Rethinking Asianism and method

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Abstract:
While contemporary Asian scholars are debating how they can avoid locking up themselves in an obsession with the West and discover new categories and new methodologies by inter-referencing and multiplying their frames of reference through grasping Asian shared realities that have moulded their histories and cultures, this essay looks back and closely examines postwar Japanese thinker Takeuchi Yoshimi’s tantalizing idea of “Asia as method” by discussing why and how he calls for a “rollback” of Western values instead of forming a distinctive Asian paradigm in order to effect universal freedom and global equality. For Takeuchi, “Asia as method” may mean Asia courageously embraces the negativity brought by Europe as the path to a higher stage of freedom and equality.
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Rethinking Asianism and Method

Abstract
While contemporary Asian scholars are debating how they can avoid locking up themselves in an obsession with the West and discover new categories and new methodologies by inter-referencing and multiplying their frames of reference through grasping Asian shared realities that have moulded their histories and cultures, this essay looks back and closely examines postwar Japanese thinker Takeuchi Yoshimi’s tantalizing idea of “Asia as method” by discussing why and how he calls for a “rollback” of Western values instead of forming a distinctive Asian paradigm in order to effect universal freedom and global equality. For Takeuchi, “Asia as method” may mean Asia courageously embraces the negativity brought by Europe as the path to a higher stage of freedom and equality.

Keywords
Asia, Method, Takeuchi Yoshimi, Modernity, Eurocentrism, Epistemology

While it is debatable if the institutional practice of cultural studies is another kind of grand narrative in complicity with the ubiquitous globalized capitalism brought by the hegemonic West, there is always a strong desire from other parts of the world for a genuine reconstruction of knowledge paradigm and a radical intellectual reassessment in regards to culture, representation, ideology, modernity, postcolonialism, globalization and many other socio-historical issues. The project is concerned with examining and testing the founding ideas, narratives and systems of thought that today’s Western-oriented world too often relies upon. Indeed, generations of Asian intellectuals are galvanized to strive for epistemological horizons specific to Asian societies and to ponder the meanings and directions of Asia at the time when the world has been dominated by European imperialism and Eurocentric mode of knowledge production. Pan-Asianism was once, in the early twentieth century, an idealist mission to foster a continental identity against Western hegemony and materialism, although the notion has then been appropriated by the Japanese military to justify its aggressive expansion to other Asian countries. In the post-war era, the calls for Asia’s historical, cultural and political awakenings and the search for its autonomy remain strong and have repeatedly returned over several decades. One of the recent seminal works is Kuan-Hsing Chen’s Asia as
Method: Toward Deimperialization, a thesis on epistemology with implications for subjectivity transformation, underscoring the significance of inter-referencing among Asian societies’ common destinies in order to produce alternative perspectives and to distance from the obsessive absorption with the West and Western knowledge. While “Europe/the West as method” has been dominant in knowledge production over past few centuries, “Asia as method” was first proposed by Takeuchi Yoshimi in a 1960 lecture. His “method” totally goes against the post-war third world nationalist and decolonizing striving for autonomy or self-determination, since Takeuchi’s notion of “rollback” is not to move away but return to the very core principles of Western Enlightenment that had derailed into the barbarism of European modernity. Yoshimi’s insistence on the unfulfilled-ness and redeemability of Enlightenment resonates with Jürgen Habermas’ call for completing the “unfinished” modernity project anchored in principles from the European Enlightenment. In this way, the “Asian method” may open up a possible dialogue with the West’s own struggle for answers to the exploitative and violent development of modernity. With these historical contexts, I would like to examine the trajectories of these endeavors, even though their motives were always mixed.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Pacific War in the early 1940s, Japan’s ultranationalist theorist Komaki Saneshige, a Professor of Geography at Kyoto Imperial University, and his group attempted to establish for the rising anti-Western Asian empire a new geopolitics by means of which the world would be seen from the height of Japan (in Komaki’s words, ‘the height of takamanohara’, which is heavens in Shinto myth) to counteract European global cartography. In his schema of reconstructing the world space, Komaki renamed different continents and seas under influences of the ‘overcoming modernity’ debate and the projection of East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In his geographical nomenclature, America becomes ‘East Ajia [Asia]’, Australia ‘South Ajia’, Africa ‘Southwest Ajia Continent’, Pacific Ocean and Atlantic Ocean as ‘New Great Japan Sea’ and ‘Great Japan Sea’ respectively. The act of renaming is an ideological, if not phantasmal, manifestation of Japanese empire’s aggressive ambitions to conquer the world. It also reveals how the referring function does not necessarily correlate to any described substance. Contingencies and rhetorical dimensions of geographical perception under Western organizing framework perhaps are also unfolded in Komaki’s act of re-nominating. European cognitive mapping and name-giving activity of the world have demonstrated how hegemonic Western discourses exercise their power and control over almost all descriptive and non-descriptive lands, objects and their features by ‘baptizing’ them with words. The geographical representations constructed through nomination provide a condition for the operation of navigational colonization. However, Komaki’s reversal of the geographical names to Asia-centered perspective cannot really remake history. Neither can it be anti-Western in epistemological sense. Given the fact that
the notion of ‘Asia’ was a European invention, he only repeated the act of genesis by the Occidental itinerary of knowledge.

Far from offering an alternate world, the empire-building of Japan may allow Western powers to witness the features of their own development in a new kind of references that are unfamiliar and too regional-bound to them. Japanese imperialism of the 1940s has strategically appropriated the notion of ‘Asia’ to compete with Western powers as well as to legitimize its imperialistic expansion, colonization and leadership in the Asian regions. With such appropriation, however, ‘Asia’ was no longer defined as an abstraction or a given entity of the world dominated by forms of European thought but a construct of otherness refusing to be reduced to the same within the hegemonic sway of the Western perception. In the heyday of European imperialism, some Asian thinkers already strived to conceive a possible world after Europe. Fukuzawa Yukichi’s idea of ‘(Japan’s) dissociation from Asia’, Okakura Tenshin’s concept of ‘Asia is one’, Rabindranath Tagore’s promotion of Asian spiritualism, or Sun Yat-sen’s ‘kingly way of Greater Asia’ can all be understood as forms of resistance against the powers of Europe from an East-versus-West perspective. Asianism as a general term referring to a wide range of ideas and movements has created consequences in much of Asia since then. That may explain why even if the idea of Asianism or terms like ‘Toyo’ (Eastern Seas, the Orient) ‘Toa’, or ‘Higashi Ajia’ (East Asia) were notoriously defamed by Japan’s military aggressions, postwar Japanese intellectuals, the left-wing in particular, still insistently (or perhaps even unwittingly) tried to reconfigure the notion of ‘Asia’ as a persistent form of defiance against Western hegemony.

Inspired by the wave of independence movements in many Asian countries and the establishment of a Chinese socialist state, Japanese progressive intellectuals sought to identify with something larger than a nation or a common race (tongzhong / dōshu)³ that had served as a major ideological propeller for the World War. The collectivity of oppressed people became their point of identification. With idealization of socialist China as a vanguard against capitalism and imperialism, Japanese leftist thinkers reiterated the notion of Asia, which was ideologically amorphous and its cultural-political manifestations diverse and complex throughout Japan’s modern history, as an important vision to strive for emancipation and for a better human future. Under the historical contexts of Jawaharlal Nehru’s advocacy of pan-Asian non-alignment and Mao Zedong’s promotion of Asian-African-Latin American Third-Worldism, the thoughts of Asia, in the minds of left-wing Japanese thinkers, are not merely anti-Western critiques expressing discontent with the Eurocentric international order, or nativist rejection of Western-styled modernity, but also orienting towards revolutionary and utopian visions in the Cold War age that has suffered from a paucity of political and cultural imaginations. The ideal of Asianism can be alive again in contemporary liberation or revolutionary movements in other areas of the world, and have, therefore, more than a purely Asian historical significance. It also provides a new incentive to theorize a global relationship
between liberation practice of people and epistemology of knowledge. To say the least, epistemology can validate the others as a subject of equal status and should not be manipulated as an instrument of domination by the sameness.

Scholars of the postwar generation are looking for a pre-modern or a lost Asia of the past, a temporality prior to the invasion of Europe, i.e., prior to the formation of the oppositional notions of ‘Europe’ and the ‘Orient’, for example, Hamashita Takeshi’s study of China-centered tributary system in East-Southeast Asia before the age of European imperialism. The focus is not simply historical but also epistemological: they are not exactly seeking a golden Asia-centered world system that edges Western domination (i.e., Asia-centrism versus Eurocentrism), but a different configuration, if not a newly emerging conception, of knowledge through which the truth and the complex reality of Asia can be examined. Postwar socio-political mayhems in the name of decolonization movements also created impacts on the operation of existing knowledge system. Ethical considerations are injected in the discourse of history and politics that targets at the previous attempts for hegemonic control. Instead of holding to the objectivity and neutrality stance, reason is redefined as something that should be in support of salvation and of constituting the lived experiences of oppressed people, though it does not necessarily lead to the idea that everything boils down to subjective interpretations and perspectives. Cultural critic and Lu Xun scholar, Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910-1977) has advocated for ‘Asia as method’ (Hōhō to shite no Ajia) which is commonly grasped as a (China-centered) form of resistance in occupied Japan of the 1960s when the US power fully monitored its Asian allies for Cold War strategic concerns in order to maintain the hegemony and legitimacy of postwar order in Asia by containing contesting communist movements. Takeuchi’s recondite but tantalizing idea of ‘Asia as method’ might not be fully comprehended and decoded, but his call for resistance and alternative model through a different understanding of Asia did provoke a lot of responses from Asian intellectuals both in the public arena and the academy (Takeuchi was the one renowned for being capable of subverting ‘pure’ scholarship of Japan’s academic institution by intertwining it with the public discourse of controversy).

What the Method is
That ‘Asia as method’ has been interpreted and modified by different scholars to deal with a variety of issues may urge us to look back closely at Takeuchi’s autobiography-based essay/lecture ‘Asia as method’. While the word ‘method’ is inserted in the title of Takeuchi’s famous essay that has induced interesting imitations, there is seemingly no specific methodology involved in relation to how he understands and anticipates to ‘Asia’ even though the context of his writing was all about searching for method. While later critics take Takeuchi’s formula ‘x as method’ by filling it with various terms for different discursive-political purposes and engaging in debates on the ontological status and
epistemological functions of that ‘x’, there is relatively little analysis focusing on the
meaning of the term ‘method’ in all those discourses. Perhaps, it is presumed that since ‘x’ is
an equivalence of ‘method’ in the formula, if the status of ‘x’ is solved, then ‘method’ will not
create any new problem. However, are ‘x’ and ‘method’ really identical? How significant the
‘method’ may mean to object ‘x’? Method is usually understood on the basis of the specific
nature of the object to be reflected and investigated. ‘Asia’ is a matter of method rather than a
matter of content because we cannot count on having this ‘object’ deduced from previous
understandings, perceptions and articulations from either Europe or imperialist Japan as a
‘result’. But did Takeuchi provide us any method to realize his ‘Asia’? With what method can
his ‘Asia’ be understood? Can generic definition of method as some kind of procedure,
practice or practical application in accordance with the principles of epistemological
exposition be pertinent to Takeuchi’s ‘Asia’?

In regards to any concrete methodology offered in the essay, Takeuchi mentioned his
own experiences of studying China – at first, he was taught to adopt a sheer textual approach
which was dominant in Japan’s traditional kangaku (Han studies) and shinagaku (sinology or
China studies) scholarship. But such method entirely overlooked human presence. Later, he
took his first trip to the neighboring nation. After interacting with the people there, he
discovered the severe inadequacy of existing sinology and endeavored to change the very
way Japanese study China by exploring the ‘heart’ (kokoro) of actually living Chinese. But
such an attempt to study China is only the beginning of the ‘method’. After making
comparison between Japanese modernization as something introduced externally from the
West and the Chinese counterpart as the one being forged from its inherent ethnic-national
characteristics and impulses, and after calling for a new way to understand modernization on
the basis of a more complex framework than that of East-West binary oppositions, Takeuchi
did not simply stress the differences between Asia and Europe or within Asia. Instead, he
came to embrace general humanity and universalism by stating that ‘men are substantially the
same, even in their historicity. Modern societies are thus the same around the world, and we
must recognize that these societies produce same types of people. Likewise, cultural values
are everywhere the same’. Yet, universal values like freedom and equality, though spread
from the West, were also weakened by Europe’s colonial invasion and exploitation in Asia
and Africa. Although Takeuchi reiterated Tagore and Lu Xun in order to point out how Asian
poets are able to see severe limits of the Western powers, the notion of Europe has not been
thoroughly discredited, in Takeuchi’s heart, either by imperialism, racism, transnational
capitalism, or by every act of colonial atrocities committed in the name of bestowing
European civilization upon the dominated. In his vision, while Europe (Takeuchi understands
the United States as ‘pure Europe’) is and would be incapable of effecting universal freedom
and global equality,

the Orient must re-embrace the West, it must change the West itself in order to realize the
latter’s outstanding cultural values on a greater scale. Such rollback of culture or values would create universality. The Orient must change the West in order to further elevate those universal values that the West itself produced. . . When this rollback takes place, we must have our own cultural values. And yet perhaps these values do not already exist, in substantive form. Rather I suspect that they are possible as method, that is to say, as the process of the subject’s self-formation. (Takeuchi, 2005: 165)

However, Takeuchi immediately added at the end of his essay in a modest tone that ‘[t]his I have called “Asia as method” and yet it is impossible to definitely state what this might mean’ (165). Perhaps ‘Asia as method’ cannot be conceived as any substance, but only as subject. But what is method if it cannot even tell us the steps to be taken for performing certain task? Does Takeuchi imply that, other than ‘method’, ‘Asia’ is something which is impossible to be defined? Criterion for determining ‘Asia’ is no longer referential (ie the word corresponding to the thing named) but only phenomenal. Stable meaning of ‘Asia’ is suspended though it can be comprehended in phenomenal and cognitive sense. It becomes a signifier, or an object of a dynamic and changing perception and cognition, in which a subject in the process of its self-formation finds out his or her understanding of it is being constantly modified. Each new discovery may add a new dimension to the previous constituents that are being contradicted, expanded, transformed, repeated, or allowed it to be open to the wildest arbitrariness. ‘Asia’ then is shifted from a referential code to a poetics at the cost of producing definitive meaning, namely a poetic representation which is not based on the reproduction or imitation of an external historical referent. As such, the ‘method’ contains possible negation of any affirmation or certainty.

Perhaps, Takeuchi never sees ‘Asia’ simply as a ‘method’ to serve itself, but an exemplarity of certain ‘theory’ that testifies its truth-value. As long as theory is understood as a system of concepts attempting to bestow a global explanation and pretension upon the field of knowledge, it has to be verified by praxis to arbitrate if it is a speculative or ascertainable form of knowledge. Theory, for Takeuchi, may refer to Western notions of freedom and equality which were introduced to Asia through colonial invasion. But Europe has failed to deliver these values and make them available to the world other than Europe itself. The claims to truthfulness of Enlightenment theory have been undermined because of conspicuous discrepancy between its ideals of universal freedom and its real practice of exploitation and enslavement throughout the world.

Asian resistance against the advancement of Europe, according to Takeuchi, is doomed since it only functions as a referent ‘out there’ for Europe to define itself and to ascertain its cognitive perception of the world. In other words, Asia’s resistance acts as an important precondition for the reach of Europe’s knowledge into phenomenal categories of time, space and subjectivity. The form of resistance grounded on Asia may mean both in opposition to and in the meaning of resting against Europe. Ambiguity of resistance and submission is at
stake in the situation. Asia’s resistance to Europe, though failing if seen from the angle that is caught up in the realm of representation, inscribes rather than effaces the universal dimension of the theory brought by European aggressors. Conceived of in relation to ‘theory Europe’, ‘method Asia’ seems to be subject to it, and when theory goes awry, method also appears arbitrary and problematic. But Takeuchi’s re-articulation of ‘Asia as method’ tries to liberate it from the hold and supremacy of theory by converting it into a figure of agency. It then becomes the mission for Asia to ‘rollback’ in order to ensure that the ‘theory’ and the ‘method’ sustain each other. That may explain why rollback can create universality. Takeuchi suggested that Asia can find itself and create its own subjectivity paradoxically by re-embracing the West. Is ‘Asia as method’ a way to override ‘Europe as theory’ which is actually lagging behind rather than self-posing as something superior or always in advance? In other words, Takeuchi’s ‘Asia as method’ may provide a possible model that Asia’s project of self-formation and reestablishment of cultural values does not have to be anti-Western.

By re-embracing Western values, that is to say, the ‘rollback’, Asia is not necessarily a passive and inferior imitator or follower, since it is a willing act of ‘re-embracing’ than a simple embrace of Western values that historically refers to the way how Asian countries were coerced to adopt Western culture for their own survival. On the contrary, ‘Asia as method’ with the ‘rollback’ can shape the content of theory and offer some kind of didactic productivity and strength, constituting not exactly a complementary, symmetrical nor antithetical relationship with the theory. Asia is then envisioned as both heirs to and revolutionaries of European values. In such schema, like method and theory, ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’ could be both ally and enemy, or neither, at the same time. The ‘rollback’ or re-embracement suggests neither hostility nor alliance but their simultaneity materialized in a virtual presence together without clear distinction or borderline. Different from revolt against the West, the act of rolling back treats the European other (as oneself) as though they were friend and enemy at the same time. The logic of reason states that to be both friend and enemy is a contradiction, but this logic fails to condition a newly possible relation. Neither actual kindness nor hostility but a third comprising both prepares a symbolic place for their actualization. The simultaneity of hostility and alliance may not refer to an East-West relation but also allude to the historically ambivalent position of Japan to Asia and the West in inter-war periods: a cruel invader of other Asian countries but also a (self-claimed) Asia defender against European colonialism. The Pacific War waged by Japan indeed carries a double nature, that is to say, it is a war as sheer conquest of an Asian aggressor over other Asians as well as a war with collective efforts of Asia against Western imperialism. The ideological slogans of ‘liberating Asia’ and ‘new world order’ promoted by Japanese military did resonate with Asian collective desire at the time, even though postwar decolonization movements in Asia cannot be attributed to Japan’s political ambitions. The entangled histories have complicated what Takeuchi means by ‘rollback’. ‘Rollback’ could be
productive in the sense that it acknowledges the legacy from Europe (and Japan as well), no
matter the brutality and violence accompanied with it, as an inherent, built-in part of Asian
cultures in modern era since Asia has actually taken part in it by sharing same temporality (let
alone Japan was one of the modernity-driven imperialist powers), and displaces the one-sided
resistance that depicts native nationalists against European imperialist encroachment on the
rest of the world.

Against current calls for the formation of distinctive ‘Asian theory’ or ‘substance’
supposedly developed from local, indigenous vantage points, ideas, practices and experiences
in order to challenge Western hegemony and transform Eurocentric epistemological
foundations, Takeuchi’s views show how he fully understood anti-Western drive for crafting a
Asian (or post-Western) school of thought, or Asian own model of modernity, is actually
motivated by an undying inferiority complex and a vain attempt to create nothing more than a
poor copy or a derivative discourse of Western theory. Takeuchi’s argument could be easily
misinterpreted as a simple reinforcement of civilization hierarchy by which only Europe can
produce theory (indeed Europe is proud of its unique and exceptional mode of theory or
knowledge production, which is able to constantly criticize, reflect and transform itself).
Apparently, modern ideas, knowledge, and values have to be transported from Europe to the
rest of the world. However, it would be futile, for Takeuchi, to search for an actual or
substantial difference at the level of content to which signifiers ‘Europe’ and the ‘Orient’ refer.
The notion or representation of ‘Orient’ or ‘Asia’ is an external imposition that cannot lead to
any inherent self-identity. More important is that, Europe can never be simply ‘Europe’ either.

Ambiguity and Coincidence of Enemy and Ally
In Takeuchi’s another famous essay ‘What Is Modernity? (The Case of Japan and China)’, he
writes, ‘[s]imply being Europe does not make Europe Europe’ (2005: 54). Europe’s self-same
identity cannot be obtained from claiming a naturally given Europe. Instead, Europe must go
through incessant tensions and conflicts, including confronting the heterogeneous like the
‘Orient’ and risking the danger of losing oneself, so as for the European self to be identified
structurally and securely with the idea of Europe. European Enlightenment thinkers looked to
the Orient for their origins. European oriental studies during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries rendered the East into various orients (the Asian elements invented in the founding
classical myth of Europe) from which Europeans create a narrative of origin, comprise a
remote past against which progress is measured, project and romanticize a mysterious
primitive realm where innocence and purity can be accessed. The oriental object constituted
by European epistemological institution has become something that Europe is heavily
dependent upon. Takeuchi described how Europe cannot claim natural ownership of itself and
its identity. There seems to be some kind of obscure forces occupying Europe, tearing it apart
from within, and driving it to aggression and destruction: ‘there existed in Europe something
fundamental that supported this instinct, making the invasion of the Orient inevitable’ (2005: 54), and ‘in order for Europe to be Europe, it was forced to invade the Orient. This was Europe’s inevitable destiny, which accompanied its self-liberation. Its self was confirmed inversely by encountering the heterogeneous’ (2005: 55). It is evident that the logic of alienation of self in the other is in play. But how can Europe really attain its liberation if it is pulled and driven by those instincts and impulses in all direction? Europe’s self-alienating instincts were grounded on ‘the will of capital, a speculative spirit of adventure, the Puritan spirit of pioneering, or yet another instinct for self-expansion’, or ‘something [that] has been deeply intertwined with the essence of what is called “modernity”’ (2005: 54). How can Europe get outside the circuit of modernity drive? Does it differentiate itself from itself by positing its otherness and then overcoming this difference, ie homogenization of the world? Thus, the ‘truth’ of Europe’s relating to its otherness or to the heterogeneous is its self-relating, or self-movement. The logic of self-circulating capital governing Europe creates its own material conditions and converts them into suitable moments of its own expansions. So can such circuit be taken as a model for revolutionary process of emancipation?

On the other hand, Takeuchi believed, Asia after European invasion and the accompanied modernization process can never simply go back to claim its own self either, since some ‘new things were born in the Orient that had never previously existed’ (2005: 54), one of which was ‘the phenomenon of Oriental capitalism’ (2005: 55). If Asia believes it can still get rid of the ‘new things’ brought with European encroachment, it will only fall further because resistance against Europe, in Takeuchi’s analysis, only leads the Orient to ‘increasingly Europeanize’ (2005: 55-6). ‘Oriental resistance was merely the essential element that made the world history [in Hegelian sense] more complete’ (2005: 56). History of resistance in the Orient was history of modernization, ie Europeanization. In other words, the stronger Asia desires to unite oneself with its own self-same identity, the further it actually alienates itself and remains removed from it. The resistance, or self-liberation movement, of Asia only reproduces European hegemony. Then, in Takeuchi’s logic, shall Asia resist or not? Perhaps, his notion of ‘rollback’ is already a rejoinder: instead of simply fighting against universal values imposed by Europe and asserting oneself as a heroic confrontation with external power, ‘Asia’ announces, after its process of resistance, total surrender by giving up its particular content in order to revolutionize Europe, to elevate and realize universal values that the West produced. In this sense, Takeuchi’s idea echoes with Habermas’ appeal for a ‘Europe’ that is beyond Eurocentrism. This ‘Europe’, in Habermas’ view, should pull itself together by learning the lessons of history and correcting its own mistakes in order to play its “appointed civilizing role” (2006: 5).

Takeuchi denounced Japanese modernity as nothing since it zealously copied the West while praising China for its overcoming of European modernity that has been violently imposed upon Asia. Making reference to John Dewey and Bertrand Russell’s comparative
comments on Japan’s apparently successful modernization and China’s nascent modernity when they had visited the two countries in the 1920s, Takeuchi concurred with them that Japan’s achievement was only superficial whereas modernization in China was internally generated and had greater potential. Japan at best, in Takeuchi’s words, is only an ‘honor student’ or ‘model student’ who closely imitates and chases after Europe in order to become ‘as European as possible’ without much resistance. Appropriating the Hegelian dialectic of master and slave, he called Japan a ‘slave’ who does not know that he is a slave (‘The slave is a slave in thinking that he is not a slave’ [79. Emphases in the original]), and believes that he is a master attempting to emancipate ‘backward students’ (ie other Asian countries). However, a master, if he is a real one, will never emancipate the slaves or eliminate the institution of slavery altogether, since the status of the master is totally dependent upon the slave. Takeuchi was aware that once Hegelian dialectical machinery is set in motion, the immediate beings of all things will be changed and some imperceptible complex meanings may take place. In today’s situation, it is facile to state that no one can save the slave except by him- or herself. Freedom and equality cannot be granted to the slave from the master. The slave’s own self-emancipation has to go through a trial of risking one’s life or negation. What it means is the slave has to recognize in the negativity that threatens to annihilate him or her as the very core of his or her subjectivity. The slave has no other choice but to identify fully with this negativity. In other words, freedom and equality can never come from the master. There is only a substitution of one master by another. The price one pays for such identification is the sacrifice of all particular content or the so-called essence.

Takeuchi’s denial of Japanese modernization and applause of the Chinese one may have a lot to do with his longing for a revolutionary China and his guilt feeling toward the crimes committed by Japan against China and the rest of Asia. He dramatically remarked that ‘[t]he absence of resistance means that Japan is not Oriental, but at the same time the absence of the wish for self-preservation (the absence of the self) means that Japan is not European. That is to say, Japan is nothing’ (64). However, his critique of Japan’s modernity as ‘nothing’ has brought out the dilemma many Asian countries have confronted since the nineteenth century: how to become modern while at the same time discarding the derogatory categorization of being ‘Oriental’ but not losing an identity. Apparently, in Takeuchi’s view, Japan has failed to create its own sense of self in relation to Asia and Europe. His critique of Japan’s modernity as nothing embodies the ambiguity of Japan’s view of itself and its position in the world constructed by Europe. While abandoning traditional Chinese learning and knowledge, Japan was not able to find any real alternative other than adapting itself to the organizing frameworks of Eurocentric world history. However, in the cliché of dialectical reversal, utter nothing or negativity could be converted into new higher positive order. There may be no real effective reversal from negative to positive, from retreat to advance, or from defeat to victory. But there can be a shift of position, a pure formal change through which retreat is re-viewed
as advance.

Re-embracing the West, or re-rolling / rewinding of its values, for Japan as nothing, means more than imitating, accepting the superiority of Europe and paying homage to precursors. Rather, it is an act for itself not to divorce from modernity but to innovate, break with, displace, surpass, rework the hegemonic episteme, reject established patterns and redefine the universal. Unlike Habermas’ rehabilitating project of revivifying reason as an agency, Takeuchi’s attempt to propose new model for defining universality beyond the confines of rationalist discourse but based on ethical considerations is not novel. Many predecessors have endeavored to do so by incorporating and converting many Western elements to explain and objectify the Orient into some positive features. But he is no longer pointing at one alternative that follows or precedes another in space and time. The historical necessity of a universality always turns out to be an imperial and monolithic order that englobes all differences and imposes an order on them. Against the rational principle of non-contradiction or excluded middle, Takeuchi proposed a semblance of universality or a concept of equivocal duality that allows mutual convertibility of A (A for Asia?) and not-A. It is a concept that naturalizes the excess of negativity, allows the other as stranger to cross my threshold, penetrate and become a part of me, inside me, but outside my control. Contrary actualities only set things apart in exclusive disjunction. But it is the reciprocal convertibility without distinguishable border that gives rise to an a priori locale for cooperation and struggle to act out at the same time. Such reciprocity undoes the closure of reason and enables a new relation to create one’s subjectivity by suspending and reconsidering the meanings of alliance and enmity. In a way, the subject fully identifies with or embraces the external force that threatens to annihilate him or her. The self-formation of the subject, as Takeuchi proclaimed, would have the presence of the real/objective other within it. The other does not originate in the subject but comes from outside and acts as outside agent taking effect or taking charge within. Perhaps, ‘Asia as method’ is designed to recognize this objective alterity and institute it as part of the reality. At the end, ‘Asia as method’ may mean that Asia is not necessarily embracing the positive values. Instead, it courageously embraces the negativity (ie the annihilation of one’s particular content or essence) brought by Europe as the only path to a higher stage of freedom and equality. It is an affirmation mediated by negation.

Denying himself a Marxist, Takeuchi did not see ‘Asia as method’ an unending conflict between Asia and Europe, reaction and progress, tradition and modernity, past and future. Neither is it a dialectical struggle of the opposites. The manner of taking sides is only illusory. But re-rolling of idealism and universal values, with the rejection of false ideals, is also not an easy line to tread. What should be overcome is not capitalist modernity brought by the external force but the subject’s immanent ‘pathological’ content / essence. To re-embrace the West for Asia is to alienate itself from its presumed natural givenness. Europe in such method is seen as a supranational universalism in opposition to narrow or even
warring nationalist identification. ‘Asia as method’ as an openness is not regulated by any
governing theory, pre-existing transcendent order, or enforced closure of system. That ‘Asia
as method’ cannot be fully accounted for by the set of pre-existing conditions may suggest
that we encounter the limitation of our totalizing epistemological frame of reference or
abstract objectification. But it also refers to something more than the ideational, that is to say,
the incoherence of material reality.

The recent rise of some Asian nations, China and India in particular, may create hopes
that their successful economic developments can lay ground to the emergence of a different
structure of knowledge. What may happen is a working through of many of the ideas and
concepts that have been influential and governing since the nineteenth century, in order to
decide what needs to be renewed or kept and what discarded. It can be recognized in the calls
for cultural studies not only to be concerned with real politics but also be critically
self-reflexive. While “Asia as method” is by no means a reversed hierarchy of “Europe/the
West as method,” the ongoing project of many Asian scholars to look at a wide range of
categories and frameworks developed from multiple contexts in order to advance a different
understanding of world history would continue Takeuchi’s vision in a convoluted way.

Notes

1. The ‘kindai no chokoku’ (Overcoming Modernity) debate aimed to overcome limitations brought
by modernization modeled on the West in order to reconstruct Japan’s own cultural wholeness
and uniqueness. Pacific War was interpreted as a revolt against modern West and its hegemony
over Asia. For detailed discussion of the historical background and ideological implications of
the ‘Overcoming Modernity’ symposium held at Tokyo in 1942, see Harootunian (2000) and
3. Civilization, a European concept borrowed by the East, historically is another rallying point for
the supranational link of Asia, although its discourse both transcends nationalism and serves the
territorial nation-state. See Duara (2001). On the other hand, religious affiliation and
commonality also strengthened the idea of pan-Asianism. Many Asian thinkers have endorsed
Buddhism as a means of allying Asia.
4. See the works of Hamashita Takeshi (2008) in English translation, for instance. Prasenjit Duara’s
recent essays on Asia could also be understood as a similar attempt. See Duara (2010).
5. See, for instance, Yuzo (1996 / 1989); Nobukuni (1999); Sun (1995); Chen (2005). English
version is in Chen (2010: 211-255).
6. Takeuchi’s talk, in the lecture series by Maruyama Masao, Otsuka Hisao and other scholars, was
given at International Christian University on methodology in intellectual history. These lectures
were published as Shisō shi no hōhō to taishō – Nihon to Seiō (The Method and Object of
Intellectual History: Japan and the West) edited by Takeda Kiyoko in 1961. For English
translation of Takeuchi’s essay, see Takeuchi (2005: 149-165).
7. See Takeuchi (2005: 165)
8. ‘Nothing’ is not necessarily bad in the tradition of Japanese philosophy. Nothing can be anything
that constitutes a higher form of universality. In pre-war periods and during the wartime, many
Japanese thinkers attempted to theorize Japan as neither Asia nor Europe but being the only
nation knowledgeable in both Oriental and Occidental civilizations, therefore serving as the ultimate symbol of universalism. Instead of suffering from either cultural indebtedness to China/Asia or cultural borrowing from Europe, Japan as nothing can transcend the distinction between the Orient and the West by providing a higher ontology in nothingness.

9. For Hegel, what is crucial is the self-liberation of the slave. Even if a person is born a slave and raised by a master, as long as they become conscious of their freedom and wills it, they are free in the moment. ‘For the personality and freedom of my will are essential parts of myself’, writes Hegel in *Philosophy of Right*. Requoted from Buck-Morss (2009: 61).

10. Takeuchi wrote that he lacked any beautiful memories of communism in Japan since he ‘had in fact seen quite a few former communists commit tenkō [ideological conversion] during the war, after which they collaborated more actively than did many noncommunists. Thus [he] did not join in when communism became popular after the war but rather stood back and kept an eye on the movement, all the while feeling [himself] slightly old-fashioned’ (Takeuchi, 2005: 152).

References


