ethics of unilateral non-reciprocity” (ibid: 297). Against Levinas’s denying of reciprocity and over-emphasis of the Other, Richard Bernstein’s counter argument is more convincing, as he has the following to say:

\begin{quote}
[The] irreducible alterity does not mean that there is nothing in common between the I and its genuine ‘Other.’ If there were nothing in common, we would once again find ourselves in the aporias of self-defeating relativism and/or perspectivism. Acknowledging the radical alterity of ‘the Other’ does not mean that there is no way of understanding the Other, or comparing the I with its Other. Even an asymmetrical relation is still a relation. Alternatively we can say that to think of ‘the Other’ as an ‘absolute Other,’ where this is taken to mean that there is no way whatsoever for relating the I to ‘the Other,’ is unintelligible and incoherent. We must cultivate the type of imagination where we are at once sensitive to the sameness of ‘the Other’ with ourselves and the radical alterity that defies and resists reduction of ‘the Other’ to ‘the Same.’ […] We must resist the dual temptation of either facilely assimilating the alterity of ‘the Other’ to what is ‘the Same’ (this is what Levinas so acutely emphasizes) or simply dismissing (or repressing) the alterity of ‘the Other’ as being of no significance –‘merely’ contingent. We must also resist the double danger of imperialistic colonization and inauthentic exoticism when encountering ‘the Other.’ Contrary to Levinas there is a reciprocity between the I and ‘the Other’ (l’autrui) which is compatible with their radical alterity. For both stand under the reciprocal obligation to seek to transcend their narcissistic egoism in understanding the alterity of the Other” (Bernstein 1991: 74, original italics, my underline).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{92}Levinas’s main ideas of ethics are found in his two major books Totality and Infinity (1991) and Otherwise than Being (1981); see also Hand (1989).
Apart from Bernstein, Derrida (1978, 2000), Alain Badiou (2002) and Terry Eagleton (2009) also take issue with Levinas for his absolute prioritising of the Other. Indeed, Self and Other are relative and reciprocal to each other. To establish one’s identity one has to be situated in a relation with the Other, as “[o]ne cannot be outside the relations that constitute the other; one’s own identity is dependent on being in relation to her” (Flax 1998: 440; see also Zhao Yiheng 2010: 6).

When it comes to translation, Spivak’s view constitutes a good disclaimer of Levinas’s notion of ethics, as she argues that, “[p]aradoxically, it is not possible for us as ethical agents to imagine otherness or alterity maximally. We have to turn the other into something like the self in order to be ethical” (Spivak 2004: 372).

### 3.1.2 Reciprocity as a norm and practice

Besides being an important concept in philosophy and ethics, reciprocity is practiced as a social norm in many societies and activities such as in social communication and economic exchange. In sociology, reciprocity figures prominently. American sociologist Howard Becker argues that human beings live in reciprocity, as “*Homo reciprocus*” (1956: 16). He makes a reference to the fact that in ancient China, “[m]an was viewed not only as reciprocal with his fellows, but also with nature” (ibid: 27). In the view of another American sociologist Alvin W. Gouldner, reciprocity is a pervasive social norm across various societies. He argues that a norm of reciprocity can be hypothesized as universal (1960: 171). What he means by the norm of reciprocity is that “if others have been fulfilling their status duties to you, you in turn have an additional or second-order obligation (repayment) to fulfill your status duties to them” (ibid: 176). For him, “[t]he norm of reciprocity [is] that each party has rights and duties. […] In effect, reciprocity has its significance for role systems in that it tends to structure each role so as to include both rights and duties” (Gouldner 1960: 169, original italics, my underline). Liang Shuming, the “last Confucian in modern China” (Alitto 1986), not resorting to sociology, has expressed similar ideas. Liang notes that, in Confucian ethics, each party is supposed to give regard to the other without claiming initially his/her rights because the rights will be granted by the other in the interaction or mutual regarding (Liang 2011: 90). As Confucian ethics is of paramount importance to the formulation of the

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93 Qin Jianghua (2013a) is a clear summary of ancient Chinese reciprocal attitude and forms to nature, gods, king, and relatives, confirming Becker’s knowledge here; see also Wang Shuo (2011).
model of reciprocal ethics in translation for my project, it will be discussed in
greater detail in the next section.

In anthropology, reciprocity is also a very important issue. French moral
philosopher and economist Serge-Christophe Kolm states that reciprocity “has
dominated anthropology for eighty years” (2006: 397). In the UK, the
anthropologist Malinowski points out that reciprocity was a routine practice in
archaic societies as he stresses that “most if not all economic acts are found to
belong to some chain of reciprocal gifts and counter-gifts, which in the long run
balance, benefiting both sides equally (1932: 39; see also van Baal 1975: 13).
Reciprocity as a principle in anthropology is elucidated by the French
sociologist and anthropologist Marcel Mauss in his well-known essay *The Gift*
([1924]1970). In that essay he describes three interlocking duties for one to be a
social member: “to give, receive and repay” (1970: 80). But “to Mauss reciprocity
was anything but a matter of course” (van Baal 1975: 23) as he observes that the
gift is always followed by a counter-gift like an obligation in a contract. Modern
French structuralist anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss believes that the principle of
reciprocity can be the foundation of all social relations (1969: 84). Meanwhile, also
in anthropology, following Malinowski, American anthropologist Marshall Sahlins
takes reciprocity as utilitarian rather than spiritual (see Ki 2006: 731). And to
Holland’s anthropologist, Edbert de Vries, “reciprocity is of a *holistic* character,
rooted in and expression of the integrated human personality” (1968: 10, my
emphasis).

Aside from sociology and anthropology, the importance of reciprocity has also
been acknowledged in the field of economics. See, for example, the discussions by
S-Ch. Kolm from the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, France
(Kolm 2000, 2006, 2008). According to Kolm, of the four ways of exchange in
human economic activities, reciprocity is the only alternative to oppressive
command, selfish exchange, and utopian unconditional altruism. He argues, quite
rightly, that reciprocity is “central to genuine social improvement” (Kolm 2006:
379). Others agree with Kolm, including Offer (1997) and Bruni (2008) who also

92The Holland anthropologist J. van Baal points out that the influential Cunnison English translation
of Mauss’s *Essai sur le Don* is very “inaccurate” (van Baal 1975: 16, fn3), but for the unavailability
of other translations, the one referred to here is still Cunnison’s version (1970). The above quoted
three duties in van Baal’s translation are: “to give, to accept, and to return” (van Baal 1975: 26), the
difference lying in the second “to receive” or “to accept”.

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address the phenomenon of reciprocity in economics. Luigino Bruni’s view of reciprocity is more general and broader as he argues that “civil life is essentially a matter of reciprocity. Cooperation, friendship, contracts, pacts, family, love and even conflict, are all relationships very different from one another, but sharing basically one characteristic: all are forms of reciprocity” (2008: ix, original emphasis). For Bruni, “[w]hat is typical in each form of reciprocity is the encounter of giving and receiving. It is in this sense that reciprocity is one. At the same time, reciprocity comes in many guises and is inspired by many different motivations: therefore, reciprocities are many” (2008: 96, original emphasis).

Reciprocity is also applied in international relations where states grant favors to each other in specific cases or in general relations (see Keohane 1986). In intercultural communication, reciprocity is equally important. For example, Johannesen et al states that, “[i]n their book, Foundations of Intercultural Communication, Guo-Ming Chen and William Starosta attempt to ‘integrate both universal and relative perspectives’ in proposing an ethic for intercultural and multicultural communication. They believe that while some different ethical standards for different cultures may be necessary because of divergent value assumptions, a set of ‘universal principles of intercultural communication ethics can be generated.’ They started with reciprocity as the fundamental universal principle of interpersonal communication” (Johannesen et al 2008: 225-6, original emphasis). Moreover, the motivation of reciprocity has been researched in psychology, sociopsychology, and even biology (see Kolm 2000: 117 and Axelrod 1984).

In addition to such general examination, there are also more nuanced and insightful understandings of reciprocity. For example, in Nel Nodding’s caring ethics, the reciprocal relationship between the cared-for and the caring can be a relation of direct response, but it can also be the cared-for’s “personal delight or happy growth” (Noddings 1984: 176). Likewise, Ellen Wondra argues that “reciprocity is not a matter of exchange, but of offering and response. And a gift subsequently given by the other is not a ‘return’ but a ‘new offering’” (2004: 71, my emphasis). This is a revealing and constructive point. It is, in fact, in accordance with the notion of reciprocal relationship in Chinese culture. The giving/reciprocating relationship in Chinese culture is not just a common relation of exchange, neither a relation of complementarity in the economic sense, nor a peach-for-peach mutuality, but also a way for showing respect and regard. What the
Chinese value more is the notion of “one meal amounting to a thousand gold”, i.e. the yi 義 embodied in the timely giving (Wang Shuo 2011: 121). Gao Zhaoming also argues well that “reciprocity must be right and good” (1997: 29, trans., original emphasis); a contractual utilitarian reciprocity, if devoid of good and beauty, is far from sufficient to build a world appropriate for the full development of humanity (ibid: 30).

With respect to the typology of reciprocity, three scholars’ works stand out: Sahlins (1972), Kolm (2008) and Bruni (2008). Sahlins develops three types of reciprocity: generalized, balanced and negative reciprocities (1972: 193-6) in his seminal Stone Age Economy.95 Generalized reciprocity, placed by Sahlins at the “solidary extreme” of the spectrum of reciprocities, is practised in the family circle, with its demand for obligatory returns being implicit and long-lasting; at the other “unsocial extreme” is the negative reciprocity, i.e. the exchanges among acquaintances, emphasising use-value, non-return, or even exploitation. Balanced reciprocity, located at the midpoint, is the most widely accepted mode of gift exchange. Sahlins’ typology of reciprocity, although about ancient societies, has been influential since its inception. For example, Chang Xiangqun (2010), largely drawing on this typology, writes her tome on reciprocity/lishang wanglai practised in contemporary rural China.

Kolm (2008: 98) views reciprocity also of three types: balance or matching reciprocity, liking reciprocity and continuation reciprocity. His standard of classifying reciprocity is the motive of reciprocating. But his view of reciprocity is too narrow, for he largely centres on the gift-giving/re-giving interaction, that is, the positive side of reciprocity, without considering much of the negative side of it.

Bruni develops three forms of reciprocity too: reciprocity of contract, reciprocity of friendship or philia, and unconditional reciprocity (2008: x). The first form, i.e. reciprocity of contract, refers to the self-interested exchange, the second mutual gift, and the third unconditional giving (traditionally taken as unilateral acts of altruism). For Bruni, the third form of reciprocity can be “summarized by the expression of ‘gratuitousness’: the action inspired by gratuitousness is relational (not individualistic), but is not conditional upon the other’s response” (ibid: 48, original emphasis). This form has only one trait in common with the other forms: freedom.

95The typology was in its incipient form in Sahlins’ earlier essay On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange (1965) and fully developed in this quoted work.
Not coincidently, here Bruni’s third form of reciprocity, his focus in the book, is congruent with the choices of junzi-like persons who can initiate an action without seeking approval of others but the action is relational to and for the sake of the others de facto (see section 3.2.2.3 below).

Compared with the three typologies of reciprocity above, Schmidt also has three, but broader, more inclusive and comprehensive types: balanced or “symmetrical” reciprocity (2006: 82: original italics): A to B, and (then) B to A; transitive reciprocity (ibid: 83, original italics): A to B, and (then) B to C or to a larger B; and reverse reciprocity: A to B, and (then) C to A. Here what A, B, and C are giving is not necessarily in kind and of exact equivalence, but rather in a loose sense. They are all independent agents possibly in different capacities. All three forms can be both positive and negative. The “then” in the brackets is added and means that the reciprocity at issue may entail a sequence of time or may happen simultaneously between the parties concerned. With respect to the activity of translation, the first type of reciprocity figures prominently.

In sum, reciprocity is a basic, polymorphic and pervasive pattern of fundamental human interaction to sustain a society (Kolm 2006: 376). Van Baal’s definition seems more comprehensive and objective: “[r]eciprocity is doing or rendering something in return for a good received, an act committed, or an evil inflicted” (1975: 11, my emphasis). That is to say, besides positive and generally benevolent reciprocations, there are undeniably also negative or malign reciprocations [in revenge]. Some of such negative reciprocations are practised for deterrence of further harm. Van Baal concludes his essay on reciprocity by claiming that “reciprocity is a universal rule for all human relations” (1975: 69, my emphasis). Schmidt, too, looking chiefly at the positive side, argues that “[p]rinciples of reciprocity are at the core of a just society” (2006: 94, my emphasis).

Reciprocity can thus be positive and negative, direct and indirect, real-time and “delayed” (van Baal 1975: 36), equal and approximately equal, in kind and not in kind. It can be between individuals, between groups, and between individuals and

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96De Vries found that in some extraordinary examples that “reciprocity expresses itself by preference not in giving something in return, but in on-giving” (1968: 16). This ‘on-giving’, I understand, is equal to Schmidt’s transitive reciprocity here.
97Different from Sahlins’ typology of “negative reciprocity”, here ‘negative’ refers to opposite to ‘positive’, i.e. evil for evil, ‘an eye for an eye’ type.
groups. It can be between equal parties, and between unequal parties, latent and patent (cf. Gouldner 1960: 170, n39). But more than that, more than being viewed as a concept and social norm, reciprocity can also be viewed from the perspective of value and virtue, as we will discuss below.

### 3.1.3 Reciprocity as a value and virtue

C. A. van Peursen advances a philosophy of reciprocity; he takes it as a value (1968). For him, in the West, because of individualism mankind and society are in the egocentric predicament. To get out of this predicament, he promotes this value of reciprocity. He argues that “[r]eal reciprocity implies […] self-identity, the necessary basis for personal responsibility, without which no fundamental reciprocity would be possible” (1968: 22, my emphasis). Without this self-identity, reciprocity may render one lost to mass-mentality (ibid: 27). In his thought, both humans and society are redefined in the frame of reciprocity: “man as a speaking being exists only in reciprocity” as “dialogue precedes monologue, consciousness of responsiveness precedes self-consciousness” (ibid: 29). For him, man “is not like a thing, existing in itself and linked up by ties to other things; rather man is not human as a thing existing in itself, he is man through his human relationships” (ibid: 30, my emphasis). Therefore, “reciprocity is not, in the first place, an empirical relationship, nor a given fact. It is not a fact but a value, not an empirical relation but a norm according to which empirical relations can be analyzed and judged” (ibid: 31, my emphasis). Elsewhere he also stresses that reciprocity is a “dynamic principle” (ibid: 34, my emphasis), “a task, a value to be realized” (ibid: 37, my emphasis). Similarly, Schmidtz also argues that reciprocity can be taken as a value to be promoted, the willingness and ability to reciprocate (2006: 85, and fn. 22, my italics).

Another more thorough study of reciprocity as a virtue is done by American philosopher Lawrence C. Becker (1986). Becker proposes reciprocity, rightly, as a fundamental moral virtue (1986: 3) and summarises his concept of reciprocity in the following set of maxims: “that we should return good for good, in proportion to what we receive; that we should resist evil, but not do evil in return; that we should make reparation for the harm we do; and that we should be disposed to do those

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*Schmidtz takes Becker’s *Reciprocity* as “a wonderful, neglected book” (2006: 75).*
things as a matter of moral obligation” (ibid: 4). Thus, he argues that it is a *deontic virtue* (ibid, my emphasis).

Yet Becker reminds us that, reciprocity “has been less prominent, by name at least, in moral philosophy, but its controlling ideas lie behind much of the moral theory about restitution, retribution, gratitude, fair play, and proportionate justice” (ibid), and “[i]t has been held to be a defining, or ‘structural’ element in the human psyche, giving rise to our most basic social practices and institutions” (ibid: 3-4).

Similar to Bruni, Becker also finds that reciprocity is prevalent in human life. To Becker, “[g]ifts and goods pervade our lives. So do evils and injuries. Everywhere, in every society of record, there is a norm of reciprocity about such things” (ibid: 73). The forms are varied and dynamic because “[t]he details differ strikingly from place to place, time to time, and every society is profuse with forms” (ibid: 73; see also Becker 2001: 1464). At the same time he points out expressly that “[r]eciprocity is not the Christian virtue of loving forgiveness or turning the other cheek” (1986: 95), neither, “for the most part, money matters” (ibid: 113). So reciprocity is prevalent but manifests in different forms.

Meanwhile Becker asks a sharp and important question as to the scope of the norm of reciprocity: should it be restricted to “voluntary transactions” or open to all of our interactions with others (2001: 1465)? His answer is available in the 1986 book: “we owe a return for all of the good we receive, not merely for the good we accept” (Becker 1986: 4, original emphasis), in part echoing what is involved in Confucianism as noted above (see Qin 2013a). For Becker, the practice of negative ‘tit for tat’ such as ‘an eye for an eye’ is not ethical as he claims that “[r]etaliation, defined as returning evil for evil, is by definition unjustifiable. It is by definition an instance of acting immorally” (ibid: 95).100

To those who object to reciprocity because they think reciprocity may subject the disadvantaged into entrenched long-term inequalities, Becker argues that such inequalities are not a result of reciprocity. But rather, “commensurate exchanges are to be measured in terms of both benefits received and sacrifices made, with the final

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100This is different from the Chinese concept of ‘bao’ as discussed by Yang Lien-sheng (1957), Zhai Xuewei (2007), Chang Xiangqun (2010), Wang Shuo (2011) and Qin Jianghua (2013a, 2013b), which includes both the positive and negative sides of reciprocity but richer. Zhai Xuewei (2007), Wang Shuo (2011) and Qin Jianghua (2013a) elucidate clearly the concept and practice of ‘bao’, which is an important part of Confucianism, but beyond Confucianism as ideas of Buddhism are also involved in it. But reciprocity for this study will not be the same with what is examined in the literature, rather, gleaned and redefined.
assessment to be made in terms of what best achieves the purposes of reciprocity” (ibid: 134). As Becker argues, reciprocity “outweighs any single ideal or value that conflicts with it” (ibid: 143) and it is a more inclusive virtue even than justice since it is “not confined to situations of social conflict; it is meant to operate in all social transactions” (ibid: 148). From what has been discussed above, we may conclude that reciprocity is also a value and a virtue, which are paramount elements for ethics. In what follows below, I will explore two more specific and influential conceptions of reciprocity, one in the West and the other in China, namely Ricoeurian reciprocity and Confucian reciprocity.

3.2 Ricoeurian Reciprocity

Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) was a “leading” French philosopher (Kearney 2006: vii), and “one of the most challenging, hospitable and enduring thinkers of the twentieth century” (ibid: viii). In his career as a hermeneutical philosopher, Ricoeur was a prolific author (see Marsh 2002). His writings “cover a formidable range, and are often of considerable complexity” (Giddens in Thompson 1981: vii). But his views on ethics are chiefly expressed in his later works including Oneself as Another (hereafter OA) (1992), which stemmed from his Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh in 1986, his essay “Approaching the Human Person” (1999), and a book series on justice, i.e. On the Just (2000) and Reflections on the Just (2007a). These two books on justice are a further development of his major monograph OA, and in them he developed or “corrected” what he called his “little ethics” in OA (2007a: 3). Ricoeur is well versed in the entire Western tradition of ethics, ranging from Aristotle’s teleological ethics, via Kant’s deontology, to modern developments like Rawls’ theory of justice and Habermas’ ethics of discussion. His view on ethics of reciprocity is largely represented in the aforementioned writings. In 2004, just one year before his death, he published a booklet sur la traduction, translated into English in 2006 as On Translation, in which he expressed his thinking on the nature and importance of translation, his philosophy of translation, and his vision of translation as a paradigm. But what is most relevant to this study is his view of ethics of reciprocity. This being the case, we will confine our discussion in the following chiefly to his notion of ethics of reciprocity.
3.2.1 Threefold reciprocity

For a closer look at his view on reciprocal ethics, it is useful to give a whole picture of Ricoeur’s conception of ethics first. In his second book on the just, Ricoeur (2007a) reconstructs the whole realm of moral philosophy. To him, the most fundamental and most ordinary moral experience consists in “the conjunction between the positing of a self that is the author of its choices and the recognition of a rule that obligates us—at the intersection of the self that posits itself and the rule that imposes itself stands the autonomy thematised in Kant’s practical philosophy” (2007a: 2)\(^1\). Taking this conjunction of a self and a rule or Kant’s morality of obligation as a “new median” (ibid), Ricoeur complements and corrects his “little ethics” developed in his *OA*, as mentioned above.

In this new formulation, the domain of ethics is seen as split between a fundamental ethics taken as “anterior” and a cluster of regional ethics taken as “posterior” (ibid). Ricoeur defines morality [Kant’s notion of ethics] as “the plane of reference in relation to which a fundamental ethic that is anterior to it and an applied ethics that is posterior to it are defined” (2007a: 56). He uses the metaphor of ‘upstream side of norms’ to refer to the fundamental ethics, which goes before morality and that of ‘downstream side of norms’ to refer to the applied or “regional” ethics which go after morality (Ricoeur 2007a: 45). Apparently, Ricoeur sees ethics as a river in a metaphorical manner. And here “morality” for him is reflected in various norms or obligations in Kantian sense. An ethics of the good born from desire or wish as the fundamental, flows through the morality of duty or norm to the specific regions where practical wisdom is needed.

But at the same time, Ricoeur argues that “there is no need to oppose the two types of predicates [good and obligatory]” (2007a: 49), as, for Ricoeur, they do not “belong to the same reflective level” (ibid). For him, the “obligatory” belong to the “plane of norms” while the “good” belong to “a more basic order, that of desire that structures the whole of the practical field” (ibid, my emphasis). In such practical fields, virtues or excellences of action, as Ricoeur sees it, “consist essentially in a way of acting under the guidance of rational preferences” (ibid). Ricoeur continues,

\(^1\)Here it can be seen that Ricoeur’s “objective norm and subjective imputability” (2007a: 47) are somewhat like the concepts of *Li* 礼 and *Ren* 仁 in Confucian ethics. *Ren* is something a subject tries to internalise and realise in his/her being and doing while *li* is something that exists objectively over time that may guide and direct his/her being and doing.
“[T]he transition between the limited aims of practices (crafts, lifestyles, and so on) and the intending of a good life is ensured by the mediating concept of the ergon, the ‘task’—which orients a human life considered as a whole. The task of being human overflows and envelops every particular task that assigns a good intention to every practice” (ibid: 49-50, my emphasis).

Deeply influenced by Aristotle, Ricoeur’s stress of the direct relation between a practice’s aim and a good life seems overstated. For in modern society, a practice usually has its own aim or aims, which may not have a direct relation with a good life because a good life is so individualistic that it should be placed in the realm of aesthetics rather than ethics (cf. Li Zehou 2010: 15, 111, 175).

Ricoeur’s threefold structure of wishing for a good life, for and with others, in just institutions constitutes his notion of ethics, the fundamental level of his three-level hierarchical model. Ricoeur argues, as noted above, there is a homology between the Kantian triad of imperatives and the triad of wishes in this fundamental ethic: “a good life, solicitude, justice” (2007a: 6). His view on reciprocity is largely embodied in this threefold structure.

In fact, Ricoeur repeatedly expresses this triadic structure in various places (1992: 172, 180, 239-40, 288; 1999: 45; 2007a: 4, 6, 7, 56, 233, and 237). It is like this: any rational human person is wishing to live a good life, with and for others, in a just institution. This well known threefold structure can also be conveyed in the following alternative: self-esteem, solicitude, and just institutions. In essence he means: first, preserving oneself in terms of self-esteem; second, respecting the other; and third, for human survival and happiness, the former two need to happen in just institutions. An in-depth elucidation of this threefold structure of reciprocity follows:

In his essay ‘Approaching the Human Person’, Ricoeur proposes the following definition of ethos: “desire for an accomplished life – with and for others – in just institutions” (1999: 45, my emphasis). Ricoeur argues that “[w]hile subscribing to Levinas’ analyses of the face, exteriority, alterity, even the primacy of the appeal emanating from the other over the recognition of self by self, it seems to me that the most profound ethical request is that of the reciprocity that institutes the other as my

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102Kant’s famous three formulations in Ricoeur’s words go like this: “taking the moral law as the practical analogue of nature’s law; respecting humanity in my person and in that of others; and taking myself both as the legislator and the subject in a kingdom of ends” (Ricoeur 2007a: 6).
likeness and myself as the likeness of the other. Without reciprocity or, to use a concept dear to Hegel, without recognition, alterity would not be a matter of one other than myself, but the expression of a distance indistinguishable from absence” (Ricoeur 1999: 46, my emphasis).

As I see it, all the rest of Ricoeur’s later views on ethics are based on this basic notion of reciprocity embodied in the human. For first of all, the self is the starting point of any constitution of ethics. Without this self, the agent is absent and there is not any possibility of interaction between the self and the other. And any “other” is similarly a “self”. But this “other” is not only the face-to-face other in intimate relationships like love and friendship, but can also mean the “everyone” other in just institutions. As Ricoeur affirms, “[m]y other is thus not just the person who appears to me through his face but also everyone defined through his social role” (2007a: 234).

For the self or human to be constituted, Ricoeur sees these three equally important elements as indispensable and interconnected. For Ricoeur, the desire or wish for an established or good life is the first one which precedes any imperative. This desire or wish, in fact, confirms the subjectivity of any rational person. Ricoeur employs the term of self-esteem defined by “intentionality and initiative” (1999: 46) to describe this element.

Self-esteem, in fact, is also expressed earlier in the monograph OA in answering the key question concerning the self or its identity: “Who?” (1992: 16) from four perspectives: “Who is speaking? Who is acting? Who is recounting himself or herself? Who is the moral subject of imputation?” (ibid). In this book, Ricoeur employs the language of philosophy in terms of semantics and pragmatics in the first two studies to establish the linguistic person: I can speak. In studies 3 and 4, he turns to the philosophy of action to investigate the agent of action: I can act. And then in studies 5 and 6, he resorts to his tour de force, hermeneutics, to answer the third question: I can narrate or recount myself. He commits three chapters 7, 8 and 9 to the establishment of the moral subject. In this way a person is constituted who can speak, act, narrate or “remember” (2007a: 81) and be responsible or imputable for his/her speech, action and narration.

In his 1999 essay, Ricoeur also argues that “[r]oughly speaking, one could say

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103Richard A. Cohen and James L. Marsh give the subtitle “The Ethics of Subjectivity” to their edited collection *Ricoeur as Another* (2002) on Ricoeur’s view of ethics developed in his monograph *OA*. 101
that the problematic of the person is identical, in the field of action, with the question who has done what and why” (Ricoeur 1999: 50, original emphasis). “The who of action presents the same three-fold structure as the moral ethos. On the one hand, there is no agent who cannot designate himself as being the author responsible for his acts. Here we rediscover the two components of self-esteem: the ability to act on our intentions and the ability to produce, by our own initiative, efficacious changes in the course of events. It is primarily as an agent that we enjoy our own self-esteem. On the other hand, though, human action is only conceived as interaction under numerous forms varying from cooperation to competition and conflict” (Ricoeur 1999: 51, original italics, my bold).

Later, regarding self-esteem or subjectivity of the self, Ricoeur reminds us rightly that “[e]steem has to do with oneself” (Ricoeur 2007a: 202); “[i]n self-esteem a human being approves his existence and expresses a need to know that his existence is approved by others” (ibid: 203); and “[t]here must first be a subject capable of saying I am capable of taking the test of the confrontation with the other” (2007a: 75, my emphasis)\(^{104}\). This can also serve as a strong statement of objection to Levinas’ stance discussed previously of seeing a subject as being subjected and even hostage to the Other, echoing what Mencius asserted long time ago: “if one finds oneself in the right, one goes forward even against men in the thousands”\(^{105}\) (Mencius, 2.2A, Lau 2003: 32).

The name solicitude is the second term or element in Ricoeur’s definition of ethics: wishing to live ‘with and for others’ (my emphasis), a movement initiated by the self towards the other and responded by the self of the other. Solicitude meaning living “for and with” others presupposes mutuality; “The other, my likeness – such is the wish expressed by ethics with regard to the relationship between self-esteem and solicitude” (Ricoeur 1999: 46). This solicitude is also reflected in Ricoeur’s discussion of autonomy and vulnerability on the part of any person because ‘self’ and ‘any other’ may act and suffer at once in the interaction at issue.

And the third one is “the wish to live in just institutions” (1999: 46, original emphasis). This concept of “institution” also has something to do with the term “other”. In such institutions, “I only join” or establish a relation with “the other”, “a

\(^{104}\)Self-esteem is also an integral part in the above discussed Becker’s view of reciprocity (see section 3.1.3).

\(^{105}\)自反而縮，雖千萬人，吾往矣。'’zifan er suo, sui qian wan ren, wu wang yi’（“Gongsun Chou 1”公孫醜上, Mengzi 孟子）
distinct person”, but “a partner without a face” (ibid). Ricoeur sees a difference between “the other person”/“the other person of friendship” with respect to interpersonal relationship and “everyone”/“the everyone of justice” beyond friendship to involve strangers (1999: 47). With this notion of “just institution”, Ricoeur stresses that, for a person to be constituted and an ethics to be established, in addition to the face-to-face familiar other, there is also the strange “everyone” other of justice (my emphasis).

By “institution” Ricoeur also argues that “[a]ny institution can legitimately be conceived as a scheme of distribution, where the parts being distributed are not only goods and merchandise but also rights and duties, obligations, advantages, responsibilities and honours” (1999: 47). It is obvious that here Ricoeur’s “just institutions” can be understood largely from the perspective of politics. Ethics and politics are different in that, as Ricoeur sees it, “politics deals with the distribution of power in a given society” (1999: 47, cf. Young 1990: 8). And “[t]he most general function of any institution is to ensure the nexus between what is one’s own, the nearby, and the distant in something like a city, a republic, a common wealth” (2007a: 61). Concerning modern society, for Ricoeur, many practices like medicine and law are all institutions in which the agents exercise their agency and moral decisions. Similarly, translation can also be taken as an institution in which different parties are involved in different cases, the translator being an indispensable and pivotal agent (cf. Kang 2009).

In sum, Ricoeur’s notion of the basic structure of ethics is like this: “the wish to live well, with and for others, in just institutions” (2007a: 211). Below this ethics of “the good” is “the obligatory” in Kant on the second level, and then practical wisdom in concrete situations, all three together constituting a hierarchical model for Ricoeur. Here, it can be seen that Aristotelian teleology goes first, Kantian ontology is taken as a means for this aim, and phronesis/practical wisdom is employed by Ricoeur to work on the concrete level in the contextual or historical regional/applied ethics. Ricoeur makes a distinction between ethics and morality but he tries to make it clear that the two are not necessarily exclusive of each other; instead, the two are, for him, reciprocal to each other and, realised in the practical wisdom on the part of agents in judging in concrete situations.

3.2.2 Reciprocity of autonomy and vulnerability
According to Ricoeur, anyone acting might also be suffering or be the recipient of the other’s action. In other words, a capable human being has some capacity, but at the same time s/he may also have some ineluctable inability. That means s/he is also a person of vulnerability or fragility. In his own words, “not simply opposed to each other, our two terms go together: the autonomy in question is that of a fragile, vulnerable being” (Ricoeur 2007a: 73). That is, any self is acting while suffering, any autonomy is accompanied with vulnerability. This is born of his insight into the essence of a human being as at once a “capable and vulnerable” person. i.e., every rational agent is both capable of acting and suffering with respect to an event. In essence, human beings are autonomous and vulnerable at once. “If the basis of autonomy can be described in terms of the vocabulary of ability, it is in that of inability or a lesser ability that human fragility first expresses itself” (2007a: 76).

To expound his view on this human inability or fragility, Ricoeur turns to the most basic aspect of human beings, the ability to speak: “What immediately comes to mind is the fundamental inequality among human beings when it comes to mastering such languages, an inequality that is not so much of a natural given as a perverse cultural effect, once the inability to speak well results in effectively being expelled from the sphere of discourse” (2007a: 76). Ricoeur also rightly claims that “[i]t is always the inequality between agents that poses the ethical problem at the core of the unequal structure of interaction” (1999: 52).

Ricoeur here reminds us of the possibility that any able agent at the same time is also a fragile, vulnerable being, so that s/he should consider the result of any action upon him/her as well as other interactants because of this existence of reciprocity of autonomy and vulnerability. In fact acting and suffering are interconnected; this reciprocity entails the role of agent and patient who are in principle reversible. Any subject might be one of acting and suffering, of autonomy and vulnerability.

For Ricoeur, autonomy and vulnerability “confront each other in the same field in such a way that each one becomes the presupposition of the other” (2007a: 19). Meanwhile, for Ricoeur, the most characteristic features of autonomy are that it is at once a presupposition and a task to be accomplished (2007a: 17).

By extension, this reciprocity of autonomy and vulnerability on the part of individual human beings can be encapsulated to certain groups of individuals and larger communities. Some are seemingly more autonomous but at the same time
they may be vulnerable as well. Of course, some groups or communities are more vulnerable than autonomous compared with others because they have difficulty in defending themselves, for example, their own culture and/or language at a certain time when it comes to intercultural communication.

3.2.3 Reciprocity between the universal and the contextual/historical

Ricoeur argues that, in this Ricoeurian reciprocity, the universal and the historical are also reciprocal. Ricoeur first takes translation as a model to support his argument that universality is both an actuality and potentiality and it involves both universality and contextuality. Ricoeur asserts, rightly, that, “[d]espite fratricides, we campaign for universal fraternity. Despite the heterogeneity of idioms, there are bilinguals, polyglots, interpreters, and translators” (2006: 18). That is to say, translation is practised in spite of the insolvable theoretical dilemma of the translatability/untranslatability. For him, “translation is de facto; translatability is de jure” (1996: 4).

Here Ricoeur put ethics and translation in a relation of analogy: universal fraternity is preached in spite of fratricides; translation has always been practised in spite of the ardent argument of translatability and untranslatability. That means the various languages are historical while translation is universal. Further, “[t]ranslation is definitely a task, then, not in the sense of a restricting obligation, but in the sense of the thing to be done so that human action can simply continue” (2006: 19, my emphasis). And, as Ricoeur observes, “[t]he diversity of languages has to do with a major structure of the human condition, its plurality” (2007a: 25). “There is no self-identity without diversity in relation to others” (ibid). Thus, “[t]ranslation is from end to end the remedy for plurality in a world of dispersion and confusion” (ibid: 28). “Humanity, I said, only exists as fragmented. In this regard, historical communities, with their dominant ethnic, cultural, juridical, political, and religious features, can be compared to heterogeneous linguistic conglomerations concerned to protect their identity when confronted by such diversity” (ibid: 29). In consequence, “[t]o translate is to do justice to a foreign intelligence, to install the just distance

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106The untranslatability hypothesis originates from von Humboldt’s philosophy of language, which develops further into the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis of language relativity, according to which different languages map or reflect different worlds. Philosopher Quine’s view of language is also a well known source to support the argument of untranslatability as seen from the Avaggi anecdote in his book Object and Word. (see Quine in Brower [1959]1966).
from one linguistic whole to another. Your language is as important as mine. This is the formula for equity-equality, the formula for recognised diversity” (ibid: 31, my emphasis).

To further illustrate his view of reciprocal ethics, Ricoeur uses medical decisions and juridical sentences as other examples. To Ricoeur, the relational structure of the medical act is like this: [the patient has] “the desire to be released from the burden of suffering and the hope for healing” (2007a: 200). As Ricoeur insightfully sees it, medical ethics takes into account not only the stance of the physician, but also the desire of the patient. Ricoeur observes that, in medicine, it is suffering that brings doctor and patient together and gives rise to the importance of medical ethics and, in law it is conflict that brings the parties concerned together. In a way, in medicine the physician and the patient are in a reciprocal relationship. Analogically, as in medicine, translation ethics cannot just look at what should be done on the part of the major agent the ‘translator’, but also whoever would take part in the implementation of the rewriting work with regard to a translation project in a reciprocal manner. The translator and other participants such as the author and the reader are also similarly reciprocally constituted in a way.

To conclude, as Ricoeur states that “[t]he whole cosmos falls under human responsibility: where something is possible, there is the possibility of harm and therefore the need for moral vigilance” (2007a: 14, my emphasis). Ricoeur’s view on ethics echoes Confucian ethics in that Confucian ethics takes the cosmos as its largest community to take care of. In general, as can be seen, Ricoeur takes harm as the source of ethics for he also asserts that, “[r]eflection on action and its opposite, passion, cannot fail to involve moral preoccupations once the action of an agent on a victim [patient] is an occasion for harm and a tort, and in this sense has to fall under the vigilance of moral judgement” (2007a: 13-14, my emphasis). On the whole, it can be seen that in the West, Ricoeur expounds the ethics of reciprocity largely at the philosophical and social level concerning today’s world. The next section is to discuss Confucian reciprocity which can be said to lie largely on the historical and practical levels.

3.3 Confucian Reciprocity (shuzhong 恕忠, wulun 五倫, junzi 君子)
With regard to the limitations of studies on translation ethics in China, Yang Zhenyuan’s observations are to the point (see section 2.3.2.3). For him and also for me, on the one hand, the understanding and application of profound Western ethics are insufficient in translation ethics studies in China (Yang 2013: 227). On the other, an in-depth exploration and application of traditional Chinese ethical thoughts are absent (ibid: 228). Yet Yang’s attempt to employ traditional Chinese ethical thought in his study is limited and narrow too (see section 2.3.2.3, pp 81-82).

To me this limitation in drawing on Western ethics and Confucianism is not merely manifested in the studies on translation ethics in China, but also strikingly in the West. Those scholars discussed in section 2.3.1, including Chesterman, Pym and Baker, haven’t gone deeply enough for a thorough critique of the Western tradition. More importantly, Confucian ethics, with a long history in terms of thought and practice, is not available in the ethical views of any of them.

Traditional Chinese or Confucian ethics is rich and profound, and able to reflect the fundamental outlook of the Chinese people (Cai Yuanpei 2009: 13). As Fan Ruiping, an apologist for reconstructionist Confucian bioethics, argues well, “the true spirit of the Confucian relations, as Tao points out, is not domination-cum-subordination, but rather, reciprocity. Reciprocity is not equality. It is virtue-based interconnectedness, interdependence, and interactions (Tao, p.24)” (Fan 2010: 20-21, my italics). Julia Tao elucidated this reciprocity earlier: Different from a contractual society, where human relations are regulated by the concept of individual rights, “[i]n the Confucian non-contractual society, human relations are guided by the concept of jen[ren] or benevolence107 (Tao, 1998, pp. 606-607). Individuals are bound together by relations of concern and caring, empathy and reciprocity” (Tao 2004: 22, my italics).

And, “[f]or the Confucians, standing on one’s own feet does not mean standing apart from other people. The web of reciprocal obligations or moral relations in which one finds oneself, defines oneself. In a truly reciprocal role relationship

\[107\]Yu Yingshi has a lucid summary of Confucian ren 仁. For him, ren, as an all-embracing ethical concept in Confucianism, contains not just “reason” or just “sense”, but something of both (2004: 402). It is the unity of moral awareness and emotion developed on the part of an individual, and only the availability of ren can define one as a human being in the moral sense (ibid: 403). Compared with the universal concept of justice in the West, the counterpart in Chinese culture is the concept of ren, which, based on the heart/mind school of thought, is intra-transcendental as opposed to “justice”, which, as a legal concept, originating in the theory of God-laid law, is extra-transcendental (Yu 1984: 65). Ren 仁 the Chinese character, presupposing two persons, is itself a relational concept, and is the “fundamental human virtue” (Fan 2010: 17).
where there is mutuality in the interaction, ‘self’ and ‘other’ are both constituted as well as constitutive of each other in the bonding and individuation which take place within the relationship. The reciprocity of benevolence in relationship is the guiding principle which has structured society and human interaction in China for nearly two thousand years” (ibid: 23, my emphasis). In Confucian ethics, indeed, the importance of reciprocity is widely appreciated. J. P. Schultz, for example, argues that “[r]eciprocity is the basis for all human relations in the Confucian social order” (Schultz 1974: 144). Eric Mullis (2008: 35) suggests that Confucian ethics provides a viable account of reciprocity that remains relevant for those living in modern contexts. Moreover, according to Lin Duan’s observation, Confucian ethics with an attribute of contextualised universalism, will not only work in personal and interpersonal acts on the micro level, but also in interactions between different societies and cultures on the macro level (2002: 202).

A question might be raised about the English concept of “reciprocity”: is it sufficient and broad enough to express the rich and profound tenets of Confucian ethics? What exactly is meant when we say Confucian reciprocal ethics? As I see it, Confucian reciprocity is largely embodied in the following three aspects which feature the most feasible and practical attributes of Confucian ethics and suffice to cover what the above scholars mean: (1) shuzhong; (2) wulun; and (3) junzi, including junzi buqi. They are also most relevant to the practice of translating. Yet it has to be borne in mind that because this is a study of TS, rather than a sinological work, the explorations of such terms are made just in the best interests of translation and translation studies.

3.3.1 Shuzhong in Confucian reciprocity

Zhong 忠 and shu 忍 are usually taken as a fixed concept written as zhongshu in Confucianism for it is well known that, in The Analects, Confucius’ disciple Zeng Shen [Zeng Zi 曾参] sums that there is a single thread that binds Confucius’ way: “The way of the Master consists in doing one’s best and in using oneself as a

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108 The “last Confucian”, Liang Shuming, states that China is a society that is ‘centred on ethics’ (“倫理本位”) (Liang 2011: 78). For him, “ethics means nothing but for a person to be clear about the relationship between him/her and others, and of such mutual relation, what counts is to give regard to the other mutually” (“互以對方為重”) (ibid: 87, trans).
measure to gauge the likes and dislikes of others" in D. C. Lau’s translation (The Analects, 4.15, Lau 2008: 59). Here “zhong” is rendered as “doing one’s best” while “shu” as “using oneself as a measure to gauge the likes and dislikes of others”. The two terms are also often translated respectively as “loyalty” and “reciprocity” (e.g. Li Chenyang 1994: 76). For Li, a contemporary Confucian philosopher, the former, zhong“loyalty”, is understood as pushing to one’s limits in pursuing one’s cause while the latter, shu“reciprocity”, as being thoughtful of others. In both Lau’s and Li’s renditions of the term zhong, the presupposition of ‘others’ is not made explicit, whereas in the translations of shu, the notion of ‘others’ is explicitly conveyed. However, the rendering of shu as “reciprocity” is obviously a narrowed conception of both and is different from my understanding of Confucian reciprocity, for my understanding, covering not only “shu” but also wulun and junzi, is much broader as will be elaborated here and below.

Different from Zeng Zi’s summary in which zhong and shu are put together and zhong precedes shu, elsewhere in The Analects, shu alone was stressed by Confucius. It goes like this: When Confucius was asked by Zi-gong, another disciple, if “there is a single word that can be a guide to conduct throughout one’s life”, Confucius answered, “It is perhaps the word ‘shu’. Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire” (The Analects, 15.24, Lau 2008: 289, my italics). As such, regarding the understanding of Confucius’ “single thread”, i.e., zhongshu, shu or shuzhong, there are varied interpretations or understandings. For Wei Zhengtong, an influential Contemporary Confucian philosopher, it is zhongshu. For him, the notion of zhongshu in Confucianism is of universal significance (e.g. 2007: 36) and the way of zhongshu, in essence for him, means self-respecting and other-respecting (ibid: 38), almost the same with what Paul Ricoeur advocates when he discusses “approaching the human person” (2009).

But for Herbert Fingarette, shu goes before zhong. He states, “As Confucius said, shu and chung [zhong], mutual empathic identification along with mutual commitment to the integrity of the other, form a main-thread of the truly human life” (Fingarette 1991: 223). And Angus C. Graham’s understanding is more insightful. For Graham, shu is more important than zhong since he proclaims that “While shu

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109 “夫子之道，忠恕而已矣。” (“Liren里仁, Lunyu 讀論”).
110 “其恕乎！己所不欲，勿施於人。” (“Wei Linggong”衛靈公, Lunyu 論語) cf. Li Chenyang’s translation: “what you don’t desire do not effect on others” below in the following page.
is not a virtue but a form of analogical thinking, chung [zhong] is one of the Confucian virtues, displayed on behalf of others in general and of one’s prince in particular. For the disciple Tseng-tzu [Zeng Zi] at least, the one thread cannot be quite reduced to a single concept; there has to be both the wholeheartedness on behalf of others and the act of putting oneself in their places by which one learns what to do for them” (Graham 1989: 21, my emphasis). Here, in Graham’s understanding, the notion of “others” presupposed in shu and zhong is brought out clearly. Also, as Graham sees it, correctly, Confucius’ “What you do not yourself desire do not do to others” [“己所不欲勿施於人’] constitutes “the negative form of the Golden Rule at the heart of ethics” (Graham 1989: 20, my italics). Graham’s understanding closely conforms to the norm of ethics, i.e. not to do the negative (i.e. e.g. harm) forms the easier start of any ethics.

While there are arguments about the understanding of zhongshu, shuzhong or shu, there are also disagreements of the meaning of the concept zhong. For example, in Wing-Tsit Chan’s compilation A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, for Chu His [Zhu Xi 朱熹], zhong means “the full development of one’s [originally good] mind”, for Ch’eng I [Cheng Yi 程頤], zhong is “the Way of Heaven”, and for Liu Pao-nan [Liu Baonan 劉寶楠], zhong is equated with Confucius’ saying “Establish one’s own character” (Chan 1963: 27, original supplement). While it is not easy to judge those interpretations, I regard contemporary German sinologist scholar Michael Schimmelpfennig’s understanding of zhong as highly revealing. He traces its more basic meaning to be “honesty” in his PhD thesis on Wang Yi’s exegesis of Qu Yuan’s poetry as opposed to most scholars’ interpretation of it as “loyalty”. In his research, “[a]n examination of the key-term related to government and political ethics within Wang Yi’s commentary leads to the rather surprising result that the commentator is not interested at all in the question of loyalty, the seemingly central question connected with the Qu Yuan myth. Instead his exegesis concentrates on the question of honesty, straightforwardness, and personal integrity. While the expression zhong commonly translated with loyalty appears repeatedly within Wang’s exegesis, the commentator uses it in its basic meaning of honesty, honesty in speech and honesty in one[’]s actions.” (Schimmelpfennig 1999: 830-831, my emphasis). Schimmelpfennig’s finding of zhong as having a more basic meaning of “honesty” is important to my notion of Confucian reciprocity for it offers a more
basic and crucial meaning: honesty or sincerity.

Taking into account what is discussed above, it is safe to conclude that the two terms of “shu” and “zhong” in Confucian ethics are inseparable but interdependent. Confucius in fact advocates his negative and positive versions of the “golden rule”: “what you don’t desire do not effect on others”, the definition of shu by Confucius (The Analects, 12.2, Li 1994: 76) and “to establish oneself, you should establish others, to succeed yourself, you should help others succeed”\(^{111}\), the definition of zhong (The Analects, 6.28, Li 1994: 76). They are mutually defined and interconnected, just like the two sides of a coin. Hence I contend shu precedes zhong. Shuzhong covers both the omissive/passive and commissive/active sides of ethics. They together constitute one dimension of what I mean the Confucian reciprocity, with shu meaning “not effecting on others what you don’t desire” and zhong meaning “being honest and doing one’s best” concerning any human interactions.

Meanwhile, this Confucian reciprocity goes beyond the Western rights and justice perspective because in this vein of thinking, a gentleman or ethical agent will not be passive and just care about his/her own wellbeing, but will go to great lengths to care for others for the better as well. In contrast, for the proponents of rights/justice perspective, reciprocity is the basis for a contractual society: if you do not infringe on my rights, I will not infringe on yours (Li 1994: 76), narrowly framed because the active and positive aspect are excluded.

### 3.3.2 Wulun in Confucian reciprocity

Next to shuzhong, wulun is another important constitutive aspect in Confucian reciprocity as I see it. Jing Haifeng, a contemporary Confucian scholar, argues that, of the many notions prevalent in Confucianism, ‘wulun’ is the most fundamental, the starting point of the entire moral system, and the main thread of social network of interpersonal relationships (2008: 51). The notion of wulun is, as a matter of fact, a pithy summary of the basic interpersonal relationships and the fundamental stipulation of such relationships in traditional Chinese society.

They are, first given in Mencius: “love between father and son, duty between

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\(^{111}\) “夫仁者，己欲立而立人，己欲達而達人。” (“Yongye”雍也, Lunyu 論語) cf. D.C. Lau’s rendition: “a benevolent man helps others to take their stand in that he himself wishes to take his stand, and gets others there in that he himself wishes to get there” (Lau 2008: 101).
ruler and subject, distinction between husband and wife, precedence of the old over the young, and faith between friends”\(^{112}\) (Mencius, 3.4A, Lau 2003: 60). For Confucianism, \textit{wulun} can cover all human relations (Hahm & Bell 2004: 411) outside of which no one can establish himself. Of the five relationships, only the last, i.e. friendship, is of equality, the other four are concerned with unequal relationships. The ruler prevails over the ruled, the father his sons, and the husband his wife, the elder the younger. But “it is misleading to believe that Confucianism supports dictatorship in human relations” (Fan 2010: 20).

In fact, in such five relationships, the former is just seemingly dominant because they have to initially perform well as a ruler, a father, a husband, and an elder brother, living up to their respective name as they do have more say. In cases where the former fail to play their part the seemingly dominated ones can exercise their autonomy by refusing to adhere to their duties, rather than follow the routine of fulfilling the duties required of them. It is thus clear that \textit{wulun} includes relationships of reciprocity between both equal and unequal parties.

Several other contemporary Chinese philosophers or historians illuminate the notion of \textit{wulun} more concretely. For example, as Tu Weiming, a contemporary Neo-Confucian philosopher sees it, “[i]n the Confucian tradition, the father-son relationship is not only dyadic and hierarchic but also absolutely binding.” (1989: 41). Tu also observes that “a social dyad (like the father-son relationship in Confucian ethics) is \textit{not a fixed} entity, but a \textit{dynamic} interaction involving a rich and ever-changing texture of human-relatedness woven by the constant participation of other significant dyadic relationships” (Tu 1985: 237, my emphasis). Further, “[t]he father-son tie is a constraint, a limitation, and a bondage; yet through its constraining, limiting, and binding power, it provides a necessary means for self-cultivation for the father as well as the son” (Tu 1985: 240).

For the historian Yang Lien-sheng, “[a]n equally basic principle governing the father-son relationship is reciprocity” (Yang 1957). That is, “[a]ccording to the norm, the father should act fatherly so that the son can follow in a manner most appropriate to his self-identification. The son’s filiality is conceived as a response to the father’s kindness. The father must set an example for the son as a loving and respectable person before he can reasonably expect his son to love and respect him”

\(^{112}\) \text{“父子有親，君臣有義，夫婦有別，長幼有序，朋友有信。”} (Teng Wengong I, \textit{Mengzi} 孟子)
(Yang 1957). Liu Shu-hsien, another contemporary Confucian philosopher (2007: 242), also stresses that the pre-Qin Confucianism, including Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi 荀子, gives prominence to name-rectifying, that is, the relationships between the sovereign/jun and the subjects/chen, father and son are mutually binding¹¹³.

Based on the pre-Qin Confucianism, especially wulun, Tu also argues that ethical duties are distributed according to the station of the party, i.e., the higher the station or position, the more is demanded in terms of morality: “we hold that an individual, a group, a country or a region is all the more obligated to promote the wellbeing of the human community if they have more capacity and influence” (Tu 2010: 96, trans). In other words, a party with better resources in an exchange or interaction is supposed to assume more responsibility.

This point has been observed by some Westerners as well. For instance, to Ronald McLaren, “[t]he East has created a system that does not conceal behind a de jure egalitarianism the de facto inequalities which we experience both in fundamental human relationships and in more artificial institutions. Instead the inequalities themselves are seen as creating responsibilities that define roles and bind individuals to altruistic behavior” (1984: 62).

This asymmetric reciprocity, i.e., the more powerful or more possessed of resources should give or do more than the less in an interaction, is not only recognised in Confucian reciprocity. J. van Baal, Dutch philosopher, as noted above, for instance, also states that “[i]f a recognised rank difference obtains, the superior tends to give more than the inferior is expected to return, just as parents usually give more to their children than the children will ever return” (1975: 44-45), and “[i]t is no mean thing that the rich should give more than the poor” (ibid: 47).

### 3.3.3 Junzi and junzi bu qi in Confucian reciprocity

Yet this reciprocity framed in shuzhong and wulun does not preclude the possibility that a person can exercise his/her agency or autonomy as shown in the following statement by Confucius: “the Three Armies can be deprived of their commander, but there is no way a common man can be deprived of his purpose”¹¹⁴ (The Analects, 9.26, Lau 2008: 155), and another one by Mencius as mentioned above: “if one

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¹¹³Embodied in this statement: “君君臣臣父父子子” (“Yanyuan” 颜渊, Lunyu 論語)
¹¹⁴ “三軍可奪帥也，匹夫不可奪志也。” (“Zihan” 子罕, Lunyu 論語)
finds oneself in the right, one goes forward even against men in the thousands” (*Mencius*, 2.2A, Lau 2003: 32).

All this shows that, for Confucians, a person can choose to pursue what s/he takes to be right without any constraints. This is a character of *junzi* as Confucius advocates. As noted in Chapter 2, in *The Daxue 大學* [*The Great Learning*] when Tymoczko’s views on translation ethics are discussed, based on self-cultivation, a *junzi* will be able to manage his family, run a state and bring peace to the world. In Mencius’s words, such a figure is a great person or *dazhangfu*, who “cannot be led into excesses when wealthy and honoured or deflected from his purpose when poor and obscure, nor can he be made to bow before superior force” (*Mencius*, 3.2B, Lau 2003: 66).

This *junzi* personality strongly illustrates the contribution to ethics on the part of Confucian wisdom as Confucian wisdom opens and establishes the moral subjectivity of any rational human being; for Confucians, everyone is in possession of a mind/heart of infinity from birth in theory (Liu Yuli 2011: 131). *Junzi* is in effect a crucial concept in Confucius’ teachings. It is Confucius’ ideal to cultivate this kind of person in family and society. According to Yang Bojun (see Fang 2015), the concept of *junzi* appears 107 times in *The Analects*, available in each and every one of the 20 chapters. Confucius transformed ‘*junzi*’ [exemplary man] and ‘*xiaoren*’ [small man], two concepts of identity, into two concepts of morality. For him and Mencius, a *junzi*, in addition to the “missions” listed in *The Great Learning* mentioned above, is apt to be a good official, a good teacher, or a good husband as an example for their respective corresponding parties in various life relations. In particular, Confucius stresses, “The gentleman is no vessel” (*junzi bu qi*) (*The Analects*, 2.12, Lau 2008: 21), i.e. he is no specialist, as every vessel is designed for a specific purpose. Instead, he is a cultural one, as opposed to the ideal human

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115 Yet this is not existential ethics as Jean P. Satre preached (see Robinson and Garratt 1999: 100) because, while both stress freedom of choosing, a *junzi* can be an example for others via his/her *ren*/*righteous decisions and actions.*

116 “富貴不能淫，貧賤不能移，威武不能屈：此之謂大丈夫。” (“Teng Wengong 2” 腾文公下, *Mengzi 孟子*)

117 Different from D. C. Lau’s translation of *junzi* as “gentleman” (e.g. 2008: 21), here I choose to follow Roger Ames’ translation (2014: 2) for I think Ames’ rendition is closest considering the entire teachings of Confucianism, although throughout the thesis I use standard *pinyin* i.e. *junzi* for its rich connotation embodied in this important Confucian concept as in other key terms.

118 “君子不器。” (“Weizheng” 為政, *Lunyu 論語*)
person as a tool, a specialist, a professional in Max Weber’s Puritan ethics and modern society (see Lin Duan 2002).

By distinguishing junzi ethics and xiaoren ethics, Confucian ethics acknowledges the existence of de facto inequality between people in terms of intelligence, capability and moral cultivation, hence constituting a layered ethics. Han Shaogong, a well known contemporary Chinese novelist, in his recent essay “Ethics Retold”, comments that, “[i]ronically, modern humans, who have pursued the goal of equality via numerous enlightenments and revolutions, have so far de facto failed to demolish the hierarchy of power and capital, but have demolished the hierarchy of ethical responsibilities” across the world (2010: 12, trans). Here Han, like Tu Weiming, advocates that some people, as preached and practiced by many Confucians in the past two-millennia China, should shoulder more and heavier social responsibilities and have the high-rank direction-making morality as supplementary to the low-rank morality.

In the same vein, the historian Yang Lien-sheng, also pays heed to the importance of “the dual standards of Confucian ethics, one for the ‘gentlemen,’ or chiun-tzu [junzi], and the other for the ‘small men,’ or hsiao-jen [xiaoren]. Confucian idealism advocates the way of the gentleman as praiseworthy, whereas Confucian realism defends, or at least tolerates, the way of the small man as normal” (1957: 304). This idealism is based on the acknowledgement of the de-facto inequality in human beings in terms of intelligence and moral cultivation as Mencius expresses well: “That things are unequal is part of their nature” (Mencius, 3.4A, Lau 2003: 62).119

This tolerance for the “way of the small man as normal” is significant in modern society as there should be different requirements of different people in different positions of modern hierarchy or echelon in terms of power, capital, intelligence, and resources. This is a kind of real justice—justice according to one’s due.

In sum, Confucian reciprocal ethics in my view is both duty/principle ethics and virtue ethics stressing the reciprocity between unequal parties [地位不等之個人、群體或民族國家] (see also Liu 2011). It is duty/principle ethics because, for example, in the case of family ethics, it is an obligation for parents to set an example in their behaviour, including showing love to both their parents and children, and the children follow suit in showing love and deference towards their parents. It is virtue ethics because…

119 “夫物之不齊，物之理也。”（“Teng Wengong 1”滕文公上, Mengzi 孟子）
ethics because, for instance, all parents are social beings and they are supposed to serve as living models for their children on the one hand, and on the other it is highly advisable for them to try to become and maintain being a person of noble character or junzi.

3.4 Ethics of reciprocity cross-culturally integrated

Integrating Ricoeurian and Confucian reciprocity, I agree with Eugene Eoyang’s view when he said that “[i]f the world is to become truly global, and not merely Westernized, there must be some accommodation between the culture of ‘rights’ and the culture of ‘rites.’ The West insists on the application of principle regardless of history or tradition; the East persists in maintaining tradition often at the expense of principle. Each has its blind side; each its inequities and hypocrisies. Only a comparative perspective, as well as a composite ethics and aesthetics, can extricate us from hegemonic thinking” (2007: 73, my italics).

From the above discussion, it can be seen that what Ricoeurian reciprocity stresses is more the reciprocity between equal parties, taking justice and fairness in terms of rights as its ultimate goal than between unequal parties. By contrast, in Confucian reciprocity, reciprocity between both equals and unequals is stressed, especially reciprocity between unequals, which is more rite-oriented, taking harmony and interdependence as its ultimate goal.

Regarding translation, cross-culturally and cross-linguistically, translators and other parties, whether equal or unequal, can and should interact reciprocally and help texts, languages and cultures interact reciprocally. The modern Western view of reciprocity and the long time-withstood Chinese/Confucian view of reciprocity can be reciprocally joined in an integrated manner to pave the way for the formulation of ethics of reciprocity in translation, which will be undertaken in the next chapter.
In Chapter 3 Ricoeurian and Confucian reciprocities were discussed as the theoretical foundation for the formulation of the model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’. But the existing views on reciprocity in translation were not examined there. As the core chapter of the thesis, based on what was expounded in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 starts with an examination of those views, chiefly those by Walter Benjamin and George Steiner, representing reciprocity between languages and between texts, Bonnie S. McDougall, representing reciprocity between individual persons, and Anthony Pym and Annie Brisset, representing reciprocity between cultures and between nations. Then this chapter will proceed to discuss reciprocity from the perspective of three relations involving a translation project, i.e. the intercultural/interpersonal, person-textual, and intertextual relations. The discussion will address the three key passive entities of texts, languages and cultures, and the three major active parties of individual persons, collectivities and nations. The explorations and discussions in these two sections will culminate in the stipulation and substantiation of the proposed ethic model of reciprocity in translation.

The content of this reciprocity model is represented in the form of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits in different kinds and degrees to the active parties of individual persons, collectivities and nations as well as the passive entities of texts, languages and cultures respectively. As an integrated model, concerning its nature and operation, it is a combination of principle ethics concerning translation as a process and translation as a consequence in its spatiotemporal/socio-cultural context, and virtue ethics concerning the major translating agent the translator, and other minor but necessary parties in any translation project including the author, the reader and/or the client, etc. The ethics of reciprocity is virtue and motive when exercised on the part of the translator and other participants in their interaction for guiding decision making, an obligation for translating as an act or process, and a principle when exercised for judging the consequence of translation the product. In this way, the model will have more explanatory power than the existent ones discussed in Chapter 2. Along with Chapter 3 as the theoretical foundation, Chapter 4 is thus arranged to address the second research question: the ethics of reciprocity in translation.


4.1 Reciprocity in translation

In TS as introduced in Chapter 1, reciprocity is not a rarely discussed phenomenon; it has been expounded by various scholars. Therefore in this section the views by some important theorists and scholars will be scrutinised first.

4.1.1 Reciprocity between languages and between texts in translation

Reciprocity as a relationship between languages and between texts has been discussed by well-known translation scholars. The most notable is Walter Benjamin. In his influential essay ‘The Task of the Translator’\(^{120}\) ([1923]2004), Benjamin is seemingly concerned with his view of the task of the translator. But as Pym observes, “Benjamin, like his predecessor Humboldt and his successor Heidegger, takes translation as a problem of languages rather than of people” (2012: 25, my emphasis). Instead of discussing the task of the translator as the major theme as the title of the essay seems to suggest, what Benjamin in fact addresses is how translation can be and is an effective and undeniable way for effecting reciprocity and harmony between languages.

Benjamin did argue that the task of the translator is to release in the re-creation or the translation the pure language that is imprisoned in the original, and that it is not to communicate information or sense embodied in the original but to create the afterlife of it. But what is more implicitly stressed by him is the fact that translation is an effective way to extend and enrich the translating language rather than just copy the original. For Benjamin, translation manifests the reciprocal relationship between the original and the translation in that the original continues its life in the translation, i.e. its afterlife while the translation, by touching the original but lightly, makes the translating language grow from the translation. As Benjamin states, “All purposeful manifestations of life, including their very purposiveness, in the final analysis have their end not in life, but in the expression of its nature, in the representation of its significance. Translation thus ultimately serves the purpose of expressing the central reciprocal relationship between languages” ([1923]2004: 77, my emphasis). Meanwhile, “[t]ranslation is so far removed from being the sterile

\(^{120}\)Paul de Man once in a lecture mentioned that “in the profession you are nobody unless you have said something about this text” (1985: 26). In this lecture it can be seen that de Man attached too much importance to language in his reading of this text by Benjamin.
equation of two dead languages that of all literary forms it is the one charged with the special mission of watching over the maturing process of the original language and the birth pangs of its own” (ibid: 78, my emphasis). Benjamin is stressing the vital importance of good translation for the growth of both the translated and translating languages. By “good”, of course, Benjamin means the interlinear reciprocal translation.

Yet it must be borne in mind that what Benjamin deals with is chiefly the translation of literary works, although he emphasises at the end of the essay that the interlinear translation of the Scripts is the prototype of all good translations. That constitutes the limits of his argument of translation as a general and complex phenomenon. His emphasis of translation as reciprocity between languages is not from the ethical perspective either. But it suffices to serve as a support to the argument that in translation there can be reciprocity between languages, i.e. both languages can benefit from translation as long as the translator is qualified to render great literary works.

The second scholar to mention who brings in the issue of reciprocity in TS is George Steiner. As a pioneering scholar in the field, Steiner is particularly significant for his renowned “hermeneutic motion”. Yet the ethical dimension of Steiner’s thinking in his hermeneutic motion is not fully recognised. Phil Goodwin’s recent essay ‘Ethical Problems in Translation: Why We Might Need Steiner After All’ (2010) helps us rethink Steiner in terms of translation ethics. Goodwin argues that “Steiner’s model is self-consciously ethical, rather than descriptive121. It tells us how we ought to approach the act of translating” (2010: 36, original emphasis). For Goodwin, Steiner’s model “represents one of the most sustained pieces of thinking about translation ethics in the field” (ibid: 27). Goodwin is drawn to Steiner because of “Steiner’s acute sensitivity to ethical issues, a sensitivity which arises from a certain view of language” (ibid). In Goodwin’s view, for Steiner, “translation always involves a certain violence, and this makes the ethical issues inescapable” (ibid, my emphasis).

But what I see important in Steiner is his emphasis of the fourth movement of restitution or reciprocity in his hermeneutic model. Steiner asserts that “[t]he enactment of reciprocity in order to restore balance is the crux of the métier and

121 Goodwin criticised Robinson’s reading of Steiner as an almost typical example of the ‘intentional fallacy’ (2010: 36), see Robinson (1998: 97).
morals of translation” (1998: 316, my emphasis) and “[t]he paradigm of translation is incomplete until reciprocity has been achieved, until the original has regained as much as it had lost” (ibid: 415). But what did Steiner mean by reciprocity here?

Informed by Levi-Strauss’s *Anthropologie structurale*, Steiner develops his notion of reciprocity. For Steiner, the first motion is trust given by the translator to the original, “[t]he a-prioristic movement of trust puts us off balance. We ‘lean towards’ the confronting text. […] We come home laden, thus again off-balance, having caused disequilibrium throughout the system by taking away from ‘the other’ and by adding, though possibly with ambiguous consequence, to our own” (1998: 316, my emphasis). Steiner’s second hermeneutic movement is aggression. For him, to understand for translating is “invasive and exhaustive” (1998: 314), and “[t]he translator invades, extracts, and brings home” (ibid)\footnote{122This is really different from or opposite to Spivak’s metaphor of “surrender to the text” in translation (Spivak 2004: 370).}. Despite such aggression and invasion, he acknowledges that “the translated work is enhanced” on several levels (ibid: 316). He also discusses the risks or damages brought about by translation to individual translators and writers (ibid: 315), and to the translating language/culture and society as well at the third stage of incorporation (ibid: 316). Yet for any translation, as Steiner sees it, the original has been rendered unbalanced after the “penetration” and “incarnation”; the translator is taking too much or too little (ibid: 317). So a motion of restitution is needed to keep the equilibrium between the two texts. Steiner stresses that translation should be an exchange: “[b]y virtue of tact, and tact intensified is moral vision, the translator-interpreter creates a condition of significant exchange. The arrows of meaning, of cultural, psychological benefaction, move both ways. There is, ideally, exchange without loss” (ibid: 318-9, my emphasis). Or the exchange is his “radical equity” or “equalizing transfer”, or “fidelity”—“the enactment and expression of reciprocity”, “a bond of adequacy as between text and text” (ibid: 416, my emphasis). He thus states that “[a] bad translation is one which is inadequate to its source-text” (ibid, my emphasis).

But how can such reciprocity be realised? Are there any specific measures? To realise reciprocity, for Steiner, the translator should “endeavor to restore the balance of forces, of integral presence, which his appropriative comprehension has disrupted” (Steiner 1998: 318). And “[a] translator is accountable to the diachronic and synchronic mobility and conservation of the energies of meaning. A translation is,
more than figuratively, an act of double-entry; both formally and morally the books must balance” (ibid: 319, my emphasis). Steiner acknowledges that, in rare cases, reciprocity is really realised between two works, two languages, and even two communities of historical experience (ibid: 429).

It can be seen that what Steiner emphasises are the traditional categories of meaning of text, fidelity to the source text, and balance or equalising of meaning between texts. He asserts that “[t]ranslation recompenses in that it can provide the original with a persistence and geographical-cultural range of survival which it would otherwise lack” (ibid: 416). It is no doubt an ST-oriented model. It is not much of a relationship between people or cultures but largely one between texts.

Meanwhile, Steiner’s model is still in the realm of ‘how to translate’, but the ‘how’ to realise the fourth move is vague (see also Robinson 1998: 99). Steiner admits it is difficult to convey what reciprocity means in an abstract manner as well (1998: 316). In this aspect, it is different from mine as mentioned in note 19 in Chapter 1. Steiner’s model is also different from Goethe’s notion of three epochs of translation123, where Goethe discusses the three different approaches to one single text while Steiner is discussing the four-step process of rendering one work, although his examples seem to show that some translations stop at the third stage of incorporation (see ibid: 315).

In the light of translation ethics, who or what are affected by a translation is not coherently clear for Steiner; for him, the target “language or cultural ensemble” may risk being transformed, and “we may be consumed” (ibid). But that is, in a way, ineluctable. His conception of the fourfold hermeneutic motion seems incongruent with his examples. The division of aggression and incorporation and restitution is problematic because other expressions such as interpretation and rewriting are more accurate to describe the process of translation.

All in all, Steiner’s reciprocity means balance, equity, and, in the final analysis, fidelity, hence too narrow in regard to the complexity of translation ethics.

4.1.2 Reciprocity between individual persons in translation

Reciprocity in translation has also been discussed in terms of the relationship between individuals. For example, Bonnie McDougall, though not the first to look

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123 Robinson takes Steiner’s fourfold model as a revision of Goethe’s three-epoch approach (1998: 98).
at translation from the perspective of reciprocity, has systematically discussed literary translation as reciprocity from her own experience as a translator when she worked in China in the 1980s. For her, translation can mean reciprocity.

As she narrates, in China in the 1980s, the writer or “translatee” in her words offered their works for translation, and the translator did the translation as a way of returning the favour. As she describes, “[i]n the language of gift exchange, the translatee offered the translator a gift of his poem. The translator reciprocated by returning the gift with added value: her translation of his poem” (McDougall 2011: 97).

The reciprocity in her description is chiefly between specific individuals, i.e. the translator and the translatee, who could usually contact each other directly for the translation. The relation is reciprocal because both could benefit from the translations in question. In fact, “the mutual benefits of personal transactions between the writers and translators were also very apparent, and the translations that resulted were well received domestically and internationally” (ibid: 98). The benefits for the translator include friendship, social connections, and other tangible or intangible “goods” (ibid: 109-112). The benefits for the translatees are, but not limited to, translated works, published works, heightened fame, and other things (see McDougall 2011: 99-105).

In her reflection, although that kind of translation may not be able to constitute a major pattern of translation, it, however, as an important complement to the largely European-dominated theory and history of translation, has its significance. In fact, in China today, the practice of reciprocal translation is not infrequent as large translation projects are often finished by language teachers or translators for their friends or acquaintances, who may return the favour in other fashions other than just economic remunerations (see also Qin 2013b).

McDougall is right in her observation that “a key characteristic of reciprocity is that it always benefits both agents and the wider social environment” (2011: 19), as has been discussed in Chapter 3. She argues that “[t]he notion of translation as a gift exchange could be deeply inspiring to both the translatee and the translator, even if and when the personal relationship faltered” (McDougall 2011: 143). This is a highly important point for reciprocity can be tapped further for a model of translation ethics as done in this study. Her further reflection on the notion of reciprocity is of significance to the present study. She has found that:
A common observation by ethnographers and others is that gifts should be of equivalent value (i.e., balanced), except where the social standing of both parties is obviously unequal. In such cases, the value of the gift from the superior party is normally greater than the value of the gift from the inferior party. The greater generosity of the superiors is mark of their greater wealth or position, and the inferiors accept the gift without thereby feeling demeaned in recognition of their inferior position. Thus, the father gives generously to the son, who repays the father in smaller coin, or the lord gives generously to the servant, who owes little or nothing in return. These cases will qualify as balanced reciprocity because all parties acknowledge their respective standings. (McDougall 2011: 129, my emphasis)

This is in actual fact what was practiced in ancient China as well as in places around the world including China today, and it is also a real form of reciprocity (see also van Baal 1975).

Some other points made by McDougall on translation are also insightful and informative to the present study. For example, she states, (1) “There is an odd assumption at large that each and every poem belongs to a transcendental category of perfection compared with which any translation is necessarily an inferior product. A moment’s thought will show that this can hardly be the case. There are good poems, bad poems, and mediocre poems, just as there are good, bad, and mediocre translations. A good poem badly translated will not make for agreeable reading, but a mediocre poem may be lifted out of the ordinary through a creative translation” (ibid: 112, my emphasis); (2) “There is an ever-present challenge in that translations are often admitted to be less than perfect. However, few original literary works are perfect either. A poor translation can open the path to a better translation […]”. And (3), “[t]exts are not neutral or fixed, and even if the notion of interaction and reciprocity between texts is fanciful, there are subtle differences between texts that have been translated and those that have not” (McDougall 2011: 144-145).

Such ideas are revealing to the formulation of the model below because the source text as a key factor, as discussed here by McDougall convincingly, is not a fixed or monolithic entity; the translator needs to consider its nature and quality when making a decision whether and how to undertake the translating job. This text factor will be addressed at greater length below.

### 4.1.3 Reciprocity between nations and between cultures in translation

In addition to reciprocity between languages and texts and individuals, there is also reciprocity between cultures and nations in translation. As noted in Chapter 1, Brissett’s proposal of reciprocity is to address the imbalance of the volume of translation between the Western languages/cultures and other ‘minor’ cultures. As
she found from her survey for the UNESCO, the volume of translation from Western languages and cultures, especially that from European-American languages/cultures, far outweighs that from the other way round, i.e. translation of “the literature and knowledge of many developing nations” (Brisset 2003: 127). Literary masterpieces and major social science works of the West have been largely translated into minor languages. But it does not mean that there are no literary masterpieces and sophisticated social science works in the developing world. Such works should also be translated into the major languages of the West. For various reasons the volume of translation from developing nations to developed nations is far lower. A result of this practice is that the translating minor languages might be dominated by expressions imported from dominating languages, especially English, and such languages might be “condemned to silence” in the world or, “permanently relegated into the vernacular” (ibid).

Brisset’s proposal can be said to be a noble one, trying to address the issue of unfairness and injustice of translation imbalance between the first world and the third world. It indeed points out the importance to formulate an ethics of reciprocity in translation, but as a guiding model it is not as practical and feasible because translation as a cross-cultural, cross-national activity, seen from a political perspective, entails asymmetries of power relations. Her definition of reciprocity is vague to the extent that her conception of translation is not coherent. It is clear that what she discusses is the notion of translation as a sequence of activities including more than one translation as opposed to a specific project; in her discussion she has not made any distinction between a translation and translation. In so conceiving of translating, the ethical subjects are not well framed.

Another scholar who has also directed attention at the issue of reciprocity between cultures in translation without employing the term expressly is Anthony Pym. As discussed in section 2.3.1.3 above, Pym put forth his model of intercultural cooperation on translator ethics. As I see it, the model of cooperation is largely one of reciprocity. He argues that “[w]e should translate in certain circumstances only, investing variable effort, in order to promote long-term cooperation between cultures” (2012: 12, my emphasis). But Pym’s model is basically for cultures, excluding many other equally important parties and entities for the implementation of a translation project, for example, the translators themselves, as noted in section 2.3.1.3.
All these views of reciprocity in translation supply a foundation for the present study to delve further on this issue for the formulation of the model. In addition to such views, there are other more important points closely related to reciprocity in translation: three important relations concerning a translation project, i.e. the interpersonal/intercultural, person-textual and intertextual relations. What follows will address them.

4.2 Reciprocity and three relations concerning translation

As regards any translation project, concerning the objects and subjects of reciprocity, there are three key passive entities: texts, languages and cultures, and three vital active parties: individual persons, collectivities and nations. The passive entities like text, language and culture with respect to any translation project are all crucially important but undoubtedly hard to define succinctly. With regard to the active parties, individual persons may include the translator, the author and the client/commissioner/publisher, collectivities may be in the form of an institution or an agency that commissions a translation or the people embodied in a fiction, and nations that are much larger communities. Regarding a translation project, the above three key passive entities and three vital active parties constitute three major relationships respectively between individual persons or peoples/cultures/nations, between text and individual persons, and between texts.

4.2.1 Three key passive entities

Text, language and culture, indispensable to any translation project, are enormously complex, but it does not mean that they cannot be scrutinised for the present study.

First of all, as shown above when discussing McDougall’s view of translation, text has been touched upon briefly as a crucial passive entity with respect to any translation project. In fact Tan argues that text is “an extremely important concept” (2012: 80) to translation because text rather than people constitutes the foundation of translation (ibid: 77-80). Neubert and Shreve in 1992 published their celebrated book *Translation as Text*¹²⁴, arguing that the “text is the central defining issue in

¹²⁴Schäffner reviewed the book as a classic in TS in the first issue of the journal *The Translator* 2012, but Toury regards it as just “one of a whole array of realizations of what” he calls the “‘myth of the text’” in TS (2010: 160).
translation” (1992: 5) and that the “text has to be considered the primary object of translation study” (ibid: 10). Undoubtedly much importance has been given to text in TS because text is definitely indispensable to any translation project, as a text containing information or idea or with meaning to be mined is otherwise unavailable to the target readers if not translated.

Centring on text, another key concept in translation studies, equivalence, as noted previously (see note 53 in Chapter 2), is also attached predominant importance. But its importance has been challenged with the development of the discipline, especially with the advent of DTS (Toury 1995, Hermans 1999) and the cultural turn in TS, which has shifted the study focus from the ST to the TT and more, to the receiving socio-cultural context and its influence. Given post-structural and post-colonial approaches to translation, the fixed meaning of the ST is even doubted (see e.g. Davis 2001) and power and ideology are all said to play a critical role (see e.g. Hermans 1985, Lefevere 1992a, 1992b).

It is thus argued that, the fact that text is taken as primary in translation is largely owing to the traditional linguistic approach to translation, where other equally, if not more important, factors like translator and the translational context, have been overlooked, or not given due attention. Accordingly, text is not drawing the attention it used to capture.

Nevertheless, three aspects concerning text merit close attention insofar as the formulation of translation ethics is concerned. They are the issues of text typology, authorship or ownership of a text and quality of a text. First, text might fall into different types or genres, closely related to which the meaning of some text can be neutral or fixed while some others cannot claim a neutral or immanent meaning in terms of room for interpretation\textsuperscript{125}. Second, equally important but often overlooked in the studies of translation is the fact that texts are of different qualities although quality itself is an elusive concept, ranging from classic to poor. Third, while most texts are attributable to some producer named the author\textsuperscript{126}, some texts are

\textsuperscript{125}Interpretation is a key concept in literary criticism, for which Ricoeur published a monograph *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (1976) to express his notion of it (see Valdés 1991: 3-21). Gadamer in his *Truth and Method* (1960/1989) in the pages dedicated to translation stresses that translation cannot be a reproduction of an original, it can only be an interpretation reflecting both empathy and distance (1989: 385-90). See also Venuti’s conception of translation as noted in section 2.3.1.2, Chapter 2, page 60.

\textsuperscript{126}Concerning the concept of “author”, Foucault’s essay “What is an Author” (1977) is recognised as influential in the line of post-structuralist thinking.
authorless or can only be traced back to collective author or unidentifiable. The following is to address them respectively.

Insofar as text typology is concerned, to begin with, it is helpful to look at the definition of text. The scholars above who give prominence to text haven’t given a definition of text. Here I accept Ricoeur’s definition of text as “any discourse fixed by writing” (1991b: 106), meaning that a text is not an utterance or a speech but something fixed by writing and this agrees with the focus of the present study, which will not consider the ethics in interpreting. Neubert and Shreve fail to define text too but they do point out correctly that “Venuti’s call for resistive translation refers primarily to certain literary and cultural texts” (1992: 4, my emphasis) and argue well that “[d]ifferent types of texts presuppose different translation techniques and different criteria for revision or criticism” (ibid: 17-8). They also contend that “[t]exts and their situations define the translation process” (ibid: 5, my emphasis). Whether “texts and their situations” can define the translation process is questionable because more factors are involved than just the texts and, “their situations” is a term short of thorough account. But their view reminds us of the importance of text typology.

Text typology is important to translation because it has much to do with translation strategies and methods as discussed by numerous translation scholars (e.g. Reiss [1971]2000; Newmark1988; Neubert and Shreve 1992; Trosborg1997). Reiss in her book Translation Criticism ([1971]2000) classifies text into four types: content-focused, form-focused, appeal-focused, and audio-medial, which is later changed to multimedia (Reiss & Vermeer [1984]2013: 187). The first three basic ones are renamed respectively as informative, expressive and operative text (Reiss 1989: 109).

Undeniably the framework developed by Reiss is to a large extent still relevant today. For example, she argues that “the type of text is the primary factor influencing the translator’s choice of a proper translation method” ([1971]2000: 17). But her distinction between form-focused text and appeal-focused text is in fact too arbitrary, rigid and very prescriptive. Compared with the content-focused, or practical text (I prefer this rougher but also more comprehensive term), there are far less appeal-focused texts circulating around the world, let alone in terms of importance.

But on the whole such text typology has been challenged as too broad (see e.g.
Hatim & Mason 1990: 138). Zhu Heng also argues that it is not of much meaning to classify texts in an abstract manner and many texts cannot be classified at all, like a biography for instance (2015: 7). American translator Green (2001: 58) argues that “rather than talk about ‘literary’ and ‘nonliterary,’ we would be better off talking about distinctions between ‘expressive’ and ‘objective’ prose or between ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’ writing”.

Hard to distinguish as texts are in terms of type, I therefore take Snell-Hornby’s concept “scope of interpretation” as an effective approach to text and its translation. As she argues, “[w]ith certain special language texts involving standardized concepts (particularly in science and technology) the scope of interpretation is narrowed down considerably” (Snell-Hornby 1995: 34, my emphasis). Meanwhile, “[…] the more specialized the text, and the more specific the situation, the more the individual style recedes to make way for group convention. In a special language text[,] the circle of readers and the relation to the non-linguistic world are limited and prescribed” (Snell-Hornby 1995: 124).

Earlier, Neubert and Shreve also point out that there are other pragmatic texts which “participate in practical communication” and “exchange primarily value-free technical, scientific, and commercial information” (1992: 5, my emphasis). They assert, rightly, that the “foreignness” of the ST is not “a benefit in these translations” (ibid, my emphasis). They also rightly observe that “[m]any specialized texts have specific audiences. They reflect the unique expertise of specific authors, and they reflect special purposes in their textual organization. […]” (ibid: 41). In fact, a scientific text, or more specific, e.g. a mathematical text can be neutral or really “value-free”, and the room for interpretation hence can be said to be strictly fixed.

As such, it can be posited that there exists a continuum along which all texts are placed between two extremes from the interpretation-fixed ones like manuals, instructions, medical materials to interpretation-open ones like literary works especially poetry. In this manner, a text manifests its textuality from complexity to simplicity in terms of whether it is rich in ideas or merely about hard information.

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127As regards the definition of literary text see also Beaugrande and Dressler (1981): a text that presents a systematic alternative to the accepted version of the “real world” (1981: 191). As for the difference between literary works and philosophy ones, it is at times also hard to tell. For example, Sean Burke in his Ethics of Writing points out that Nietzsche, giving no attention to differentiating philosophy and poetry, should be in large part responsible for the abuse and even blundering use of his writings in Germany during WWII (2008).
In this vein of thinking, texts can be interpreted and rewritten by the translator according to their possible place along the cline. In terms of difficulty posed by different text types, it is generally agreed that literary works are more formidable than other kinds because there are many more elements involved such as rhyme and imagery. As argued correctly by Green, “[l]iterary texts are often highly personal and original, and, the more a text is personal and original, the harder it is to translate” (Green 2001: 11). Literary translation is more difficult also because, as Terry Eagleton states, “[l]iterature, in the meaning of the word we have inherited, is an ideology” (2004: 19, original emphasis).

Opposite to the literary works on the other end are the practical texts. As Green argues correctly, “[t]he conventions governing many kinds of nonliterary writing are fairly uniform all over the world. They are designed to be objective and impersonal” (Green 2001: 11, my emphasis). This is truer today in an age of globalisation (see Robertson 1992) where more information in high tech and science needs to be shared so standardised form will be developed or preferred for easy and efficient availability around the world. Moreover, as Xie Tianzhen (2014b) argues too, we are in an era of professionalised translation as the quantity of practical materials to be translated far outnumbers that of the literary works.

However, this stress of translation of practical texts does not mean that the translation of literary works is of less importance because as Young and Haley (2009: 286-7) argues very well that literature in fact plays a vitally important moral role in intercultural communication and hence its translation. And here, one point deserves further attention. That is: although undeniably literary or philosophical texts are hard to interpret because they may have more than one sense to different readers, yet “[i]t is too glib […] to say that every text involves ‘a program or a matrix having the greatest potential, variability, undecidability, plurivocality, et cetera,’ for this does not answer the question why specific texts are interpreted in the determinate ways in which they have been read” (Bernstein 1991: 190, my emphasis).

To sum up, text type is of vital importance to translation and translation ethics because different texts have different functions. The content embodied in a text ranges from merely concrete information to rich and complex ideas. When a text is a scientific, legal, medical and other information-intensified “fact texts” (Newmark 1999: 72), its function or purpose is often simple and direct, largely just for
information transmission or knowledge transfer. In translating such texts, ‘accuracy’ will be the first request and the translator has no choice but try to be an expert in the field in question to guarantee the accurate representation of the information in the source text. Translating such texts entails less ethics because no much cultural image or national identity is involved. In other words, not all texts are steeped in political, ideological and cultural implications as Venuti (1992, 1995, 1998) and many other cultural translation studies theorists advocate (e.g. Lefevere 1992a). The translations of such practical texts can be judged correct or wrong in technical terms. Such rightness or wrongness can be further evaluated ethically.

But when it comes to more idea-intensified texts like literary, religious and philosophical ones, the situation might immediately become complicated because a literary work for example might be in possession of intrinsic values such as linguistic beauty, critical power, artistic clout, unique style, profound ideas or sharp insights of human nature, or vivid description of a people or ethnicity. It is also largely in the case of “literary and cultural texts” in Neubert & Shreve’s words that ideology, power and national image are involved, thereby posing more questions in terms of ethics. Judging terms to such works will be chiefly good or bad.

Next to typology, the second key aspect concerning a text is its quality. As another important parameter concerning a text for translating (ethics) it is because not all texts are well written and can withstand the test of time; a text can be at any point in the continuum from poor to classic. Traditional translation studies tend to approach translation in terms of equivalence or fidelity to the ST, because the quality of the ST is taken for granted. Or, more accurately, translators are conditioned not to see problems existing in the ST, which is instead taken as the absolute criterion. However, all texts are of human linguistic construction, thereby bound to be in various qualities.

As for what is meant by “classic”, the following quote makes a good answer: “We only call a text a classic if it somehow, in spite of years or even centuries of linguistic and cultural shifts, critiques, counterarguments, parodies and translations into alien contexts, it does not lose its force. It remains a classic as long as we acknowledge it as worthy of renewed engagement, in spite of its (now known) shortcomings—be they stylistic deficiencies or fallacies of argumentation”
Examples are countless. In China, we have from the pre-Qin [221BCE] Four Books to the Qing Dynasty’s *Honglou Meng* [*The Dream of the Red Chamber*] by Cao Xueqin and, in the West there are Plato’s *Republic*, Shakespeare’s tragedies and Goethe’s *Faust*.

As for what is meant by “poor” on the other end of the continuum, like “classic”, it is also relative, especially relative to the proficiency and expertise of the reader at issue concerning the field knowledge and subject matter. In the field of TS, this issue has drawn attention from theorists and translators. Vermeer, for example, rightly observes that “[t]exts are often defective” (Vermeer 1996: 67, n. 24). For Robinson, it is a translator’s duty to improve the “badly written texts” as he argues that “[a]lmost every conservative translation theorist agrees that the translator should improve a badly written text, and not simply transfer to the target language the original’s shoddiness as accurately as possible” (Robinson 2003: 89; 2015: ) (cf. Williams & Chesterman 2001: 19). Newmark (1983) also argues that a translator must correct mistakes in the ST instead of preserving them in the TT.

But Neubert and Shreve have doubts on this by asking “is the translator always in a position to judge? Can the translator recognize the mistakes? Are all facts known?” (1992: 78). Such questions are relevant and will be addressed below because they and the quality of text have much to do with translation ethics, which, to a large extent, has long been overlooked or even neglected; what the above scholars discussed is not mainly from the perspective of ethics, especially reciprocal ethics.

Text type and quality apart, the last aspect regarding a text is its authorship or ownership as a more accurate description. Ricardo Muñoz argues that the notion of “possessive authorship” is relatively young in cultural terms when he reviews Andrew Keen’s 2007 book *The Cult of the Amateur* (2012: 368). But in China, various texts have been identifiable concerning their authors as early as Confucius and Mencius in the pre-Qin period until today. Thus it can be said that usually many texts have an identifiable author but it is also possible that some texts may be authorless or finished by a collective authorship and end up anonymous.

For example, in the West, it is well known that the Bible cannot be claimed to be finished by any recognizable author at all. Presently in today’s world, a novel or

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128 Cf. Ryckmans’ definition of classic text: “A classic is essentially a text that is open-ended—in the sense that it lends itself constantly to new developments, new commentaries, different interpretations” (Leys [Ryckmans] 2014: xi).
very personal work can easily claim an author and copyright, but some impersonal business documents like an ad or leaflets often go with no single author acknowledged. For another instance, a company’s prospectus or annual report, when unable to be said to belong to a clearly designated author, it can be improved or changed according to the common practice in the field. When such texts are translated, the translator may be more expert in terms of textual expression and organization.

Next to text, the second key passive entity is language. Language is so important to human beings that to British philosopher Alfred N. Whitehead, “[h]uman civilization is an outgrowth of language, and language is the product of advancing civilization. Freedom of thought is made possible by language: we are thereby released from complete bondage to the immediacies of mood and circumstance” (1968: 35). And, “the mentality of mankind and the language of mankind created each other” (ibid: 40-41). But according to Liu Runqing, a language educator and professor in linguistics, no final definition of language is available, what is mostly agreed upon is the following one: language is an arbitrary, spoken, sign system for human communication (2002: 1).

For Xu Guozhang, linguist and language educationist (1991: 1, trans), “language is a special sign system specific to human beings. It is a medium to reflect the mutual reaction when used for the relationship between humans; it is a device to acquire knowledge about objects when used for the relationship between man and the objective world; and it is a vehicle and container of cultural information when used with culture”129. For the present study, the ontological question130 in regard to language is beyond its compass, what is taken as the most relevant aspect to translation ethics will be the functional dimension of it: what can it be used to do. From Xu’s definition above, we can see that he approaches language also from its functions. It is obvious that language itself is not a monolithic entity independent of human beings although human beings as individuals and communities are bound to be conditioned and affected by the language(s) one (they) is (are) grown up with131.

129“語言是人類特有的一種符號系統。當它作用於人與人之間的關係的時候，它是表達相互反應的中介；當它作用於人和客觀世界的關係的時候，它是認知事物的工具；當它作用於文化的時候，它是文化信息的載體和容器” (my emphasis).
130Chomsky’s works, for example, are attempts to address the ontological question of “what language is” (see Liu 2002: 159ff, and Chomsky 1966, 1976).
131For Heidegger, language is the house of human existence (1996: 358) and Heidegger grants an ontological status to language, but I agree with Li Zehou in this respect that language cannot play a
In other words, language is to serve human beings rather than the other way round. Language is neutral; it becomes ideological or non-neutral because of the user rather than in and of itself. Many translation theorists or practitioners have a clear idea about this. For example, Said Faiq argues that “language doesn’t make sense, we make sense of language” (1995: 42). To A. W. Schlegel, in Robinson’s translation, “language in itself is an inert tool; it waits upon the artist to unpack its potential with his deft touch” (see Robinson 2002: 217). Domenico Jervolino states affirmatively that “[i]t is not language that talks in us; man talks” (2009: 31). German professor, poet and translator Wolfgang Kubin claims, rightly, that “language does not know an end to itself”, asking at the same time, “[e]verything can be said this way or that way, but what is the right way?” (2014: 218). American writer bell hooks says, “I know that it is not the English language that hurts me, but what the oppressors do with it, how they shape it to become a territory that limits and defines, how they make it a weapon that can shame, humiliate, colonize” (hooks 1995: 296). And, “Bakhtin […] himself repeatedly insists that words don’t do things, people do” (see Robinson 2003: 103, original emphasis).

Furthermore, as John Thompson points out in his introduction to Bourdieu’s monograph *Language and Symbolic Power*, “[w]e are experts in the innumerable and subtle strategies by which words can be used as instruments of coercion and constraint, as tools of intimidation and abuse, and signs of politeness, condescension and contempt. In short, we are aware that language is an integral part of social life, with all its ruses and iniquities, and that a good part of our social life consists of the routine exchange of linguistic expressions in the day-to-day flow of social interaction” (Thompson 1991: 1, my emphasis).

Meanwhile, according to Cheney et al, “[o]ur language, our symbols, set up screens through which we view the world: some aspects of the world are inevitably featured, while others recede or are obscured from view (Burke, 1966). Words can alternately narrow or broaden our vision, just as optical lens can do. Above all, the selection of one label, one category, over another implicates choice and thus is as much a matter of ethics as it is of fact” (2010: 6, my emphasis). Also, “[w]ords can break as many bones as can sticks and stones—and perhaps more bones—through depriving people of the respect they rightfully and inherently deserve as human

role to that extent (Li 2009: 205-6, 2010: 131). For Wittgenstein, there is no ‘essence’ of language, it is a game and an instrument (1997: 31e, 151e).
beings” (Spence and Van Heekeren 2005: 67). Language thus does not have a characteristic of class; the users of a language may belong to different classes.

Accordingly, a language user’s choices of words, sentences, etc. really count no matter whether it is in monolingual communication or in interlingual communication like translation. In this sense, language can be used to do good or evil in various ways, dependent on the user(s).

Positively, language has been so important to human beings as noted above in Whitehead’s discussion that human beings can be said in part defined by this sign system. It can reflect reality, facilitate communication and carry cultural information. In terms of the relationship between language and the objective world, language can be used to describe reality in a neutral manner. For example, we can say “It is snowing” when it is really snowing or “The cat is on the mat” when it is really there, with no other connotations or implications. Or at an airport, we can follow the notice to board our plane via a designated gate. In such situations, the language is transparent and neutral and used for normal communication in a neutral manner. Clearly, with the help of language human life is able to run smoothly and the world is in order.

But at the same time, undeniably, there is another side: language can also be used to do evil as mentioned above. In addition to reflecting reality, language may deflect, select or create reality. This does not mean evil, but by deflecting reality, for example, language can hinder communication or even give rise to conflict. Translation scholar Louise Kelly observes very much to the point that, “[i]t is obvious that the Dionysica language theories of Heidegger are as inadequate as the empirical communication models of Nida. These both ignore the multifarious purposes of language: language can frustrate communication, act purely as a medium of information, or create new worlds for its users” (Kelly 1979: 226-7). Ricoeur also finds that “not only can we say the same thing in another way, but we can say something other than what is the case” (2006: 28, original emphasis). What is more, for Ricoeur, language has the “propensity for the enigma, for artifice, for abstruseness”, in sum, “for non-communication” (ibid: 28, my emphasis)

Along the same line of thinking, central to Steiner’s thought, is his “astonishment,

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132Here it has to be borne in mind that it does not mean Ricoeur denies the function of language for communication as he stresses that “languages do not form closed systems which exclude communication” (1996: 4). Opposite to Benjamin (2004), Ricoeur is optimistic about translation for he states that “translation is de facto; translatability is de jure” (ibid).
 naïve as it seems to people, that you can use human speech both to love, to build, to forgive, and also to torture, to hate, to destroy and to annihilate” (2001: 201, my emphasis). At greater detail, he continues, “[l]anguage is leprosied with cliché, with individual and social hypocrisy, with glib imprecision. It has served (brilliantly) the demands of genocide and of political enslavement. Its reserves of apologia and of mendacity, of factitious embellishment, and of amnesia, look to be inexhaustible. […] On the most intimate levels of love and of friendship, language betrays and betrays itself” (Steiner 2001: 202-3).

Tyulenev expresses a similar idea, “[s]ymbolic violence causes symbolic suffering of the dominated and less privileged at the hands of the dominant. A powerful means of symbolic violence in all societies is language: the way things are expressed in languages confers on the phenomena expressed a value” (Tyulenev 2014: 175, my emphasis). Apparently language is powerful but not sovereign, subject to its users to do either good or evil.

Apart from language’s lack of autonomy, another characteristic feature is also relevant to translation ethics, that is, language is at once public and personal. American philosopher Kwame A. Appiah states that, “the key insight of modern philosophical reflection on language is that language is, first and foremost, a public thing, something we share” (2006: 28), so that “language enables us to perform a social interaction” (Munday 2012: 13). For Anthony Giddens (1991: 8), “[a]ll of us speak languages which none of us, as individuals, created, although we all use language creatively”. Douglas Robinson too expresses a similar view, “[l]anguage is social behavior, and to the extent that it is controlled at all, it is controlled by local hegemonic social forces that are profoundly conservative but never monolithic or universal or perfectly successful” (2003: 130).

But at the same time, it has to be recognised that language is also, in a way, personal, because it can be used creatively to the extent that many writers or speakers can develop their style in their writing or speaking. Language is public, but can be used individually and publicly. Such expressions as literary language, legal language, or political language are problematic, what we have are in fact literary texts, legal texts or political texts. In the same vein, general language or specific language is wrong; there is just language employed for general purpose or specific purpose. Hence, we have text typology but not language typology concerning a natural language.
Closely related to language’s publicity and personality is another feature, that is, it is also in a sense both stable and changeable. Stability allows room for the publicity of language, and change is largely conveyed in the form of creative and private use and in the evolution of human civilization and a language’s interaction with other languages and cultures. Whitehead rightly argues that change and stability are interwoven and required by each other: the interweaving is “at the base of our concepts of personal identity, of social identity, and of all sociological functionings” (1968: 53). But there are theorists who argue against the stability of language, especially those affected by the postmodernist thinking, Derrida’s deconstructionism in particular (see Davis 2001). For example, Robinson is especially against the “bridge”—“stable civil engineering”—image for translation in the Western mainstream conception of translation because, for him, language itself is not stable, instead, “too multiple, too shifting, too human to sit still long enough for a bridge to be built” (1991: 134, original emphasis). This emphasis of “too human” indirectly brings to the fore the lack of sovereignty of language, but Robinson’s conclusion is, apparently, drawn from his observation of Western languages.

True, there is fluidity in any language, always in flux over time, but there is actually also stability in language at the word, phrase and even sentence levels. As Whitehead notes above, human civilization is recorded partly by and in language. A specific case in point is the Chinese language where, many expressions have not undergone much change in their meaning even after the vicissitude of thousands of years.

For instance, Confucian aphorisms like “三人行，必有我師焉：擇其善者而從之，其不善者而改之” (The Analects, 7.22) will not cause much trouble for understanding.

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133Cf. “there are categories and concepts which, in their most fundamental character, change not at all” (Wittgenstein 1997: 184) and, “[l]anguage is only as handed down” (Habermas 1970: 259, H’s emphasis, qtd in Thompson 1981: 82).

134The following five different renderings can show the little difference in their understanding of this famous dictum: (1) Even when walking in the company of two other men, I am bound to be able to learn from them. The good points of the one I copy; the bad points of the other I correct in myself (Lau 2008: 115); (2) When I walk along with two others, they may serve me as my teachers. I will select their good qualities and follow them, their bad qualities and avoid them (Legge [1893]2011: 202); (3) Even when walking in a party of no more than three I can always be certain of learning from those I am with. There will be good qualities that I can select for imitation and bad ones that will teach me what requires correction in myself (Waley 1998: 87); (4) Put me in the company of any two people at random—they will invariably have something to teach me. I can take their qualities as a model and their defects as a warning (Leys 1997: 32); (5) Walking in the company of others, there is bound to be something I can learn from. Their good traits I follow; their bad ones I try to avoid.
to even a Chinese senior primary school student. Despite the very minute shades of difference in the renditions of this aphorism, the general meaning of it remains largely similar to each other and the meaning can be argued to be stable for over two thousand years.

And so is it in English. For example, I don’t think we can claim that there is much change of the basic meaning of the well-known line by the poet Shelly since its debut: “If Winter comes, can Spring be far behind?” (Shelly [1820]2004). This feature of publicity and privacy, stability and change on the part of language allows it to be understood and room to be improved with respect to the rewriting process of translation, which in turn has much to do with translation ethics.

What is more, because translation entails at least two languages\textsuperscript{135}, the inequality of languages is another unavoidable issue. To a large degree, the inequality renders ethics more important to translation (Chu 2009, Bassnett & Trivedi 1999). As Robert Young argues, “Languages, like classes and nations, exist in a hierarchy: as does translation itself, traditionally thought of in terms of an original and an inferior copy. Under colonialism, the colonial copy becomes more powerful than the indigenous original that is devalued. […] The colonial language becomes culturally more powerful, devaluing the native language as it is brought into its domain, domesticated, and accommodated” (2003: 140). Gayatri Spivak’s well known line is as insightful: “The status of a language in the world is what one must consider when teasing out the politics of translation” (2004: 378). She is discussing the politics of translation but it applies to ethics. Further, the concepts of majority and minority languages also convey much in this sense of linguistic inequality (see Cronin 2003, 2006) because, as known, a language will be extinct when the last person speaking it dies.

From such delineation it can be seen clearly that language is an extremely important but also enormously complex passive entity to translation and translation ethics. For the purpose of the model formulation, a typology of translation similar to text typology, although difficult, is needed.

Chinese philosophy scholar Ni Liangkang, based on his view of language, sees translations in roughly three types: technical translation; literary translation; and
idea translation (2004: 90). Similar to this is TS scholar Zhu Heng’s view. I think of his view as, to date, the most effective classification of language and translation. He holds that language can be seen in three dimensions: the instrumental, the ideational, and the poetic, respectively with an orientation towards the signified, the signified/signifier combined, and the signifier (2015: 5, 128). When related to translation, texts may be generally distinguished accordingly since the signified-oriented texts feature the instrumental dimension/function of language, i.e. meaning and information transmission, hence with higher translatability; the signified/signifier combined texts feature largely the ideational dimension/function of language, where new signifiers in the translating language are to be created to convey the ideas at issue, hence with decreased translatability; the signifier-oriented texts feature the poetic dimension/function of language, almost untranslatable, hence more room for interpretation and creation needed (ibid: 128). Such a classification of language and translation can be mapped, along with the corresponding texts, to the cline conceived above when text is discussed.

The third vital passive entity concerning translation is culture. Terms like ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ are “notoriously complex” (Chesterman 2010a: 104). As “an extremely complex concept and an enormously important subject” (Tan & Shao 2007: 206), the complexity of culture also renders it extraordinarily difficult to define. According to American anthropologists Alfred Louis Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn (1963: 66), culture witnessed over 160 definitions.

As noted in note 25, Chapter 1, the concept of culture in this study is used in the traditional sense, following Tan Zaixi and Shao Lu’s definition: “a system of values associated with specific human groups which consist of their ideology, socio-politics, and customs and habits, in addition to the language they speak” (2007: 206). This definition is echoed largely in TS scholar Sergey Tyulenev’s account: “In a narrower sense, the term ‘culture’ means behavioural patterns acquired through socialization into a particular human collectivity. In this sense, the term is usually applied to large groups extended in space and time, usually in modern societies associated with nations or nation-states, that is, nations as geographical and political units or to peoples within such units (Hungarians, English, Buryat, Flemish cultures)” (2014: 23, my emphasis). Thus, apparently, “culture is first and in most cases always local and national. This premise constitutes the foundation for any cross-cultural value goal and identity because it is vital to the
existence and fate of a nation or state” (Wan 2001: 48, trans). Conceived this way, it is different from Homi Bhabha’s atypical definition of “culture” (Bhabha 1994); a culture is closely associated with a specific human group and reflects this group’s values.

Culture is also dynamic but relatively recognizable for a period of time by the people embedded within and those beyond\textsuperscript{136}. In addition to being represented in other human creations like architecture, music, fine arts, a culture is largely embodied in such a group’s language. In this sense, it is possible to say ‘a culture’, ‘cultures’, ‘our culture’, ‘Chinese culture’, or ‘British culture’. Accordingly, there are cultural images and values corresponding to different groups of people, which might in a way overlap with the people’s possible national\textsuperscript{137} images and values. But culture is different from society in that “[a] culture is a set of values and conventions, while society, a system of interpersonal relations, is a mechanism for transmitting these values to individuals” (Kluchhohn 1949: 37, in Tyulenev 2014: 23).

When culture is associated with translation, the translation of certain texts such as literary ones brings two different cultures into contact and this contact as interaction makes their otherwise unrecognizable, or logically inexistent, differences prominent and even conflicting with each other. Different translations of such texts in certain way may give birth to different images to the target audience in the target culture. Lawrence Venuti ([1993]2010a) in an overstating manner argues for the role translation plays in cultural politics. For him, translation ethics is, in a nutshell, a cultural innovation on the target side as I have argued in Chapter 2 (see section 2.3.1.2, p60). For Edwin Gentzler, “translation constitutes one of the primary means by which culture is constructed and is therefore important to any study of cultural evolution and identity formation” (2008: 2). The problems of misrepresentation, distortion, or even demonising of one culture by another via translation are the major ones engendered to cultures by translation, having much to do with translation ethics.

It is therefore argued well that “translations are one of the primary means (not the only means, to be sure) by which cultures travel” (Dingwaney 1995: 6). Closely

\textsuperscript{136}Ricoeur argues that “The identity of a group, culture, people, or nation, is not that of an immutable substance, nor that of a fixed structure, but that, rather, of a recounted story” (1996: 7). This notion is born of Ricoeur’s stress of “narrative identity” (see Ricoeur 1992: 113-68).

\textsuperscript{137}‘National’ as an equally thorny concept will be addressed at some length in the following section.
related to language, culture is thus constitutive of and constituted by translation. But “The cultures, and texts, being translated should, ideally, constrain this move [the translator’s ‘return’ to the center], compelling the translator and her product (translation) to enter into a subtly dialectical interaction with the ‘source,’ through which ‘difference’ is both mediated and recorded, nor sacrificed or appropriated” (ibid: 10).

Here it has to be stressed again that, the cultural difference that some translation theorists, especially the postcolonial ones (e.g. Niranjana 1992, Venuti 1992, 1995), advocate to preserve, is seen and established by the party called the translator in his/her rewriting process in the target language. As noted above, the difference or ‘foreignness’ of the ST or the source culture logically is established only when it has been translated or rewritten as the TT. Before the relation of translation, there is logically no such thing called ‘foreignness’, which is not foreign or exotic in its own right to its own audience in its own culture. Temporarily and physically, the ST precedes the TT, but logically, the so-called TT renders the prior text into an ‘ST’.

Aside from a TT’s accurate preservation of foreignness or difference in the source text and culture, at times accurate translation of a literary work which ‘accurately’ reflects or describes a culture might not be preferable to the translated culture, because such a translation plays a role of exposing an ‘insider’s wrong to an ‘outsider’, culminating in a harm to the translated culture (see Young and Haley 2009: 280). As such, for the sake of preserving certain culture it is better to leave it alone rather than allow it to be translated.

Meanwhile, culture as a passive entity structures a translator’s decisions and choice as much as it might be affected by the translator’s rewriting process. Cultures allow the existence of interculture but it does not mean that translators all fall into such intercultures (cf. Pym 2012: 4). Although for Carbonell i Cortés, “[c]ultures are not to be seen as models of totality but as dynamic systems – pattern-based constructions – whose frontiers are fuzzy and therefore open to hybridizing processes” (2010: 102), most, if not all, translators belong to, if not completely immanent, a certain recognisable culture (see Section 2.3.1.3, pp 72-73). Such sense of belonging may ineluctably frame their allegiance in their translating decisions and choices. Tyulenev even argues, correctly, that “the concept of translation as a ‘third space’ placed ‘in-between’ cultures may be a dangerous notion” (Tyulenev 2014: 183).
To conclude this section, I contend that text, language and culture as three key passive entities concerning any translation project are interconnected with each other. Through translation, the pairs of texts, languages and cultures involved may benefit or be harmed in different form, depending on the text type, translation type and degree of culture involved in the text, and the translator and translation purpose involved.

4.2.2 Three major active parties

The three major passive entities, i.e. text, language and culture discussed above are in the final analysis for the sake and well-being of the active parties concerning translation. With respect to any translation project, these active parties refer, first, to individual persons or individuals who team up, persons who undertake the specific job of implementing the process of rewriting a text from one language in another language. In this process, certain groups of people and large communities like nations may be affected and they may in turn exert effect on this process as well, depending on the text type, text kind and purpose of the translation involved. Such groups of people and nations constitute the second and third active parties respectively. They are classified in this fashion because they can respectively exercise their agency in one way or another to protect or promote their interests or, in a negative sense, generate harmful impact on other possible parties in question.

Like text, individuals such as translators and/or authors can choose to be neutral or not neutral, depending on the kind of texts they translate or create. For instance, when one is translating a mathematical text, the Euclidian geometry, for example, s/he can be free of value judgment and just try to complete the knowledge transfer. But if it is a novel, or a philosophical text, the translator in most cases cannot be free from value judgment with his/her own ideology or worldview involved, although nearly all codes of ethics for the translators and interpreters request that they stay neutral and faithful in their job. In other words, here the individual persons refer to any individual who might be a stakeholder concerning a translation project, his/her right or interests might be infringed on or affected.

The second kind of active parties refer to groups of people or institutions with an autonomous identity. They can be such organizations as an international corporation or a university that may have their interests to maintain. The readership of a translated work falls into this category too, because some readers may protest
against a translation for a given value. Those people described in a work of fiction also belong to this category for they have their identity to be preserved as well. Or, those who can say “we” in the process of implementing the rewriting work as opposed to “you” or “they” all fall into this category.

The third kind of active parties are nations or peoples. Nations or peoples are, relatively speaking, independent to command certain rights and interests like national image and linguistic rights although it is contended that they are not monolithic entities, instead, always in flux of dynamic change and growth. Benedict Anderson (2006: 6) even argues that a nation is in fact “an imagined political community”. But no matter whether Anderson’s point is convincing or not, a fact is that the UN has more than 200 members, and we are not in a post-nationalist era yet as Martha Cheung argues well (2011: 85).

Neither can it be denied that with the financial crisis starting from the United States in 2008, the European Union, once regarded as standing for the future of a larger stateless community (Li Zehou 2010, cf. Ricoeur 1996), is undergoing a crisis as well, not only financially and economically, but also politically and culturally.138 Another undeniable fact is that among all the states on this globe, there is still the distinction between the First World and the Third World, with so many countries and regions still in the developing or underdeveloped phase economically speaking. Such nations all have their own national languages, traditions and cultures, and hence their national identity, which is usually embodied in their literature and folklores and customs.

The relevance of nations or peoples to translation is that such national identity needs respect and recognition in translation be it literary works or other cultural traditions, and such national identity and interests might undergo harm or benefit with respect to a potential translation project. Postcolonial approach to translation has expressly revealed that translation has been employed as a powerful tool in complying with the colonial and dominating process on the part of the colonising languages and powers (see Niranjana 1992, Robinson 1997c). But, at the same time, it is also recognised that translation is not only a way for domination but can also serve as a channel for resistance or decolonisation (see e.g. Cheyfitz 1991).

Reading Paul Ricoeur, Chesterman argues that one’s “ipse-identity is constructed

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138 While this thesis was being revised for its final form, the UK voted in the form of a referendum to leave the EU on June 24, 2016.
and defined vis-à-vis the Other” while one’s *idem*-identity is what keeps one as oneself over time. Chesterman states, “[a]t a larger level, national building too involves incorporating aspects of the Other into the nation’s *ipse* (or accepting ‘contamination by the foreign’, as Buden and Nowotny put it) as well as strengthening the national *idem* via the resurrection of national myths, and fortressing the national *ipse* by preserving traditional enmities” (Chesterman 2010a: 105). That is to say, a nation must have something that preserves its identity as itself over time. While a nation is open to interact with other nations via translation to take in new elements or factors, it at the same time will ensure what keeps it itself is not lost via too much interaction or absorption of ‘foreignness’.

In sum, such individual persons, groups of people, and nations are the agents that might exert impact or be affected concerning the rewriting of a translation project. Their relations and the relationships between texts, languages and cultures respectively constitute the content of the model of reciprocity in translation, which will be addressed below.

### 4.2.3 Three relations

As ethics first and foremost is concerned with the relation between persons or peoples/cultures, when it concerns a translation project, it is assumed that the interpersonal/intercultural relationship weighs more than the text-personal relationship, which in turn outweighs the intertextual relationship between ST and TT. In other words, they are on different levels. But at times these three relationships can be on the same level. For example, when the text concerned is a practical one where not much intercultural relationship is involved, when the intertextual relationship is well made, the interpersonal relationship is reciprocal. As a matter of fact, the relationship between an ST and a TT is just a necessary condition for the ethical relationship between persons/peoples but not an adequate one. This relationship is established by the translator’s rewriting of the ST based on his/her interpretation and his/her interaction with other potential parties, including all those who may take a part in the finalisation of the product.

Meanwhile, the translator on the one hand interacts with parties within the same society and culture such as the client/commissioner/publisher, on the other hand they may interact with parties across cultures/societies like the author, and/or other parties like the publisher if available, depending on the concrete translation project.
The translator’s rewriting and interaction will result in a product—the translation, which will constitute or affect a certain relationship between the two cultures involved if it is a literary or religious text. Of the three relationships, the interpersonal/intercultural and the text-personal are dynamic, involving ethics, whereas, the intertextual is static and secondary, involving the traditional ethics, i.e. not real ethics.

This model starts from a text that is to be translated or to be rewritten. Despite the definition of text quoted from Ricoeur above, here it is taken that the text initiating the translation project can range from as short as a word, a sentence, up to a line of poem or a public notice, and as long as a novel or drama or a book, or a series of texts to be translated.

Based on such explicated relationships between these categories of active parties and passive entities, the model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ is to be formulated below.

4.3 Ethics of reciprocity in translation

In Chapter 2, I argued that translation and translator cannot be defined independently of each other, but defined mutually. This decides that translation ethics must largely be concerned with the major agent, the translator. As noted above, a translation project starts from a text, but the text is a static object; it is how the translator interacts with other parties in interpreting and rewriting the final translation product that is most relevant to ethics in translation.

This vision of translation also decides that translation ethics has to be approached from single translation projects in their concrete socio-historical context because different concrete translation projects entail different translators and other agents in their spatiotemporal contexts. This model of reciprocity consists on the one hand of no or minimal harm, which stresses the omissive side of ethics, and on the other of mutual benefits, which constitutes the commissive side of ethics. To realise the reciprocity of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits to any translation project, it is necessary first to see what possibly count as harm and mutual benefits.

4.3.1 Harm and mutual benefits concerning a translation project
Concerning any project, the potential acting/paraprofessional/professional translator as discussed in Chapter 2, after checking the text to be translated and interacting with other possible agents or participants, s/he will decide to undertake the job or not. After deciding to proceed with the translation project, they will implement the interpreting and rewriting work, which results in a text, accepted by the parties concerned as a translation. In such a process, because too many invariables and forces might be involved, it is likely that the process and the product may produce harm or benefits to the passive entities of texts, languages and cultures, as well as the active parties of individual persons, collective institutions and nations.

4.3.1.1 Potential harm to passive entities and active parties

As noted above and in Chapter 2, ethics for this study starts from the omissive side, i.e. no or minimal harm. When it comes to translation, it is naturally necessary to see what may give rise to harm to the active parties and passive entities in translation.

There are undoubtedly different types and degrees of harm involved in and by a translation to individuals, collectivities and larger communities like nations, and/or to texts, languages and cultures. Admittedly it is not easy to pinpoint harm in a straight manner; it has to be seen in its various kinds and degrees. In the first place, it can be framed on three levels: At the top of these three levels, harm may be done to intercultural/international parties (i.e. nation/cultural level) in the form of collective national interests, like cultural image, national identity, national dignity in the form of degradation, demeaning of the image or identity, cultural appropriation, cultural discrimination, cultural misrepresentations/distortion.

On this nation/cultural level, what postcolonial approach to translation studies has revealed are the kinds of profound harm to the peoples and nations concerned on the macro level, where the more powerful dominate or exploit the weaker in

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139 This harm exposed, it cannot be denied that translation can also serve as a means for resistance as summarised well by Young: “If translation involves the power structure of acts of appropriation, it can also invoke power through acts of resistance. In a sense, this comes closer to traditional ideas about translation. Here, the aphorism ‘tradutore, traditore’—translator, traitor—moves out of the realm of betrayal. Where the indigenous culture is being opened up for appropriation by the conquering culture, any act of translation thus involving an act of treachery, the necessary, traditionally lamented failure of translation becomes a positive force of resistance, resisting the intruder” (Young 2003: 141-2).
various forms via translation projects. For example, Kathleen Davis has rightly observed from Niranjana’s discussion of British translation of Indian law that “privileging target culture expectations often has a devastating impact on the source culture” (Davis 2001: 100). On this level, the imbalance in terms of volume of translation is also a kind of harm as evidenced by Brisset and other scholars, although this phenomenon is not represented in just one single translation project but largely in the exchange of translations between minor and major languages/cultures (see e.g. Brisset 2003).

Another form of harm on this level is that a people’s identity may be degraded. As argued by Spence and Van Heekeren (2005: 67), “the degradation of a societal group to which we as individual persons may belong, degrades us personally by degrading the societal identity that partially, at least, constitutes our own personal identity”. This means in a national group, one’s personal identity is usually associated with such national identity or cultural image. To maintain rather than degrade both is generally a necessary task to achieve for all those who belong to this group. When it comes to translation, the texts that may reflect this identity should therefore be preserved rather than undermined or distorted or misrepresented in most cases as determined by the specific context of the project.

Racial stereotyping is another obvious harm on this level that should be avoided or reduced regarding translation because “the attendant attempts to use translation to ‘fix’ (that is, to isolate and make static) stereotypical aspects of source cultures” (Merrill 2013: 131) constitute a kind of serious harm to the culture and people concerned.

What is examined above is largely about the different kinds of harm from the perspective of misrepresentation or distortion of a culture or people in regard to translation. Opposite to misrepresentation, an accurate representation may be as harmful as those discussed above. In this respect Young and Haley have argued convincingly:

We have just considered the possibility that misrepresentation of a culture can be harmful and wrong. One might argue that, even when outsiders accurately represent a culture other than their own, they can do so in ways that are harmful and wrong. Consider, for example, a novel that does not misrepresent a culture (and, consequently, is not wrong on this ground) but still puts the culture in a bad light. Some cultures are plagued by serious problems. Colonization disrupts cultures and causes a series of problems such as high rates of violence and substance abuse. A novel may accurately represent this reality. One might think that when outsiders (accurately) represent the culture, its members may be stigmatized. Discrimination against members of the culture may be reinforced and perpetuated. In this way the insiders could be harmed and, one
might conclude, even the accurate representation of insiders by outsiders is wrong. It might seem that it is more often wrong to represent other cultures than we have suggested. It might seem that the insiders have a right not to have their dirty laundry exposed to the world. (Young and Haley 2009: 280)

This argument also finds support in what American translator Jeffrey M. Green discusses. As revealed by him, in some circumstances a translator can be a kind of “informer” when accurately translating some secret aspects of a text specific to a culture, which might not be welcomed by the source culture society for the secret aspects are “inappropriately” revealed to other cultures (2001: 152). In such cases, it is certainly not doing much good but rather harm to the source culture. This argument that accurate translation can be as harmful as or more harmful than misrepresentation sheds powerful light on how complex translation ethics can be at times.

What is more, in today’s world where various conflicts are not decreasing in spite of the acceleration of globalisation, there are other kinds of harm on the social and cultural level generated by and in translation as summed up by Tymoczko. She states that: “[s]ome translators engage in cultural translation to support or even incite imperialist wars, to further economic exploitation, to support terrorist agendas for organizations that kill civilians, and to back up data-mining surveillance operations that control domestic populations” (2007: 253).

Below this macro cultural/national level is the second level where the interpersonal harm (persons-groups) is concerned. Such parties first include the individual translator, author, and the client/commissioner/publisher, or any other individual persons whose interests are involved in a translation project. They also include the collective groups or institutions like the readership, community of the translators or the profession as a whole, and people represented in a literary book.

Such individuals and collectives may be harmed economically, intellectually and psychologically. For example, on the micro level, the author might be harmed in the form that his/her economic, symbolic and social capital, in Bourdieu’s terms, suffers. It can be harm to the author in terms of authorial intention (cf. Eco’s ‘the intention of the text’)\(^\text{140}\). In the case of Lao She, a famous novelist, for instance, what he was fighting for was actually his right to expression, as he did not wish to see that his intention and expression were changed in the translation by Evan King (1945),

\(^{140}\)It reads “the outcome of an interpretative effort on the part of the reader, the critic or the translator” (2003: 5).
especially when it was a case where the translator did all the alterations without acquiring consent from Lao She who was good at English and masterful in terms of literary language in his mother tongue, Chinese\textsuperscript{141}. (A detailed study of this as a case of non-reciprocity will be done in the next chapter.)

On this level too is another enormously important active party, the readership, for whom largely the major purpose of any translation project is implemented\textsuperscript{142}. As often as not, the readers may be misled, deceived, and their interests maybe infringed on by a problematic translation in terms of too much omission or too radical change of the message or meaning.

The fact that there are an enormously large number of poor translations available in the present Chinese market as evidenced in Luo’s study (2012) in Chapter 2 (see section 2.3.2.2, p79) is another indicator that the readers may easily be harmed. Another kind of harm is the translation of “cultural rubbish” which will exert incalculable mental or psychological harm to the readership (Yu Yizhong 2006). The readers usually have no direct participation in any translation project and they also have difficulty in finding out whether they have been duly respected. Thus the conscience and sense of responsibility on the part of the translator is of considerable importance.

When it comes to the translator, s/he may suffer in terms of pay, esteem, recognition, or even life as discussed in Pym (2012). In other words, the harm a translator, be s/he an acting/paraprofessional/professional translator, may be inflicted on, can be financial, psychological, affective (Steiner 1998: 315), and social (Laygues 2001: 69-83). Such harm can also be inflicted on the ‘making while breaking’ profession of translation. Also as examined in Chapter 2, Venuti developed his victimology of translators who are rendered “invisible” and often confronted with countless “scandals” in their highly important but frequently marginalised work (see Venuti 1995, 1998). What the feminist approach to translation has helped to reveal is in fact the harm of males done over females in translation in most cases. But the “hijacking” (von Flowtow 1997) or

\textsuperscript{141}An interesting example about American translator Howard Goldblatt’s translation is one similar to this but with an opposite result: when he was translating one of Mo Yan’s novels, he changed the end of the novel to an opposite as well the way King did to Lao She’s novel. King was sued but Goldblatt’s measure is welcomed. The difference consists in the fact that Goldblatt made the change after talking to the author Mo Yan (see Xie Tianzhen 2015: 5).

\textsuperscript{142}Of course there are translations that are not chiefly for the target readership or audiences. For example, as McDougall examines, the translations finished by the FLP in China in the 1980s were more propaganda-served than reader-oriented (2011).
“womanhandling” (Godard 1990: 94) translation preached and practiced by some feminist translators is a kind of harm done to males by females to some extent as well if seen in the light of reciprocity.

Lastly, on the lowest and static level, harm may be produced on the linguistic/textual level, i.e. intertextual/interlingual to the texts and languages involved. Such harm can be highly complex and has to be looked at from the perspective of different text types. For example, the operative effect in terms of the text type and kind developed by Katharina Reiss (2004: 177) can be a parameter to be considered by the translator. In the case of practical or factual texts, harm may be in the form of linguistic inaccuracy, wrong wording, etc. When a literary work is concerned, even a phonetic/sonic change might give rise to certain harm. Semantic, syntactic and stylistic harm in terms of various discursive strategies is also quite possible. But it has to be seen that the discursive strategies are not sufficient conditions to decide whether a translation is ethical or not, as argued when discussing Venuti’s view on translation ethics (see section 2.3.1.2, pp 62-63). Distortion, (mis)appropriation and misrepresentation can be on the levels of word, sentence and text, linguistic units that each can express important meanings.

In short, this section is a general account about the potential harm to the passive entities and active parties, and any specific harm can only be decided in the concrete translation project in its context.

4.3.1.2 Potential mutual benefits to the passive entities and active parties

A good ethics cannot stop just at the omissive side; it must also address the commissive side, i.e. the benefits to the parties in any interactive event. In the case of translation, as discussed above, the mutual benefits are to the passive entities of texts, languages and cultures, and to the active parties like individual persons, collective institutions, and nations or peoples.

To begin with, there are limitless mutual benefits to the passive entities of texts, languages and cultures. A text after being translated will usually enjoy wider circulation and popularity not only in its own society and culture, but also in the target society and culture (see McDougall 2011: 144-5). The ST will be enhanced in its status in its own culture after being translated. If it is a practical text, the information and knowledge accurately conveyed will be available for a larger audience. And if it is a literary work, an enlarged audience will be able to enjoy the
potential cultural meaning or literary aesthetics, the feedback from foreign readers to the source culture will not only boost the reputation of the ST in question, but also facilitate better comprehensibility of the book. A case in point is the novel Lang Tuteng by Jiang Rong in China (2004, 2008). It was translated into English by Goldblatt as Wolf Totem, and the novel was released into the market both in Chinese and English. The English translation globally released enormously increases the sale of the original in China.

In terms of culture, Pym’s standard of long-term intercultural cooperation (2012) is an obvious mutual benefit for the two cultures in question. But it is a little abstract. What is more down to earth are the enhanced mutual understanding and intercultural communication from more well translated literary, philosophical and religious works. A very powerful example is Buddhist sutra translations from Sanskrit and other western Asian languages into Chinese for over one thousand years in China. The doctrines have gradually found their way into Chinese culture over such a long period of time. And for the source culture, the Indian culture, because large part of their Sanskrit Buddhist works have been destroyed over the years, can now benefit from the Chinese or Japanese translations of such sutras.

In the second place, the mutual benefits to the active parties can be said to be innumerable throughout the history of translation both in the West and China. It is well known that the history of Europe can be said to be a history of translation (see Ricoeur 1996, 2006, 2007a). Ancient Roman translation of Greek classics, Renaissance translation of Greek classics from Arabic works, and vernacular translations of the Bible from the times of the Septuagint, to St. Jerome’s Vulgate, to Martin Luther’s German Bible, to the St James Authorised Version, are all good examples of mutually benefiting translations (see Tan 2004: 2-3).

Cultures, nations or peoples apart, individuals can of course mutually benefits from a concrete translation project. An author is usually happy to see his/her work translated into another language. Steiner argues, in a way correctly, that, “[t]o class a source-text as worth translating is to dignify it immediately and to involve it in a dynamic of magnification” and “[t]he motion of transfer and paraphrase enlarges the stature of the original” (1998: 317), with the condition that the translator is a qualified one relative to the ST in question. Moreover, “[t]he original text gains from the orders of diverse relationship and distance established between itself and the translations” (ibid).
The translator can harvest reward in terms of remuneration or symbolic capital as well. Spivak’s translation of Derrida’s *Of Grammatology* is a good example, a good case in point for the ethics of reciprocity. Spivak benefits much from her translation of Derrida’s *Of Grammatology* which led to her academic flowering, and conversely, Derrida was able to see more influence of his works in the United States after this translation (see Pym 2012: 124-31). According to Wang Ning too, Spivak’s translation is said to be successful to such an extent that whenever a French reader has trouble understanding something in the French original text, s/he can always find a solution by turning to Spivak’s English translation (Wang 2009: 131).

Here clearly, another function can be established, i.e. translation is not necessarily just for the so-called target readers who have no access to the foreign language. This point can also be supported by the English translations of Chinese classics. The English translations to some degree help today’s Chinese to understand the classic works materialised two thousand year ago. It is also an example of reciprocity.

In the above, I have adumbrated just some key possibilities in the harm and benefits concerning a translation project. As new situations will emerge from time to time, the harm and benefits will be varied relative to the concrete translation project. Meanwhile, in many translation projects, it is usually the target culture or society that initiates the translation and therefore more benefits seem to be gained on that side, but if well balanced, both sides can benefit and equilibrium between the passive entities and active parties can be kept. Of course the efforts are supposed to be made by all the potential agents, including the pivotal agent the translator.

### 4.3.1.3 Active parties outweighing passive entities

In the two sections above, the potential harm and mutual benefits to the passive entities and active parties are discussed. As noted previously, language is to serve its speakers, i.e. human beings, so is it true of translation. As such, regarding a translation project, the interests and benefits of the active parties like the individual persons, collective groups, and nations or peoples far outweigh those of the passive entities such as the texts, languages and cultures.

What is more, it must be kept in mind that, as different translation project may involve different parties and entities, so the harm and benefits will as a consequence of this also differ. Apparently the harm and benefits may be in different degree: They can range from trivial to substantial in degree, from one trip to lasting, from
invisible to obvious, depending on what stakes are involved in the specific translation project.

Finally, reciprocity in terms of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits should work as a principle and virtue, its key lying in the potential acting/paraprofessional/professional translator. For example, as Sherry Simon questions and suggests (2012, personal communication), in the translation of literary works, there might be “productive dissonance”, which cannot be taken as harm. What is examined above is just a general survey rather than an exhaustive account. In fact, they cannot be exhausted at all for new situations are bound to emerge. So what counts as harm and mutual benefits in a large sense will be eventually decided in the concrete translation project.

4.3.2 Reciprocity resulting from not-translating, ‘equivalent’ translation and manipulated translation concerning a translation project

Concerning any potential translation project, choices for ethical reciprocity are embodied in the following circumstances: first of all, not-translating on the part of the major agent, the translator, in certain circumstances, for reasons on the part of the translator him/herself, the text or content of the text, or the context of the translation project respectively; second, in circumstances concerning various text types where ‘equivalent’ translation can and should be realised (near 100%); and third, in various situations where manipulation in the rewriting process is needed (over -100%) rather than the above ‘equivalent’ translation.

For example, when the ST is problematic, or when power or higher stakes/interests like life saving, cultural image or national identity maintenance are involved, the result may reach the point where no similarity between ST and TT is available, what ends up instead is complete difference between them. All these three kinds of conscious choices can lead to reciprocity as will be illustrated below.

4.3.2.1 Not-translating towards no/minimal harm and mutual benefits

An acting/paraprofessional/professional translator’s decision not to undertake a given translation or not to translate certain content/aspect of a given text is the initial part of this ethics because, no harm will be incurred thereof. In so doing the de facto reciprocity is not broken, or in other words it is maintained.

In TS, in fact, this issue has been touched upon sporadically. For example,
Williams & Chesterman asked this question, “when it might be more ethical not to translate at all” (2002: 20, my emphasis). Shane Weller also inquired, “[i]s it ever ethical to translate?” (2006: 33). Ni Liangkang, a German philosophy expert in China, raised this similar question: “to translate or not to translate, that is a question” (1996: 83, trans; cf. Dollerup 2008: 49). As noted above in Chapter 2, Baker (2008) and Pym (2012) also respectively propose not translating but for different reasons (see pages 64 and 70, 72 in Sections 2.3.1.2 and 2.3.1.3).

The existence of large numbers of bad translations (Chesterman 2010: 207, 221), despite an absence of its definition, at least in part has much to do with this ethics. Thus the decision on the part of the acting/paraprofessional/professional translator not to undertake a translating job is no trivial matter, but rather a key issue ethically speaking.

In the history of translation in China, there have been proposals of not-translating, like Xuanzang’s ‘five cases of non-translating’, which yet in essence means ‘five categories of transliteration’ (Tan 2010: 6)\(^{143}\). The ethics of reciprocity in ‘not-translating’ as the starting part of my proposed model is different. A survey of the relevant literature reveals that ‘not-translating’ as a choice towards no/minimal harm and mutual benefits concerning a translation project is largely manifest in the following circumstances.

The first kind of circumstance concerns the translator him/herself, which seems trivial and commonplace but after close scrutiny it is found to be not the case. As can be seen, it is stipulated explicitly in many ethics of code (e.g. code of ATA) that,

\(^{143}\)According to Tan Zaixi, the five cases discussed by Xuanzang 玄奘 are: “when the translator was faced with mystical terms, terms with implications, terms of objects that did not exist in China, conventionalized transliterations, and expressions that carry strong Buddhist associations, he should not try to replace them with idiomatic Chinese expressions, rather, he should leave them unchanged except that they appear in Chinese characters with the same sound” (Tan 2010: 6; cf Cheung 2006: 157-8). Xuanzang, the most outstanding Buddhist translator in the Tang Dynasty (618-907CE) (Tan, ibid) whose original name is Chen Yi 陳祎, is the given name in the practice of Buddhism, and the common ‘surname’ for all Buddhist monks is Shi 釋 (another name for Buddhism in Chinese) but usually omitted. So their names are often transliterated in English as Xuan Zang [Xuangzang], Dao An [Dao’an 道安] , Yang Cong [Yancong 彦琮], etc. (See also Cheung 2006: xxxii-xli). Here I choose to use the standard *pinyin* system (Xin 2003) to write their name as one unity to indicate that their name is just a given one rather than a full name in the Chinese tradition. Aside from this non-translating as transliteration, not-translating can also mean word or term borrowing from the ST into the TT. NBA, ATM, and OK are examples in today’s Chinese. Both this two are different from my concept here. Jody Byrne (2012: 138) mentions another important case of “not to translate” concerning the translation of scientific and technical texts, that is, when “a technical text quotes text from another publication” and when “an authoritative translation exists” (ibid, original emphasis) for the quoted text, not to translate but to use the authoritative one if available. This is a good reminder because such cases may also happen in other kinds of texts such as works of social sciences and the humanities.
when a translator is not up to the job, the translator in question should not take it.

The reason underlining such stipulation is that the translation otherwise resulted might do harm to the ST and the reader. This applies not only to novice translators but also to experienced translators. This issue is, if not completely, often overlooked in the field and beyond. A case in point of not-translating on the part of even an expert translator is Xu Jun, professor of French literature and translation from Nanjing University of China. As a member of the editing committee of over 10 peer-reviewed prestigious academic journals like META, Babel, Foreign Languages Teaching and Research and a 1999 winner of “Gold Ordre du Palm Academic de Françoise”, he has translated more than 30 renowned literary and social science books from French into Chinese. Such an expert translator gives his own example of quitting one translation task.

It was in 1996 when he was invited to translate the Russian French philosopher Vladimir Jankelevitch’s First Philosophy into Chinese. A translation contract was signed with the Shanghai Sanlian Press and, to translate this book, he made every effort to study philosophy as preparatory work. After half a year’s hard work he finished one sixth of the book. But when he came to realise that his competence in philosophical concepts and thoughts was not sufficient to do justice to the book if he continued, he chose to give up the task at the cost of ‘losing trust’ to a friend and breaking the contract. In his own words, he “couldn’t bear to cheat the author and do harm to the readers” (Xu 2007: 16, trans). This is no doubt the choice of a responsible translator and a good example of not-translating. In his example, no serious harm is made to the passive entities and possible active parties, and in consequence de facto reciprocity is maintained in reality.

With respect to the translator, translation competence apart, affect and emotion are also factors that can tell a translator not to do a certain translation job. That is to say, when the highly charged content, is not agreeable to the translator, s/he should choose not to take the job, especially when what is concerned is translation of literary works. For example, Justin O’Brien (1959: 85) states that “[o]ne should never translate anything that he does not admire”, and if possible, “a natural affinity

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144 Chesterman makes it clear as well in his no. 7 virtue of “truthfulness” in his proposed Hieronymic Oath: “I will be honest about my own qualifications and limitations; I will not accept work that is outside my competence” (2001: 153, my emphasis).

145 See the author bio of his book Shengming zhi qing yu fanyi zhi zhong [The Lightness of Life and the Weight of Translation] (Xu 2007).
should exist between translator and the translated”.

American translator Jeffery Green (2001: 15, my emphasis) also contends that “it is morally wrong to translate material with which you have no affinity” because a translator cannot possibly do it justice. Elsewhere Green also stresses that “[i]f possible, translators should stay away from work they don’t admire” (ibid: 132). Likewise, Tu An, an influential Keats poetry translator from China, once stated, “if I do not love the work, I will not translate it; when I have no thorough understanding of the work, I will not translate it” (Tu 2005: 61, trans; see also 2010: 59, cf. Ni 2004: 92).

It cannot be denied that this not-translating proposal has much to do with the traditional notion of fidelity, and is thus placed on a lower level compared with the free manipulation on a higher level, when it is concerned with a higher value like national image or cultural image building in colonial circumstances.

Closely related to translator’s competence and his/her emotion is another similar factor, i.e. his/her unconsciousness of cultural hegemony in new forms. Postcolonial approaches to translation studies have exposed the harm done by translation on the colonised languages and cultures. But it is quite probable that cultural hegemony may creep into translation in certain implicit and unconscious form.

For example, Spivak in her seminal essay ‘The Politics of Translation’ ([1993]2004) points out the important issue that in Western feminism there is a tendency that the difference of women in the ‘Third World’ may be homogenised. When translated into the ‘First World’ languages, the English language in particular, the women in the third world suffer from amnesia and marginalisation in the first world. For those women in the first world to really learn and recognize the women in the third world, they are advised not to translate, but rather, by abandoning their essentialism and Caucasian-centrism, assuming a “withholding of translation” in Carol Maier’s words (1995: 27), to learn in an “intimate” manner the feminine language of women from the third world (Spivak 2004: 379).

The second circumstance is centred on the text or content of the text to be translated. For example, a text, which is about the construction of a chemical plant in a region of a developing country that will generate harm to the environment in terms of water pollution, needs to be translated. If a translator knows all this, then s/he is obliged to refuse to undertake the job even if it may mean the loss of a handsome remuneration. Gouanvic (2001: 209) expresses a similar stance when
facing a like situation while Robinson reflects on the issue in the same vein without giving an affirmative answer. Robinson in his textbook *Becoming A Translator* leaves unanswered such questions as ‘dilemmas’ encountered by professional translators (2012: 28) (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.1.2, p58).

But Pym argues that a translator is not responsible for the content by claiming that “[t]ranslators need not subscribe to the material they translate; they are only responsible for the *presentation* of that material in a certain way and in a certain time and place” (Pym 2012: 59, original emphasis). Yet the content of the material is of vital importance because, as noted above, the material to be translated may be neutral but when applied wrongly, it may do harm. In such a case, when the translator is aware of such a possibility, the choice of not doing the job is of course the ethical one. Another example in this line is given by the EU professional translator Emma Wagner (Chesterman & Wagner 2002: 106)\(^\text{146}\). Knowingly translating something that is harmful is doing harm to the translator him/herself as well as the parties affected.

Also concerned with content is the ‘sensitive’ texts that entail race, religion and ideology\(^\text{147}\). That means the content of the text is not neutral like that in a practical text. Such categories are taken by some scholars as essentialist or reductive, or abstract and general (cf. Baker 2009: 191), but it does not mean any religion-related or ideology-rich texts cannot be translated because, if so, many works will only be read by relatively smaller readerships and cannot spread to benefit as many human beings as possible. Many works, more often than not, do entail ideology. The point is, in today’s world replete with conflicts in varied forms and degrees, it is better not to translate certain works to avoid the harm to interracial relations or the tradition of a certain people at a given time.

A case in point in this line is Salman Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses* (see Pym 2012: 7-8, 38, and 56). Pym, as noted above, posits that “translators are *not* responsible for

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146 Wagner is a professional translator and responsible for 200 translators working into 11 languages in a department of the European Commission. She expresses different opinions concerning translation ethics in her dialogue with Chesterman. While Wagner supports the translator’s autonomy in making whether-to-translate decisions (C & Wagner 2002: 95, 106) she sticks to the traditional view of translation of being faithful to the ST as she claims that “[t]he original text is *final, fixed and immutable*; but the translation is a fluid, perfectible thing” (ibid: 80, my emphasis), but the argument is more a belief than a fact as it is refuted by a case she herself cites, the case she calls the ‘eclipse of the original’, in which the translation takes over from the original […] and then the original has to be changed to match the translations (ibid: 107).

147 This “sensitive” is of course relative to the potential acting/paraprofessional/professional translators, who are faced with the specific text to be translated.
the content of the messages they bear”, but “somehow responsible for the effects of those messages” (2012: 61, original emphasis) because translators are not authors owing to what he calls the “translation form” (ibid). But when I review Pym’s model in Chapter 2, the question has been asked: what is the relationship between translation and free speech? Free speech cannot be completely free, as in fact philosopher Simon Blackburn has argued very well:

Free speech is sacred. Yet the law does not protect fraudulent speech, libelous speech, speech describing national secrets, speech inciting racial and other hatreds, speech inciting panic in crowded places, and so on. In return, though, we gain freedom from fraud, from misrepresentation of our characters and our doings, from enemy incursions, from civil unrest, from arbitrary risks of panic in crowds. (Blackburn 2001: 102, my emphasis)

By the same token, the translation of such materials should not be allowed either, as a very accurate and faithful translation will do more harm to the relevant audience and society at large.

Related to this circumstance is another very catchy word in the field of TS in the past decades: ‘difference’. Many TS scholars have stressed respecting ‘cultural difference’ and preserving ‘cultural difference’ in translation as the right ethics to replace the traditional notion of textual equivalence (see Venuti 1998; Shen 2008, 2014; van Wyke 2010, 2013; Xu 2012; Yang 2013). To a large extent, they are right, but they overlook one important aspect. That is, recognition of and respect for difference should be preconditioned by a requirement that the ‘difference’ in question should be itself not harmful and does not incur harm to others. For example, Hitler’s Mein Kampf or a text that is full of demonising narratives about other parties, be they individuals, collectivities or nations. Such a text might be surely different in every sense, but it should not be translated insofar as its renditions may generate harm to the parties concerned.

A third circumstance is client/publisher/commissioner-triggered or other contextual factors oriented. In this circumstance, it first concerns translation cost proposed by Anthony Pym. That is, when there is a better alternative to translation for a cross-cultural communication, the ethical choice is to abandon the project. For deciding to translate in such a situation is detrimental to the interests of the client/publisher/commissioner who seems to need the translation (see Pym 2012: 157).

Pym’s proposal is based on a cost/benefit analysis; when the cost of translation or
the effort invested in the project outweighs that of the transaction of intercultural communication, alternatives to translation should be preferred. This is no doubt more demanding on the translators but the choice taken is more ethical and, in the long run, the translator will win trust from the client and be reciprocated otherwise.

In this circumstance what is also concerned is the pay for a translation project, which is seemingly a minor reason for not to undertake a translation. If the pay is too low against the running rates, a translator still decides to take the job, the harm will be to the long-term interest of the profession. Of course, if a translator is to take a job for a friend who has done a favor to the translator one way or another in the past, s/he is actually reciprocating. S/he can even do the translation at a very low rate or even for free as is a common practice in the communities of foreign language teachers in China (cf. Qin Jianghua 2013b: 28).

Such circumstances, where not-translating is the ethical choice, are not fixed and lasting. In the case of some texts, that it is not ethical to translate them at a given time does not mean that it will still be unethical in the future. With the change of time and context, it is ethical to translate the otherwise untranslatable texts. Hitler’s Mein Kampf (Hermans 2007) can be a case in point. For the same acting/paraprofessional/professional translator, when s/he has grown in competence and experience over time, it will be no problem for him/her to undertake the same job previously beyond reach.

Doing no harm is a principle, but the forms of harm change, hence it is up to the acting/paraprofessional/professional translator to exercise their agency in their interaction with other potential participants to decide whether to undertake a ‘translating’ job or not. At the same time, it has to be reminded that not-translating towards no/minimal harm and mutual benefits cannot be a pretext for not-translating which may really be unethical in many situations, as will be discussed in the following section.

To conclude this section, as also noted in Chapter 3, reciprocity can be positive and negative. When related to translation, in the case of not-translating, the purpose is to maintain positive reciprocity and avoid possible negative reciprocity.

4.3.2.2 ‘Equivalent’ translation towards no/minimal harm and mutual benefits

In TS, as examined in Chapter 2 over translation ethics, there are often striking disagreements over the realm of translation ethics or the translator’s responsibility.
For instance, Chesterman in his 2001 essay contends that “the political engagement of the translator lies outside the realm of professional ethics” (2001: 147). Maria Tymoczko takes issue with this directly. She argues that “[o]ne form that the dispersal of ethics, ideology, and translator agency takes is the focus in professional codes of ethics on the microlevels of textual fidelity and immediate obligations to the employer, effacing larger spheres of geopolitical responsibility to communities and the world” (Tymoczko 2007: 320, my emphasis). As reviewed in Chapter 2, I have argued that the ambit of translation professional ethics as conceived by Chesterman is too narrow (see Section 2.3.1.1, p54). Gouanvic in the same special issue of *The Translator* expressed objection to Chesterman’s stance as well (Gouanvic 2001: 209). Undeniably, Tymoczko’s is a very noble idea, echoing the notions reflected in Confucian ethics. But something warrants a closer look here because Chesterman and Tymoczko both seem to have failed to take into account the importance of text typology regarding translation ethics.

As noted in section 4.2.1, text is the static starting point as a key passive entity for any translation project. A potential acting/paraprofessional/professional translator has to decide first what kind of text to translate, and then decide whether to undertake the project. When the decision is made, what follows is to decide whether the text should be rendered in an ‘equivalent’ manner after interaction with other possible parties (see also section 2.2.1). With respect to the large quantity of texts in fields of science, technology, law, social sciences, what is concerned is chiefly knowledge and information. Regarding such texts, maximum/optimal equivalence comes first, and here it is “truth” that is the key parameter of reciprocity. And the task for the potential translator is naturally ‘equivalent’ knowledge and information transfer. When such transfer is realised or when the ‘truth’ is transmitted, the initiator obtains the needed information and the target readership or the client has access to the otherwise unavailable knowledge, and the translator involved gets paid and the author or copyright owner is rewarded in terms of royalties or otherwise remuneration. In such a process, no harm generated, mutual benefits implemented on the part of all parties concerned, and consequently ethics of reciprocity is maintained.

Examples are easily available. For instance, in terms of ‘factual knowledge’ (Munday 2012: 37), for sentence “water is liquid at normal temperature” (adapted from Munday’s), an equivalent can be readily found because there is only one
meaning and no room for interpretation otherwise. Another example is the following: “Attention please, passengers for flight 2345 for San Francisco are boarding at gate No. 9”. For it, an ‘equivalent’ translation is not hard to produce. And it must be translated in ‘equivalent’ language, or the world of life will be out of order. In daily life, countless such language uses can be easily rendered into another, ‘equivalent’ text and language.

For yet another example, on the website of the Immigration Department of Hong Kong, all the information is provided in both English and Chinese. The information in the two given languages has equal force because the versions in both languages have been taken as official by law. The result is absolutely one of reciprocity. For the Department itself will avoid the possibility of being misunderstood and, those who need to use the website can benefit from the information. At the same time, whoever finishes the translation should also have been remunerated for their work.

What Chesterman stresses largely falls into the translation of such practical or knowledge-oriented or ‘truth’-conveying texts. In contrast, what Tymoczko sets her eyes on, to a large degree, belongs to what Neubert and Shreve terms as “literary and cultural texts” (1992: 4, my emphasis) when they talk about Venuti’s proposed “resistant” translations. As noted above in section 4.2.1, all texts can be roughly classified into these two categories, literary and practical. Without this rough distinction, it is not easy to understand the seemingly wide discrepancy among scholars over the issue of translation ethics. As has been noted, intervention in translation is inevitable, including ‘creative’ or ‘manipulated’ rewriting besides developing ‘equivalence’ between the ST and TT. It is in the end the potential acting/paraprofessional/professional translator who, after interacting with other possible agents or participants, decides what step to take.

But even in the case of literary works, concerning which more room for interpretation is available, it does not mean that an acting/paraprofessional/professional translator can conduct the interpretation as freely as s/he feels like it when there are no other external deciding forces from ideology or patronage in Lefevere’s terms (1992a). This means ‘equivalent’ translation in the translator’s comprehension and creation will work and result in reciprocity as well between the passive entities and between the active parties. For example, in China today, the translation of Shakespeare or Milton will not be interfered with by any censorship authorities except for the requirements on the
translator’s linguistic skills and cultural competence by the publisher (More to be said on this below).

Meanwhile, without the intervention of ideology and other potential political, economic forces, ‘equivalent’ translation will entail fewer risks while more manipulation of the text in the rewriting may involve larger spheres of responsibility and therefore more risks148. ‘Equivalent’ translation will demand more on the linguistic transfer, hence less risk, culminating in different reciprocity on different levels.

Accuracy or standardisation/explicitation may be a good/benefit to the target readers for their efficiency in taking in the necessary information (cf. Pym 2012: 145) when the translated texts are info-intensive or purely scientific or technological texts. But in the case of literary translation concerning very personal or imaginative texts, more room left for the reader’s interpretation may be good, especially when the translating language/culture is in urgent need to import new ways of expression, as illustrated in the Romantic period of German (see Berman 1992) (cf. Munday 2012: 115). (More to be said about this below)

4.3.2.3 Manipulated translation towards no/minimal harm and mutual benefits

As discussed above, a translator first should know when to take a job and when not to. After deciding to undertake the job, s/he can choose to try to produce an ‘equivalent’ rendition of the ST in form, content, quantity, effect or value. This equivalence works towards reciprocity in terms of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits. But in a different context, s/he may choose to manipulate the ST to produce a TT that is not linguistically equivalent to the TT largely, but to be more ethical.

Here it is vital to point out that the expression of ‘manipulation’ is not necessarily a derogatory one (cf. Hermans 1985) because it can be used as a neutral term to describe the process of translation. In any translation, the translator’s manipulation or intervention is inevitable, the purpose of which depends on the translator’s aim or purpose of undertaking the translation, the text and context of the translation project. In countless circumstances, manipulated translations are preferable for the sake of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits. What follows below are typical circumstances where manipulated translations are more reciprocally ethical than the

148 As regards translators’ risk aversion, see Pym (2012: 108).
previously argued ‘equivalent’ translation.

The first circumstance concerns itself with the text to be translated. Like the discussion in the previous section, the source text as a key passive entity is an enormously important variable. But as noted in section 4.2.1, the ST is not necessarily always a classic, especially when it is a practical or hurriedly finished work. Such a text may have shortcomings that are open to improvement, relative to the translator, his/her competence and truth value involved in the text at issue. In such situations a responsible acting/paraprofessional/professional translator will inform the producer or author and will try to suggest improving the ST. If the producer or author is not reachable, the translator should try to manipulate in a manner of rewriting the TT towards the result of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits.

In such a case, the ST is not substantially harmed, instead, the client or initiator will benefit from the product because such a translation will work better and more effectively. And in some cases a responsible paraprofessional translator may do a better job than a so-called professional translator because the former is usually an expert in a specific field where s/he has profound expertise of the subject matter. Thus his/her manipulation is more reliable than the professional translator when other conditions like sense of responsibility are equal.

In another circumstance, when cultural connotations involved in the two languages are different and faithful word-for-word or strictly ‘equivalent’ translation will bring about problems or serious harm to the reader or the client of the translation project, manipulated translation is needed. For example, the brand-name “baixiang 白象” [literally, white elephant] of a battery made in China, when translated into English, should not be rendered literally as “white elephant” because its connation will not facilitate a profitable market. This example is about the translation of practical texts.

Problems may arise in ‘faithful’ or ‘equivalent’ translation of simple daily phatic expressions too. For example, in China, Chinese people used to address each other in the following way, like “chi le ma 吃了嗎”[literally, have you eaten?]. If translated into English literally it will surprise the readers or give rise to misunderstanding of Chinese culture. A common solution would be a functional rendering like ‘hi’ or ‘hello’. All the proposed translations for such examples are not
equivalent in the traditional sense, but examples of manipulations, which will bring about a better effect of communication rather than harm. With no harm done, the parties of communication both benefit, hence a case of reciprocity.

The third circumstance is raised to the level where national interests or cultural image is involved. Tymocko’s example of the Irish figure Cú Chulainn in Irish literature translation is a case in point regarding national interests in literary translation (1999: 62-89). This example is in a colonial context, but it does not mean that in ordinary context, a translator cannot or should not manipulate an ST. The key to the issue is harm; when an ‘equivalent’ translation will do harm rather than good to the ST/C, manipulated translation should be taken up. In such cases, an acting/paraprofessional/professional translator is justified to manipulate the text to be translated and exercise cutting, adding, altering or even rewrite a TT completely different from the ST.

Seen from the perspective of ethics, this is just like in expedient situations it is obligatory to tell lies rather than tell the truth, as opposed to the categorical imperative to tell truth even when a life is threatened in Kant’s often quoted tale (2003). Seen from ethics of reciprocity, the text may seem harmed but because the stakes of interests are raised higher, the textual value has to give way to the higher value of national identity and cultural image or national esteem. Reciprocity on higher levels is thus maintained.

Finally, as noted above, 100% equivalence is not possible (Tan 2012: 14), but nil equivalence is possible. Nil equivalence means a situation in which the meaning of the TT has nothing to do with the meaning of the ST. In such a case, a question may be posed: can it still be called a translation? Yes, it is still a translation, because it is also the result of the translator’s effort and working for the parties concerned. Put otherwise, only when the translator understands the ST thoroughly, can s/he ensure that the ‘translation’ has nothing to do with the meanings in the ST.

This is evidenced in the example given by Hermans (2007: 43), where new meaning is added, however, the new meaning has nothing to do with what the speaker says. Let us imagine another situation: The mother of a young child was complained to by her child’s school teacher that the child was too noisy and was unable to keep quiet for more than three minutes. What the mother told the kid, however, was: your teacher has praised you; she said you can sit still for over three minutes, in the past you could not sit quietly for even one minute. A translator or
interpreter may as often do the same thing in his/her translation or interpretation when necessary. Another simple example goes like this: ST: “You are a rascal”, TT: “You are a hero”, which will help the communication continue, and it may otherwise break with a faithful translation.

Of course, manipulated translation can be unethical or less ethical than it should be. For example, the well known case of German translation of *Anne Frank’s Diary* described in Lefevere’s is a typical example of manipulation but unethical (1992a: 66-68). It is well recorded by Lefevere that the manipulation is for the sake of sale boosting rather than for cultural image maintenance or intercultural cooperation. What benefits most is the German publisher and maybe the translator, but the somewhat harmed parties include the German audience who are denied the reality of the young girl’s description to a large degree although the diary had been edited by her father even before the German translation (ibid: 66-72).

To conclude, manipulated translation is ethical only when it is done for no/minimal harm and mutual benefits to the active parties and passive entities concerning a translation project. No doubt the above analyses are largely text-referenced, but they are people-oriented, people dealing with texts to produce effects on the parties involved, hence ethics-oriented as well.

The previous explorations have addressed the potential harm and benefits to the key parameters of passive entities like text, language and culture, of active parties like individuals, collectivities and nations, the prioritised relation between interpersonal/intercultural, person-textual and intertextual relationships, and the choices of not-translating, ‘equivalent’ translation and manipulated translation towards no/minimal harm and mutual benefits to the abovementioned passive entities and active parties concerning a translation project. They paved the way for the eventual formulation of the model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’.

**4.3.3 Ethics of reciprocity as a dynamic integrated multi-layered model**

The ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ I am developing is a dynamic integrated multi-layered model. It is dynamic because any potential acting/paraprofessional/professional translator has to position his/herself in the face of a translation project according to his/her relation to the text, the text type, the power relations between him/her and all other potential agents or participants. It is integrated because the model will concern itself with not only the translator the
pivotal agent, but also the process of translating and the product the translation. It is a combination of virtue ethics and principle ethics.

It is multi-layered because, according to Confucian distinction between junzi and xiaoren ethics discussed in Chapter 3, any potential acting/paraprofessional/professional translator can choose to be just a contracted ordinary task accomplisher by meeting the basic requirement in the contract or agreement or what is stimulated in the ethical code. At the same time, this same figure can choose to aim high at larger missions as Tymoczko advocates, reckoning beyond one’s small circle with even the entire world/tianxia as the reference point in their rewriting work.

This reckoning echoes the Confucian appeal to care for the world/tianxia. Such reckoning will supersede just one’s own or one’s small community’s interests to cover as much as possible to realise the reciprocity between persons, peoples/nations, and even between mankind and the cosmos. The various layers or levels are not mutually exclusive but are complementary to each other and transformative into each other just like the transformation between junzi and xiaoren.

In what follows comes the formulation of the model.

4.3.3.1 Model vertically layered with levels of values in translator’s interaction with other agents

For any acting/paraprofessional/professional translator to decide to translate or not to translate a given text, to strive for ‘equivalence’ or to alter, to add, to cut, to gist, s/he will need to weigh all the necessary and relevant factors and have the competence to conduct weighing such factors. But to become a translator is a continuing process or, becoming a translating subject is a process rather than an immutable and fixed process. A translator may take necessary measures in his/her dealing with a source text after obtaining ‘informed consent’ from the source text author or copyright owner if available. But at the same time they have to interact with other potential agents as well. Translation is a process full of decisions and choices149; one choice means that other choices have to be excluded for the time being. Different translators are consequently bound to produce different translations because they cannot make exactly the same decisions and choices with different texts in their different context.

149Jeremy Munday states correctly that translation is a constant evaluative process (2012: 155).
In terms of expertise, all acting/paraprofessional/professional translators can be said to fall along a cline from amateur or novice translators to expert professionals whether they are employed or freelancing, individual or collaborative. That is, the translator is not a fixed entity; s/he should be an acting or becoming translator, the former being in essence a non-translator while the latter may be established but still can be said in the process of becoming (cf. Robinson 2012). For s/he may encounter an ST that is beyond his/her reach despite the fact that s/he is a professional or acknowledged/certified translator as discussed above in the case of Xu Jun in section 4.3.2.1. It does not matter much whether a project is to be finished by an individual translator or a group of translators, because both modes have been available in the history of translation, and a group too must make similar decisions in terms of ethics.

What is more, as Maria Constanza Guzman argues,

"Communities assign[ing] a text-translation its meaning, [...], allow[ing] for its very existence” in part overlaps with my notion that translation is co-defined by translators and other potential agents or participating parties. Reciprocity often needs to be realised between unequal parties where asymmetric power tensions are involved. In this aspect, the Confucian wing of reciprocity is of more significance as has been discussed in Chapter 3.

In this line of thinking from the perspective of power tensions, with respect to translators, Tu Binglan (2013: 124-174) in her PhD thesis summarises three translation ethic models with respect to the translators in the late Qing China (1898-1911): the master model as exemplified by the translator Lin Shu, i.e. translator performing like a master in the interaction, the servant model by Yan Fu, i.e. translator performing like a servant in the interaction, and the master-and-servant model by Lu Xun, i.e. translator being equal with other participants.

From her classification and other studies of the relationships between the translator and other agents or participants in any translation project, it is safe to
conclude that there can be chiefly three relations between the pivotal agent of translation the translator and other participants: translator-dominating relation, translator-dominated relation, translator-others equal relation, depending respectively on the status of the translator, of the author, of the reader, and of the client/publisher/commissioner, etc. with respect to a specific translation project. A translator, like any human role, must be in relation to other interactants like an author, a reader, a client, or a publisher to establish his/her identity. All these individuals and other larger active parties in part constitute the context for a translation project. This context can become highly complex because it can include the broader historical, cultural, or social factors when the text to be translated is a literary work or involves much ideology.

Taken as a whole, any translation project entails the translator(s), the source text, and the context of the translation. The text being static, the power relations between the translator and the context determine the possibility and degree of reciprocity. A close scrutiny can reveal three kinds of relationship between them: mutual or two-way benefit as illustrated by a line between the translator and other parties, one-way benefit as illustrated by two arrowed lines, the translator either dominating with the arrow towards others or dominated with the arrow towards self, and mutually blocked interaction as illustrated by a dotted line between them. Of the three relations, only in the first relation, reciprocity has an opportunity to be realised. This is shown below in Translator Figure-1:

![Translator Figure-1: Power relationship between translator and other parties](image)

Translator Figure-1: Power relationship between translator and other parties

Based on the above figure, the relationship between the translator and other agents can be further probed in terms of autonomy and corresponding responsibility as ethics deeply concerns autonomy and responsibility of the ethical agents. In this
respect, it is found that there are four kinds of relationship between the major agent
the translator and other parties or agents: (1) full autonomy and full responsibility
on the part of the translator, where all other parties wield zero influence or control
over the translator(s)’ decisions and choices in the interpreting and rewriting work;
(2) much autonomy and accordingly extensive responsibility where the translator(s)
somewhat dominate the context; (3) limited autonomy and hence limited
responsibility where the translator(s) are dominated by other parties in the context;
and (4) zero autonomy and hence zero responsibility where translators have no
control over their work but are controlled by other parties completely. This is shown
below in Translator Figure-2:

![Translator Figure-2](image)

Translator Figure-2: Translator’s autonomy and responsibility vis-à-vis other parties

Obviously, as illustrated above, there are four power relations between the translator
and other potential agents concerning a translation project. It seems such relations
are fixed. But when seen from another perspective, i.e. the impact or functions of
translator(s)’ choices/decisions, there can be four fields that can be mapped
according to Confucian junzi ethics. Informed by Confucian ethics (see *The Great
Learning*), four concentric enlarging fields are open for a translator to take into
account when doing a translation: (a) the translator him/herself; (b) the profession or
practice of translation as Pym advocates (2010b: 160, 167); (c) a larger community:
one’s social class, religion, ethnicity or nation; and (d) all human beings under
heaven/tianxia. In this respect, translator(s)’s agency, subjectivity, allegiances and
motivation are of considerable importance in spite of the counter power from all
other potential participating parties centring on a translation project; his/her allegiance can be to any of the four depending on his/her personal ethics/values.

Tymoczko, as noted in Chapter 1, from a different perspective, expresses similar views on the translator’s agency: “If translators, like ethnographers, are constructors of culture through their representations, transmissions, and transculturations, they obviously play a very powerful role in cultural interface and cultural mediation” (2007: 262). Confucian harmony-aimed reciprocity can help translators to exercise their agency out of the ethical dilemma even when they are in an unequal relationship with other parties. This is shown below in Translator Figure-3:

Translator Figure-3: Fields of impact of translator’s choices/decisions

By harmony-aimed Confucian reciprocity, it means any party should be mutually other-regarding (see Liang Shuming 2011: 90-91). In translation, relative to the translator, the other may be the author, the client/publisher/commissioner, the reader, etc. Meanwhile, according to Recoeurian reciprocity, any party may be acting and suffering, depending on its interaction with an interactive party. In such a dynamic relationship, a translator may be more powerful in terms of prestige or cultural capital in Bourdieu’s terms. As such, s/he should give more consideration to the other’s interest, or withhold his/her influence or power in an appropriate manner. Conversely, when the author or the client/publisher/commissioner is in a more imposing position, they should show more respect and recognition to the translator for smoother cooperation relating to the given translation project. It is in essence the translator’s and all other potential parties’ virtue or disposition to strive for no/minimal harm and mutual benefits to the parties and entities involved in and affected by the translation project.

By prioritising the values concerning the translation project, a translator, in his/her interaction with other potential participating agents, in a vertical fashion, can choose to aim high or low in deciding not to undertake the project, to pursue
‘equivalent’ translation, or to produce manipulated translation according to the ST and the translation context. This is the first dimension of the model of ethics of reciprocity in translation. What follows in the next section is the dimension concerning the translator’s dynamic dealing with the text with reciprocity as a combination of *virtue* and *principle*.

4.3.3.2 Model horizontally combined of *virtue* and *principle* with translator’s dealing with the text based on interacting with the context

As pointed out above, in any translation project, there are three crucial factors, the ST—the static start of any translation project, translator—the dynamic start of any translation project, and the context covering all possible active parties and passive entities. This dimension of the model will therefore take into account the potential variables of the ST at stake. As noted above in section 4.2.1, the ST is not necessarily a stable and immutable work; it may be poorly written or have been proved a classic, one-trip or everlasting, latest or very old, aligned to a cline from standardised impersonal or even depersonalised texts like scientific and technological ones to imaginative personal texts as shown below in the Graph of Text:

**Cline/continuum of text**

←_________________________________________________________________________→

1. Scientific and standard ---------------------------------------------→imaginative texts
2. Impersonal or depersonalised ---------------------------------------→personal texts
3. Largely info transmission------------------------------------------→infinite aesthetics
4. More standardised, free of cultural identity ----cultural identity/ideology involved
5. Little or no room for interpretation----------------→more room for interpretation
6. Poorly written or problematic ←----------------------------→classic/canonical texts
7. Thin ←------------------------------------------------→thick translation

**Graph of Text**

As seen from the above graph, the text for translation may be, first, one along the
continuum from an impersonal scientific practical text that is more standardised, aimed largely for information or knowledge transmission with little room for interpretation and not much of cultural identity to a highly personal, imaginative text which is relatively profound in aesthetics, with more room for interpretation. Secondly, the ST can also be one that is along the cline from a poorly written or problematic text to a time-withstood classic or canonical text, be it in literature, philosophy or religion.

The third issue concerned here is the required translation by the client/publisher/commissioner, i.e. the TT. The TT can be one along a spectrum from a very thin translation to a highly thick one. In the above graph about text, the items from 1 to 6 are about the ST, and the 7th is about the TT. That is why there is a space left between items 6 and 7. By ‘thin’ I mean, the TT is a partial or gist translation as proposed by Simon Chau (Chau 1998), or business abstract translation, including the extreme cases where zero transmission may be the best choice. Zero transmission of the ST can be found in the translation for resistance or for the sake of interest or value on much higher level such as life-saving, nation building. Such ‘thin’ translations are different from or even opposite to the ‘thick’ translations like the academic ones with plentiful paratextual data developed by Kwame A. Appiah (2004) and practiced by translators like Shan Dexing (2004) and Martha Cheung (2006).

Facing such a complexity regarding the ST and TT, any potential acting/paraprofessional/professional translator as the dynamic start for a translation project, s/he or they should first decide whether they should accept or refuse to undertake the translation job, and then learn whether what is needed is a gist or full translation, an inward or outward translation, and then decide whether they should produce an ‘equivalent’ translation or a manipulated one, towards no/minimal harm and mutual benefits to the active parties and passive entities concerned. Here, inward translation refers to translation from L2 to L1, i.e. one’s mother tongue; outward translation is the opposite direction, i.e. translation from L1 to L2.

Specifically, with respect to the ST, it is the acting/paraprofessional/professional translator’s obligation to consider the text type, text quality and text authorship as examined in section 4.2.1. In the case of non-literary texts, reciprocity is realised when the truth or information embodied in the source text is transmitted or translated into the TT and the translator is paid properly. In such cases, the target
culture/side needs the truth/information/message. When the translator has conveyed the information or message, s/he has done the job and should be paid with remuneration or capital otherwise as agreed upon before the translation. Having been paid, the translator receives the reward from the work done and the ST/side benefits in the form of royalties or otherwise. Such non-literary texts are on the rise in quantity in today’s world (Xie 2014b) and increasingly they are accomplished by large number of practical/professional translators, the repayment for the translator is his/her economic remuneration or social status.

In the case of literary works, while an author shows appreciation (e.g. Nobel Prize winner Mo Yan’s case) to the translators for their hard work at translating his/her work into another language/culture, the translators may also express a sentiment of gratitude to the author in that they are allowed an opportunity to be a language and culture mediator and to accrue some capital, economic, symbolic or social. Meanwhile, classics in human history, like Shakespeare and The Analects, are really invaluable as they have intrinsic values: profound ideas, deep insights into human nature and various aesthetic values, rather than instrumental values. When they are translated, the intrinsic value outweighs any other interests and that is why they are continually translated and retranslated into different languages. They can benefit TT readers as well as they have benefited ST readers.

Yet once national interests are involved in the translation of literary works, the intrinsic value of literary aesthetics may have to give way to the instrumental value. The otherwise first-order value is turned into second-order value in such circumstances. A telling example is the translation of Irish literature during its postcolonial periods (see Tymoczko 1999) as noted previously.

The decisions and choices concerning any translation project are at times difficult to make, the details can be illustrated holistically below in Diagram 1.
Diagram 1 Translator’s ethical choices/decisions regarding a translation project

As shown in this diagram, in the pivotal position, an acting/paraprofessional/professional translator in his/her interaction with other possible agents first decides whether to take or not to take action in this spatiotemporal context. S/he may interact with the author via the ST on the same level, in which the linguistic truth or textual fidelity is only one option of ethical choices, translator-author consultation in the form of “immediate assignment” (Tymoczko 2007: 219) may be one alternative if the author or producer of the text is available; on the same horizontal level but in another direction the translator(s) may interact with the implied or potential readership, but in most cases no direct interaction; on the same horizontal level but diagonally, the translator(s) will interact with the client/publisher/commissioner of this translation project, the parties involved here being not fixed but changable depending on the concrete translation project as shown in the dots.

Concerning this translation project, as shown in the diagram, a prioritising of values will take place in the decisions and choices on the part of the translator(s) in/after interaction with other potential parties. Such values are conveyed in the vertical axis as stake levels involved in text/language, life/culture, and the communities/peoples/nations. Usually the value of a translation project lies in the transfer of linguistic truth of or textual fidelity to the ST. On this level, when the linguistic truth is transmitted, no harm is produced while mutual benefits are realised, and reciprocity is therefore accomplished.

But when the value of life or value of cultural image/national identity is
concerned, the stakes of the translation project are raised to a higher level, and the linguistic value gives way to the more important cultural values. When more significant ideological questions of ethical engagement and geological concerns are involved, the stakes are raised further higher, values of national interests, for instance (see Tymoczko 2007: 41), will reign supreme over other interests.

As shown in the diagram, translators work bottom-up, from the textual level, to linguistic, cultural and national levels, but they need to think top-down, from the national or cultural level to the textual level in most cases (cf. Chestman’s notions of micro-ethics and macro-ethics 1997). Working bottom-up from the textual/linguistic level the translator generates effect at the other two higher levels as well: interpersonal and intercultural/international. But what the translator should take into account when making decisions should be not just the textual/linguistic factors but the intercultural/international stakes as well, maybe more the latter, that is top down. The responsibility will naturally largely fall on the translator at issue.

When it comes to the relationship between the ST/SL/SC and TT/TL/TC, the result should be reciprocal respectively based chiefly on the efforts of the translator, with more than one TT ranging from complete difference from the ST marked by “-1” to near 100% equivalence to the ST marked by “1” in the diagram. Complete difference and near 100% equivalence can both mean reciprocity, dependent on the specific translation project as discussed above.

The three relations, i.e., intertextual, person-textual, interpersonal/intercultural, as discussed in section 4.2.1, can be on the same level when the ST in question is a practical text, but when the text and context of the translation project involves more than just linguistic truth transfer, there may be distinguishable levels between them, and the intertextual relation gives way to the latter two, especially the last one, i.e. the interpersonal/intercultural relation.

Boiling down to a specific acting/paraprofessional/professional translator, when s/he decides to translate, s/he agrees there is something good or worthwhile in the ST that is worth the effort, (cf. Steiner’s “trust” in his hermeneutic motion 1998), or s/he is forced to undertake the job. S/he has his/her allegiance to, for example, a cause, his/her community, his/her language and culture, so if the content in the ST that s/he thinks is not ‘good’, s/he will cut, alter, or add to improve it in the rewriting. This motion is usually acceptable in the translator’s society and culture. But it might do harm to the source side text/language/culture, so the decisions and
choices should be a result of interaction and interpretation with the relevant parties. The decision to alter, to cut, to add, or try to make no alteration, no cutting, no distortion, in the rewriting on the part of the translator will all be acceptable insofar as reciprocity is working as the first principle. In such cases, misrepresentation or distortion is therefore not a decisive factor for judging whether a translation project is ethical or not, but just one possible alternative for maintaining reciprocity in accordance with the specific translation project.

4.3.3.3 Model with translator/Translating/Translation integrated

The entire picture concerning translation ethics can be seen in the following continuum: professional code of ethics ≤ translator ethics ≤ translation ethics ≤ general ethics/personal values. In this continuum, it is clear that professional code of ethics is the narrowest for the so-called professional translators, as in any practice that can be called profession like law or medicine. Chesterman’s (2001) proposal for a Hironymic Oath belongs to this realm. The next, translator ethics, is what Pym (2012) has tried to illustrate. His model has attempted to cover all those professional and amateur translators, including what he calls paraprofessional translators.

What I am proposing is a model of translation ethics that covers not only the acting/paraprofessional/professional translators, the pivotal players concerning a translation project, but other prospective agents. This translation ethics is meant to be broader, more general and comprehensive, covering both Pym’s translator ethics and Chesterman’s professional ethics. Along the continuum, it has something to do with personal/social general ethics as well because here ideology and power are also involved.

To see it clear, this model of ethics of reciprocity concerning a translation project is conveyed below in Diagram 2:
As shown in this diagram, the model starts from general ethics staying as the foundation at the bottom, covering three angles: motive/character/virtue (agent); act (process); consequences (impact on the parties in question) corresponding respectively to the three key dimensions of translation: the agent translator, the process translating, and the consequence translation, which are placed at the top of the diagram. Although Confucian ethics is understood to be able to cover all these three angles in Western ethics, it is taken as an independent framework emphasising reciprocity to join a typical representative from the West, i.e. Ricoeurian reciprocity. Thus the two are placed at the second level of the model as the concrete framework for formulating the model above the level of general ethics. Ethics of reciprocity is
thus conceived as consisting of being virtue/motive on the part of the major agent
the translator and all other potential parties, of being a principle guiding the act of
translating on the part of the translator and all other parties, and of being a principle
to check the consequence of the product.

It is integrated on the third level and multi-layered on the fourth level. What is in
the large oval is the content of reciprocity: no/minimal harm and mutual benefits to
the active parties and the passive entities concerning a specific translation project.
As the core of the model, the oval is stressed in terms of a bold line. At the top of
the diagram is the level of translation which includes all the three dimensions:
translator, translating, and translation as a product. The former two are placed in an
oval because they both are dynamic or active, while the latter, i.e. translation is
placed in a rectangle for it is static; by itself it cannot judge or change anything.

For the model to operate, first, before the act of translating, reciprocity is
represented as a virtue or a motive on the part of the translator(s) and other potential
agents. At this stage, the translator(s)’ competence/emotion, ideology, position,
attitude to ST/SL/SC and TT/TL/TC, will intervene and s/he or they has(ve) to
decide whether to undertake the job. Second, during the act or during the process of
translating, the translator(s) carry out the co- and re-writing work interacting with
the other possible agents. Third, after the act, what is available is the translation, the
TT. Such a translated text should produce no/minimal harm but mutual benefits to
the active parties including the individual persons, the collective groups, and the
nations involved in an order of increasing importance, as well as the passive entities
including the texts, languages and cultures in an order of increasing importance as
well. The harm incurred in and by the translation may be invisible, substantial and
lasting, which should be offset to the state of being visible, superficial and
immediate, depending on the nature of the concrete translation project. Similarly,
the mutual benefits generated in and by the translation may be visible, trivial and
immediate, which should be increased to the state of being invisible, substantial and
lasting.

The model formulated, ethics-oriented, does not describe translation as it is, but
prescribes what good translations as ought to be. It is practice-oriented, with a view
to complementing the existent models. Good translations are understood to be those
that are to reduce misunderstandings, conflicts, and to lead to (more) peace,
coexistence, and harmony between different languages, cultures, individual persons,
collectivities, and larger communities such as nations. Reciprocity in terms of minimisation of harm, and maximisation of mutual benefits between active parties like individuals, collectivities and nations, and between the passive entities in the form of texts, languages and cultures is suggested as the ultimate goal for any translation project. Moreover, on the part of the pivotal agent the translator and other parties, there are three awarenesses for the model to work effectively; they are the awareness of text type, awareness of value levels and awareness of self-reflexivity.

The model’s applicability will have to be tested to real translation cases. That will be the task of the next chapter.
Chapter 5 ETHICS OF RECIPROCITY IN TRANSLATION TESTED

In the previous chapter, the model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ is formulated, but its applicability has to be tested in real-life translation projects. As an integral part of the thesis, Chapter 5 focusses on case studies, aimed at addressing the third research question: How does the model of ethics of reciprocity operate in translation projects? The purpose is to look into the possibilities as well as the limitations of the model.

Although ethics first and foremost concerns itself with human beings that are active, translation ethics as conceived in this model nevertheless also takes into account text that is passive and takes the ST as its static starting point. Only when there is an ST can there be the possibility of establishing a translation project, in which a potential translator or translators and other prospective parties are involved. As such, the test of the model is conducted around and on cases of finished translation projects where the parameters of the model are analysed. Meanwhile, although it is aimed at general applicability, it is not possible to test the model for all projects. Therefore a choice of translation projects is unavoidable. (In this ethical model, awareness of text type is regarded as one of the three important awarenesses on the part of the agents for the model to work effectively, the other two being value stratification in a translation project and self-reflexivity on the part of the translator and other potential parties).

According to the text typology discussed in Chapter 4, all texts are roughly classified into literary text and practical or non-literary text (see section 4.2.1), considering the extent to which ethics is involved in those roughly different texts. Because the classification can only be general rather than precise, there are certain texts that are not distinctly literary or practical but somewhere in between. They are classified thus as semi-literary texts so that no texts are left out for the test of the model’s validity.

Of course texts can be looked at from other perspectives, such as scientific texts and non-scientific texts, legal and non-legal texts, etc. But literary texts are traditionally fundamental in studies of arts and the translation of such texts is most formidable for translators because many issues are involved, as has been discussed
in section 4.2.1 (see pp 126-128). Not only are there the difficult linguistic elements like rhyme and imagery, but there are also complex ideological factors entailed in literary texts as opposed to the texts dealing with science, technology, or law, etc. When translated, such linguistic elements and ideological factors all constitute difficulties and generate more ethical challenges for translators. Literariness is taken as the baseline of text classification for the test of the model also because it is relatively straightforward to distinguish between literary texts and practical/non-literary texts while those in between are addressed as well for the test of the model. As such, in this chapter, three kinds of text are discussed for the test of the model.

To all these three kinds of text, the model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ is supposed to apply. Specifically, in the translation projects of literary, semi-literary and non-literary works, mutual benefits are achieved and no harm is done to the active parties and passive entities involved in such projects. At the same time, there may be cases where reciprocity is not realised between the active parties and/or the passive entities via the efforts of the translator and other parties. That is to say, on the one hand harm may be done to the active parties of individuals, collectivities and/or nations, and/or to the passive entities of texts, languages and/or cultures on one side or the other, or on the other hand mutual benefits are not accomplished in the translation projects concerned. In such cases, non-reciprocity occurs in the descriptive sense but the model still applies because in theory the parties involved, especially the pivotal agent, the translator, should have made efforts (could but in vain) to help accomplish reciprocity in the form of mutual benefits and no/minimal harm.

In addition to the cases where reciprocity is realised or not realised, there are projects where reciprocity is not relevant as shown below, for when the translation projects are materialised the conditions do not allow reciprocity to be realised. It means that even if the agents such as translators and other potential participants had made efforts, they could not have accomplished reciprocity as conceived in the model. In such projects reciprocity is therefore not relevant. They become exceptions of the model and reveal that the model may have its limitations in addressing some extreme cases.

Such cases of ethical reciprocity, non-reciprocity and the projects where reciprocity may be irrelevant are studied discriminately in randomly selected
examples, which are as varied as possible in terms of genre and translation direction. But for my limits in language competence and typicality of examples, selectedness of examples becomes inevitable. For instance, for the translation projects of literary works, any examples should be workable, such as the translation of Mo Yan’s work by Howard Goldblatt and Yang Xianyi’s translation of modern Chinese literary works, but I chose to use Shan Dexing’s translation of *Gulliver’s Travels* (English to Chinese), Even King’s translation of *Luotuo Xiangzi* (Chinese to English), and the translation of Chinese literary works into English by a translation institute, the Foreign Language Press, respectively for ethical reciprocity, ethical non-reciprocity and the case where reciprocity is not relevant. They meet the parameters of the model in terms of mutual benefits and no/minimal harm to the active parties and passive entities.

To be more specific, I have several reasons to use the case of King’s 1945 translation of Lao She’s *Luotuo Xiangzi*. First, I have been directing attention to the novel and its translation all these past years. As a Chinese person from the northern part of the country, I fully understand Lao She’s very idiomatic, northern dialectal Chinese and I enjoy reading his works with a unique Lao She style. Second, Even King’s translation project involves virtually all the factors that a translation project may entail ethically speaking, hence quite suited for my present concerns. Third, it is also a justifiable choice especially from the perspective of translating from Chinese into English, given China’s on-going ‘outgoing’ initiatives, i.e. initiatives that embrace and encourage enhanced efforts to translate contemporary Chinese literature into foreign languages.

When the model is tested to non-literary texts, I use four cases which are typical in proving that ethical reciprocity is realisable in ‘equivalent’ translation and/or manipulated translation, that non-reciprocity may happen but the model applies, and that reciprocity is not relevant in the translation of non-literary texts owing to specific political conditions or external constraints otherwise. By the same token, the model is tested to translation projects of semi-literary texts. Since ethical models on the one hand can be applied to describe and evaluate moral phenomena, including translations, and on the other can be used to help the agents make ethical decisions, i.e. they also have a prescriptive function. As noted above, in conducting researches in the humanities, choices of examples are unavoidable as I have mentioned in Chapter 1. The examples that I am providing below will then justify
for themselves why they are employed for the test of the model.

5.1 Cases of ethical reciprocity in translation

Reciprocity in terms of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits to the passive entities and active parties concerning a translation project can be seen in the translator’s decision of not-translating, his/her seeking ‘equivalence’ in the translation, or his/her intentionally manipulated translation after possible interaction with other potential participants, depending upon the specific context of the translation project. In this model, before the act of translation, reciprocity is taken as a virtue on the part of the translator and other participants, during the act of translating, reciprocity is taken as a principle to guide the parties involved to pursue it, and after the act of translation, it is a principle to evaluate whether reciprocity is achieved in the translation as a consequence. When tested to specific translation projects, all these three aspects of ethics of reciprocity will be weighed insofar as it is possible.

In the following cases, the first is a translation project of literary translation from English into Chinese. In this project, the translator tried to produce an ‘equivalent’ translation, which is found to have generated no harm to the passive entities of texts, languages and cultures and the active parties of individuals, collectivities and peoples/nations concerned, but benefits those parties and entities in many aspects, hence a case of ethical reciprocity.

The second case is a translation project of a semi-literary text from Chinese to English. In this project, before and during the translating, the translators tried their best to produce an ‘equivalent’ translation too. The project is found to have produced mutual benefits to the active parties and passive entities while no harm is inflicted. It is therefore also a case of ethical reciprocity. The two cases tested are both projects of ‘equivalent’ translation out of the three choices open for translators and other participants to achieve reciprocity as formulated in the model in the previous chapter.

Different from the first two cases of ‘equivalent’ translation, the two subsequent projects, both small in scale, are cases of manipulated translation of non-literary texts. In these two translation projects, because the value of accurate linguistic transfer or ‘equivalence’ gives way to higher values, the parties concerned benefit mutually and no one is harmed, reciprocity is achieved on a higher level as one
option described in the model. They are therefore cases of reciprocity as well, proving that reciprocity is realisable in manipulated translation.

5.1.1 Ethics of reciprocity tested to the translation of literary text

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter above, I choose Shan Dexing’s translation of *Gulliver’s Travels* (Shan 2004, 2013) as an example of ethical reciprocity in ‘equivalent’ translation to test the model. Jonathan Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels* is a classic in the history of English and world literature. It was first published anonymously in the year of 1726 in London and then republished in 1735 in Dublin by another publisher, with omissions in the first publication added and with Swift’s personal touch involved (2004: 54-57, 2012a: 285). The novel was translated into different languages soon after its publication (2004: 83-87).

It was first translated into Chinese in 1872 (ibid: 89). It has since witnessed altogether 25 Chinese ‘translations’, including rewritings and adaptations before Shan’s undertaking (see ibid: 456-58). According to Shan’s research and I have checked, almost all the previous translations have been incomplete or just adaptations, without the last two parts of the four in the original being translated (ibid: 124). Shan concludes that its Chinese translation is a history of mistranslation (ibid: 88). The most striking features of such “mistranslations” include the fact that they appear just as a children’s book for only the first two parts of the source text are translated. The novel as a children’s book obscures the novel’s status as a classic satire.

Shan, as a scholar-cum-translator, accepted the challenge from the “National Science Council” (NSC) of Taiwan Executive Yuan to accomplish a full academic translation from the year of 1998 as one of the Annotated Translation Projects of the Classics in the Humanities and Social Sciences initiated by the NSC. The project was planned to be accomplished within two years but actually ended up taking Shan six years. As Qi Bangyuan...
sees it, Shan’s translation of *Gulliver’s Travels* constitutes a real academic translation that will withstand the test of time (2012b: 268) and it has a very high academic value (ibid: 270). As a matter of fact, Qi congratulates Shan on the translation as “a contribution with which one’s life is not spent in vain” (2004: 5, trans). Qi’s words are not just complimentary. I agree with Qi that Shan is up to the name of a renowned translator of academic standing (2011: preface 2). What follows is a discussion of why this translation project clearly manifests the ethics of reciprocity in equivalent literary translation.

As noted at the beginning of this section, the ethics of reciprocity in translation, when applied to the pivotal agent the translator and other participants, is virtue, i.e. the disposition to produce no/minimal harm and mutual benefits to the passive entities and active parties concerned in a translation project. Thus we need to see the translator and other participants in this connection. As a translator, Shan is experienced and competent, for, before this project, he had successfully translated many works, Edward Said’s seminal work *Representations of the Intellectual* in 1997 with annotations being one of the better-known examples.

Shan is also a self-reflective translator. In his own words, “[a]s a scholar-cum-translator for over a quarter of a century, I have long been very concerned about the task of the translator and the important role that he/she plays. It is my *conviction* that in addition to translating the text proper, a responsible translator, as a mediator between two cultures, had better serve his/her target audience by informing them about the reception history of a particular text, especially a classic, not only in its source cultural context, but also in its target cultural context” (2012a: 279, my emphasis). His self-reflexivity helps him see the necessity to produce mutually beneficial translations.

As for other potential participants of Shan’s translation project, there are the major literary works from the Chinese mainland and Taiwan into English. A typical example is the two-volume tome *An Anthology of Contemporary Chinese Literature* a translation project published by Washington University Press in 1975. With Professor Der-wei Wang from Harvard University, she also co-compiled an anthology *Chinese Literature in the Second Half of A Modern Century* published by Indiana University Press in 2000. For details about her scholarship and achievements, see Shan 2012b and her own memoirs (Qi 2011).

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154It was first published in Taiwan in 1997 as 《知識分子論》 by Maitian [Rye Field] in Taipei, and ranked into top 10 good books by China Times in the same year. It was republished in its simplified Chinese-character version in 2002 by Sanlian, a well known publisher of academic books in Beijing. The second edition of this translation by Sanlian was in 2013. For his reflection on the translation of this title, see Shan (2009: 19, n15). About details of his other translation works, see [http://www.ea.sinica.edu.tw/89-1.html](http://www.ea.sinica.edu.tw/89-1.html), accessed March 21, 2016.
initiator and the implied readership. In his interaction with them, Shan the translator can be said to possess the virtue to give regard to those others. For example, to NSC, the initiator or commissioner, Shan accepts the requirements by providing the requested apparatuses including a critical introduction, a review of the novel, a full translation and annotations (see 2012a: 281).

Besides the agents (the translator and other participants), the model also applies to the act, the translating process. Regarding the translating process, reciprocity should work as a principle to guide the translator and other participants to generate no/minimal harm and mutual benefits to the passive entities and active parties. In this aspect, Shan did quality work in the sense that, when he was undertaking the translation, he asked his young son and two nephews who were in primary and secondary school to read the manuscripts of the translation (2004, foreword: 11). By doing so, the translation would be less formidable and more accessible to the young audience as well as scholarly readers, for it was intended as a thick academic translation.

When the model is applied to the translation as a product, it is a principle to see if reciprocity has been realised in the translation as a consequence. As a translation, Shan’s work can be said to be complete because it is for the first time that all the four parts of the novel have been translated. Shan’s translation can also be said to be faithful and accurate because he goes to great lengths to correct the errors found in previous translations. Examples include the translation of individual words in the source text like “Physik”, “Mrs” (Turner 1998: 5), and improve the translation of key expressions like “Yahoo” (see 2009: 46-47), etc. Accuracy in his translation project is also reflected in Shan’s close attention paid to the editions of the source text, which is taken for granted in preceding translations (see 2009: 51).

Has this translation project of Shan’s brought mutual benefits to both the source text/language/culture and the target text/language/culture, and to individuals centring on the project like the author, the translator himself, groups of people like the readership, the commissioner and the publisher, and to other larger communities? Let us see.

The first product of the project is of course the translation proper. The translation proper\textsuperscript{155} runs 454 pages, with rich annotations and post-chapter and post-Part

\textsuperscript{155}The “translation per se is more than 155, 000 Chinese characters in length, while the annotations run to more than 94, 000 Chinese characters in length (approximately three-fifths the size of the
remarks, covering all the four Parts of the ST. This is also evidence of the translation being a full one. The translation proper apart, Shan also wrote a long critical introduction of 142 pages (Shan 2004: 13-154). He is fully aware that it is an academic translation. For Shan, “an academic translation is not just another translation in ‘quantity’, but also another kind of translation in ‘quality’. Via dual-contextualisation, such a translation will avail readers of an opportunity to appreciate the translation of literature and the translation of culture. Embodying word, text, literature and culture, it will also enable readers to learn about the resulting process of a classic in its source context and in its adopted context similarly” (2004: 128, trans).

Here his vision of translation as dual-contextualisation results from his view of the role played by a responsible translator (see Shan 2009: 19-27). For him, a translator generally plays a dual role: explicit and implicit (2009: 19). The former is embodied in the translation proper, i.e. the translator’s representation of the ST in the form of a rewritten TT. The latter is largely illustrated in the paratexts added to the translation proper, including translator’s introduction, translator’s notes, preface, epilogue/afterword, and even interviews and references. In Shan’s understanding, all such paratexts on the one hand stand for the translator’s (extra) service to the ST and readers, and on the other, they represent the translator’s responsibility and accountability to the author, an effort to further facilitate readers’ comprehension of the ST and its author (Shan 2009: 20).

Accordingly, rich annotations, footnotes and a long introduction are available in this project, serving as telling evidence of Shan’s conscientious efforts to transmit the culture embodied in the ST and to enhance readers’ understanding of it and the culture thereof. In this way, an ‘equivalent’ translation is produced and the passive entities including the English text/language/culture and the Chinese text/language/culture are benefited mutually because an ST classic in English is made a TT classic in Chinese.

At the same time, being aware that the heavy annotations may hinder readers’ reading, Shan made efforts to “make the annotations rich without being lengthy, concise without being sketchy”, “both informative and interesting”, so that both scholars and common readers can enjoy reading them (2012a: 286, original translation itself)” (2012a: 285).

\(^{156}\)Genette (1977: 1) explains well what paratext means.
emphasis). His efforts succeeded because both the translation and the footnotes are equally “informative and interesting” as stressed by Qi above.

What is more, after the publication of this academic project, Shan managed to push the publisher to publish a popularised version, i.e. a less academic but average-reader-friendly version with a shorter but more refined introduction. Nine years after the publication of the heavily annotated academic translation, the publisher issued the popularised version (Shan 2013), one much more accessible to the general audience. Thus, more average readers can benefit from such a translation while the author Swift is done a great service and justice.

In addition to the author Swift, the other active parties on the level of individuals include the translator Shan himself. From this project Shan benefits in terms of his derived academic publications on Swift studies (e.g. Shan 2002) and on translation studies in general (Shan 2007). His symbolic capital is undoubtedly enhanced after this impressive undertaking.

Shan himself has clearly expressed that it is highly possible to realise reciprocity, hence entailing a win-win situation between the author, translator, publisher, and reader involved in/around a translation project (2007: 237). This in part also explains why his translation project is employed to illustrate the model of ethical reciprocity. His translation did achieve the goal for mutual understanding and reciprocity between the cultures involved on the macro level, because with this thick academic translation, readers will certainly understand better the English culture and Swift the author. The English culture in turn will learn indirectly that their classic is valued and that the Chinese-speaking world is not a closed society but is eager to learn from the outside too.

In sum, Shan’s project involves no higher value like the value of life or nation, but mainly the value of faithful or ‘equivalent’ rendition of the ST as expressed by Shan himself in his reflection on the purpose of the initiative by the NSC (2012a: 282-83). It is a case of reciprocity in terms of realised equivalence under the pursuit by the translator, whose self-reflexivity (Xie 2005) and agency towards reciprocity played a crucial role.

5.1.2 Ethics of reciprocity tested to the translation of semi-literary text

In the previous section, the ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ is tested to the translation project of a literary text, Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels* by Shan Dexing. In
this section I will continue to test the model, but to the translation of a semi-literary text, Martha P. Y. Cheung’s *Anthology of Chinese Discourse on Translation* (hereafter the *Anthology*).

The *Anthology*’s full name is *An Anthology of Chinese Discourse on Translation, Volume 1: From Earliest Times to the Buddhist Project*¹⁵⁷, edited with annotations and commentary by Cheung, with Lin Wusun¹⁵⁸ being its advisory editor. It was first published in the end of the year 2006 by St. Jerome Publishing¹⁵⁹ based in Manchester, UK. In 2010, it was imported into China by the Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press. It is not a literary work, and it is not a practical or non-literary text either. What has been selected and translated into English in the *Anthology* consists of 82 entries divided in two parts: discourse about translation and discourse on translation, the former including excerpts and full texts from well-known Chinese classics like the *Daodejing* and Confucius’s *Analects*, the latter from Buddhist literature. Some feature literature (see e.g. entry 80) while most not as they are chiefly narratives or arguments on Buddhist sutra translation. Thus it is hard to classify them into modern genres; I choose to take it as a semi-literary text for there is no other, more accurate term available to describe it.

As we did above with Shan and his translation project, we need to discuss Cheung and her translation from reciprocity as a virtue on the part of translators and other potential participants, as a principle of guiding the translating process, and as a principle for evaluating the consequence, i.e., the translation, in terms of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits to the active parties and passive entities involved in this project as well.

To begin with, besides being a renowned scholar in TS (Bai 2010: v), Cheung was an established translator. In her earlier career she translated into English Chinese literary works including contemporary stories, poetry and plays. In addition, she also translated Zen Buddhist works and texts of traditional Chinese medicine¹⁶⁰. But her most influential translation work is the first volume of the *Anthology* she edited and translated with the help of three other veteran translators in Hong Kong, ¹⁵⁷It is in fact the first of the intended two-volume project, spanning from the earliest time to 1911 when China entered into a new era; unfortunately, Professor Cheung’s early passing in 2013 prevents the expected publication of the second volume, which was almost drawing to its close.
¹⁵⁸Lin, a senior translator, then was the Executive Vice-President of Chinese Translators Association.
¹⁵⁹For its unusual success in exclusively publishing monographs on translation studies, the publisher was acquired by another more prestigious and larger academic press Routledge in the year 2014.
¹⁶⁰Regarding Cheung’s major translations in addition to this outstanding *Anthology*, see Bai Liping (2010: xii).
she herself being the pillar translator. For the present study, Cheung is taken more as a translator than as a TS scholar because in the translation project of the *Anthology* she played a pivotal role more as a translator than as a TS scholar although the translation is not completed by herself.

As a translator, besides displaying the indispensable translational competence, Cheung was a conscientious and self-reflexive thinker. She was fully aware why she undertook the formidable task of translating, compiling and providing commentary in the project. She stated that “[t]he agency of a translator entails responsibilities, the heaviest being the responsibility to know why one is doing certain things in the first place, and to be articulate about it”, thereby choosing to “play the game up front” (2013: 75).161

With this project she aimed to promote a “cross-cultural understanding of Chinese thinking about translation” (2009: 179) and “to use translation and editorial commentary, as well as other paratextual apparatuses, to create a discursive space for intercultural dialogues” (2011: 50), i.e., to address the “aphasia” problem in the field of TS in China (ibid). Put otherwise, she also had the latent aim to address scholars of Chinese translation studies, in the hope that “they will see the value of rereading and re-interpreting traditional Chinese discourse on translation by relating the material to contemporary theoretical concerns, and produce new thinking on or about translation that would allow them to speak on equal terms with scholars from the West” (2013: 86).

Or seen from another perspective, she decided to compile the *Anthology* also, to some extent, owing to a postcolonial imperative to “assert the right of self-representation as a personal act of resistance against subjugation and hegemony” (2013: 82, my emphasis) on the one hand. On the other hand, as she stated, “I wanted the *Anthology* to have an impact not only on the target culture but also the source culture” (ibid, my italics).

In sum, in the project, Cheung had more than one mission and goal to accomplish: To address the problem of aphasia in Chinese translation studies, to create a platform for real dialogue, to invite equal communication, to represent Chinese culture to the world with a view to winning more understanding of and respect for this nation called China with a long history of translation practice and translation.

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161 In this and the following quotes from articles by Cheung herself, just year and page of quote are given.
thinking, which yet has long been otherwise unknown and unappreciated around the world, especially the West, and even somewhat in its own country. The *Anthology* did turn out to have the desired impact towards both Western and Chinese readers (Bai 2010: iii) and obtained the desired goals, as will be shown below. Cheung thus can be said to be a *junzi*-like translator, who tends to aim at higher-level reciprocity.

To fulfil the common task of transmission and the larger mission of addressing the aphasia in the field of TS in China, Cheung took measures to help ensure the reliability of the “source texts” and the quality of translation. For example, she invited Lin Wusun as an advisory editor and a team of top-calibre translation scholars from the Chinese mainland to form the advisory editorial board. Further, as noted above, she also invoked three other experienced and sophisticated translators in Hong Kong to join her to do the translations.

Cheung also took ‘thick translation’ as her general policy to accomplish the *Anthology*. For her, “translation is a form of cultural representation, not mere interlingual communication, and what is being represented is the identity of an entire culture” (2007: 32, my emphasis). This is the overall policy she adopted in her translation and editing of the *Anthology*. As can be seen, she practised what she advocated. That is, when she was doing translation, what came into her view was more than just interlingual communication. As a result, the “thick” translation is not just the translation proper, it also includes the 300-odd footnotes and the abundant commentaries after many of the 82 entries, as also well practised by Shan Dexing discussed above. Such footnotes, commentaries plus the translations, provide the English language audience with easy access to the source texts. Meanwhile, it also avails those Chinese readers who can read English of an opportunity to enhance their understanding of the texts.

With such measures and her own clear vision, the project benefits mutually the passive entities of texts, Chinese and English languages and cultures and active parties of individuals, collectivities and nations, with no harm produced, in the following way. First, the quality of translation is guaranteed as shown in the comments: “[t]he translations themselves are accurate, fluent, and above all intelligent” (Minford 2010: 322), “[t]he translations themselves are readable and mostly reliable” (Benn 2009: 133), and “[t]he quality of the translations of the

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162To learn more about this policy or strategy, see Appiah (2004), Hermans (2003), Cheung (2007), and Xu Minhui (2014).
original entries is very high” (De Meyer 2010: 158).

Being a reliable equivalent translation, the project is thus especially beneficial to the source culture, i.e. the Chinese culture whilst it benefits the Western culture, especially the English speaking world. John Minford, professor from Australian National University, a well known translator, who co-translated with David Hawkes the topmost Chinese classic Honglou Meng\(^\text{163}\), comments that Cheung’s *Anthology* “will certainly help to dispel the reputation China has acquired of having always been a monolingual, monolithic, inward-looking, culture in which translation has played little part” (Minford 2010: 321). Minford also agrees that, by quoting Cheung’s own words, ‘it will contribute to “a fuller understanding of and a deeper respect for Chinese culture”’ (Cheung 2006: 2’) (ibid, my emphasis). Theo Hermans, at the closing of the 2013 International TS Symposium held in Xinxiang, Henan Province, China (September 19-20), also praised highly Cheung’s *Anthology*, saying that scholars from the West have developed more understanding of and respect for China via this book (in Lu Wei 2013: 88). From such comments, it can be seen that the project mutually benefits the Chinese culture and the English speaking cultures.

Secondly, it benefits the TS scholars and the field both in China and the West. Maria Tymoczko praised the *Anthology* as “[a] stunning piece of scholarship” and possibly “the most ground-breaking contribution to translation studies in a quarter century” (Cheung 2006: xv). According to Wang Hui, the *Anthology*, as an academic translation in its strict sense, with every entry and term studied, plus a wide range of footnotes and commentaries, affords the English readers a thorough understanding of the discourse on Buddhist sutra translation (2008: 110). A result of this is its wide use in postgraduate programmes of Western universities, such as Ottawa University (Brissett 2011, personal communication). For its significance, it was also introduced back to China in 2010. As Qin Jianghua sees it, the *Anthology* not only exerts an enormous impact on the field of TS in the world, but also opens up a new study space for Chinese discourse on translation, and creates opportunities for cooperation between TS scholars across the world towards further development of international translation studies (2013c: 40). This is a clear benefit to the field of TS.

\(^{163}\)Hawkes translated the title of the novel as *The Story of the Stone* (1973-1986); it has been also translated as *The Dream of the Red Chamber* (e.g. by Chi-chen Wang 1958; Florence and Isabel McHugh 1958) or *A Dream of Red Mansions* (by Yang Xianyi and Gladys Yang 1978), and otherwise.
At the same time, the benefit has gone beyond the field of TS to other disciplines. Minford comments, again, “it is a book not just of value for scholars of translation studies. The student of Chinese thought, literature and culture in general will learn an enormous amount from its pages. This book is one of those rare cases where, through the prism of reading and understanding which is translation, old texts and sayings, indeed whole sections of the cultural landscape, are seen in a new light” (Minford 2010: 323, my emphasis).

As Zhang Xu summarises it, the Anthology is in fact not just a collection of translations of Chinese discourse on translation, benefiting the TS academia across the world, its impact on the research of Chinese cultural history, Chinese intellectual history, and translated literature and comparative literature will be far-reaching as well (2012: 7). In Bai Liping’s words, the Anthology set up a bridge for the communication of discourse on translation between the West and East, between the past and present (2010: x)\(^{164}\). As Yang Quanhong sees it, against the background of Chinese culture’s ‘stepping out’ as initiated by the Chinese government, the Anthology is a pioneering success, and can even serve as a textbook (2013: 107)\(^{165}\).

In sum, Cheung’s Anthology does not involve direct inequality of power but representation of cultural identity in addition to linguistic transfer. As a consequence, the translation or the Anthology realised reciprocity in terms of ‘equivalent’ translation on the level of passive entities and active parties, especially on the level of culture. As for the active parties of individuals, Cheung and her team took seven years to finish the project (2006: 1). Their efforts were well reciprocated in the form that the project is highly appreciated and, Cheung herself published quite a number of essays based on the Anthology, contributing to her increased prestige globally in the field of TS, similar to Spivak’s case as analysed by Pym (Pym 2012: 126).

\(^{164}\)Bai’s review as introduction is written for the imported republication of the Anthology for the readers in the Chinese mainland by one of the influential publishers of introducing key TS publications in the West, Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press. He entitles his review as “Dongru youwei, nengjiu shenyin 洞入幽微能究深隐”, a sentence used by an eminent monk translation scholar Shi Yancong commenting on another eminent monk scholar Shi Dao’an to sing highly of Cheung’s work. Cheung’s translation of these eight characters is as follows: “his work showed a thorough understanding of the most minute and deeply-hidden meanings” (2006: 138). For the entire entry on the text by Shi Yancong from which the quote Bai takes, see entry 63 in the Anthology.

\(^{165}\)But it has to be borne in mind that Cheung’s project of course is not one generated to answer the appeal of government, instead, it is out of her own awareness to promote international translation studies and addresses the problem of aphasia on the part of Chinese intellectuals as regards cross-cultural communication.
5.1.3 Ethics of reciprocity tested to the translation of non-literary text

As noted at the end of the last chapter, the model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ is intended to apply to all genres rather than any one single text type. The two above cases are translation projects of literary and semi-literary texts. In this section, I will focus on the translation of practical texts. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the following two examples of practical text, are better able to illustrate the ethical reciprocity in manipulated translation. In them manipulated translation towards reciprocity in the form of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits to the active parties and passive entities involved in a translation project can be seen clearly.

As seen in Chu (2009), in this translation project, a listed company’s prospectus was to be used in the Hong Kong stock market in English. The ST of the prospectus was in Chinese and needed to be translated. When the translator received the ST, he found that it was not in accordance with the format of similar texts in the field, so he improved the ST to make it comply in format with the similar texts and sent it back to the client. The client, i.e. the company in question agreed with the improvement, and then the translator proceeded to finish the translation of the improved ST.

In this project, first, the translator at issue obviously uses his agency to improve the ST when he finds it insufficient compared with the common format of similar texts. This shows that he is well versed in the field or subject matter, a text in which is for him to translate. Second, he is responsible not in the sense that a professional translator should be faithful to the ST, but in the sense that he is loyal to the practice of the specific field. By doing so, the translator benefits the client in that both the ST and TT will work ‘professionally’, and at the same time, the translator himself is rewarded for his work as implied in the example because the listed company accepts the proposal of improving the ST and the translation. In this case, the passive entities involved are chiefly texts, for languages and cultures have not been in prominent positions. The active parties include the translator and the client, also the owner of the ST and initiator of the translation project, no larger communities are involved. Thus the relations are quite simple. When the client’s needs have been met and the translator paid, mutual benefits are produced with no harm generated in the process of translating and in and to the product. As such, this case constitutes a good example of reciprocity insofar as the ST is improved and the translator exercises his
agency for a result of no harm but mutual benefits to all the parties concerned. It clearly shows manipulated translation can produce reciprocity.

Likewise, beyond China, translation projects that are attestable to this model of reciprocity can also be found. Translator-cum-theorist Douglas Robinson’s frequently mentioned case is a typical one (1991: 116ff; 2013a: 14-16; 2015: 66-75, 189). This case is his real experience. It was back in the late 1970s when he was working in Finland, he was asked to translate from Finnish into English a conference paper by a professor of movement science, who would present the paper at a conference in Poland. But the paper as Robinson saw it was not up to the standard for an academic conference. For Robinson, the author of the source text in question is a “less competent writer” who needs his help to prepare a successful presentable product (1991: 116). In Robinson’s words, “[t]he source text was a nightmare: grammatically often incoherent, stylistically without emphasis or other signs of relative importance, argumentatively quite simply lost” (2015: 66). Robinson calls this professor from the University of Jyväskylä, Finland “Professor X”. What did Robinson do with this Professor X’s deficient text? In Robinson’s own words again, he “was to rewrite the source text as a clear and presentable target text” in such a manner that he “moved paragraphs, cut a few things, added some argumentative transitions” (ibid). Professor X in Robinson’s narrative “was reassured” and “relieved”, and “thanked” Robinson. That means he was satisfied with Robinson’s manipulated translation—improved rewriting.

In his later reflection (1991, 2013a, 2015) on why he improved the ST in this case, in addition to the possible “writerly arrogance” at the time because he then was in his twenties and thought he could write better than many others as he recognises today (2015: 67), he also postulates some other more crucial factors or reasons like “transfeelings” or his newly created term “somatic mimeticisms” (2015: 70, original emphasis). Here it is beyond the compass of this study to evaluate Robinson’s analysis of his newly developed concept of socioaffective ecology of translating (2013b). What we can see in this example is reciprocity realised to all the parties involved in a concrete translation project. For Robinson as the translator gets paid for his job, the ST author is happy with the change and improvement made. In

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166In the 2013 essay published in *East Journal of Translation* it was “the mid-1980s” (2013: 14). Maybe Robinson could not remember exactly the time, but this does not affect the validity of his case to test the applicability of my model of reciprocity.
Robinson’s earlier reflection on translation, especially on the “turn of the translator”, he states that “SL authors are not gods, and that we as translators are not the gods’ humble servants” (1991: 116). While establishing the agency of the translator, Robinson is absolutely right in pointing out that, facing with the too “badly written source texts” (2015: 189), a translator is justified to improve it and consequently benefit the source text author and the target text reader mutually.

Leaving his complex expounding of his improvement behind, I think the justification can be simple in terms of translation ethics: reciprocity. Both Chu’s and Robinson’s examples of translation projects fall within the cases of poor quality source text concerning which faithful ‘equivalent’ translation is not preferable, but manipulated translation instead. After being ‘manipulated’ or improved, the result is that all parties involved suffer nothing but gain or benefit. This reciprocity in improvements on the part of the translator is of enormous importance because there are in fact too many “bad texts” (Emma Wagner’s words) to be translated. McDougall as translator also confirms this argument and practice of improving the source text as discussed in the previous chapter (McDougall 2011). Of course, the precondition is that the translator is qualified and equipped with the awareness of reciprocity, including self-reflexivity. Although it may seem that the ST as a passive entity is done harm, the result however is that the active partie are happy and benefited mutually. As formulated in the model in Chapter 4, active parties go before the passive entities ethically speaking.

5.2 Cases of ethical non-reciprocity in translation

In the section above, I tested the model for cases of reciprocity. In this section I will apply the model to translation cases in which reciprocity is not realised ethically. Ethical non-reciprocity in translation can happen in various circumstances. For example, when the author and the translator are subject to exploitation by each other for they are on unequal footing, reciprocity is failed. It can also be under circumstances where the benefits to the passive entities and/or active parties are not balanced. At the same time, the model informed by Confucian reciprocity includes the notion that the ‘stronger’/richer/more powerful should give more while the ‘weaker’/poorer/less powerful should try to reciprocate in one way or another in proportion to one’s capability. If the ‘stronger’, be it the translator or author, yields
one’s power or influence and dominates, then reciprocity cannot be accomplished. Details follow below.

5.2.1 Ethical non-reciprocity in translation of literary text

Concerning the translation of literary texts, Evan King’s translation *Rickshaw Boy* of Lao She’s *Luotuo Xiangzi* [駱駝祥子] (hereafter *Xiangzi*) is a typical case of ethical non-reciprocity in manipulated translation. In it, reciprocity is not achieved.

I start from the ST and its author to see the case clearly. As a well known writer in last century China, Lao She was prolific, producing eight million words in various genres including novels, plays, essays and short stories (Xia 2009: 1). Apart from *Xiangzi*, his most famous novels are *Lihun* [離婚] and *Sishi Tongtang* [四世同堂], and his plays *Chaguan* [茶館] and *Longxu Gou* [龍鬚溝]. He is the only writer in China who was granted the title of “People’s Artist” and named a “Great Master of Language” (anon 1981: 1). Born in 1899 to a poor ethnic Manchu family in Beijing, Lao She’s real name is Shu Qingchun 舒慶春. Not well-off through his life (Hu 1977: 62), he witnessed the downfall of the Qing Dynasty, the Republican period, and the founding of the PRC, and drowned himself in 1966 when the Cultural Revolution began167.

*Xiangzi* has been publicly acknowledged as one of Lao She’s best works. Chinese American literary critic Hsia Chih-Tsing lauded it as “the finest modern Chinese novel before the second Sino-[Against] Japanese War” (Hsia 1961: 206). To Harvard comparative literature professor David Der-wei Wang, it is “a cornerstone of hard-core realism in modern Chinese fiction” (Wang 1992: 144). Recently, at the “Lao She and City Culture Summit Forum” held in Shanghai October 15-16, 2011, son of Lao She, Shu Yi 舒乙, consultant to China’s Lao She Research Council, shared the news that a *Xiangzi* Museum was established in Qingdao, and that a Lao She Reading Society was founded in Japan 60 years ago (Lou Chengzhen 2011: A9).

Another piece of news confirmed by Shu Yi in 2009 is that Lao She was nominated for the 1968 Nobel Prize for Literature, for he enjoyed the most translations as a

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167 For detailed introduction of Lao She and his works before the period of the second Sino-[Against] Japanese War, see Hu Jinquan (1977), for a comprehensive understanding of Lao She see Vohra (1974) and Xu Deming (2006), for comprehensive introduction with respect to translation of his works, see Kwok-kan Tam (2005) and Howard Goldblatt’s introduction (2010) to his recent retranslation of *Xiangzi*. 

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writer at the time, including translations of Xiangzi in Swedish (Zhou Tianhan 2012: C04).

But as a modern literary classic, Xiangzi witnessed various fates. It was first serialised from issue 25 to 48 in Yuzhoufeng¹⁶⁸, i.e. from September 1936 through October May 1937 in altogether 24 chapters (Kong Lingyun 2006: 7). The first publication of the novel in the form of a book is the 1939 edition published by the Shanghai-based publisher Renjian shuwu [人間書屋] and then the 1941 impression by Wenhua shenghuo [文化生活] in Chongqing (ibid).

After the novel saw the end of its serialisation, Lao She reflected on the writing of it in an essay ‘How I Came to Write the Novel “Camel Xiangzi”’ ([1945]1981). In Shi Xiaojing’s translation, Lao She states, “[a]s soon as it was finished, I told the editor of the magazine that I am more pleased with this novel than any other of my previous works” ([1945]1981: 234). Lao She continues, “There are of course many faults in the book. I, personally, am most dissatisfied with the abrupt ending. Because it was coming out in instalments, I had to write exactly twenty-four chapters. In fact, I should have written two or three more additional chapters to round off the story. However, nothing can be done about this now, for I never care to revise anything once it has been published” (ibid: 235, my emphasis). Such words show that Lao She would like to see his works appear the way they did originally.

In the 1950s, however, Lao She had to revise his works including Xiangzi because of the changed political situation at the time. The fact is that the People’s Literature Press, the most prestigious publisher of literary works in China, published his revised Xiangzi in 1955 with an afterword by Lao She (Kong 2006: 10). To 1977, the novel had seen 17 separate editions, and pirated rampantly (Hu 1977: 114). Various collections or complete works have since come to appear in varied forms up to today. But Kong’s study confirms that of all the collections, Xiangzi in Volume two of Lao She’s Classic Works published by the Overseas Chinese Press in 1999 is the 1939 original (2006: 10).

As for English translation of Xiangzi, altogether four complete versions are produced. Evan King’s Rickshaw Boy was the first, published in 1945 in the United States. In 1979, a second translation was made by Jean M. James and published by Hawaii University Press. The year 1981 witnessed the translation by Shi Xiaojing

¹⁶⁸It [宇宙風] is a semimonthly sponsored by Lin Yutang and published in Shanghai in the 1930s, for details see Xia Tian (2009: 75, n26).
published by both the Foreign Language Press in Beijing and the Indiana University Press, and in 2010 a fourth version was finished by Howard Goldblatt and published by HarperCollins.

What concerns this study the most is the first one, i.e. King’s *Rickshaw Boy*, because it involves non-reciprocity implicitly and explicitly when tested to the model developed in the present study. In what follows, I will illustrate why this is the case in terms of the passive entities and active parties including first the translation, and second the translator and other major parties concerned.

As Kong stresses, when King was doing his translation, what was available was just the serialised version in *Yuzhoufeng*, or the 1939 and 1941 edition of the novel. Kong concludes that King’s translation had to be based on these three texts, the same text but in different editions (see Kong 2008: 156, n4). Goldblatt also stresses that his translation is based on “the original (1939) Renjian shuwu edition” while consulting “the 1941 Wenhua shenghua[ō] chubanshe edition” (2010: xiv). Goldblatt’s stress is supportive to Kong’s judgment. So this study examines the TT, Evan King’s 1945 *Rickshaw Boy* against the 1999 Overseas Chinese Press edition as the ST. Now let us see what happened to *Xiangzi* in *Rickshaw Boy* the translation.

In 1945, the New York-based publisher Raynal & Hitchcock published Evan King’s *Rickshaw Boy*. Commercially, the publication was a huge success for it became a Book-of-the-Month Club choice and the Best Seller of the year (Hu 1977: 114; Kao 1980: 30), with sales amounting to nearly a million (Bartlatt 1955: 3-B). But as has been pointed out by various writers, translators and scholars, King’s *Rickshaw Boy* rewrote many parts of the novel, and what is most striking is that he changed the ending of the novel completely from a tragedy to a happy ending comedy (Hu 1977: 114; James 1979: vi; Kao 1980: 30; Goldblatt 2010: xii). Its commercial success was not attributable to any definitive reason for many factors were involved, such as the then international relations, the publisher, King’s own translation methods and strategies (cf. Xia 2009). One simple but striking feature of King’s translation is that he divided Lao She’s long paragraphs into short ones with more focused theme in each like paragraphs in English writing. Thus the TT is much easier to follow for the target audience. Other strong features are detailed in Xia (2009).

169For example, the last paragraph on page 427 (Lao 1999) was re-paragraphed into three ones from the last paragraphs on pages 324 through 326 (King 1945).
But the change in plot is also obvious, especially when seen today in retrospect. The last three and half pages of Chapter 21 in the ST (Lao 1999: 432-35) were reorganised into King’s Chapter 22 on pages 335-36 and 341, and all the rest was King’s creation, centring on a Ch’inghua [Qinghua] University girl student “not much over twenty” (King 1945: 334). Chapter 22 of the ST is one about Xiangzi’s final new hope of obtaining a monthly job at Mr. Cao’s home and finding his neighbour the poor girl, Xiao Fuzi, one he feels deeply attached to. But this Chapter is ended with despair, for Xiangzi fails to find the girl Xiao Fuzi, his last hope, at her old shabby living place. In Chapter 22 of the ST, neither the one radical girl student from Qinghua nor another character, Li Pock One, two characters created by King, is involved. In King’s Chapter 22, almost everything is changed from Chapter 22 of the ST. In King’s text several pages are composed by King the translator, about the girl student from Qinghua, who leads Xiangzi to reflect on life, himself and the girl student’s remarks. For instance, Xiangzi is told by the girl student, “You shouldn’t run that fast for anybody, no matter what they pay you” (King 1945: 339). This is in fact the translator’s sympathy shown to the miserable puller from the lips of the created girl student. Lao She’s Chapter 22 is changed into King’s Chapter 23 combined with large chunks of the ST’s Chapters 23 and 24, so that King’s Chapter 24 is a completely rewritten text about the execution of three people instead of only one, and Xiangzi’s happy ending with Xiao Fuzi’s staying alive. The plot that Xiangzi’s selling Ruan Ming for 60 dollars in Lao She’s ST is replaced by King’s plot, in which “One Pock Li”, one of the two added characters, commits the mean wrong of selling Ruan for 60 dollars (King 1945: 378). The Qinghua girl student should have shouted some democracy slogans like “Freedom of publication” (ibid: 377) and “Freedom of speech” (ibid: 378) before the execution.

In King’s rewriting, the hopeless, soulless, degenerated rickshaw puller is turned into a self-examining and sympathetic man. In so doing Lao She’s intention is completely altered. A comparison of the endings of King’s translation, Lao She’s original, and the other translations will illustrate the stark difference between Lao She’s ST and King’s TT. King ends the novel like this:

Suddenly he knew what meant to do: no one could stop him! With quick movement he lifted the frail body up, folding the sheet about it, and, crouching to get through the door, he sped as fast as he could across the clearing into the woods. In the mild coolness of summer evening the burden in his arms stirred slightly, nestling closer to his body as he ran. She was alive. He was alive. They were free. (King 1945: 384, my emphasis)
The original source text and other three major translations go as follows respectively:


Handsome, ambitious, dreamer of fine dreams, selfish, individualistic, sturdy, great Hsiang Tsu. No one knows how many funerals he marched in, and no one knows when or where he was able to get himself buried, that degenerate, selfish, unlucky, offspring of society’s diseased womb, a ghost caught in Individualism's blind alley. (James trans. 1979: 249)

Xiangzi, so decent, willing, fond of day-dreaming, self-serving, solitary, strong and admirable, had been an attendant at countless funerals, but has no idea when and where he will be buried himself, where his despairing ghost, product of a sick society, degenerate, selfish, unfortunate and individualistic will finally be laid to rest. (Shi Xiaojing trans. 2005: 586)

Respectable, ambitious, idealistic, self-serving, individualistic, robust, and mighty Xiangzi took part in untold numbers of burial processions but could not predict when he would bury himself, when he would lay this degenerate, selfish, hapless product of a sick society, this miserable ghost of individualism, to rest. (Goldblatt trans. 2010: 300)

Apparently what is presented by King is another Xiangzi rather than the one by Lao She.

After the publication of the translation in 1945, Alexander Brede from Wayne University published a review in the following year, i.e. 1946, in the 3rd issue of The Far Eastern Quarterly. For him, it is “both an interesting and informative novel”, “deserves a place in world literature along with such a novel as Les miserables” (Brede1946: 341) and therefore “deserves to be widely read” (ibid: 342). For King’s rewriting and adaptation, Brede writes that “the kindness of a radical student, a genuine affection for Little Lucky One [Xiao Fuzi], a prostitute, and an encounter with his father-in-law help to restore his self-confidence and ambition” (ibid: 341, my emphasis). But in fact, as Xia Tian points out (2009: 13), his comment “ignored the translator and took it for granted that he was commenting the original”. As long been recognised and as discussed above, the radical student from Qinghua and the survival of Xiao Fuzi are both born of King’s change of the novel’s ending. In the original, Xiangzi was just a hopeless and soulless walking ghost, with no ambition or goal left; it is King the translator who helps to “restore his self-confidence and ambition”.

Lao She, in 1950, expressed his discontent with the translator King, by saying that: “in 1945, this book was translated into English in the States, the translation was not bad\(^{170}\), but the last chapter was deleted, and the tragedy fate of the

\(^{170}\)Lao She’s original words are “譯筆不錯”。On the whole Rickshaw Boy reads smooth and mostly
characters was changed into a happy end to cater to the American readers. […] The translator did not ask for consent before his alterations. When I arrived in the States, it had become a bestseller, and it could not be corrected according to the original” ([1950]1990: 203, trans), although in the afterword to his revised 1955 edition of Xiangzi Lao She expressed his regrets that, he “feel[s] deeply ashamed” because “he gave them [the labouring people] no future, no way out. They lived miserably and died wronged” despite his “expression of sympathy for them and admiration of their sterling qualities” (Lao She [1954]1981: 230, trans. Shi Xiaojing). But as Goldblatt points out, such words are not necessarily really from the bottom of Lao She’s heart (2010: xiii).

Obviously, it is not that King’s translation is not generally good enough in Lao She’s eyes. What he was fighting for was actually his right of expression, as he did not wish to see his intention and comprehension altered that dramatically. The literary value is in fact awfully undermined in King’s alteration. That is not what Lao She wished to see. As privileged Chinese literary scholar Lyrlil Birch sees it (1961: 52), “[a]ny slip, any relaxation of the writer’s control might have invested the figure of Hsiang-tsu [Xiangzi] with self-pity or wrapped him in a mist of sentimentality. There is no such slip. Lao She looks long and hard at the city of Peking through the eyes of his rickshaw man”. Lao She as a writer is therefore harmed in this manner.

Lao She suffered also economically from the translation. It cannot be denied that Lao She benefited from the translation economically to some degree because, as recorded by Kao (1980: 31), he sustained himself in the US for another two years faithfully rendered (Xia 2009). Lao She of course has his judging criterion: it has to be borne in mind that he stayed in London for five years teaching Chinese at the School of Oriental Studies, London University from 1924-1929. During this period, he also helped Clement Egerton to translate the Ming classic Jinpingmei 《金瓶梅》 into English (Hu 1977). On page 36 of Hu’s book on Lao She and his works, the two notes say enough about Lao She’s help in this translation: in note 6, Hu writes, “金瓶梅: The Golden Lotus, By Clement Egerton, George Routledge & Sons Ltd London 1939. In Biographical Dictionary of Republican China (Howard L. Boorman, Columbia Press, 1970)里，是這樣的：‘For the next five years, he (Lao She) spent most of his time at the home of Clement Egerton, then the heir of the Chinese at the school, whom he assisted in the translation of Ming novel Chin-ping-mei (P. 132)”; in note 8, Hu quotes Egerton’s “translator’s footnotes” about Lao She’s help: ‘Without the untiring and generously given held[p] of Mr. C. C. Shu, who, when I made the 1st draft of this translation, was Lecturer in Chinese at the School of Oriental Studies, I should never have dare[d] to undertake such a task. I shall always be grateful to him’. From these words it can be inferred that Lao She is competent in both language and translation.

171 As mentioned in note 141 of Chapter 4, Mo Yan’s case is different in that first Mo Yan has no English and second, he has trust in his translator Goldblatt’s judgment so he approved of Goldblatt’s changes in the translations, meanwhile, Goldblatt has not altered Mo Yan’s work to that dramatic extent.
largely depending on his share of the *Rickshaw Boy* royalties when the State Department’s one-year stipend ran out. But as revealed later, the share to him is of a tiny proportion compared with what went to King. Economically speaking, *Rickshaw Boy* was a success in sales as George Bartlett reports that “[his] translation of ‘Rickshaw Boy,’ a Book of the Month Club choice, sold close to a million copies in the English version and appeared in a dozen foreign languages” (1955: 3-B). But the staple profit went to King as confirmed by Wilma Cannon Fairbank, wife of John K. Fairbank, who talked about this to Lao She’s widow Hu Jieqing after the Cultural Revolution during Wilma’s visit to China to attend the National Day celebration (see Li Wei 2014: 56)\(^{172}\).

Undoubtedly *Rickshaw Boy* contributed greatly to building Lao She’s popularity and high visibility in the United States. But it was not the sole contribution maker, because other people may have played a role as well, like the well-known American China Studies scholar John King Fairbank, who came to China and became associated with Lao She, and the Nobel Prize winner Pearl S. Buck, who knew well of Lao She as a writer then (see Li Wei 2014: 45ff). Lao She’s friend, translator George Kao also played a part in promoting Lao She’s works in America (see Kao 1980).

In addition to Lao She’s personal harm, King’s *Rickshaw Boy* also brought harm to Chinese culture in a way. According to Hu Jinquan, immediately after King’s *Rickshaw Boy* was sent back to China, it triggered anger among people in the circle of arts and literature, for its cover features a rickshaw puller of wretched appearance, with a pigtail standing up. Established literary figures at that time such as Mao Dun and Cao Yu\(^{173}\) both pointed this out (Hu Jinquan 1977: 114; see also Li Wei 2014: 54). Such an image of the Chinese is an absolutely wrong representation of the source culture since in fact the Chinese people had long stopped growing pigtails when the novel was written. Nowhere in Lao She’s original novel were Xiangzi and his fellow rickshaw pullers depicted as growing pigtails either.

\(^{172}\)It has to be kept in mind that this essay by Li Wei is not an academic one and the magazine in which it was published is a popular one. But the knowledge in it has been commonly acknowledged, so it is valid to be used as evidence about Lao She’s life and translation-related issues.

\(^{173}\)Cao 曹禺 was a reputed playwright then, and he went to the United States with Lao She in 1946 at the invitation of American Statement Department and came back to China next year while Lao She stayed there for another three years (see Li Wei 2014).
Then what is the role of the translator in all this and what could he have done to eschew such harm?

Evan King is the pen name of Robert Spencer Ward (1906-1968), an American Foreign Service officer chiefly serving in China. Ward has a Chinese name Hua Ruide [華瑞德], born in British Columbia of Canada on June 27, 1906, and died in September 1968 in St Petersburg, Florida. He retired in the year 1951 and settled in Florida (Zhao Wuqiang [Zhao Wuping] 2015a: 7). On December 4, 1955, the Florida-based newspaper *St. Petersburg Times*\(^{174}\) published a special report by George Bartlett featuring Ward. The article was entitled “Robert Spencer Ward Knows Orientals As Few Americans”. According to this report, Ward graduated from George Washington University with a plan to go into politics. As for his career, it says that Ward spent 19 years in China as a Foreign Service officer and was able to speak Chinese like a native. In 1929, when he was first assigned to Canton [Guangzhou] as vice-consul, he studied Cantonese. And then he was assigned as language officer to Peking [Beijing] where he studied Mandarin [Putonghua]. Speaking of language expertise, the report says that “Ward was highly useful to the department [US State Department] as a trouble shooter, and most of his career was spent in dangerous and unhealthful spots. He was under frequent Japanese bombardment during World War II, and was interned with the fall of Hong Kong” (Bartlett 1955: 3-B). This internship was also mentioned by Lawrence Salisbury, another American diplomat to the East. In Salisbury’s introduction to Ward’s book *Asia for the Asiatics? The Techniques of Japanese Occupation*, he confirms that Ward “was on duty as a Foreign Service officer” in Hong Kong when on Christmas Day of 1941 the British governor surrendered to the Japanese invaders and “Mr. Ward was held by the conquerors for six months” (Salisbury 1945: v). The translator of the 2010 *Xiangzi*, Goldblatt, also mentions Ward as “a translator using the pseudo-name Evan King, reputedly a prisoner of the Japanese in Northern China when the work [*Rickshaw Boy*] was done” (2010: xii).

\(^{174}\)It went through 2011, and as of January 1, 2012, it was renamed as the Tampa Bay Times, for details see its website [www.tambay.com](http://www.tambay.com).
Bartlett’s special report also highlights Ward’s translation and writing. It says at the beginning of the article that “Ward has met with great success, both as translator and author, under the pen name of Evan King” (Bartlett 1955: 3-B), with the sales of Rickshaw Boy totalling almost a million copies as noted above. Rickshaw Boy apart, the report also mentions “Village in August” as among his “successful adaptations” (ibid). Bartlett’s accolade of Ward’s success as an author refers to his novel Children of the Black-Haired People published by the London-based publisher Michael Joseph Ltd in 1956. In Bartlett’s report, this novel has been called “the best book yet written in English on Chinese village life” (Bartlett 1955: 3-B). What merits special attention is the stress that Ward is a patriotic officer and “had a deep purpose in his writing” (ibid). It is thus highly possible that he translated with “a deep purpose” too. Xiao Jun’s work shows that Rickshaw Boy is not Ward’s first translation from Chinese.

Another point is that Ward/King has a complex relationship with Lao She. On the copyright page of the above mentioned 1945 book on Japanese occupation techniques, Ward uses his real name, but there is a line of dedication on the first page. It reads, “To L.S. whose complete integrity and profound understanding of Asia could still be of great avail to his own countrymen” (Ward 1945: iv). This “L.S.” can be nobody else but Lao She or Law Shaw, his normal English name (see Hu 1977: 8). It can be inferred that Ward thinks highly of Lao She and explains in part why he chooses to translate Lao She’s latest novel Xiangzi.

After Lao She went to America, despite his unhappiness with Ward’s alterations, he agreed that Ward/King could go about translating Lihun [離婚] announcing of his

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175 This is the translation of another Chinese writer Xiao Jun’s work Bayue de xiangcun《八月的鄉村》, which has been acknowledged as the very first modern Chinese novel that sees English translation. Ward’s translation of Xiao Jun’s work had to do with the collection of Living China compiled by Helen Foster Snow, wife of Edgar Snow, the author of Red Star over China (see Zhao 2015a: 6). Living China: Modern Chinese Short Stories is a collection edited by Edgar Snow and published in 1936 by the same publisher with Rickshaw Boy Reynal & Hitchcock, for details see Xia (2009: 99).

176 According to Hu (1977: 108-109), there are disputes over this issue, some argue that Lao She did not allow King to translate Lihun from the beginning, but what is more logical is another version that he first agreed but then disagreed after he found that Ward played the old trick of changing his novel. I take the second version here and also see Xia (2009).
novels. What enraged Lao She was that he found Ward changed the plot again as he had done before to *Xiangzi*, the plot of his most satisfactory work *Lihun*. Ward even set up his own company to profiteer from his translations. What was more insulting to Lao She was that for this translation, Ward gave up Lao She’s usual English name Law Shaw, used instead another translation “Venerable House” (Li Wei 2014: 55). On the copyright page, it is printed that the book is copyrighted to Evan King (ibid). In rage, Lao She had to resort to law to take back his copyright and ask a Chinese writer in America, Guo Jingqiu 郭鏡秋[Helena Kuo]\(^{177}\) to retranslate the book and renamed it as *The Quest of Love of Lao Lee* since *Divorce* had been used by King first (ibid).

This is confirmed by Zhao Wuping. According to Zhao, in a letter to David Lloyd on March 29, 1948 by Pearl S. Buck, the second agent of Lao She’s works in America, Buck’s literary agent too, Buck revealed that Lao She was angry and could not bear Ward’s repeating his old tricks of altering the plot of *Lihun*, so much so that Lao She withheld the translation of *Divorce* by King. But King turned violent, telling Lao She that if it was not for his “improvement”, Lao She’s works were of little value. He also frightened Lao She by hiring a lawyer against him (Zhao 2015b: 72, see also Xu Deming 2006: 195)\(^{178}\). Xia Tian also confirms (2009: 177) that Lao She, with the help of Pearl S. Buck, sued Evan King “for having pirated his works”.

All this shows that Ward/King is not really respectful of the literary value and the author Lao She. I agree with Xia (2009: 97) that “Evan King was more an official than a translator or a writer at least in the 1940s when he translated *Luotuo Xiangzi*”. King’s *Rickshaw Boy* is not reciprocal because whilst Ward himself gained benefits from his translation both in terms of economic capital and cultural capital, to borrow a term from Bourdieu, the author, Lao She, suffered both economically and culturally although he eventually obtained half of the royalties for *Xiangzi* the

\(^{177}\)For detailed information about Guo, see Xia (2009: 176).

\(^{178}\)Because this is a narrative online which is not paginated, the page is added by me. The source of this online narrative is found and thus its reliability is confirmed. The author Zhao Wuping examined the Lao She’s archives in the Butler Library of Columbia University to come to his conclusion (see Zhao 2015b: 68-88).
As for the other parties concerning this project, the publisher is another key player. According to Xia’s study, Reynal & Hitchcock\textsuperscript{179} was well established “as a reliable publisher” (2009: 98-99) when it was publishing King’s translation \textit{Rickshaw Boy}. This publisher no doubt reaped much from this project. But it cannot be decided whether King initiated the translation and went to contact this publisher or the publisher recommended this novel to him. Anyway, the cover of the novel is not friendly to the Chinese people and Chinese culture. It cannot be ascertained either whether Ward was consulted when the cover was designed, because if it had been, Ward should have pointed out to the publisher that the Chinese people had long stopped keeping pigtails. Having been a diplomat in China for 19 years and lauded as an American who knew the Orientals as few Americans did, Ward was responsible to inform the publisher of the misrepresentation. Or it is possible that he acquiesced in the design to cater to the imagination and taste of the general American readership at that time about their stereotyped China and Chinese culture, prioritising the economic profit over fact and truth. The follow-up translations of \textit{Xiangzi} into other European languages based on \textit{Rickshaw Boy} certainly generated more capital and fame to both Lao She and Ward, but the problem is that such translations are the relay of wrongly informed message, producing unimaginable misunderstanding of the intention of the author and the source culture.

To sum up, reciprocity is not achieved in \textit{Xiangzi}, a manipulated translation project, although in the model formulated manipulated translation is legitimisable for its potential towards reciprocity. First, relating to the passive entities in this project, the ST was harmed in that it was altered dramatically in the TT and the Chinese culture was damaged because the TT conveyed a misrepresentation of the Chinese people. Second, with respect to the active parties, the author was deeply hurt because his intention was changed and he also suffered economically. The translator harvested both economic and cultural capital, but at the cost of the author. Also in connection with the active parties, the Chinese people were inflicted

\textsuperscript{179}Xia’s analysis of this publisher is convincing and insightful (Xia 2009: 98-99).
because the translation reinforced the stereotype of them as exotic and erotic on the part of Western readers as Ward rewrote by spicing up sex scenes in various places in the novel (e.g. 1945: 76-77, 270, 271, 323, 329, 363 vs Lao [1939]1999: 282, 394, 394, 426, 429, 443). As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, in such a project, the translator could have been honest and given what was due to Lao She economically, and reminded the publisher of the cover design. Meanwhile, just like what Goldblatt did to Mo Yan (Xie 2015: 5), he could also have informed Lao She that he was not happy with Lao She’s ending so he would like to change it for the sake of better sale. If so, reciprocity might have been realised.

5.2.2 Ethical non-reciprocity in translation of semi-literary text

This case of ethical non-reciprocity in translation of semi-literary text is from Danish translation theorist, Cay Dollerup. According to a study by Dollerup, there are many culturally embedded texts which, when translated to other cultures, are turned into something different. Here a hypothesis underlining Dollerup’s study is discernible: the “culturally embedded texts” can remain the same after translation (2008: 48). In fact it is impossible; for anything after translation will have changed, whether in form or in content. In other words, difference is absolute while sameness is relative. The crucial point is that the translation should aim at achieving as much equivalence as possible to the source text (see Tan 2012: 14) if the situation of the project requires and allows so. If not, as discussed in the development of the model in Chapter 4, a choice of not-translating or manipulated translation may be preferable.

One of Dollerup’s examples is the translation of his National Hymn. In his view, it should not be translated at all. When translated, as he sees it, the “solemnity and dignity this hymn conveys to the Danish audiences” are often lost. The most serious problem to him is the one that occurred to the English translation by the American poet William Wadsworth Longfellow, who rendered the original hymn “in a singable form (c.1850), a translation used in performances by choruses in the US” (Dollerup 2008: 49). For Dollerup, the translation of the Danish National (or Royal)

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180Because I have no Danish I choose to trust what Dollerup narrates in the essay and have not tried to find the Danish national hymn and Longfellow’s rendition to compare. I didn’t manage to email to Dollerup for confirmation about his stance either because his essay has said enough about it.
Hymn into English is very problematic because it “renders a cultural and national gem to showy spectacle” (ibid). The national anthem accordingly suffers.

Dollerup uses this example to show his stance that “not everything that is local can become global and there are texts that will remain completely alien in other cultures” (ibid) because they “do not contribute to our shared global and international understanding” (ibid). He is right in this aspect; it is close to the not-translating alternative in the reciprocity model developed in this study, which constitutes a more ethical choice concerning certain translation projects. This example is a case of non-reciprocity in translation because seemingly the American audiences could enjoy foreign or Danish culture from the rendition of the Danish National Hymn, but they were not aware that the rendition was a “showy spectacle” in the eyes of an expert or experienced and conscientious translator from the source culture. Great harm thus had been inflicted on both the ST and TT. At the same time, the Danish culture was harmed and the American audiences were deceived.

As a case of non-reciprocity, what can be done to make the translation of such culturally rich semi-literary texts ethical if they have to be translated? Dollerup sees translation roughly in three kinds: imposition, requisition, and negotiation or agreement (2008: 35). He argues rightly that more and more translations should be the result of negotiation or agreement rather than imposition or requisition. Via negotiation or agreement, the languages/cultures and different parties involved can benefit mutually rather than one of them benefits while the others suffer. This promotion of negotiated translation has an affinity with part of the model I developed in Chapter 4.

5.2.3 Ethical non-reciprocity in translation of non-literary text

As regards the translation of practical texts, as expounded above, reciprocity is chiefly achieved in the accurate transfer of information/knowledge contained in the source text. When the information/knowledge is transferred or ‘truthfully’ rewritten, the ST author, the target reader and the client all benefit from the project. But in fact, because translation ethics is largely concerned with the interpersonal relationship in addition to the intertextual relationship between the ST and TT, even when a source text is well translated, the translation project may not necessarily constitute an ethical or reciprocal project. The example given by Anthony Pym (2012: 76-81) about a historical professional translator can illustrate this clearly.
During the ninth century in Baghdad, the translator Hunain ibn Ishâq did translations from Greek to Syriac and Arabic about a certain book on bones\textsuperscript{181}. The translations involved two different clients. The relationship between the translator Hunain and one of the two clients gave rise to problems ethically. Let us first see how Hunain became a translator. Hunain did not intend to be a translator initially. According to Badawi, Pym’s source, anecdotally, Hunain wished to study medicine from doctor ibn Masawaih who later happened to be Hunain’s first client as he wanted the bone book to be translated into Syriac. But Masawaih, the first client, refused with scorn this then young man (Pym 2012: 78). Rejected from the field of medicine, the young Hunain was said to study Greek and Arabic seriously and developed himself into a linguistic professional, a translator and, at the same time, “a gifted physician in his own right” (ibid). Such a translator, when asked to retranslate the book on bones into Syriac for this specific client, doctor Masawaih “with maximum clarity and detail” (Badawi 1968/1987: 34, in Pym 2012: 76), did not refuse the requirement but finished the task as requested, without showing any disrespect for the client or the demands although we know between them there used to be conflict. So far, it can be seen that Hunain, as a professional translator, manifests professionalism in the translating job.

It is then in his third translation, in Pym’s words, i.e. his retranslation of the book on bones into Arabic that something goes wrong in terms of ethics as conceived in this study. At that time, Hunain the translator was older, “more sure of himself, and more capable of imposing his own criteria” in translating (Pym 2012: 79). In other words, the translator at issue “having become truly professional, was worthy of trust and was now responsible for all his decisions” (ibid) as “the best of translators” of his time in Baghdad (ibid: 80), because at the time his second client abu Ga’far Muhammad Musa, the caliph of Baghdad, did not give him any instruction on how to translate but rather left all decisions to him, in contrast to the first situation where the client the doctor asked for “maximum clarity”. This abu Ga’far Muhammad Musa, the second client, according to Pym, is probably no less influential than

\textsuperscript{181}According to Pym, the book is named “Galen’s Book on Bones” and the narration about Hunain’s translations is in the following quote from Badawi: “Sergios had translated it into Syriac, and not very well. Then I [Hunain, my adding] translated it a few years ago on behalf of Yuhanna ibn Masuye [or Masawaih, Pym’s original adding]. In my translation, I aimed to develop the ideas with maximum clarity and detail, for this man [Masawaih, Pym’s original adding] loves clear speech and constantly invites us to it. Since then, I have re-translated it into Arabic for abu Ga’far Muhammad ibn Musa” (Badawi 1968/1987: 34, in Pym 2012: 76).
al-Khwārizmī, the founder of algebra, hence commands much authority.

Such a translator in front of such a client, what wrong did he commit then? Because of the translator’s impeccable reputation qua translator, the client decided to pay him for his medical translations in gold by the weight of the translations. At this news, the legendary translator “reportedly ordered especially heavy paper to be made” for his translations and, for this, he became enormously rich as an individual (Pym 2012: 80). Regardless of the “veracity of the anecdote” (ibid) as Pym reminds his readers, the validity of the example about this translator is doubtless. It is not wrong for a translator to become rich, but it is absolutely wrong for him to become rich that way. It is a typical case in which the translator has got the upper hand, and then wields his advantage to the disadvantage of the client. As a consequence, it is a good example of non-reciprocity because linguistically, the client certainly gets what is needed from the translation, and the translator seemingly obtains what he wants too, and even more than his due, but the client concerned is in fact cheated, disadvantaged and harmed in a sense although he may very well be wealthy enough not to care at all.

What is more, in Pym’s eyes, when the translator Hunain decided to order heavy paper for the translations, the ‘individual person’ in the translator outworked the ‘professional translator’, a case in point of individuality beating professionalism. To Pym, it seems that individuality and professionalism can be divided and as such the translator is “only free to act as a translator, not as an individual” (2012: 80). In this case, it is true that Hunain should not have exercised too much of his individuality to dominate his professionalism. But in other cases, the situation may be inverted. That is, a translator should exercise his individuality to dispel his professionalism as Baker discusses (Baker 2006, Chesterman & Baker 2008). Individuality and professionalism cannot be completely separated but have to be weighed on the part of the translator in question in each and every specific context.

Meanwhile, as Pym reflects while discussing this case, the relationship between the translator and the client/publisher/commissioner is not always stable or fixed. Instead, it is dynamic in the sense that a translator and other parties are not static but in the process of changing all the time, depending upon who might be involved in the relationship. In other words, the element of time has to be considered in translation ethics because a translator is always a “becoming” translator (Robinson 2012: 212; also see the case of Xu Jun cited in section 4.3.2.1 of Chapter 4).
Whenever the translator is in a dominating position and dominates the translation project or the other way round, i.e., the translator is in a dominated position and is dominated by other potential parties concerning a translation project, meanwhile the dominating party should show more regard to the weaker but fail to or even take advantage of their upper hand, it constitutes a case of non-reciprocity as attested to our ethical model of reciprocity informed by both Ricoeurian and Confucian reciprocity.

5.3 Cases where reciprocity is not relevant

The model of ethical reciprocity in translation is meant to have wide or general applicability, but it does not mean that in reality it can be applied to all and any translation projects. In some cases where the translator is predisposed to translate according to external command, deprived of the capacity to exercise his/her agency, even if they make efforts, reciprocity will not be realised, and reciprocity becomes irrelevant. In what follows, I will address some examples of such cases concerning the translation of literary works, semi-literary texts and non-literary texts. Meanwhile, translation of intelligence for military actions in times of war or radical political conflicts obviously cannot be reciprocal either; in such translation projects, the translators no doubt translate with a clear purpose to defeat the enemy or the opponent.

5.3.1 Translation projects of literary text

The application of the model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ depends on the translator’s and other possible participants’ agency in interaction with each other towards reciprocity in the form of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits to the passive entities and active parties in/around the translation project. Being in a pivotal position, insofar as a translator is not able to exercise his/her agency to negotiate with other active parties like the author, the client/publisher/commissioner, for reciprocity, his/her agency is strictly controlled, even susceptible to be compressed to nil, as shown in the diagram of Translator Figure 2 in section 4.3.3.1 of Chapter 4, reciprocity then is impossible and then irrelevant in such translation projects even if the translator may have the motivation to pursue reciprocity.
In the history of translation in contemporary China, there is a special institution that plays an immense role in translating Chinese literature, especially contemporary literature (see Ni Xiuhua 2011). That institution recruits many foreign translators to help it to do the job. One of them is the Australian translator, translation studies scholar Bonnie S. McDougall, who gives a detailed account of the institution from her own experience (McDougall 2011). The description of her translation experiences in the institution shows well that not all translations can be accomplished reciprocally, in some instead, reciprocity is not relevant. Let us see why.

The institution in question is the Foreign Language Press (FLP), founded in 1952 and stationed in Beijing. It is an institution that “operates on a significantly different, non-European model” (McDougall 2011: 2) because it is no ordinary institution. In McDougall’s words, it “was a part of a massive state apparatus for controlling information” (ibid: 3), for “the release of information about China to the world” (ibid: 27). It is set up after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China with a specific task to reshape the image of China to the outside world in the cold war era, as Ni Xiuhua’s research confirms (Ni 2011: 29-30). Although Ni’s study is concerned with the period from 1949-1966 while McDougall worked there in the early 1980s, the atmosphere and work process of the institution did not see much change until the late 1980s.

In this institution, editors and translators team up to work independently of each other. The editors are chiefly graduates of Chinese language and literature who have little, if not any knowledge of foreign languages or cultures (McDougall 2011: 51, see also Ni 2011: 37). The translators are responsible to the editors. In McDougall’s words, “[t]he roles played by editors and translators were vertically segregated along a management line where translators were instructed by editors who in turn were following instructions from higher up” (2011: 67). In terms of text selection for translation, the translators almost have no say because all the literary texts have been selected by the editors or staff at higher ranks, and have been censored before translation (ibid: 68, 70, my emphasis).

182McDougall is an Australian and she works with the largest translation team in the FLP where there are also many other translation sections for other major or minor languages. According to Ni’s survey, from 1949-1966, there are altogether 22 target languages, with English being the largest and most important, and in fact many books are relay translated in the world via the FLP English translations (see Ni 2011: 41, McDougall 2011: 31)
The situation is more “sensitive” (ibid: 70) vis-à-vis the translation of modern and contemporary literature. For, according to McDougall, another institution, i.e. the Chinese Writers Association, plays a decisive role in ensuring that the texts chosen for translation are ‘politically correct’. Although some junior editors at times do exercise their agency in recommending texts for translation, “their range of choices was contained within the bureau’s primary mission to produce and control information about China for the outside world” (ibid: 72).

As for the translators in the FLP, which sponsors a major magazine Chinese Literature183 responsible for translating Chinese literature, they often go with their names unrecognised for their translation. As McDougall states, “only a few items ended up under my name and are included on my list of publications” (ibid: 79). There is no difference in individual cases concerning the translators, for they are treated in the same way. All these descriptions by McDougall about the FLP and the translators’ work are similar to the depiction in Ni Xiuhua’s study (2011). According to Ni, the translators in the FLP become “unit persons” (2011: 36) whose subjectivity is largely undermined or even completely eviscerated. The overstress of the political function of such translations gives rise to the evisceration of the translators’ agency or, turned their individual subjectivity into faceless collective subjectivity (ibid: 39).

In retrospect, McDougall claims that “[f]rom a teacher’s perspective, the FLP’s translations from the 1950s to the end of the century, with the exception of the Panda list184, had become a harmful influence185, restricting a comprehensive view of modern Chinese literature both in the narrowness of its cannon and in the mediocrity of its translations” (McDougall 2011: 42). As she points out further, the problem with the translation of literary works by the FLP is that “little or no

183According to Ni Xiuhua, the FLP altogether issues 4 key magazines: People’s China, set up in 1950 published in languages of English, French, and Indonesian, China Pictorial, set up in 1950 too, published in 16 languages in 1958, Peking Review, established in 1958 published in 5 foreign languages like English and French, and Chinese Literature, established in 1951 in English and in French in 1964 (Ni 2011: 30). This last magazine Chinese Literature, since its inception, has been afforded topmost priority in promoting the image of the PRC (ibid: 31). It was discontinued in the year 2000 (McDougall 2011: 33).
184Geng Qiang in his PhD dissertation reveals that, largely for the efforts on the part of Yang Xianyi and his wife Gladys Yang, translations of the Panda list for Chinese literature generally succeed in its first decade from 1981 to 1989 although “only a few translations from the book series enjoyed a better reception among readers” in the US and UK (Geng 2010: 4, 7).
185For Ni Xiuhua, however, despite the fact that all translations at the FLP and Chinese Literature have to be subjected to filtering and choices through multi-layers, they play an important role in promoting the image of the newly founded PRC and in highlighting its status as an independent nation-state in its first 17 years from 1949 to 1966 (2011: 44).
attention was given to the literary qualities of the translation” although the English used “was competent and idiomatic” under the checking and double-checking system at work in the FLP from the 1950s through the end of the 1980s (ibid: 82).

As seen from McDougall’s, Ni Xiuhua’s and Geng Qiang’s studies, the major problem in the translation of the FLP is that the translators principally cannot exercise their agency or wield their subjectivity in text choice, translation strategies and translator’s preface composition. Ni (2011: 34) sums well too that the final state of the translations is not decided by the translators or editors. When the translations reach the hand of the audience eventually, they may have been adulterated by many unidentifiable hands and minds. Because the translators cannot be responsible for their work, the reciprocity in terms of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits between active parties and passive entities concerning a translation project cannot be achieved and seen. This fact that the strictly politically-conditioned environment as shown here prevents the realisation of reciprocity does not mean the model of reciprocity fails or not general enough but instead has its limitation in addressing extreme institutional translation cases, because, as found in Buddhist sutra translations in the Tang Dynasty, also translation projects in institutions, reciprocity is well accomplished (see Wang Tiejun 2006: 248-50).

5.3.2 Translation projects of semi-literary text
In the previous section, it is illuminated that it will be hard for reciprocity to be achieved in the translation projects of literary texts if the agents are subjected to strict politicisation in institutions and then the model is not relevant. In fact, translation projects of semi-literary texts make no exception if they are in similar circumstances. This can be seen clearly in the FLP case. Because the difference is just in the text type, no detailed discussion is needed here.

5.3.3 Translation projects of non-literary text
In the above two sections, it has been shown that it is impossible for reciprocity to be achieved in translation projects of literary and semi-literary texts in a strictly politicised circumstance and then the model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ becomes irrelevant. Likewise, it will be the same when non-literary texts are translated in a similar situation.
This can be seen in the studies of institution translation again. In this connection, TS scholar Kaisa Koskinen, an ex-translator for the European Commission, reveals a lot. According to her, translation plays a crucial role in maintaining the linguistic diversity of Europe, but the translation process shows that reciprocity cannot be realised in institutionalised translations of non-literary texts there.

As Koskinen states, “[t]he institutions of the European Union have been built to fulfil particular tasks. In order to accomplish their tasks, the institutions produce agreements, legislations, policy papers, reports, rulings and decisions. That is, they produce texts” (ibid: 49). All these texts cannot be said to be literary or semi-literary but absolutely practical non-literary texts. They have to be translated to ‘speak’ to a particular audience.

Kokinen finds that, in the EU, translation is in fact prevalent in all sectors, but in the European Commission, itself being an enormous translation entity, the Directorate-General for Translation (DGT), the largest translation agency in the world in Koskinen’s words, is set up to facilitate the operation of the Commission for 25 member states in 20 different languages (ibid: 69). DGT, this particular institution, becomes the study object for her ethnographic research, the Finnish Unit under the DGT being her focus. Her textual case is made up of “the unpublished preliminary drafts of a Communication (COM(2001)678) as well as the two Finnish translations” (ibid: 119).

From her study, we learn that, all institutional translations share something fundamental in common: “the translations are constrained and controlled by the translating institutions, and the official nature of the institution endows the documents with authority and performative power” (2008: 2, my emphasis). Meanwhile, as she states, “[i]nstitutional text production can be described as a relatively stable, controlled, or standardized, and normative form of activity” (ibid: 7, my emphasis).

Specifically, what Koskinen finds is as follows, quite like the situation of the FLP discussed above, although not a completely state-controlled department. First, in opposition to what Andrew Chesterman claims (1997: 194) that, “[l]anguage is individual186, translation is a personal act. I myself must take responsibility for what I say and how I say it, and to whom I choose to speak”, the situation as Koskinen

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186 As explicated in section 4.2.1, Chapter 4, language, as I see it, is both individual and public, rather than just “individual” or just “public”.

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finds it is highly different: In the European Commission, “language is not individual but quite heavily controlled, and translation is not a personal act but a collective process, where I as an individual translator can only assume a limited responsibility for what I say, to whom and how” (Koskinen 2008: 24), as “an instrument of multilingualism” (ibid: 25). Second, it is found that “[t]he overall impression one gets from these communication and language policy documents is that even though translation is a core activity, and multilingualism is praised as a core element of EU policy, the potential provided by the large in-house translator crew has not been realized, and translation remains an invisible activity perceived as a form of mechanical code-switching. The expertise of trained translators in issues such as readability, cultural adaptation and audience design remains untapped in high-level policy papers” (ibid: 67, my emphasis).

And third, according to Koskinen, although translators in DGT are A-level officials like other Commission officials in the hierarchy of offices with the same pay and benefits, they, however, as Koskinen stresses, feel that they do not have “substance value” but “instrumental value” (ibid: 92), and have difficulty in identifying with their peers (ibid: 93). The translators are physically divorced from other officials for most DGs are located in Brussels while the translators for the Commission are in Luxembourg, stationed in an independent building. As to the translation process, the translators have “very limited contacts with any other stakeholders; they are never or seldom in contact with the source text writers, or even with the requesters, and never or seldom with the users of their products” (ibid: 95), who are every so often alive and available in theory, as Emma Wagner, another EU professional translator mentioned above, has highlighted as well (Chesterman & Wagner 2002: 17).

Koskinen also finds that “[t]he high number of mistranslations indicates lack of time and also limited revision” (ibid: 140). She even finds that “slips and errors” are “a normal part of translation work” in the EU translation, partly owing to the fact that “there is not always time for a comparative reading of the source text and the translation” (ibid: 141). This finding seconds what Wagner has disclosed in her discussion with Chesterman. Wagner also stresses that the comments from their in-house clients or customers are strikingly and depressively revealing: “they take linguistic quality for granted”; what they prioritise is “deadline” (Chesterman & Wagner 2002: 84).
Moreover, “[s]ince the translated text has been processed two times more than the original, the translation appears to be even more institutionalized than the English [ST]” (Koskinen 2008: 141). She concludes therefore that the translators in such organizations are not agents of change but rather institutional actors like a cog in a huge machine. In the conclusion of her study focussing on recognition, Koskinen writes, “[i]n the everyday life of the Commission, other officials do not regularly meet and mingle with translators, and translation remains an invisible practice to them. Translators, consequently, do not feel that they are an integral part of the organization, but rather feel like a ‘necessary evil’” (2008: 150-51, my emphasis), and consequently, “in institutional translation, the voice that is to be heard is that of the translating institution – not that of any individual writer, nor that of the translator” (ibid: 48, my emphasis).

In brief, it is obvious that the translators in the EU do not have the necessary subjectivity to exercise their full agency in the translation work; instead, they are subjected to the rules and norms of the institution from start to finish as an institutionalised part of a huge running machine. In terms of the passive entities of text, language and culture, only the first two, i.e. text and language are involved. It cannot be said that the texts and languages benefit or not because standardisation comes first. As for culture, national cultures are muted and what is stressed is the European culture as a whole. When it comes to the active parties of individuals, collectivities and nations, the EU thinks of the translations as good to the European people and peoples, but the translators think of themselves as just instruments, not caring too much of the European culture but rather their home culture. As such, reciprocity as conceived cannot be accomplished and it is hard to say that the model of ethics of reciprocity is relevant.

To conclude, in this chapter, the model of ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ is tested to various text types in different categories of reciprocal cases, non-reciprocal cases, and cases where reciprocity cannot be achieved and then the model becomes irrelevant. Reciprocity is realisable in different texts in various forms, like not-translating, ‘equivalent’ translation and manipulated translation. But in certain cases, some parties benefit at the cost of other parties whether on the micro or macro level. In such cases, translators and other participants are supposed to make more efforts to help achieve reciprocity. Lastly, the examples in the third part of this chapter show that when the translators are strictly controlled externally or cannot
exercise their agency to be responsible for their decisions and choices, it is impossible for reciprocity to be realised and then the model becomes irrelevant.

So far, the major tasks of the research have been accomplished, and it will proceed to its conclusion in the next chapter.
Chapter 6 CONCLUSION

This chapter brings the dissertation to its conclusion. It will first give an account of the landscape of translation ethics as it is. And then, the ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ as a valid model of ethics in translation is recapitulated, with its major contributions adumbrated. After specifying the limitations of the study, the chapter draws to its close by suggesting potential for further research.

6.1 The landscape of translation ethics

As a highly complex area involving issues of texts, languages and cultures as well as individuals, collectivities and larger communities like peoples or nations, translation ethics has drawn intensive attention in the field of TS in recent decades. Both in the West and China, scholars have gone to great lengths to address it, but as discussed in Chapter 1 and further scrutinised in Chapter 2, there are profuse problems in the various models and views. Not only is there the issue of absence of a clear definition of the subject matter, but also confusing uses of the key concepts of translation, ethics and translation ethics. As such, in Chapter 2, ethics, translation and translation ethics are critically delimited with a view to paving the way for the formulation of a new and more comprehensive model.

To begin with, ethics is examined broadly and it is concluded that normative ethics is the main body. Metaethics or analytical ethics and descriptive ethics are in the final analysis for the development of normative ethics. In the West, ethics has been approached principally in three ways: virtue ethics, deontological ethics exemplified by Kantian deontology and consequentialist ethics. Virtue ethics evaluates the agent or character in terms of excellence or virtue; Kantian deontology thinks an act, right for itself, is right, judging the act per se; and consequentialist ethics works by seeing whether the consequence of an act is good for the largest proportion of the people involved or affected. In China, Confucian ethics has withstood the test of time and is still prevalent for its strength as a unification of both normative and virtue ethics (Liu Yuli 2011). Normative ethics is about how to alleviate harm and increase benefits in human encounters in practice and help people understand underlying moral justifications in theory (Driver 2007: 4). It is
thus teleological and prospective, practical and prescriptive. This is an essential property of ethics and articulates the reason why first and foremost ethics is important. At the same time, more importantly, great ethics is able to explain human actions ethically. When applied to translation, no exception should be made.\footnote{About this, note 80 in Chapter 2 cited the concrete example of Koskinen in terms of translation ethics.}

After ethics, translation, the other crucial issue for a more embrasive model of translation ethics, is reconceptualised. As a complicated concept and practice too, translation is construed as consisting of three dimensions: translator the agent, translating the process and translation the product, which are all related to ethics. It is argued that the definition of translation has to be made with and by the pivotal agent the translator. In other words, they are mutually defined. In section 2.2.1, translation is defined: “starting from the translator and based on his/her interpretation and potential interaction with other parties, translation is a prioritised rewriting of a source text in the language of the target text”. I also argue that in the final analysis the translator constitutes the dynamic starting point and the key to translation ethics.

Thus, starting from the agency of the translator, translation ethics will see what translators and translations can do in terms of harm and benefits, and how to minimise harm while increasing benefits. But, because translation as a complex activity often involves more than the translator the pivotal agent, other possible parties have to be reckoned with as well. Meanwhile, in addition to texts and individuals, translation also entails languages and cultures, as well as collectivities and larger communities like nations. Texts, languages and cultures are classified as passive entities and objects of actions because they cannot exercise any agency by themselves. Individuals, collectivities and nations or peoples are classified as active parties for they can wield agency in or on the translation although at the same time they can also be affected like passive entities. Individuals include the translator, the author and the client/publisher/commissioner whilst collectivities may be in the form of an institution or organization. Accordingly, translation ethics is chiefly seen from the perspective of harm and benefits done by translators and translations to the parties and entities involved and affected.

However, different from other practices or professions, translations often occur sporadically and anyone may set up to translate, especially with the advent of the
(mobile) internet and accelerated globalisation. Aside from the remuneration-making professionals, there are also paraprofessionals and acting translators undertaking this work of cross-lingual/cultural rewriting. I therefore choose to approach translation ethics on the basis of single translation projects so that it will be easier to see the possible harm and benefits produced in and by a translation project to the active parties and passive entities. Choosing this approach is also because a single translation project can be as small as a word or sentence and as large as a book or a series of books. In terms of translating agency, a translation project is open to both amateur and professional translators. Meanwhile, in reality, any translation is a concrete piece of work. Hermans is right when he claims that “[t]he normal mode of existence of a translation is not as ‘a translation’ or ‘a translated text’ per se, but as a translated legal document, a translated philosophical treatise, a translated work of literature” (1996: 40). Focussing on a single translation project, all the necessary elements, active or passive, can be factored ethically.

With this framework of translation ethics, the problems of the existent models and views of translation ethics are seen clearly. Translation ethics is traditionally highlighted in such terms as faithfulness or fidelity, loyalty or responsibility on the part of translator and interpreter (van Wyke 2010, 2013). The focus is on ‘how to translate’, a notion which is deeply entrenched in the field. In the West, this stance can be epitomised by Rosemary Arrojo, whose statement “[t]he study of translation has always been, for the most part, a speculation about ethics” (1997: 5) is a clear indicator, because it is the case that “the study of translation” [in the West] is primarily a discussion of ‘how to translate’ (Tan 2004: 5) before TS developed into an independent discipline in its own right188. In China, Shen Lianyun undoubtedly typifies this notion because the major argument of his PhD thesis on translation ethics defended in 2014 is on ‘how to translate’ (Shen 2014), with his theme being “to surrender, surrender to the source text/language/culture on the part of translators” (ibid: I-V). On such views, translators the pivotal agents are expected not to allow their ideology or personal belief to intervene in the translation. Yet this, as has been discussed in this study, if not impossible, is difficult to accomplish in many cases and, in some cases, even unethical. For it has been recognised that any translation entails or is an act of interpretation; interpretation certainly involves personal belief,

188 Concerning the establishment of TS as an independent discipline see note 52 in Chapter 2.
agency and allegiance, not to mention the fact that many source texts are too poor to deserve the ‘surrendering’.

Ben van Wyke in his entry of “ethics and translation” for the *Handbook of TS*-Volume 1 (2010) sums up translation ethics in the manner of this traditional approach: ethics of sameness, ethics of difference and the 21st century ideas on ethics. Obviously he followed Venuti’s line of thinking, focussing chiefly on literary translation, failing to take into account the latest discussions of translation ethics by Chesterman, Pym, Baker and Tymoczko. His discussion is principally centred on intertextual relationship rather than translation ethics in its strict sense. Although three years later, in his new entry “translation and ethics” (2013) for *The Routledge Handbook of Translation Studies*, van Wyke discussed Chesterman and Pym, he seriously misread them and displayed too pessimistic a view of translation ethics partly because of his position steeped in postmodernist thinking. Because the two entries appeared quite recently (2010, 2013) in general TS instruments, they can serve as the latest summary of translation ethics in the West. However, van Wyke’s account is regretfully too inaccurate and incomprehensive to describe the vast landscape of translation ethics.

This study finds that translation ethics has been approached roughly from four perspectives: (a) the practice or profession as a whole (e.g. various codes of conduct for the profession); (b) a professional translator in his/her career as a result of modern labor division (e.g. Chesterman’s 2001 model of commitment); (c) all translators or all who do translations (e.g. Pym’s 2012 views); and (d) the translation volume between different languages/cultures on the macro level (e.g. Brisset’s 2003 proposal). In each of the four, there are problems respectively. In this classification, the larger issues such as ideology and asymmetries of power and translators’ agency involved in translation are hard to see. Many important aspects such as typical ethical parameters ‘good and evil’ or ‘harm and benefits’ are left behind. The aforementioned single-translation-project-based approach instead covers all the first three perspectives except (d), i.e. the volume imbalance model. This volume model, proposed by Annie Brisset (2003, 2011) about the situation beyond a single translation project with the element of time sequence considered, is more political than ethical (see discussion in Chapter 1).

From this perspective of the translator’s agency, I find that the major models and views of translation ethics in the West can be seen in three main streams and the
various approaches in China are largely represented in the proposals by three scholars, Yang, Luo and Liu. In the West, the first is the translator’s agency-limited (profession-oriented) model, typically represented by Chesterman. The second is the translator’s agency-enhancing (interventionist) model, manifested largely in the writings of Robinson, Venuti, Baker and Tymoczko. And, translator’s entry-free-agency-limited (all-can-translate) model epitomised by Pym comes third. They all have their insights and strengths, but at the same time weaknesses are also easily identifiable. In China, it is found that the major models are inadequate or insufficient in one way or another as well.

These models or views of translation ethics in the West and China are not comprehensive or effective enough to address the complex ethical issues involved in translation. In view of this, this thesis undertakes to develop a more comprehensive model, a model with greater explanatory power and principled guiding force, named the ‘Ethics of Reciprocity in Translation’ model as presented below.

6.2 The ethics of reciprocity in translation as a valid model of ethics in translation

Translation as an enormously complex human activity, concerns itself with persons, nations, identities, ideas, text, style, language and culture, similarity and alterity/difference, always involving at least two parties/entities, whether in the form of individuals/collectivities/nations as active parties or, text/language/culture as passive entities. The harm and mutual benefits produced in and by a translation project may fall on both active parties and passive entities. At the same time, the active parties may exert influence on the project, i.e. the passive entities.

The study finds that, because any translation project entails three dimensions (its agents, the process and its product), translation ethics will necessarily combine virtue ethics and principle ethics to evaluate the agents, process and consequence in terms of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits. It should aim at helping reveal and minimise harm while increasing mutual benefits in/by translation to the parties and entities involved or affected.

For the innately involved pairs of active parties and passive entities, the concept of reciprocity has been employed in this model as it presupposes two sides or two
parties and a mutual relationship between them. In particular, Ricoeurian reciprocal ethics in the West and Confucian reciprocal ethics in China are made use of to create a joined framework to deal with translation involving both equal and unequal parties. Confucian reciprocity is given more prominence because it addresses asymmetrical power relations with the concept of *wulun* apart from equal relations and allows the possibility of a *junzi*-type role on the part of the agents for larger missions or higher values with the concept of *junzi*. Also, with *shu* and *zhong*, meaning respectively “not effecting on others what you don’t desire” and “being honest and doing one’s best”, mutually other-regarding interaction is stressed as an important part of Confucian reciprocity. Ricoeurian reciprocal ethics is more philosophical. It is insightful for its emphasis of reciprocity between self and (familiar and strange) other, between autonomy and vulnerability and between equal parties. Confucian reciprocity and Ricoeurian reciprocity are joined reciprocally so that both equal and unequal parties involved in translation can be tackled in the model of reciprocal translation ethics.

Applied to translation, the ethics of reciprocity centres on a translation project, whereby active parties such as individuals, collectivities and nations, and passive entities including texts, languages and cultures ought not to be harmed but rather mutually benefited. They constitute the content of the ethical reciprocity. Because of the complexity of text, dynamicity of the translator and varying values involved in a translation project, to achieve reciprocity, three general alternatives are open for translators and other possible agents: not-translating, ‘equivalent’ translation and manipulated translation. In other words, reciprocity is centred on the pivotal agent the translator’s decision about whether to translate (reciprocity from not-translating); what to translate (reciprocity in content and volume); and how to translate (reciprocity from ‘equivalent’ translation, or reciprocity from manipulated translation like creative rewriting of imaginative works, including both thin and thick translations).

Translators and other potential agents are faced with these three alternatives for various factors and the three important relations regarding a translation project. First, the ST is of different type and quality and the TT needed may be a gist or summary. Second, there are acting, paraprofessional and professional translators who are of different competence and allegiances. Third, the interpersonal/intercultural relationship concerning a translation project comes first compared with the
person-textual relation, which is in turn more important than the intertextual relation owing to the possible higher values involved like national identity. No/minimal harm and mutual benefits are produced to those active parties and passive entities, but manifest differently, the former being paramount, i.e. the passive entities being produced by the parties and for the parties. In other words, the principle and ideal/virtue/value of reciprocity in the form of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits is universal or general, but the manifestations of reciprocity in no/minimal harm and mutual benefits are particular in the context of a project. The stakeholders like translators, authors, readers, and the client/commissioner/publisher are of dynamic relationships in terms of power and status. Similarly, the texts, languages and cultures in play are also often not of an equal relationship.

Based on the delineation of the content of ethical reciprocity in translation and the three general choices for achievement of reciprocity on the part of translators and other potential participants, the model is developed. It can be conveyed in the following fashion: centring around a translation project, reciprocity in terms of no/minimal harm and mutual benefits between the three major active parties and between the three key passive entities involved in or affected by the translation project should be achieved via the alternatives of not-translating, ‘equivalent’ translation or manipulated translation on the part of the acting/paraprofessional/professional translators and other possible agents, depending upon the ST (its type, quality) and the values aimed to be established by the project. Throughout the decisions and choices, reciprocity is a duty and virtue on the part of the pivotal agent the translator and other participants, a principle and value for guiding the process of producing the TT, a criterion against which to evaluate whether reciprocity as conceived above has been accomplished in the product the translation, and a general ethical theory to explain translation projects theoretically. Translation, more than a linguistic transfer, is largely a means via which a harmonious co-existence, reciprocal interdependence and reciprocal development between individuals, collectivities and nations, and between texts, languages, cultures, and even civilizations should be realised.

To see its validity and possibilities, the model warrants a test on real translation projects. Accordingly, it is tested on three sets of projects: translation projects where reciprocity is realised ethically in, translation projects where reciprocity should have been realised but failed and translation projects where reciprocity cannot be
achieved and the model becomes irrelevant. In each set, three examples of literary, semi-literary and non-literary texts are analysed respectively, for in translation ethics text is indispensable and regarded as the static starting point of any translation project, although ethics first and foremost concerns itself with autonomous agents. In effect translators and other agents work via texts to produce TTs, or otherwise. It is arranged this way also because the model is intended to deal with different genres rather than any single text type. It is found that in extremely politicised or institutionalised settings, translators are strictly constrained to the point where they cannot exercise their agency to be responsible for their action, reciprocity then cannot be achieved and the model then is not relevant. On the whole, it is proved a valid comprehensive ethical model to address the complex ethical issues in translation.

Another important finding of this study is that translation can be reciprocal and should be reciprocal for the mutual survival, mutual development of languages, cultures, individuals and societies.

In conclusion, it is possible to highlight four important features of the ‘ethics of reciprocity in translation’ model which I have striven to formulate: First, the model presupposes that the active parties concerned are autonomous although not necessarily equal to give and take in the interaction concerning a translation project. In many translation projects the parties involved often have different power and different status. With this model, in theory and in practice, the parties involved can and should exercise and pursue reciprocity. Reciprocity is simultaneously a principle, a value anda virtue to be observed in the decisions and choices on the part of all those possible agents and an ideal virtue to be cultivated and practiced consciously and conscientiously as a disposition by all the parties as well.

Second, the model is also able to address translation activities by amateur or even student translators in addition to translating practices by elitist translator-cum-theorists like Venuti and Arrojo. In line with this model, as long as these “acting translators” can meet the needs of their clientele, a relationship of reciprocity can result between them. That means, at the very worst, no or minimal harm is done, at best, mutual benefits between the parties concerned are achieved, with the precondition that the cooperative work between them is not evil or not harm-engendering; otherwise it is already not ethical.

Third, the model is an integrated model in the sense that it addresses the multiple
dimensions and levels of translation ethics. In this model, any acting/paraprofessional/professional translator can find his/her position according to his/her competence, agency and allegiance. One can choose to be an ordinary professional translator; one can also exercise his/her agency to aim high to help sustain or subvert a nation/culture as a larger mission insofar as s/he is accepted by the interacting parties and at the same time determined to face any possible risks. Such higher-goal may lead to higher-level reciprocity in the end.

Finally, the model highlights the complexity of translation ethics. Translation ethics is not merely about the traditional faithfulness or accurate representation on the linguistic level, it also involves the party-called-translator’s decision not to undertake a project or prioritise higher-level values like life-saving, national identity/cultural image building, or other national interests, for which manipulation is often preferable to accurate transmission on the textual and linguistic levels. In certain cases, eschewing an accurate translation may maintain reciprocity and is therefore more ethical.

In sum, the model is dynamic, integrated and multi-layered because it takes into consideration all the active parties who may join to produce the final product of a translation project. With this model, the scope of translation ethics has been widened from the traditional ‘how-to’, to include ‘whether-to, and ‘what-to’. The model can work for potential first-person translators to make decisions in ethical dilemmas, for third-person evaluation of a finished translation product and for understanding complex ethical issues involved in translation. In a nutshell, thanks to its comprehensibility, it can work for guiding, evaluating and explaining.

In Chapter 1 (i.e. the Introduction) above, I have quoted Moira Inghilleri to highlight the insufficiency or lack of clarity in translation ethics: “we have not by any means reached a clear understanding of or agreement about what an ‘ethical’ approach actually means in the context of translation theory or practice, or the construction of the field itself” (2009: 100, my emphasis). With this model of ethics of reciprocity in translation, I believe that the hypothesis raised in Chapter 1 has been validly tested; that the essence of translation ethics is proved to be a concern over the realisation of mutual benefits and the avoidance/minimisation of harm in the execution of any translation project; and that a clearer view has been presented about the purpose, the function and the fundamental values of the ethics of translation.
6.3 Constraints or limitation of the study

In spite of its intention to be of general applicability, the model does not and cannot really apply in all translation projects – it becomes irrelevant in some projects and, at the same time, no model whatsoever in the humanities would have that absolute kind of applicability. This is obviously a limitation of this model.

Moreover, in the field of translation, undoubtedly many translators and/or scholars still stick firmly to the traditional view of translation, i.e. an ‘accurate’ representation of whatever is in the ST. For example, Martin Weston, Head of English Translation, Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, claims that “[u]nlike wholly creative writing, that is to say the production of an original text, translating is morally neutral, the translator’s job being to translate what is there. Any duty to the truth there may be is to the truth of translating what is in the text – for otherwise one is guilty of misrepresentation, whereas it is in the interests of the reader that the true content and form of expression should be known” (Weston 2003: 149, my emphasis). This statement is not always sound in that it has been proven untenable to produce exactly ‘accurate’ representation of the ST; intervention is often inevitable and the so-called “true content” is just what the translator in question manages to produce if the situation requires and allows an “equivalent” translation to be the first choice. When such conditions as larger missions, etc. are not immediate goals, “accurate” representation becomes of course top priority, and when the desired “accurate” representation like what Shan (2004, 2013) has done as discussed in section 5.1.1 is implemented, reciprocity is also realised between all the active parties and between the passive entities involved or affected. Meanwhile, as stressed repeatedly, a translator can certainly exercise his/her agency to use the translation for larger missions. And it is common that an ST is rewritten or ‘improved’ (cf. Eco 2003: 6), because conscious and conscientious intervention is more ethical in many circumstances. But how to convince those with such entrenched traditional views on translation like Eston may be a challenge for this study.

Furthermore, the formulation of this translation ethics model is not merely for judging whether a translation is ethical in retrospect. It is also aimed for guiding decision-making and choices on the part of those involved in any translation project prospectively. But the examples in Chapter 5 are chiefly completed translation
projects. This study has not attempted to test the model on some working acting/paraprofessional/professional translators or their translation work in progress owing to the probable unreliability of interviews.

Lastly, an ethical and responsible translator should “anticipate misunderstanding and misuse” of translation (Der Jagt 2010: 120) as well, s/he should develop the disposition to reciprocate or practise the virtue of reciprocity. Excellence in translation is of course demanding rather than just a modicum of bilingual knowledge and skills of how to use dictionaries. Chesterman is right in his arguing that a translator should have the desire to become a good translator (2001: 146, his emphasis), and van Wyke’s critique of this point is wrong (2013: 557), because there are certainly (professional) translators who just go about their work without thinking of improving consciously, let alone paying attention to larger missions, as pointed out by Said (1994). This point is not contradictory to the argument that any acting/paraprofessional/professional translator in the model can find a place, to be common or aim high, because there is a precondition, that is, staying common or aiming high should be a result of reciprocity shown in mutually other-regarding, i.e. such a translator’s work is accepted. My notion of a good translator is one who tries to develop and practice this ethics of reciprocity. One obvious weakness here might be that the study has not supplied an example of a bad or poor translator who failed to reciprocate. The reason is that there are too many to count, especially in China.

6.4 Potential for further research

As noted above, the test of the model is conducted on some finished translations, what is missing or more demanded for may be to apply the model to a number of more acting/paraprofessional/professional translators who work between different language pairs like French-Chinese, Japanese-Chinese, English-Arabic, English-Japanese for example, to see to what extent the model can work effectively and to find out its further limitations, so that it can be better refined.

What is more, as Jenny Willams summarises well, “[a]s we have seen in this book, developments such as postcolonial translation and Feminist translation have raised ethical issues in relation to power and patronage. Much less debated have been the ethical dimensions of recent developments in translation technology. The question about whether to share one’s TMs, i.e. the product of one’s work, is an ethical
question – assuming of course, that translators have ownership of the TMs they have created, which is not always the case” (Williams 2013: 112, my emphasis). Not far below, she continues, “[a]n emerging area of theorizing [of translation] is in relation to technology. In the same way as new technologies have been influencing our lives in fundamental ways, so, too, are they affecting translation. While the groundwork for such theorizing has been laid by Cronin (2003), Pym (2004) and O’Hagan (2012), many questions relating to the human-machine interface, the ethical issues around crowdsourcing and the ownership of intellectual property such as TMs are in urgent need of attention” (2013: 121, my emphasis).

Both issues pointed out by Williams are important. Despite the work by McDonough Dolmaya (2011b), owing to the limit of time and study scope, how to address the ethical aspect of the impact on translation brought about by technology, especially the dramatically developing mobile communications technology, is not covered in this study, particularly from the perspective of reciprocity. For example, if the translation memory developed by a translator is shared without any condition, it will of course produce benefits to other parties, but will it at the same time cause harm to no party, for example the translator in question? Williams doubts that translation memory can be developed individually. She may be right, but she could also be wrong. All these questions need further research in tandem with the change of translation scenarios.
Appendices

**Appendix I: Andrew Chesterman’s “Hieronymic Oath” (2001: 153)**

1. I swear to keep this Oath to the best of my ability and judgement. [Commitment]
2. I swear to be a loyal member of the translators’ profession, respecting its history. I am willing share my expertise with colleague and to pass it on to trainee translators. I will not work for unreasonable fees. I will always translate to the best of my ability. [Loyalty to the profession]
3. I will use my expertise to maximize communication and minimize misunderstanding across language barriers. [Understanding]
4. I swear that my translations will not represent their source texts in unfair ways. [Truth]
5. I will respect my readers by trying to make my translations as accessible as possible, according to the conditions of each translation task. [Clarity]
6. I undertake to respect the professional secrets of my clients and not to exploit clients’ information for personal gain. I promise to respect deadlines and to follow clients’ instructions. [Trustworthiness]
7. I will be honest about my own qualifications and limitations; I will not accept work that is outside my competence. [Truthfulness]
8. I will inform clients of unresolved problems, and agree to arbitration in cases of dispute. [Justice]
9. I will do all I can to maintain and improve my competence, including all relevant linguistic, technical and other knowledge and skills. [Striving for excellence]

**Appendix II: Yan Cong’s “eight prerequisites on the translator”**

彥琮“八備”《辯正論》

誠心愛法，志願益人，不憚久時，其備一也；將踐覺場，先勞戒足，不染譏惡，其備二也；筌曉三藏，義貫兩乘，不苦暗滯，其備三也；旁涉墳史，工綴典詞，不過魯拙，其備四也；襟抱平恕，器量虛融，不好專執，其備五也；耽于道術，澹于名利，不欲高衒，其備六也；要識梵言，乃閑正譯，不墜彼學，其備七也；薄閱蒼雅，粗諳篆隸，不昧此文，其備八也。
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