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A Study of Foreign Policy Analysis Framework in Germany’s Energy Policy of the Post-Cold War Era*

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Abstract

This paper re-examines the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) with regards to the security of energy relations between Germany and Russia, understood as specific foreign policy actions—that is, “products” of foreign policy decisions. It attempts to explain why Germany consistently sought better relations with Russia, partially with the aim of securing energy
supplies. Drawing on Walter Carlsnaes’s identified lack of integrative and dynamic models that convincingly include both types of variables—structures and actors in a dynamic fashion—this study offers a link between the FPA and energy policy.

The paper focuses on the years from the 1990s through to the present, across various segments of the German government, and explores major values and objectives of German energy policy. German energy policy is intrinsic to German-Russian relations, and places particular emphasis on the Nord Stream 1 pipeline. Our research indicates that the linear sequence, as proposed by Carlsnaes himself (structure—disposition—intention—action), can be conducive in bringing about favourable conditions for further actions following the same path.

**Key Words:** energy security, foreign policy, Nord Stream, Germany, Russia
I. Introduction

This paper revisits the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) vis-à-vis energy security relations between Germany and Russia. In particular, it looks at the natural gas pipeline Nord Stream (NS1) as a specific foreign policy action—a “product” of foreign policy decision-making.

The FPA faces a particular methodological conundrum: an agency—structure problem. Accordingly, all explanations within this framework highlight the significance of either one or the other: agency (actorness) over structure, or structure over agency (actorness). Scholars such as Walter Carlsnaes (1992) have called attention to the lack of integrative and dynamic models that convincingly include both types of variables—structures and actors—in a dynamic fashion. Carlsnaes himself addresses this problem by proposing a simple tripartite analytic framework based on progressive logics. He commences with the structural dimension, which is understood to operate on the deepest level. Structure in this regard includes various types of factors, such as domestic, international, social, cultural, economic or material. These factors create a specific environment in which the actors operate. Importantly, such defined factors change very slowly.

Actors’ belief systems or underlying values shape their world views and therefore their cognition. This constitutes an intermediary level, also referred to as the depositional dimension. Beliefs and values are somewhat more changeable than structural factors, but they are not as “flexible” as intentions. The last dimension logically preceding an FPA, according to Carlsnaes’s model, is an intentional dimension, which encompasses the specific goals and the reasoning behind a particular policy undertaking.

The authors of this paper utilise the integrative analytical FPA model by Carlsnaes with reference to NS1 (Nord Stream 1) and NS2 (Nord Stream 2). In particular, we look at the FPA (NS1) as being conducive to another foreign policy action—FPA2 (NS2). This approach will allow us in the future to address a weakness Carlsnaes
acknowledges—that his model is static because it privileges structures over agents.

In terms of structure, our general epistemological choice is “organisational behaviour” as it is by far the most suitable approach, allowing us to understand NS1 as the output of large organisations which function in accordance with regular behavioural patterns. As far as actors are concerned, our choice falls on the liberal or societal approach regarding agency (actorness) as NS1 is carried out by private companies but not by national governments.

This paper proceeds with the identification of NS1 as the output of the implementation of Carlsnaes’ linear model; this output determines the structure that becomes the first stage of the second cycle of the particular model, which could end up being conducive to NS2. In other words, NS1 is the result of Carlsnaes’ model, and later set in motion the same model via a transmission belt. Special attention is paid to the consequences of such defined action and the influence exerted on the very structural dimension that underpinned the original decision leading to NS1. It is claimed that these consequences affected the underpinning dimension such that conditions were created favouring further actions, leading to NS2.

In this respect, we identify international and domestic variables that are “underlying factors.” Next, we analyse the dispositional dimension of the NS1 by identifying particular actors involved in the related decision-making process. Subsequently, the values and belief systems of the identified actors are examined. Fourthly, the intentions of the actors are inspected, specifically their particular goals.

II. Structural Determinants-NS1

A. The Structural Determinants Towards NS1

Nord Stream is a natural gas pipeline leading from the Russian Federation (Vyborg) to Germany (Greifswald). It is owned and operated by Nord Stream AG. According to the operator, “the two
1,224-kilometre offshore pipelines are the most direct connection between the vast gas reserves in Russia and energy markets in the European Union. Combined, the twin pipelines have the capacity to transport a combined total of 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas a year to businesses and households in the EU for at least 50 years. As the project strengthens the EU energy market and reinforces the security of supply, the project has been designated as being of ‘European interest’ by the European Parliament and Council” (Nord Stream, n.d.). The preparatory work for the project started in 1997 and the official inauguration occurred in November 2011 (over the intervening fourteen years the stakeholder structure evolved significantly).

At a domestic level, it is evident that energy is not just any commodity. Energy is the commodity of strategic significance for national development, which makes it relevant to the stability of the international system. Every country treats energy security, usually defined as the reliable and affordable supply of energy on a continuing uninterrupted basis, as an integral part of its grand strategy (Deutche, Schlesinger, & Victor, 2006: 3).

A reliable and affordable source of energy is of particular strategic importance for Germany, perhaps more so than for other members of the EU given its export-oriented economic model, which relies on the production of manufactured goods.

In an international context, four factors are particularly worth mentioning as they contribute to systemic structural underpinnings and are of a fundamental character. For these reason, we will refer to them as “underlying reorientations.” The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union led to the end of the narrow paradigm of realist thinking (Wallerstein, 2000: 265). This change in (global) politics facilitated the acceleration of the processes of globalisation, especially in the economic domain where the “Washington Consensus” (WC) solidified its status as the new standard. The peace dividend, heralded after the end of the Cold War, allowed a market-based
approach to dominate numerous aspects of politics, including matters relating to international relations (Davies, 2014: 6). The third factor is European integration and its institutional emanation—the European Union (EU). As a structural factor, the EU is by far the most visible embodiment of liberal institutionalism to date. Its comparative advancement regarding economic cooperation makes it one of the strongest economic players in the contemporary world.

Last but not least, we should bear in mind the nature of the energy resources at our disposal. In this respect, oil has for years remained the primary resource for our constantly energy-thirsty economies. For 2016, the International Energy Agency (IEA) forecast a worldwide average demand of nearly 96 million barrels of oil and liquid fuels per day—more than 35 billion barrels a year (International Energy Agency, n.d.). According to its Medium-Term Oil Market Report 2016, global demand will surpass the 100 mb/d threshold at some point between 2019 and 2020 (2016: 9). Consequently, for most EU members, some of the most developed economies in the world, gas has become an increasingly important element in their energy mix. For this reason alone, Russia has emerged, given its geographical location and rich energy resources, as the EU’s single most important oil and gas provider (Aalto, 2008: 26).

B. Dispositions

Energy is not just an ordinary commodity for Germany, but a prerequisite for the country’s economic growth and social stability. Germany was devastated in World War Two (WW2), and endured a lengthy process of recovery. The 1990s brought another challenge, national reunification, whereby economic growth and social stability became ultimate values for public policies, and the maintenance thereof became an essential duty of the country’s political leadership.
This has resulted in the conceptualisation of energy security as “public welfare.” In its ruling referring to the provisions of the 1965 “Act on the Minimum Storage of Mineral Oil Products,” the German Federal Constitutional Court argued that energy security falls within the “interest of most public concern” (Kuhne, 2004: 338-339).

As a result, economic interests have become increasingly prominent in the definition of state interests. Consequently, the private sector, in combination with political leadership, determines the preferences of sovereign states. This has undoubtedly been the German approach to energy security, especially because Germany has long sought to identify itself as an economic giant, rather than a global actor playing an important role in international relations via the projection of hard power.

However, following the 1998 federal elections and the coming to power of the coalition government led by Gerhard Schröder, the German disposition towards energy security underwent a significant shift because the newly-elected Chancellor’s interpretation of the concept of energy security differed from the traditional market-based approach. In particular, Schröder believed Germany’s dependence on energy imports called for powerful and competitive energy companies at the international level, and a more assertive energy policy. Also, he understood energy security regarding a state mandate that should not be left solely in the hands of private players, especially when the latter was unable to provide energy security efficiently amid large infrastructure projects (Westphal, 2008: 99-102).

Furthermore, Schröder strongly believed that not only was a strong Russia preferable to a weak Russia, but also that the Russian state, despite all its flaws, was the only guarantee of stability in Russia. For the Social-Democrat Chancellor, a stable and therefore reliable Russia was logically crucial as an economic partner. Hence, in 2001, Schröder published an article in Die Zeit (a German national weekly newspaper, considered highbrow, centrist and
liberal) wherein he re-affirmed his preference for unilateral policies in the name of German national interests and identified Russia as the focal point of the EU-Eastern policy. Furthermore, he labelled Germany as the “main initiator and motor of the European Union’s policy towards Russia” (Timmins, 2006: 308-310).

According to Chivvis, during the 2000s, the re-emergence of the concept of equidistance (Äquidistanz) arose between Moscow and Washington. Prominent political figures within the SPD, such as Martin Schulz and Peter Struck, Schröder’s former minister of defence, advocated that Berlin should consider its relationships with Moscow and Washington as being of equal importance (Chivvis & Rid, 2009: 109). In the same vein, Peter Struck, Gerhard Schröder’s former minister of defence, who represented the re-emergence of the concept of Äquidistanz between Moscow and Washington, had accordingly asserted on numerous occasions that “Germany should have the same proximity to America on the one hand and Russia on the other.” All in all, however, as Chivvis (2009: 109-110) notes, there are no fundamental differences between the views of major German political parties’ vis-à-vis Russia.

Concurrently, German leaders expected Moscow to continue playing an incremental role in the EU’s energy security landscape, particularly in Germany. The rest of the EU seemed to take a similar view. In the opening years of the 21st century, EU-Russia energy relations reached their peak comfort level. In 2000, Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission published a report in which he set the goal of doubling the EU gas imports from Russia by 2020 (as cited in Chow, 2013). According to German calculations, Russia would be increasingly important in the national and the European energy mix. The German disposition was grounded in a widespread belief that Moscow had been a reliable energy partner even during the most difficult times of the Cold War, and there was nothing to signify a change in Russian intentions.

Towards the early 2000s, Germany became increasingly dissatisfied with how the EU handled the EU energy security and
external relations. When, in 1999, the European Council published the “EU Common Strategy on Russia,” the strategy the EU adopted was largely a disappointment in the eyes of Berlin, as the EU position did not articulate a coherent strategy towards Russia. Instead, it was declaratory, offering little in the way of a common denominator between the disparate agendas of the EU Member States. According to Timmins (2006), the resulting disappointment from the failure of the EU Common Strategy on Russia to articulate a solid EU stance had a negative impact on the foreign policy thinking on Russia among the members of the Schröder government. As has been analysed above, Russia was too big to be dealt with entirely within the incoherent EU framework. Consequently, Berlin started to think of its relations with the Kremlin at a bilateral level as well (Timmins, 2006: 306-307).

The third issue regarding German dispositions that needs to be examined refers to the German conceptualisation of EU energy security strategy. As Kundnani (2011) notes, after reunification, the German political elites ceased to perceive EU integration as an existential imperative. Gradually, they identified their economic interests increasingly in national rather than European terms, predictably moving away from Kohl’s Atlanticism (Kundnani, 2011: 34-36).

A milestone for the German disposition towards EU energy security came with the launch of the EU energy security debate and the publication of the 2000 Green Paper on Energy Security. Although Germany had downplayed the strategic dimension of energy security, the EU had been increasingly interested in initiating a discussion on ensuring diversification of energy supply and also establishing a common European strategy. The latter, however, failed to materialise and energy security remained mostly in the hands of national governments (European Commission, 2000: 21-26, 48).

At the same time, there was growing German dissatisfaction with the EU energy market liberalisation process, which would open
the German energy market to foreign companies. Following the 1998 Energy Act, the German energy market was thrown open to competition, and this resulted in increasing pressures on domestic companies. Soon, however, Germany started criticising the lack of reciprocity as several important EU energy markets, including the French, were reluctant to follow suit (Westphal, 2008: 99-100). As a result, German thinking on energy security strategy became more hard-headed, and to an extent self-contradictory: operating within the context of the European energy security strategy, but at the same time outside the European framework.

C. Intentions

Following the 1998 federal elections in Germany, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder set a different set of goals with respect to German relations with Russia and the national energy security agenda. His intentions can be encapsulated in what is called the “Germany first policy,” which seeks to give absolute priority to national interests and economics as opposed to shared EU goals and politics. Therefore, Schröder intended to ensure energy security for his country by ensuring the profitability of the German energy companies (Westphal, 2008: 117).

Schröder’s aspirations regarding energy security, however, departed from traditional market-based notions of energy security that had dominated German energy policy-making for so long. All in all, the new German coalition government (the SPD and the Greens) was not solely interested in allowing German energy companies to pursue their corporate interests, but it intended to actively contribute to the implementation of a more active energy security. Towards this end, Schröder and members of the German government, such as Frank-Walter Steinmeier, sought a more active role for Germany that would allow further penetration of Russia and Central Asia, which also had abundant resources. The cornerstone of this approach was the establishment of the energy alliance with
Moscow—an idea proposed by Vladimir Putin in 2001 (Rahr, 2007: 139-141).

Facing a closely interconnected and highly competitive global political and economic landscape, Germany intended to respond to the growing challenges facing the German economy through the establishment of national energy companies that would be competitive with other energy giants. This was reflected in the intervention of Schröder’s close ally Alfred Hacked, from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, who finalized the merger between E.ON and Ruhrgas after the Federal Cartel Office had blocked it. By the same token, Schröder displayed a strong interest in securing for German energy companies a position in the Nord Stream project (Westphal, 2008: 99).

Not surprisingly, the German energy industry maintained clear intentions to foster close relations with Gazprom. Towards this end, just when Gazprom was considering alternative options for transporting gas exports to Europe, German corporations had a preference for a northern route that would bring gas directly to Germany via the Baltic Sea, that is to say, NS1. When it was suggested to Gazprom, E.ON, and BASF that they could choose the expansion of the Yamal-Europe route, the three firms were unwilling to undertake the high financial risk of a hold-up in transit states whose gas demand was projected to stay low. Instead, they preferred a more expensive, but direct, pipeline to Germany (Abdelal, 2013: 437-438). Once involved, the companies sought political support from the Schröder government because they did not want to provoke animosity within Germany or from other EU Member States. Consequently, the German political and corporate leaders intended to make some concessions to “de-securitize” the NS1 project.

By the same token, German companies were ready to align with their Russian counterparts against EU institutions to protect their joint corporate interests. For instance, Wingas and Gazprom appeared aligned in a meeting with the European Energy
Commissioner in 2004 on the issue of access to European energy markets. Moreover, German companies sought to penetrate the Russian market further, and to exploit trade and investment opportunities. Wintershall was, for instance, involved in the development of gas fields in western Siberia in 2003. Furthermore, in April 2006, Gazprom and BASF signed a swap deal that provisioned that Gazprom would increase its stake in the Wingas energy trading arm of BASF up to 50%. Moreover, BASF, through its Wintershall subsidiary, would acquire a share of almost 25% in a vast Siberian natural gas field, the Yuzhno-Russkoye deposit, one of the largest untapped fields, with a capacity of 500 to 700 bcm, enough to cover German gas consumption for five years (Kramer, 2006; Westphal, 2008: 103-105).

D. The outcome of NS1

NS1 became operational in 2011 and offered an alternative route to 55 bcm of gas flows from Russia to Germany. The establishment of such pipeline conflicted with the internal as well as the external EU energy security strategies, both of which aimed at mitigating the risks stemming from the high EU dependence on Russian gas by reducing the share of Russian gas in the EU energy mix.

The internal EU energy security strategy aimed at establishing an open and interconnected European gas market that would immunize the EUMS from gas supply disruption. To this end, the EU had published the 1st and the 2nd Gas Directive that aimed at opening up the gas market by increasing cooperation and unbundling the EU gas market. On the other hand, however, the 2nd Directive introduced an additional exemption clause in Article 22 according to which new infrastructure projects could be excluded from the provisions under certain vague conditions which referred to the importance of the infrastructure. Therefore, the European Commission turned a blind eye to the enforcement of the 2nd
energy liberalisation package, which was in force when Nord Stream 1 was proposed, as well as the 3rd liberalisation package, which came into force during the construction of the pipeline. As a result, unbundling, tariff regulation or third-party access regulations were not enforced while Nord Stream did not even apply for exemptions (Riley, 2016: 5-8).

Similarly, the external dimension of the EU energy security strategy aimed at mitigating the risks associated with greater dependence on Russian gas by reducing the share of Russian gas in the EU energy mix, and also by promoting closer interaction with Moscow. In this context, the 2006 Green Paper stressed the political and economic dangers that emanate from the large share of Russian gas in the EU energy mix. The same year, in the EC Communication to the European Council entitled “External Energy Relations-from principles to action,” the EC provided a thorough analysis of the main goals of its external energy security which would give priority to dealing with Moscow. In the following years, the EU documents such as the 2014 EU Energy Security Strategy addressed the issue of reducing gas supply risks that largely stemmed from high dependence on Russian gas and also on Ukraine as a gas transit country (European Commission, n.d.).

An additional parameter that we need to take into consideration when examining the structural issues that set in motion the German decision is declining gas production in Europe and the limited options for alternative sources for gas imports. In particular, European gas production probably peaked in 2010 with projections for lower gas production being mainly attributed to declining investment and gas production in Norway, the second biggest gas supplier of the EU (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016).

In parallel, alternative sources of gas supply entailed significant market and geopolitical risks. A possible alternative gas supplier could be North Africa, whose proved reserves of natural gas were calculated at approximately 6.8 trillion cubic meters (tcm) in 2013. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, though, the situations in two of
the most important gas producers, Egypt and Libya, remain highly unstable and as a result, investment environment has been bleak, which proves detrimental to upgrading the region’s role in European energy mix (Dickel et al., 2014: 17-21).

More recently, Eastern Mediterranean countries have emerged as a very promising gas supplier that could help the EU reduce dependence from Russia. In 2009 vast gas resources were discovered, and since then a number of gas development projects have gotten underway that involve Jordan, Israel, Egypt, and Cyprus, among others. Eastern Mediterranean gas could serve as an alternative source of gas for Europe, as the region is estimated to have 1(tcm) gas reserves (US Energy Information Administration, 2013). The conditions, though, are far from rosy as there are serious territorial disputes and geopolitical challenges between the neighbouring countries that need to be solved.

Similarly, the Caspian Sea region has for years been an appealing gas supplier for Europe, and there have been discussions with littoral states on energy cooperation dating back to the 1990s.

In 2012, EIA projected that there were approximately 8.7 tcm of natural gas in proved and probable reserves within the basins that make up the Caspian Sea and surrounding area (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013). For more than a decade, the EU has been engaging the Caspian Sea gas producers, in particular, in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, yet the results have been limited. After lengthy negotiations, the EU has introduced the Southern Gas Corridor that is projected to bring approximately 10bcm/year to South Europe, a project that is in line with the EU diversification strategy, but it is far from being considered a game-changer.

At the same time, transit risks due to instability in Ukraine and the tensions in the relationship between Russia and Ukraine undermined the reliability of the major gas transportation route in the eyes of Germany. This became clear during the 2009 gas crisis and the 2014 Russia-Ukraine war. To this end, NS1 offered a secure route for German energy imports from Russia, away from Ukraine,
and it served as a beacon for the future energy security strategy of the German leadership.

All in all, the construction of NS1 was not in line with the aspiration of the EU external energy security strategy, and it undermined the capabilities of the EU vis-à-vis Moscow. While the specific pipeline addressed a major structural energy supply risk, that is to say, the heavy reliance on unstable Ukraine as a transit country, it did not contribute to the second goal of the EU external energy strategy, which is a more diversified energy mix. As a result, although the market share of Russian fell from almost 34.6% in 2005 to approximately 26.7%, ten years later, this development was reversed and a relative peak of 32.4% was recorded in 2013, underscoring the fact that EU remains heavily dependent gas flows from Russia (Eurostat, n.d.).

More importantly, the construction of NS1 watered down the effectiveness of the EU diversification strategy, and served as a buffer for European plans to reduce dependence on Russian gas. On the other hand, it ensured access to Russian gas for German consumers regardless of any pitfalls in the EU energy strategy or future problems in the relations between Moscow and the West. Against this backdrop, Russian gas imports remained of paramount importance, and consequently, Germany had to maintain the same strategy of ensuring the continuation of steady gas flows to maintain the growth of the German economy.

III. Dispositions

A. The Dominant Role of Geoeconomics

For Germany, energy security has been one of the three key objectives of German energy policy together with economic efficiency and environmental compatibility and a prerequisite to economic growth (Geden, Marcelis, & Maurer, 2006: 9). German values regarding national interest have been encapsulated by what Edward Luttwak (1990: 17-23) coined the “rise of geo-economics”
and the consequent displacement of geopolitics in international affairs. Luttwak assures us that state policy is determined at the micro-level by a wide array of actors including politicians, bureaucrats and companies.

As a result, Berlin has been moving gradually from its past and consequent Moralpolitik towards a much more practical, narrower and economy-focused outlook tantamount to geo-economics (Szabo, 2015: 7-9). This new conceptualisation of foreign policy is characterised by the distinctive feature of national interests defined in economic terms. Correspondingly, the dominance of business, especially export-oriented business, elevates economic interests above all other types, resulting in a shift from multilateralism to selective multilateralism. In this context, Germany is willing to align with European multilateral resource diplomacy for as long as it does not harm its national energy interests.

In parallel, German industry—which traditionally plays a prominent role in national energy security—tends to consist of enterprises which, regardless of their legal form, are profit-driven (obliged by their shareholders to make money, disregarding geopolitical calculations). Effectively, despite the undeniable political and security dimensions to the energy policy, companies such as E.ON or Wintershall see the energy security landscape primarily from a commercial perspective rather than in abstract geopolitical terms. It should also be remembered that German industrialists (for example the Ost-Anschluss and the Confederation of German Industry) have for quite some time cultivated close relationships with their Russian partners (Szabo, 2015: 7-9; Whist, 2008: 14-15).

B. German Dispositions Towards Russia

The German view of Russia has also been shaped by the long-standing belief that a cooperative approach would democratise Russia and bring it closer to the West, thereby facilitating peace and
stability. For decades now, German foreign policy towards Moscow has been based on the dispositional premises of Ostpolitik, according to which security in Europe is better served when Russia is approached as a partner rather than as an adversary. Meister (2015) argues that this perception can be traced back to the pacification of the post-WWII German political elites as well as to German remorse for the mass murders committed by German troops on Russian soil in WW2. The German political elites had traditionally believed that the isolation of Russia should be avoided at all costs, and that in many respects a strong Russia would be a better partner than a weak Russia.

The German dispositions remained unchanged after Angela Merkel came to power in 2005. Chancellor Merkel Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a close aide to Schröder and Merkel’s first foreign minister, was eager to support EU integration, but they supported the basic principles of the German policy towards Russia (Speck, 2015). This is the result of a deeply embedded perception among the political elites of the country that the need for continuity in German foreign policy. As a result, even when Chancellor Merkel took a leading role in the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and led the push for EU sanctions against Kremlin, the German dispositions towards Russia, especially from the political and corporate elites remained essentially unchanged.

Concerning the former, it did not mean that Berlin labelled Moscow an untrustworthy energy partner. Following the 2006 and 2009 gas crisis, there were two interpretations prevailing in Europe about the nature of the crisis and the role of Russia as an energy supplier. The first interpretation suggested that Russia was an unreliable energy partner that would use energy as a political weapon, and was widely held by Central and Eastern European governments, as well as by the US leadership. Interestingly, this position was also espoused by some Germans. According to 2008 Financial Times/Harris Polls, after the 2006 Ukraine gas crisis, 59% of Germans considered Russia to be an unreliable energy supplier,
and 69% preferred that their country should not import Russian gas (Abdelal, 2013: 435). Similarly, scholars and independent experts, such as Frank Umbach at The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), expressed their concerns about the risks of German over-dependence on Russian gas, warning that Moscow might well use energy for political leverage. Again, such fears about Russia were dismissed by most political, bureaucratic and corporate elites, based on Russia’s “proven track record” as a gas supplier (Duffield, 2009: 4289-4290).

The second narrative regarding Russia proposes that the real problem was rather on the Ukrainian side because Ukraine was “troublesome” as a transit country. Among the outstanding supporters of this position was the executive leadership of the German energy companies as well as the majority of bureaucratic elites and politicians, these chiefly representing the SPD (Abdelal, 2013: 437-438).

It is therefore interesting to note that although there are fears about possible new gas supply disruption, Berlin has not fundamentally changed its disposition towards Moscow. It is arguable that this may demonstrate the German disposition to distance its national energy needs from the EU energy security, and help us to identify the roots of possible supply problems concerning the “Ukrainian lack of reliability” rather than the intentions of Moscow. All in all, it appears that existing German fears regarding the security of gas supply have not been correlated with any mistrust towards Russia, at least concerning its intentions to deliver the agreed gas volumes.

Similarly, German energy companies see Russia as a reliable, long-standing partner. One needs to keep in mind that the first Ruhrgas-Gazprom contract dates to 1973 while Wintershall and Gazprom established their first of several joint ventures in 1993. The common denominator in the narrative which was adopted by German companies, even after the 2006 and the 2009 gas crisis, was that Gazprom (and by extension, Moscow) constituted a reliable
energy partner that had always fulfilled its contractual obligations. In parallel, they interpreted the 2006 and the 2009 gas crisis as commercial disputes between Russia and Ukraine that did not affect the credibility of Gazprom (Abdelal, 2013: 435-438). As a result, there was a jointly held positive disposition about Moscow and the prospects of maintaining a close partnership with Russian energy companies.

The main concerns on the part of the German political and corporate elites have been more technical—whether Gazprom would be able to provide the necessary gas quantities to Europe despite its best intentions. Aside from exporting vast amounts of gas, Russia has been using gas for half of its domestic electricity generation, and therefore selling gas at a significant discount, thereby encouraging energy overconsumption. Additionally, the prospects of developing new natural gas fields, for example in the Yamal Peninsula or the Shtokman in the Barents Sea, were rather gloomy. According to Stern (2009: 2), Moscow was facing a lack of “future supply roadmap” as the three most important gas fields in Russia have been declining since the early 2000s whereas the 2001-2008 gas field development program has done nothing more than stabilise the total gas production. Furthermore, the deteriorating economic conditions of Gazprom had a negative impact on the company’s investment outlook (Chivvis & Rid, 2009: 110-111).

C. German Dispositions Towards EU Energy Security

Despite its strong commitment to European integration, at least in verbal terms, during the 2000s Germany became gradually discontented with how the EU handled energy security. All in all, Berlin appears to support the idea of a more coherent energy strategy, yet it is somewhat pessimistic when it comes to the effectiveness of the EU energy cooperation, which could lead to guaranteed energy security for the Germans.
This disappointment can be partially attributed to German disappointment concerning the implementation of the EU Gas Directives and the subsequent progress of the EU gas market liberalisation process. Responding to the provisions of the 1st Gas Directive, Germany, along with six more countries committed themselves to fully opening their gas markets by 2008, while other EUMS including France, Portugal, Belgium, and Denmark projected an adoption rate of less than 50% by the same period (Directorate General for Energy and Transport, 2000: 2-22). This had further exacerbated German discontent and distrust with the EU energy security strategy.

Concerning the external dimension of the EU energy security strategy, Berlin does not consider the EU Institutions or EU Member States as its competitors; on the contrary, it claims to support the idea of a more coherent energy strategy, yet it is rather pessimistic when it comes to the effectiveness of the EU energy cooperation, which could lead to guaranteed energy security for the Germans.

This pessimism was further reinforced by the dispositions of other EUMS which, influenced by the establishment of NS1, approached their energy security interests from a rather unilateral perspective. As a result, responding to the emergence of Russian resource nationalism that became apparent with the 2006 and the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis, as well as when in 2007 two Russian submarines planted a Russian flag at the bottom of the resource-rich Arctic Ocean, individual EUMS such as Greece, France, and Bulgaria, viewed their energy security from a national angle, and therefore they attempted to strike privileged energy agreements with Moscow (Maltby, 2013: 439).

D. German Dispositions Towards Nord Stream 1

Once Germany decided to proceed with the NS1 pipeline project, there was a widespread belief that it was indeed a European project that did not, and would not, undermine EU energy security.
Both the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his successor Angela Merkel, as well as Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who served at that time as Schröder’s Chief of Cabinet and later as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Merkel’s government, have repeatedly stressed that Nord Stream was a genuinely pan-European project and have called on the other EU Member States to support it (Whist, 2008: 12-13).

What is more, the launch of the particular project sparked different reactions among EUMS. At a national level, the construction of Nord Stream 1 Poland, in turn, a member of the so-called Visegrad Group of Central European states which also includes Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. The most memorable instance of discontent took place in 2006 when the then Minister of Defence Radosław Sikorski called the agreement between Russia and Germany for the construction of Nord Stream pipeline a throwback to the “Molotov-Ribbentrop” pact, referring to the security ramifications of that project for his country (Euobserver, 2006).

The statement reflects the Polish disposition towards NS1 and energy security. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, in 2007 and 2014, characterised Polish dependence to Russian gas imports as the greatest external threat to national security. The Polish government has identified growing importance of the economic dimension of energy security, and it has constantly stressed the use of energy as a political weapon by some states, implicitly referring to Russia. The importance of the geopolitical dimension of energy security is further emphasised by the Polish government underscoring challenges stemming from the lack of diversification of energy supplies (National Security Bureau, 2007: 6-8). Similarly, the 2014 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland recognizes access to energy resources, as well as diversification of energy supplies and transit routes, as the most important factors of energy security (National Security Bureau, 2014: 15).
What is more, other countries were inclined to follow the paradigm of Germany and establish similar pipeline networks, such as the proposed South Stream that would bring gas from Russia to Europe through the Black Sea. When, in April 2008, the then Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis signed on a deal to join Gazprom’s USD 16 billion pipeline project, the Greek government was interested in securing a special energy relationship with Russia as a result of the perceived special relationship with Kremlin. Similarly, in April 2015, the Syriza-led coalition government sought to ink an energy deal with President Putin that would include the construction of Turkish Stream. Such an agreement would also offer significant fee revenue that would help the cash-strapped country to meet its financial needs, and it would also serve as a bargaining chip towards its creditors (Pourzitakis, 2015).

Such diverse dispositions on behalf of EUMS, however, further weakened the external dimension of the EU energy security strategy, leading Berlin to further conceptualize its energy diplomacy at a national level. As a result, it should come as no surprise that amidst negotiations for bilateral pipeline projects such as South Stream and later the Turkish Stream, Berlin would view NS1 as a commercial project of national interest that do not contradict the EU energy security strategy or at least not more than other EUMS initiatives. In Berlin’s eyes, there was nothing wrong with Germany establishing pipelines with Russia as such a project would help EU bypass the bottleneck of Ukraine. At the same time when other countries would also seek privileges partnerships with Moscow, or they would try to deviate from the provisions of the EU regulations on energy policy.

In parallel, one needs to keep in mind that German energy executives' views of what constituted the optimum route for gas transportation were shaped by the absence of transit fees, which compensated for the additional construction cost associated with subsea pipelines. Furthermore, the strategy of E.ON and BASF was based on demand calculations, according to which, gas demand in Belarus or Poland would remain flat and hence would not justify the
additional transaction costs to be entailed if the consortium opted out of the expansion of the Yamal-Europe pipeline. In parallel, German executives were not ready to pursue a unilateral strategy which recognised the need for political support amid so sensitive an issue.

Despite the prominent role that energy companies play in the national energy landscape, German energy executives saw that without the consent of, and the coordination with, German policymakers, such a delicate project would face serious barriers. This should be seen, according to us, as an indirect acceptance on the part of the German energy industry of the salience of the political dimension of energy security. Likewise, it testifies to the necessity for action coordination between the German state and the German energy corporations (Abdelal, 2013: 431-438).

IV. Intentions
A. Ostpolitik and German-Russia Relations

German political leadership has traditionally believed that isolation of Moscow should be avoided at all costs. Subscribing to Ostpolitik philosophy, Berlin has traditionally intended to foster bilateral ties, to establish a closer personal relationship with Vladimir Putin, going even as far as searching for joint positions with Russia on international issues such as the 2003 Iraq War (Dettke, 2009: 194-195). Such initiatives were placed in the context of establishing a special relationship with the Kremlin that would bring economic benefits to German companies while at the same time “keeping Russia at bay” (Friedman, 2012). Like Schröder, many German politicians influential in foreign policy-making, including Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, expressed precisely the same intentions (Forsberg, 2016: 22-25). Furthermore, according to Chivvis and Rid, Germany has traditionally felt compelled not to take aggressive actions against Russia for historical reasons, a
tendency that has been observed throughout the Schröder period (2009: 114-115). To the contrary, the German government did feel compelled to serve as a bridge between Russia and the West, as evidenced by the article authored by Schröder himself for Die Zeit back in 2002 (Timmins, 2006: 305-312).

When Angela Merkel came to power in 2005, she intended to bring “sobriety” to the German-Russian dialogue, which had been shaped by the cordial relationship between Putin and Schröder. While the new Chancellor was willing to raise German concerns concerning Russia’s record regarding issues such as democracy and human rights, she was not willing to go too far and provoke the Kremlin by imposing sanctions. At the same time, in line with her predecessor, she recognised the importance of Russia as an economic partner and accordingly sought to bring closer commercial and economic cooperation between the two countries. This intention remained intact even in 2014 when Germany stepped up and took a leading role at the EU sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine war, as Berlin approved sanctions, but it opposed blunt sanctions and Merkel took every opportunity to negotiate with Moscow a de-escalation of the conflict.

As a result, after 2005 Berlin gave priority to the economic and energy dimension of the Germany-Russia relationship, which was evidenced by the construction of NS1 (Forsberg, 2016: 24-26). Therefore, Foreign Minister Steinmeier intended to continue, and possibly deepen, the foreign policy built on Ostpolitik (Chivvis & Rid, 2009: 108).

B. German Intentions Towards EU Energy Security

Firmly committed to pursuing German economic interests, even at the expense of common EU goals and values, the SPD/ Green government and later all the CDU-led coalition governments sought to achieve specific German energy goals. In other words, German political leadership pursued a distinct national energy security strategy. What is more, Berlin did not intend to pursue its national
energy agenda within a multilateral framework. Instead, it opted for bilateral “special” relations with countries of great interest such as Russia or/and China. At most, as Rahr puts it, Berlin was ready to follow through “selective multilateralism” (2007: 139-141).

Hence, the Schröder government perused independence when making decisions regarding energy security choices even if/when such would be regarded as a “zero-sum game” under the EU framework. This did not mean, of course, that Germany intended to sabotage the EU energy security strategy; on the contrary, Germany remained a strong supporter of closer EU integration in respect of energy security, at least in declaratory terms, yet to the extent that this would not conflict with German national interests.

When Angela Merkel formed her first coalition government back in 2005, the government was clear about its intentions regarding energy security. On the one hand, Merkel intended to pursue a more comprehensive energy agenda that would be based somewhat less on the supply of energy security and more on climate change. On the other hand, the CDU/CSU and the SPD continued its commitment to the security of energy supply. Consequently, the new government did not intend to change the basic course of action regarding energy security. This was evidenced by the decision to organise an extended Energy Summit in 2006, which called for a German “energy foreign policy” and to assign a more active role in the energy policy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Duffield, 2009: 4286). All in all, the German intentions towards the EU energy security strategy remained consistent regardless of the composition of the German government, and it has been giving priority to the national energy security goals while supporting the EU energy security agenda to the extent that it does not undermine the country’s energy needs.

C. Nord Stream 1 and Its Consequences

German leadership sought to de-securitise NS1. In particular, German political and industry leadership present NS1 as corporate
projects that were intended to serve the EU energy security needs, but also to integrate it as much as possible within the EU energy security strategy (Abdelal, 2013: 439-442). Other than that, the German approach could perhaps be described as “take it or leave it” as Berlin aimed to bring onboard other EU Member States, despite any possible intra-EU objections.

Unsurprisingly, the German corporate community intended to maintain close energy relations with Russia even in the aftermath of the 2006 and the 2009 gas crises. Despite fears about the security of supply, German energy companies did not intend to let these concerns distract from their energy plans vis-à-vis Russia. They indeed decided to support it in advance of the decisions of EU institutions. König, a member of the Board of Directors at WINGAS since 2002 and Chairman of the Management Board since 2009, was supportive of Gazprom, arguing that:

> Just after the days of the Soviet Union, the West encouraged companies to become capitalistic. Now they act as we do. Gazprom is a company, which operates just as European and US companies do. Gazprom’s decisions are driven by the same reasoning. Gazprom’s largest shareholder does not change what Gazprom’s management aims to do: to earn profits. (Abdelal, 2013: 440)

V. Conclusion

As indicated at the beginning of this paper, we have been interested in the consequences of NS1, understood as FPA. Our research indicates that the structural dimension (especially in the domestic context) of the NS1 understood as FPA1 does create favourable conditions for further actions that would follow the same path. It is, after all, the domestic context of Germany which, being export-oriented, creates the severe need of a reliable and affordable source of energy—a need that is often termed as being of “strategic importance.” As such, this structural domestic determinant influences Germany’s disposition and, by extension, its intentions.
This, according to Carlsnaes’s linear understanding, has led Germany to finalise the NS1. Let us again remember that in the German political doctrine, stable and affordable energy is understood to be a public good, and therefore one could also say that the provision of thereof constitutes a major source of the German government’s legitimacy.

Given the international-context structural dimensions—the end of the Cold War and consequent move from geopolitics to geo-economics, the processes of globalization and international competition, European integration (with its internal competition), and the move towards increasing the role of gas in energy mix amid political instability in the Middle East, we claim that it seems logical for further elements of the Carlsnaes’s model to follow suit. This consequently leads to reinforcement of intentional dimension, which is evidenced by Angela Merkel’s continuation, albeit in a slightly subtler form, of the Schröder “Germany first policy,” which seeks to give absolute priority to national interests and to economics.

The above analysis naturally has its limitations. Firstly, more attention could profitably be paid to the interaction between the international and domestic contexts of the structural dimension. Secondly, it begs for further research into the relationship between the NS1 and the proposed Nord Stream 2. As much as we claim that the Carlsnaes’s model allows for a persuasive explanation of NS1, the next step should seek to challenge the linear model, which would certainly enrich our understanding at the theoretical level.
References


德國在後冷戰時期能源政策的外交分析

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摘要

本篇文章檢驗德國與俄羅斯之間的能源外交關係。德國之所以尋求改善與俄羅斯的關係，有一部分是為了確保能源供應無虞。本研究奠基於 Walter Carlsnaes 的理論架構，整合結構與行為者這兩個變數，以分析外交政策與能源政策之連結。

本文聚焦在九〇年代至今，橫跨多個德國政府部門，探討德國能源政策的價值與目標。德國能源政策是德國與俄羅斯之間外交關係的實質，且著重在北溪天然氣管道一號線。我們的研究指出，Carlsnaes 提出的「結構—屬性—意圖—行動」直線序列，可以為進一步的行動產生有利的條件。

關鍵詞：能源安全、外交政策、北溪天然氣管道、德國、俄羅斯