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Catholicism and its civic engagement: Case studies of the catholic church in Hong Kong, Macau, Taipei, and Shanghai = 天主教及其公共参与：港澳台沪天主教区的个案研究

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Catholicism and Its Civic Engagement: Case Studies of the Catholic Church in Hong Kong, Macau, Taipei, and Shanghai

Zhidong Hao (a), Shun Hing Chan (b), Wen-ban Kuo (c), Yik Fai Tam (d), Ming Jing (e)

Abstract
The levels of civic engagement in terms of social services and civic activism in the different Catholic churches of Hong Kong, Macau, Taipei, and Shanghai are very different. While the former three churches have a higher level of social services, Shanghai does not. While Hong Kong has a higher level of civic activism, the other three dioceses do not. This paper explains the similarities and differences among these cities by using an analytical model of political, cultural, and individual opportunity structures. Our findings and analysis are derived from a collaborative research project on the Catholic Church’s civic engagement in the four cities using both quantitative and qualitative research methods. In a time of rapid political, economic, and social transformations in China, religion is beginning to play an increasingly important role. Our study will shed light on what roles Catholicism or other religions might play in this process, and it has important implications for church-state relations in greater China.

Keywords
Catholicism, greater China, civic engagement, culture, structure, leadership

天主教及其公共参与：港澳台沪天主教区的个案研究

摘要
从社会服务与社会批评的角度来看，港澳台沪天主教区的公共参与程度参差不齐。港澳台天主教社会服务程度较高，但是上海则较低。香港教区的社会批评程度较高，但是其他三个教区社会批评则较少。为什么这些教区公共参与有如此之大的区别呢？本

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Our research finds that the level of social services in Hong Kong, Taipei, and Macau is higher than in Shanghai, while the level of civic activism is higher in Hong Kong than in
Macau, Taipei, and Shanghai. The extent to which each place enjoys religious freedom may help us understand why the level of social services and civic activism is low in Shanghai, but it does not help us understand why the level of civic activism is lower in Macau and Taipei than in Hong Kong since they all enjoy full religious freedom. We find that the factors that influence the different levels of social services and civic engagement are a combination of political, cultural, and individual opportunities and choices. This poses a challenge to the religious market theory and calls for an integrative model of analysis that encompasses not only political but also cultural and individual factors.

In the following pages, we will first review other scholars’ assessment of the Catholic Church’s civic engagement, and some theoretical premises of the sociology of religion and social movements that might explain our data. Informed by these theories, we present an analytical model of our own, which we describe as an integrative model of political, cultural, and individual opportunity structures. Then we introduce our methods of research, followed by our findings and a discussion.

In a time of rapid political, economic, and social transformations in China, religion is beginning to play an increasingly important role. Our study not only sheds light on what roles Catholicism or other religions might play in this process, it also has important implications for the church-state relations in China.

**Toward an Integrative Model of Political, Cultural, and Individual Opportunity Structures**

There is evidence showing a lack of civic engagement by the Catholic Church both in China and in the US (Disalvo 2008:438-39; Madsen 1998, 2003). But other research finds that there might not be much difference between the Catholic civic engagement and that of other religious groups in, for example, the US (Lichterman 2007:523). In fact, the Catholic Church was at the vanguard of the global human rights revolution in the “third wave of democratization” from the mid-1970s to the 1990s. Furthermore, “[t]he church has remained one of the public voices left still questioning capitalist globalization and demanding the humanization and moralization of market economies and more just and fair international division of labour and distribution of world resources” (Casanova 2001a:433, and 2001b). The church was used to nourish and protect civil society spaces, as in the Franco’s Spain and Communist Poland (Casonova 2001b). In Latin America, Catholicism is one of the networks which the poor may access. And nuns, laypersons and clergy “have participated in different processes of social integration leading to nation building and modernization of state and society” (Romero 2001:482, 485). In Brazil, for example, a central role for the church and for lay organizations with close ties to the church is the defence of human rights. Cardinal Evaristo Arns took a stand against the government following the torture and death of
Vladimir Herzog, a prominent Jewish journalist, in 1975, and the Catholic Church was a major factor in the wave of democratization in the late twentieth century and also helped to improve the conditions of persons in prisons (Cleary 1997). Likewise, the Catholic Church in Hong Kong has also played a very important role in its democratization, although it is a different matter in other dioceses in greater China.

Various reasons have been given as to why different Catholic dioceses seem to have different levels of civic engagement. These include differences in denominational cultures, standard forms of liturgy, parish governance, and internal parish cultures (Cleary 1997:438-39). When explaining the Chinese Catholic Church’s lack of civic engagement, Madsen thinks that it is mainly due to the Chinese Catholic culture, which is similar to that of the Italian Catholic Church as Putnam observed: it “still retains much of the heritage of the Counter Reformation, including an emphasis on the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the traditional virtues of obedience and acceptance of one’s station in life,” which is “negatively correlated with civic engagement” (Madsen 1998:135). Elsewhere, though, Madsen also mentions other factors: interference by the Chinese Religious Affairs Bureaus with the affairs of the Church, and the role of bishops, clergy, and laity, although he does not dwell on them (Madsen 1998:23, 49, 73, 142-45). These two factors are what we call political and individual factors, in addition to the cultural factor above. We will examine some specific premises of the sociology of religion and social movements below and see how they may inform our own model of analysis based on these three factors.

The Sociology of Religion: The Religious Market, Culture, and the Role of Church Leaders and Laity

On the basis of the rational choice tradition in social sciences, the religious market theory posits that the structure of a religious market, specifically the level of its pluralism or openness to competition among religious organizations, determines religious behaviors such as church attendance and participation (Stark and McCann 1993). While in most studies the focus has been placed on the market determinants of religious commitment, with the overarching purpose of providing theoretical and empirical refutations of secularization theory (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Stark and Finke 2000), the religious market theory has also been extended to the analysis of secular and social involvement of religious believers in activities such as giving and volunteering. The results are generally supportive of a positive correlation between religious pluralism and volunteering (Borgonovi 2008), which accords well with the longstanding intellectual account and popular image of religious, voluntary associations as a major player in the civic life of America (Bellah 1992; de Tocqueville 2004; Wilson and Janoski 1995; Wuthnow 2004).
Following the religious market model, Yang Fenggang (2006) suggests that the heavy regulation of religion by the soft-authoritarian state in China produces a differentiated and tripartite market situation for religious actors therein. The implication of Yang’s triple-market theory is that the level of state regulation should be taken as an independent variable that shapes the structure of the religious market and hence religious behaviors (See also Finke 1990; Chaves and Cann 1992). As Szonyi (2009:315) points out, “State repression of heterodox groups limits their market, but state repression of institutional religion may paradoxically serve to expand it, since non-institutionalized groups are better able to accommodate state pressure.” This has indeed been the case in mainland China.

The religious market theory thus is useful in helping us explain the Catholic Church’s civic engagement by pointing out two important factors: religious regulation and competition. We can hypothesize that the higher the level of religious pluralism and the lower the level of religious regulation, the higher the level of civic engagement by the Catholic Church. Religious pluralism and state regulation are treated as independent variables. However, we believe that in addition to religious competition and state regulation, other factors are playing a role as well in civic engagement, namely culture and the role of bishops and laity.

“Culture” in our study refers to Chinese culture, local culture and the Catholic culture. As we mentioned above, culture has already been used in the study of the differences between religious groups regarding their civic engagement. For more examples, both Pattillo-McCoy (1998:768-69) and Barnes (2005:968) have studied how the black church and its Christian teachings and rituals have fostered its members’ civic engagement. They both cited Swidler’s (1986) definition of culture: the “symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well as informal cultural practices and rituals of daily life.” These constitute the “tool kit,” or cultural repertoire of rituals, stories, symbols, and beliefs, that can be used for social and civic mobilisation. The Bible, spirituals, gospel music, prayer and sermons, the values of freedom and justice and beliefs in their realization, Black Liberation Theology, have all been effective tools for the mobilization of the Church members for social services and civic activities and for the liberalization of the Black poor. After all, the church also has a tradition of prophetic role in addition to the priestly and kingly roles (see Weber 1978:426, 439-44, for more discussion on the priestly role in the operation of a “cultic enterprise,” and a prophetic role as a teacher of social ethics, justice and reform based on divine commandment).

The Catholicism that has been implanted in China since the sixteenth century is part of a Counter Reformation missionary movement, as we mentioned earlier. One of its main features is the hierarchical structure of the Church, and it meshes well with the Chinese culture’s emphasis on imperial hierarchy (Madsen 1998:29). The moral demands of the Catholic Church are also consistent with classical Confucian authoritarian, hierarchical, and paternalistic virtues, including being a good person and doing good deeds (Madsen 1998:77-
78, 110, 136; Madsen 2003). In addition, each of the four cities of greater China has a different culture of social movements, reflected in Hong Kong and Taiwan’s strong efforts in democratization protests and the weak performance of Macau and Shanghai. *We hypothesize that culture matters, too, in determining the Catholic Church’s civic engagement, liberal or conservative.* For example, there must be tools in the Chinese culture that encourage or hinder civic engagement. The tradition of civic engagement in the local area also influences the Church’s behavior. There are also tools in the Catholic Church’s culture that foster or hinder their social services and civic activity, e.g., traditional doctrines and teachings of Vatican II. We’d like to assess these cultural influences.

In addition to the religious market and cultural theories, the sociology of religion also examines the role of the church leaders and laity. One of the reasons that the Catholic Church made big strides in China in the 16th century was the role played by such Jesuits as Michel Ruggieri (1543-1607) and Matteo Ricci (1552-1610). They were able to interpret Catholicism in a way that accommodated Chinese rituals like the worship of their ancestors or Confucius. But this was not what Rocco’s successor Niccolo Longobardi (1559-1654) and other Catholic religious orders like the Dominicans thought. And the Vatican was on the conservative side. This led to Emperor Kangxi’s ban on Christianity in 1723, which lasted for 130 years until after the Opium Wars in the 19th century (Hao 2011). The interpretations and decisions by Church leaders as well as political leaders can often be a matter of life and death. The same was true another hundred years later. When the Communists took over China, the Vatican’s order to the Chinese Catholics was to make no compromise or cooperation. The Bishops and clergy in China led a heroic struggle in their efforts to keep the church independent from the state: some of them died as martyrs, over 2,400 foreign priests were expelled from China (in 1949 there were 2,500 of them), and thousands of them were imprisoned (in Shanghai alone in 1955 about 1,200 leading Catholics were arrested) (Mariani 2011:110, 156).

Most of the time, however, the decisions by the bishops and clergy were not a matter of life and death, but rather of more or less civic engagement. In their study of leadership styles of the Catholic leaders of two dioceses in the United States, Harper and Schulte-Murray (1998) point out how bishops can create either a tightly or loosely coupled system in the Church. In the former system, the Archbishop personally controls and shapes energy, information, and policy flows, giving clergy few incentives or rewards for making social activism, while in the latter system, the bishop is more permissive and different elements in the system are more capable of autonomous action, with he himself being outspoken on gender and racial inequalities (Harper and Schulte-Murray 1998:103, 107). The deacons and priests in the former system are more conservative in socioreligious attitudes, emphasizing liturgy and parish programs, while the deacons and priests in the latter system are more liberal, emphasizing not only these, but also “charitable work, political action, preaching, and witnessing marriages and funerals” (Harper and Schulte-Murray 1998:109). The same is true
with laity in these two different dioceses. Another study of six Catholic parishes finds that different interpretations by the priests on the Second Vatican Council’s teaching on lay leadership, including more female leadership at the parish level, result in different practices regarding women’s leadership roles in the parish (Ecklund 2006). Priests are the gatekeepers for the parish culture.

Apparently, the role of the leaders of the Church can never be overemphasized. We hypothesize that one of the major factors influencing civic engagement in the four areas of greater China is the difference in leadership styles. We will, however, also discuss the role of the laity. Together they constitute the individual factor. As we mentioned above, other two major factors are political and cultural. In the following section, we will discuss the political opportunity structure theory and our integrative-analytical model.

Social Movement Theories and an Integrative Model of Analysis

One of the major theories in social movement inquiry is the concept of political opportunity structure. Although scholars have defined the concept differently and applied it to different empirical phenomena, they mostly agree to the following four dimensions: “1) The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; 2) The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; 3) The presence or absence of elite allies; and 4) The state’s capacity and propensity for repression” (McAdam 1996:27). In our analysis of the Catholic Church’s civic engagement, we will find that the four cities of greater China indeed have had different political opportunity structures. Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan have relatively open political systems and religious pluralism but with a varying degree of civil society. The elite alignments in Macau and Taiwan are more stable than those in Hong Kong, but they all seem to have elite allies in the polity. With Taiwan as a full democracy and Hong Kong and Macau as semi-democracies, none of these systems has great capacity and propensity for repression. The Shanghai case is quite different. Mainland China is governed by an authoritarian regime and rigid religious policies. The institutionalized political system is largely closed; the extent of religious pluralism is smaller; the elite alignments are fairly stable; the Church might have elite allies, but they may not be that powerful (for example, allies in the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress are far less powerful than allies in the Politburo); and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression is high. As we hypothesized in the section on the sociology of religion, the varying degrees of state control over religion, as is now demonstrated in the structure of political opportunities, will greatly influence the Catholic Church’s civic engagement.

But we believe that the structure of political opportunities is only one of the structures. So we propose to add cultural and individual structures, as we discussed in the previous section. The analytical model we propose is the political, cultural and individual opportunity
structures (See Figure 1). X1, X2, and X3 represent the sociological context, which is characterized by the extent to which the political and cultural systems are open or closed, and how individuals (priests and lay Catholics) are affected by and affecting such systems. And it is a dynamic milieu that provides the limits and possibilities of civic engagement, which are the result of negotiation between various social agents and these systems.

![Figure 1](image)

Figure 1 *Political, cultural, and individual opportunity structures*

NOTE: This is our model of analysis, which includes political (or structural), cultural (Chinese, local, and Catholic cultures), and individual (priests and lay Catholics) factors influencing the level of civic engagement of the Catholic Church.

While the political opportunity structure is composed of four dimensions we discussed above, the cultural opportunity structure would include the tools that are provided by the Chinese culture, local culture, and the Catholic culture. In the Catholic culture, for example, there are both Counter Reformation traditions as well as modern interpretations by Vatican II. These are related to the culture of priestly, kingly, and prophetic roles. And the Chinese and Catholic cultures’ emphasis on hierarchical structure can be used to either promote or hinder civic engagement. It depends on how the clergy interpret and practice Catholic teachings and how laity and clergy interact with one another. Thus there exists an individual opportunity structure, too.

This is also a dynamic milieu, in that the political, cultural, and individual opportunity structures interact with and influence one another. The political structure may be closed, open, fragmented, ambiguous, or conflictual, and the cultural structure may be characterized by openness or rigidity of norms, beliefs, and values. The bishops, clergy, and laity may be
progressive, conservative, or ambiguous. While structure and culture certainly influence individuals, individuals are also active interpreters of culture and structure and are agents who can cultivate cultural and structural opportunities. Opportunities can be exploited since authoritarianism is often fragmented, and what seems to be a coherent state is actually composed of multiple parts of conflicting interests and beliefs (Chan and Zhou 2013). The individual actor “may possess elements of many different styles, each of which gets triggered in different circumstances” (de Vries and Miller 1986:266). He or she will thus behave accordingly. In other words, the Catholic Church’s civic engagement is dependent on the interaction of all these political, cultural, and individual variables. It is this interaction among the structural, cultural, and individual factors that affects the extent to which the Catholic Church engages in social services and civic activism.

Our Research Design

In order to understand the Catholic Church’s civic engagement in the four cities of greater China and test our hypothesis of the factors that influence their civic engagement, we did both quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews. Table 1 summarizes the number of churches and church-related organizations we have surveyed and the number of clergy we have interviewed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1: Populations and samples of our surveys in four dioceses</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Macau</th>
<th>Taipei</th>
<th>Shanghai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of parishes</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of parishes surveyed</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of parishes surveyed</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of church-related organizations</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of church-related organizations surveyed</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of church-related organizations surveyed</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of churches and church-related organizations</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of churches and church-related organizations surveyed</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of churches and church-related organizations surveyed</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of clergy interviewed</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our intention was to survey all the parishes and church-related organizations. But as it turned out, not all of them were willing to accept our invitation to participate in the survey. And not all of them could be found as in Shanghai. We ended up surveying 34 percent to 88 percent of all parishes, and 9 percent of churches and church-related organizations combined in Hong Kong, and 32 to 50 percent of them in the other dioceses. It is reasonable to assume that those churches that were resistant to our invitation to participate in the study tend to be more conservative. So our research findings may be interpreted as more optimistic than in reality in regard to the church’s social services and civic activism than the actual state of affairs justifies. Conversely, in jurisdictions with higher response rate, as in Taipei, reality may be less pessimistic as it appears.

We had two questionnaires: one for churches and the other for church-related organizations. Most of the questions are the same. In the questionnaires, we asked over 30 questions that cover about 100 variables. The most important variables are the extent of their civic engagement, which is our dependent variable, and factors that influence the dependent variable, including state regulations of religious activities, the culture of the local Church, and the role of the bishop and clergy. Furthermore, we did 49 in-depth interviews of bishops, priests, nuns, and laity, 10 or more in each city, but mostly priests. In addition to the questions above, we also asked about other factors that influence the Church’s civic engagement, such as the role of the Chinese culture, local culture, and laity.

There are two more points we want to emphasize. First, both the interviewees and respondents to our surveys tend to be church leaders and are thus representing the behavior of their church and of priests, which does not reflect participation on the mass level, like individual church attendance or volunteering. Second, as we mentioned earlier, the four jurisdictions under study are of different political systems, ranging from authoritarianism (mainland China) to semi-democracies (Hong Kong and Macau) and a full democracy (Taiwan). So when we talk about political structures or contexts, or social service and civic activism, we need to have those differences and constraints in mind. In the section below, we will discuss both quantitative and qualitative findings.

Findings and Discussion

The Catholic Church’s Civic Engagement

In our questionnaires, we asked whether the church or the church-related organizations had in the past year organized or participated in the following activities: (1) advocated the Church’s social teachings; (2) questioned or challenged public policy (meaning civic activism); and (3) provided social services. Our research finds that the differences in social services provision among the four dioceses are small (96.5 percent in Hong Kong, 78.9 percent in Macau, 74.5
percent in Taipei, and 78.4 percent in Shanghai). The percentage of social service involvement for Shanghai is even larger than it is in Taipei, although in actual numbers, it is much smaller as a matter of fact. This perception of social services in Shanghai is apparently not very meaningful. (See Figure 2.)

![Figure 2: Civic engagement of the Church in four dioceses](image)

FIGURE 2: Civic engagement of the Church in four dioceses

NOTE: The percentages refer to the number of churches and church-related organizations in each diocese that have had either sponsored or participated in events related to social teachings, to challenging government policies, and to social services in the past year. The latter two are our focuses in the paper.

However, the differences in participation in civic activities among the four dioceses are statistically significant: 47.4 percent in Hong Kong, 23.7 percent in Macau, 12.4 percent in Taipei, and 7.8 percent in Shanghai, with Hong Kong on one end of the continuum, and Shanghai on the other end (see Figure 2). A considerably larger number of churches and church-related organizations in Hong Kong have sponsored or participated in civic activism than in other three dioceses, with Shanghai having the smallest number of such organizations doing so. We have quite a few variables measuring the church’s activism. We have used questioning and challenging government policies, in general, in our analysis because it represents more directly what the church does in civic activism. We assume that it would include, in the example of Hong Kong, questioning government’s arrangement for democratization and educational and population policies.

**The Political (Structural) Factor**
How do we explain the similarities and differences, then? We hypothesized that according to the religious market theory, two of the major reasons are religious pluralism/competition and state regulation. In our questionnaires, we asked four questions that pertain to these two issues. 1) do they think that the state or government religious policies are looser or stricter compared with 10 years ago? This has to do with state regulation. 2) Do they think the Catholic religion’s relationship with other religions is more conflictual or more harmonious compared with 10 years ago? 3) Have more or fewer people converted to other religions from Catholicism in the past few years compared with 10 years ago? Questions 2 and 3 are about the competition between religions, or the extent of pluralism, an issue in the religious market theory. More competition means more pluralism, and vice versa. And 4) Do they have to consider the opinion of government officials when they initiate an activity? Questions 1 and 4 have to do with state regulation, or the political opportunity structure. Questions 2 and 3 are about the competition between religions, or the extend of pluralism, an issue in the religious market theory; more competition means more pluralism, and vice versa. So we have two fairly straightforward questions about state regulation and two about religious competition/pluralism. (See Table 2, items in the order of questions asked.)

We hypothesized that according to the religious market theory, looser state regulation and more religious competition or pluralism would positively affect the amount of social services and civic activism while stricter government regulation and lack of pluralism would negatively affect it. Our findings regarding government regulation (items 1 and 4 in Table 2) indicate that the results are mixed. First of all, it is inconclusive whether government regulation (item 1 in Table 2) is looser or stricter in the four areas of greater China. Take Hong Kong for example. While 50 percent of the respondents say no change, 37 percent of them say religious regulations are stricter, the highest percentage of respondents to say so in the four dioceses. It is hard to say whether this goes against the religious market theory's assumption that the stricter the religious regulation, the less active the civic engagement, since it is not always clear what they meant by stricter or looser. It is a matter of perception. But at least on the surface, it seems that in Hong Kong it may be that the stricter the state regulation, the more active the civic engagement. The Shanghai statistics are also interesting. Close to 45.8 percent say the state regulation is looser, highest percentage among the four dioceses, yet the Church’s civic engagement is still very low.
TABLE 2: Percent of respondents to questions about government regulations and religious competition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Macau</th>
<th>Taipei</th>
<th>Shanghai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Government religious regulations</td>
<td>Looser</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stricter</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \chi^2 = 52.57 ) ( p = .000 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Relationship with other religions</td>
<td>More competition</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less competition</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More harmony</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \chi^2 = 6.44 ) ( p = .695 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Catholics converted to other religions</td>
<td>More than 10 years ago</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fewer than 10 years ago</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not that I know of</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \chi^2 = 40.37 ) ( p = .000 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. We’ll often have to see what the government officials think when we initiate an activity.</td>
<td>True</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not true</td>
<td>88.9%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \chi^2 = 70.96 ) ( p = .000 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In fact, Hong Kong and Shanghai have similar perceptions of stricter religious regulation, 37.0% vs. 33.3%, yet civic activism is higher in the former than the latter. Should not they be
similar? This is understandable, however, because civic activism also has to do with state potential for repression. It is lower in Hong Kong than in Shanghai, hence the differences. If state regulation is very different, we should see great differences in social services. But we do not see this reflected in the percentages, although we do know that the actual number of social services in Shanghai is much smaller, as reflected in the number of church-related organizations, which is in accordance with the religious market theory, again an issue of state potential for repression rather than one’s perception of religious restrictions. Respondents’ perceptions can often be questionable. It is possible that the respondents in some cities may be exaggerating the severity of state regulation. It is also possible that their perception is based in fact. Thus we need to check their perceptions with reality whenever possible.

The statistics on religious competition or pluralism do not appear to support the religious market premise, either, but again this may be because of the inherent problems of respondents’ perceptions rather than a problem with the religious market theory. From 63.6 percent to 70.6 percent of respondents say that there is more harmony between religions (item 2 in Table 2), and over 80% of the respondents in the four dioceses say that either fewer, or no Catholics are converting to other religions, or not that they know of (item 3 in Table 2). Yet, the differences in civic activism are great, as we reported earlier. So it is not clear to what extent pluralism or competition plays a role in civic engagement. But again harmony or competition is mainly a matter of interpretation, and it compromises our judgment on this issue.

But if we look at item 4 in Table 2, the religious market premise does help us understand the church’s participation in civic activism, although not much in social services. That is, the stark contrast between Hong Kong, a semi-democracy, and Shanghai, under an authoritarian regime, about participation in civic activism (47.4 percent vs. 7.8 percent in Figure 2) can be explained by the stark contrast between the two cities in their respective heeding of the government officials’ opinion when organizing or participating in an activity: Hong Kong’s 5.6 percent vs. Shanghai’s 69.6 percent. We can thus infer that the higher the state regulation, the less civic activism, and vice versa. See Table 3.

The difference between Hong Kong and Taipei, however, needs further explanation. Both have religious freedom and low levels of government regulation, but the latter’s level of civic engagement is much lower than the former’s even though it is a full democracy. In addition, even if the state control differs greatly in the four dioceses, their perception of social services is similar, although we do know that the actual number of services in Shanghai is indeed smaller which can partly be explained by the strict state control. So our conclusion is that our hypothesis regarding state regulation only partially explains the extent to which the Catholic Church engages in social services and civic activity. There are other factors.
TABLE 3: The relationship between government regulation and civic engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government Regulation: heeding official opinions</th>
<th>Social Services</th>
<th>Civic Activism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>96.5%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macau</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>22.20%</td>
<td>74.5%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
<td>78.4%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: This table shows the percentages of respondents (churches and church-related organizations) heeding government opinions (an indicator of government regulation) when they initiate or participate in an action, and the extent to which this factor correlates with the percentages reflecting their civic engagement (social services and civic activism). An examination of the numbers indicates that while the difference among the four jurisdictions in social service provision is small, except in the case of Hong Kong, the difference in civic activism is significant, especially between Hong Kong and Shanghai. The less notice respondents take of government opinion, or the less government regulation, the more civic activism there is, and vice versa.

The Cultural Factor

As we hypothesized earlier, culture influences civic engagement of the Catholic Church. By culture, we mean Chinese culture, local culture, and the Catholic culture. Due to the limits of our survey research, we rely mainly on qualitative data for an explanation of the Chinese and local culture, but draw on both quantitative and qualitative data for the Catholic culture. The influence of Chinese culture can be seen in what Archbishop Stanislaus Lo Kuang (1989:41-44) of Taiwan used to say in the end of 1980s and early 1990s: the traditional Chinese religion emphasizes spirituality, or inner development. To participate in a social movement is to invite disapproval. This is a good example of the mesh between Chinese culture and the Catholic culture and has indeed been characteristic of the Diocese of Taipei. This might help explain the low level of civic activism in Taipei as compared with Hong Kong, even if they both enjoy high level of religious freedom and pluralism. The Diocese of Macau’s low level of civic activism may be more strongly influenced by the inheritance of the conservative Portuguese Church than by Chinese culture, but the latter’s conservative nature also meshes
with the former. This results in the Church’s emphasis on inner spiritual development and the abstract idea of citizen rights and social justice reflected more in social services rather than in civic activism (Hon Fai Chen 2013). So if the structural factor (religious regulation) better explains the level of civic activity in the dioceses of Hong Kong and Shanghai, then the cultural factor seems to better explain lack of civic activism in the dioceses of Taipei and Macau.

But the traditional Chinese and Catholic cultures influence civic activism in Hong Kong, too, positively or negatively. In our interviews, we asked some general questions about the factors that influence their civic engagement, including political, social, cultural (Chinese, local, and Catholic) and historical factors. Some Catholics in Hong Kong pointed out the similarities between the Chinese and Catholic cultures in terms of familism, which emphasizes hierarchy and order, authority and submission. The double identity of being a Chinese and a Catholic will strengthen the attitude of submission to the church leader. In other words, if the Bishop of the diocese does not favor activism, the priests and laity in the parishes will take a more passive role in social participation. On the contrary, if the Bishop favors civic activism, the priests and laity will take a more active role, following his leadership. So even if the Chinese and Catholic cultures may negatively influence the Church’s civic activism, this may change if individual factors intervened, which we will further discuss below.

Local culture makes a lot of difference, too, although they are also subject to individual interpretations and interventions. If the local culture in Hong Kong did not feature many social movements in the colonial era, it picked up momentum around 1997, beginning with the activities supporting the mainland 1989 democracy movement, and culminated in 2003 with the movement against the legislation prescribed by Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law regarding the subversion of the Chinese state, and continued in 2012 against the government’s “national education” scheme. Many Hong Kong residents feel that their freedom is threatened, which prompts them to strive for more autonomy and democracy. Hence a democracy movement is on the rise in Hong Kong. Some Catholics have been deeply involved in civic activism as a result, especially the young and middle aged. For example, about 100 Catholics participate each year in the activities organized by the Catholic Church’s Justice and Peace Commission to commemorate the 1989 democracy movement in China.

There have been some civil society agitations for democracy and equality in Macau, but they are usually small-scale. In fact, many in Macau are proud of themselves as not being in a “chaotic” situation like Hong Kong. This has had some influence on the Catholic Church’s low-key position in civic activism, but it may have more to do with how the Catholic leaders interpret the situation. In 2008 when the MSAR government initiated the legislation of Article 23 of the Macau Basic Law, there was a fairly strong movement against it although
the pro-government forces were also very outspoken. But the Bishop “did not have a strong opinion on the issue” (Macau Interview #1 with a priest, June 15, 2012), so the church in general did not express any opinion on the issue, unlike the Hong Kong Diocese back in 2002 and 2003. We will discuss further the role of the clergy in the next section.

It is not clear whether the Catholics in Shanghai would be as active as those in Hong Kong if civil society there were more open to participation without consequences. But the lack of civil society agitations certainly corresponds to the lack of civic activism on the part of the Shanghai Diocese. Ma Daqin’s case is especially rare.

Local culture, however, does not seem to have much influence on the Taipei Diocese: the local civil society is very active, yet the Church is not, except in social services. From the 1970s to 1990s when civil society movements in Taiwan were on the rise, some in the Catholic Church were strongly against the Catholic involvement in them. So the Church has never been fully in step with the development of civil society in Taiwan. Again the role of the Church leaders, which we will discuss in the next section, is apparently more important.

In our quantitative research, we examined especially the effect of the Catholic culture on civic engagement. All Catholic lay men and women are supposed to share Jesus’ three-fold ministry of Priest, King and Prophet, that is, they have a mission to sanctify, to govern and to teach. The priestly role is to participate and cooperate in the Sacramental mission of the church. The kingly role is to serve the people in Jesus’ kingdom; therefore, the ministry of the King is also understood as that of the King-Servant. The prophetic role is carried out both in the church and community, where a prophet is also understood as an advocate of social justice in society today (Weinandy 2006; Weber 1978:424-51). In our surveys, we asked whether their organization thinks it is appropriate for them to air their views on democratization, i.e., their prophetic role. Figure 3 is our findings.
FIGURE 3: Appropriateness of airing views on democratization

NOTE: This question asks whether it is appropriate for the church or church-related organizations in each jurisdiction to air publicly their views on democratization.

We see that although a lower percentage of respondents in Shanghai, Taipei and Macau felt that it is appropriate to air their views on democratization (from 51 percent to 63 percent), they are not very low. Yet, there is a big difference between Hong Kong (93 percent) and other cities. We view this as an indication of the Church’s prophetic role. Will this affect their civic activism? Table 4 shows that it does. The higher the belief in the prophetic role, the higher the extent of civic activism (as reported in Figure 2) and vice versa.

The case of Hong Kong is the most telling. Since Vatican II, the Church has emphasized the importance of advocacy for social equality in addition to evangelicalism. So in 1977, it established the Hong Kong Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, and has encouraged parishes to establish groups for social concerns (guanshe zu 关社组) (right now two thirds of the 51 parishes have such groups). Other city-wide organizations are also established to coordinate civic activities by different churches in different parishes. The Church is paying more attention to workers’ rights, educational rights, and political rights, especially after the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997. It is true that some of the civic groups are turning themselves into social service groups, but the idea of social and political concerns are still there.
TABLE 4: The effect of prophetic belief on civic activism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value percentages</th>
<th>Perceptions of their having done so</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macau</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The “value percentages” in the table refer to the percent of churches and church-related organizations that believe in the appropriateness of airing their views on democratization, i.e., the belief in the prophetic role. When this factor is correlated with their perception of participation in civic activism (see Figure 2), we see that the higher the belief in the prophetic role, the higher the level of civic activism, and vice versa.

This belief in and role of the prophet is very weak in Macau. Our interviewees believe that the Church has an obligation to improve society, but it is not necessary to criticize the government to achieve that goal. One priest took an active part in environmental issues in Macau but he said that he did so mainly to protect the health of the youths in the Catholic hostel he was in charge of (Macau Interview #3 with a priest, April 14, 2014). And he kept a distance from other political groups on this issue. A couple of priests mentioned that indeed the Diocese of Macau is lacking in civic activism, and they were not happy with the state of affairs. The conservative Chinese, Portuguese, and Catholic cultures are apparently all at work.

Similarly in Taipei, none of our interviewees felt that the Church played a clear prophetic role except in the case of a few foreign priests from various Catholic religious orders stationed in Taiwan. There is no clear system of civic engagement by the Church, either by speaking up for or against something or by arranging demonstrations of any kind, with the exception of the Archbishop’s occasional comments opposing the establishment of casinos and for the abolishment of the death penalty. The current Archbishop is already more active than the previous one. There are no permanent staff engaging in civic activism, unlike in Hong Kong, and no one is well-versed in what is happening in society or which media they may use to let others know what they think. There is still a long way to go regarding the Church’s prophetic role (Taipei Interview #5 with a lay Catholic, male, January 16, 2013;
Taipei Interview #6 with a female lay Catholic, January 16, 2013; Taipei Interview #9 with a nun, January 22, 2013.

Interviewees in Shanghai in general felt that the Catholic Church’s influence was restricted to the church itself. They thought that there was, after all, a difference and distance between the Church and society. They did not quite identify with the prophetic role of the Church (Shanghai interviewees 2012-2013). But it is not clear whether that was because of the ambiguity of their identity or because of external restrictions.

The relatively lower percentages of respondents viewing social criticism as appropriate in Taipei and Shanghai are correlated with the lower percentages of respondents who have participated in such activity. One has to conclude that the Catholic culture in each place plays a role as well in their civic engagement. But again the Chinese, local, and Catholic cultural factor is only one of the three major factors we are dealing with. As in the case of Shanghai, the culture may require them to engage in more social service and civic activity, but the state apparently does not want them to. And even if the state allows opportunities for social services and civic activism, church leaders may not want to engage in these activities, especially in civic activism. This leads us to the next question on the individual factor.

The Individual Factor

We hypothesized that the role of the bishops, clergy, and laity is yet another important factor in influencing the Church’s civic engagement. In our questionnaires, we asked the respondents to tell us, on a Likert Scale, to what extent the current and previous bishops believed in the political engagement of the Church (with 1 as “not very important,” 2 as “not important,” 3 as “important,” and 4 as “very important”). There were no significant differences in Macau (2.2 vs. 2.7), Taipei (2.5 vs. 2.3), and Shanghai (2.6 vs. 2.5), but there was a significant difference in the Hong Kong diocese, 2.4 vs. 3.6 (see Figure 4).

We mentioned at the beginning of this paper Bishop Zen’s protest at the Central Government’s Liaison Office. Indeed, he was instrumental in the 2003 movement against the legislation of Article 23. Unlike the bishops before him and the current bishop, Zen was a more activist bishop who would call on his followers to take to the street to protest inequality. This is very similar to the differences between the two bishops in the two dioceses in the US whom we discussed earlier.

If the role of the bishops is important, so is the role of other clergy. Our interviewees in Hong Kong also mentioned several clergy who were active in civic engagement, such as Fr. Stephen Chan Moon Hung, Fr. Law Kwok Fai, and Fr. Renzo Milanese from different parishes in Hong Kong. Fr. Law, for example, openly criticized some Hong Kong capitalists, and the higher leadership of the Church had to apologize for his criticism. He has been
instrumental in fostering a sense of social concern in his parish. When the Bishop of Hong Kong calls for participation in important historical events in Hong Kong, the priests and lay Catholics often follow, even if it may sometimes be a kind of “submissive participation” (fucong xing canyu 服从性参与) out of respect for the authority of the church leaders. But their sense of social justice is grounded in church teachings. So even if the current bishop is more conservative, the potential for social activism is still there.

FIGURE 4: The current and previous bishops’ views on political engagement

NOTE: This question asks the respondents about the extent to which the current and previous bishops of their jurisdiction each believed in the political engagement of the Church, with 1 as “not very important,” 2 as “not important,” 3 as “important,” and 4 as “very important.”

Our interviewees in Macau agree that the role of the bishop is important and acknowledge that it is hard to say what specific roles they play in civic activism. One interviewee expressed his sense of helplessness when young Catholics expected him to take a more active leading role in civic engagement. He mentioned that it is the Bishop, the leader of the Church, who is supposed to instruct or give permission to act on issues of social justice in Macau (Interview #1 with a priest, June 15, 2012). Apparently priests in Macau do not think that they can do much without the Bishop giving the go-ahead.
Our interviewees in Taipei are critical of the bishops for their lack of civic activism, too. As one of them commented,

Around the time of the lifting of martial law, the Bishops Council wrote us a letter calling on believers not to take to the street to create trouble. They wanted us foreign Catholic orders to sign the letter. I was so unhappy that I said bad words about the bishop. A Swedish priest said to me that it was their country’s affairs, and we foreigners should not interfere….

The previous bishop used to pay lip service to social justice, saying, “Good, good. I support you and will pray for you. God bless you.” But he did not give us money, nor personnel [to support our activity in social justice]… Only talk. (Taipei Interview #12, with a Belgian priest, January 15, 2013)

There is some change in the Diocese of Taipei but it is still not used to criticizing the government. The situation is the same in Shanghai. As one of our interviewees says:

The Catholic Church is a well-organized religious organization with relatively strong disciplines. Usually the priests and nuns will keep pace with the Bishop, and the laity will keep pace with the priests. The laity usually will not go their own way in civic engagement. In social services and civic activism, the majority of the laity will follow the Bishop and the priests. If the latter do not want to actively participate in social services, the former will not do much, either. (Interview with a priest from the Shanghai Catholic Church, July 12, 2012)

It must be added that most of the time government regulations may not be a definite no to some church initiatives, but the church may decide not to do it because of the larger circumstances and of church inertia. As one interviewee comments:

The government has no clear regulations against the church’s engagement in social services, but the Shanghai Catholic Church’s engagement in social services is very limited. To be more exact, there are very few formally registered church organizations of social services in the field of education, elderly care, and health care. But there are quite a few activities of informal services of the elderly, the sick, and other disadvantaged groups. The relevant government departments have no clear regulation limiting the church’s social services, but they do not seem to encourage them, either. To formally register a social service organization, you have to go through many hurdles. (Interview with a priest from the Shanghai Catholic Church, July 15, 2012)
In the literature review, we also mentioned the importance of laity. We know that lay Catholics have played a very important role in political activism in both Hong Kong and Macau. Martin Lee Chu-ming, a Catholic, veteran lawyer, former legislator and chairman of the Democratic Party in Hong Kong, was a strong advocate of freedom, democracy, and human rights, and was instrumental in Hong Kong’s democracy movement. He believes that he was fulfilling a mission from God and does whatever he believes is the right thing to do (Zhizhun luying, 2001).

Antonio Ng Kuok Cheong, a Catholic and a directly elected legislator, has been instrumental in Macau’s democracy movement. Ng received his secondary school education in Yuet Wah College, a Catholic school run by the Salesian Order, a male religious organization originating from Italy, and later studied in the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He actively participated in the activities of Hong Kong Federation of Catholic Students. Another directly elected legislator in Macau, Paul Chan Wai Chi, worked closely with Ng and won a third seat in the Legislative Assembly for the democratic political camp in 2009. (He lost his reelection in 2013.) He is also a graduate from the Yuet Wah College and has earned an undergraduate degree in religious studies granted by the Pontifical Urbaniana University.

But if the Bishop and the laity in Hong Kong influenced one another, that is not the case in Macau. The laity, at least the democratic part of it, does not seem to have much influence on the clergy. The interaction, however, does exist everywhere and some influence can be felt. One of the episodes in the resistance against the government control of the Catholic Church in Shanghai in the 1950s is telling about the interaction between laity and clergy. The government required the members of the Legion of Mary to register. One of the problems was that the Legion was termed as a “reactionary” group on the registration form. Most Legionaries refused to register. Later the government compromised and removed the word “reactionary.” Bishop Kung began to think that the Legionaries could now register. But the latter still refused: they preferred prison to registration. Bishop Kung then changed his mind and returned to his former position of no compromise (Mariani 2011:92-93).

The Hong Kong Catholic Church’s Justice and Peace Commission told us the story of how they influenced the current Bishop in his position on the way the Church should involve itself in the election committee for the Chief Executive (Interview with the Hong Kong Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, June 28, 2013). The bishop had thought that the Church could be a formal member of the election committee. But the Commission believed that formal involvement in the election committee would mean that the Church was endorsing its practice, which the church was not. So the Bishop agreed to continue the practice of allowing individual members to join the committee informally, rather than sending formal representatives.
Our interviewee in Taipei said that he would like to help the needy in his parish by opening the church for marriage ceremonies and funerals for non-Catholics, and the caring of their mentally disordered, but the laity in his parish resisted the effort. Another priest commented that the laity in his parish were very conservative. If he called on them to take to the street for a certain issue, half of them would leave the church (Interview #4, with a Korean priest, January 15, 2013; and Interview #11, with a Taiwanese priest, February 6, 2013). Apparently, the role of the clergy and the laity, especially their interaction, is very important in determining the direction of their civic engagement, whether it is progressive or conservative.

Conclusion: The Political, Cultural, and Individual Opportunity Structures

First of all, our analytical model of political, cultural and individual opportunity structures posits that an open or closed political system offers more or less opportunity for the Catholic Church to engage in social services and civic activism. This openness or closedness is indicated by the looser or stricter state regulations, the stability of the elites in the government, the existence or nonexistence of allies in the government, and the capability and propensity of the state to repress dissent.

Our research findings indicate that in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taipei, the political opportunity structure is much more open than in Shanghai. This is partly why their level of social service is high. The political opportunities in Shanghai are especially limited, so their levels of social service and civic activism are especially low. The fate of Bishop Ma Daqin is an obvious example of this limitedness. The capability and propensity to suppress dissent is high. But the bishop is at least not imprisoned, unlike before, although he is not allowed to resume normal work, either. There might be different opinions within the governing elite as to what to do with this kind of dissent. But the political structure premise does not really explain the Macau and Taipei cases very well in terms of their civic activism, the levels of which are low in both dioceses although the political opportunity structure is largely open. This apparently has to do with the other two factors.

So secondly, our analytical model posits also that Chinese culture, local culture, and local Catholic culture all influence the extent of civic engagement. Again this factor explains the fairly high level of social services by the Catholic Church in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan: these cultures open plenty of opportunities for support of social services. In these cultures, there are also plenty of tools for civic activism. The Hong Kong diocese seems to have used them well. The Chinese and Catholic hierarchical culture has enabled the Catholic leaders there to mobilize their advocacy for democracy. The Church has also practiced Vatican II teachings to a greater extent. And it meshes well with the local civil society culture.
But this is not true with the Macau and Taipei dioceses. They have all these tools, too, but they choose not to use them much. For the Shanghai Diocese, state control seems too tight for church members to use the cultural tools they possess for either social services or civic activism, but it does not mean that they have no opportunities for services and activism at all. The cultural factor helps us understand to a great extent the civic engagement of these dioceses. But there is more.

So thirdly, there is the individual factor. The hierarchical culture of Catholicism makes the role of the Catholic leaders especially important. Believers would follow Bishop Zen in civic activism even if they might not have really liked what the Bishop wanted them to do. The bishop’s role was instrumental in leading the Hong Kong Catholics’ civic activism. The bishops in Macau and Taipei choose not to follow Bishop Zen’s example, but there are opportunities for individuals to make these choices. Opportunities for laity are also available. Some choose to engage in civic activity, like Martin Lee and Antonio Ng; others choose not to. But they have a choice. In Shanghai, the situation is not clear. Individuals can choose, but they have to face consequences of their choices, like Bishop Ma, who is still under confinement for his speech at his ordination mass. But the importance of the role of bishops, clergy and laity in social service and civic activism is clear. And there is often plenty of room for them to maneuver, although some (in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) may have more leeway than others (Shanghai).

Finally, we want to emphasize the importance of interaction between the three opportunity structures. Political structure is undergirded by culture, and they reinforce one another. For example, traditional Chinese culture is more likely to support an authoritarian state. But since culture is becoming more diversified and modernized, political structure ceases to be a solid mass. It is also beginning to change. Chan and Zhou (2013), for example, discuss “fragmented authoritarianism” and discrepancies between the image of a coherent state and the actual practices of its multiple parts. The authoritarian state may move toward democratization, as in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, even in mainland China. A more open political opportunity structure also influences the cultural opportunity structure, providing more tools for civil society organizations to choose from. This means that civic engagement by the Catholic Church is in flux, and can increase or decrease based on the changing nature of the political and cultural opportunities.

Furthermore, Individuals are no doubt influenced by these opportunity structures, but they also play a part in changing them. Bishops Zen and Ma are obviously trying to change these opportunities. Other bishops, clergy and laity are also playing a part in this, whether it is an active or passive part, they are nonetheless involved. Even in Shanghai, there might be more possibilities for social services and civic activism than the Church thinks. That is the dynamic we want to capture in our analytical model of political, cultural, and individual opportunity structures.
To sum up, in this paper, we reviewed the literature on the sociology of religion and social movements that informed our model of analysis and explained our methods of research. We then reported our findings from a research project on the Catholic Church’s civic engagement as defined by social services and civic activism in the four dioceses of Hong Kong, Macau, Taipei, and Shanghai. We found that Hong Kong, Macau, and Taipei dioceses have been outstanding in their social services, but Shanghai is lacking. Hong Kong is outstanding in civic activism as well, but the other three dioceses are lacking. We found that it is difficult to explain the phenomena by using only one theory, either the religious market theory, or a social movement theory. So we used an integrative model of analysis: the political, cultural, and individual opportunity structures. No single factor in this model can explain the differences among the four dioceses. It is the combination of these factors that can help us explain the phenomenon to a great extent.

We believe that our analytical model has raised some interesting premises. We hope that more research will be done in the future to use the same model to further understand not only the relationship between Catholicism and civil society but also the relationship between other religions and civil society by using the same model. It should be both quantitative and qualitative, and historical and comparative not only between areas in greater China but between China and other countries of the world. This should shed light not only on the sociology of religion, but on social movement theories as well.

References


