Monism, Dualism, and Supervenience: A Debate on Distributive Justice

S. B. Benedict Chan
Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University

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ABSTRACT

What is the relationship between politics and morality? In this chapter, I discuss Nagel’s dualism and Murphy’s monism in depth. Both of them limit their discussions to distributive justice, but they admit that their views can apply to a more general discussion of the relationship between politics and morality. On one hand, Nagel argues that distributive justice can only be assured by nation-states because only states have *associative responsibility*; associative responsibility does not apply to any particular individual. On the other hand, Murphy argues that we should assure justice by both institutions and individuals, and only monism could explain why a person should act to assure justice in non-ideal situations. Both arguments have strengths and weaknesses. Nagel tells us how important sovereignty is, and Murphy tells us how important it is to assure justice. Nevertheless, Nagel fails to explain why individuals

* Corresponding Author address Email: benedictchan@hkbu.edu.hk.
are not required to assure justice, and Murphy fails to explain how principles of justice can apply to individuals. The most important problem is that they do not have the same standard to evaluate and justify both positions. Although both of them have their own reasons to support their own view, it is unclear how they can refute the opposite side. I suggest that supervenience is the key to solve this problem. I use supervenience as a standard to evaluate arguments from both sides, and then argue that a supervenience relationship between politics and morality would be the third and better position than both dualism and monism.

**Keywords:** politics, morality, justice, dualism, monism, supervenience

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**INTRODUCTION**

What is the relationship between politics and morality? Many philosophers have tried to answer this question, and in this chapter, I focus on two of them: dualism from Nagel (2005) and monism from Murphy (1998). Their ideas are particularly related to distributive justice. I evaluate their arguments in depth and then I discuss my argument. My suggestion is that we should use supervenience as a standard to evaluate the arguments of Nagel and Murphy, and I also argue that a supervenience relationship between politics and morality is a better position than both dualism and monism. The structure of this chapter is as follows: I first discuss Nagel’s dualism and Murphy’s monism, especially their strengths and weaknesses, and then I place supervenience into the debate between dualism and monism and argue for my own position.

**NAGEL’S DUALISM**

Murphy describes dualism as “the two practical problems of institutional design and personal conduct require, at the fundamental level, two different kinds of practical principle” (Murphy, 1998, pp. 253–54). For example, Murphy categorizes Rawls as a dualist. Rawls’ general idea is
that justice is the first virtue of social institutions, and “[t]he principles of justice for institutions must not be confused with the principles which apply to individuals and their actions in particular circumstances. These two kinds of principles apply to different subjects and must be discussed separately” (Rawls, 1999, p. 47). Rawls thinks that his principles of justice apply only to the political institutions of a society but do not apply to any particular individual (pp. 24–25).

Nagel agrees with Rawls and so he also considers himself a dualist. He thinks that it is the nature of sovereign states that creates the special demands for distributive justice. Principles of distributive justice are normative principles for the distribution of property; they set up some constraints on how property can be distributed justly. Nagel (2005) thinks that principles of distributive justice should only be designed specifically to nation-states. He writes:

Sovereign states are not merely instruments for realizing the preinstitutional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is precisely what gives the value of justice its application . . . an institutional relation which must then be evaluated by the special standards of fairness and equality that fill out the content of justice (p. 120).

[Rawls’] two principles of justice are designed to regulate neither the personal conduct of individuals living in a just society, nor the governance of private associations, nor the international relations of societies to one another, but only the basic structure of separate nation-states. (p. 123)¹

¹ More precisely, Nagel argues something more than dualism, which can be called “the multilayered conception of morality.” He thinks that normative principles for nation-states should neither apply to individuals nor global institutions (this is also why he thinks that there is no global distributive justice). Nevertheless, he agrees with other dualists that normative principles for politics should be distinct from normative principles for individuals, and his arguments against global justice do not affect the discussion here. Therefore, I think that his idea about nation-states’ associative responsibility can still be considered as a significant argument to support dualism.
In general, Nagel’s main argument is that distributive justice depends on *associative responsibility*, which is only created by specific relations within a state. He thinks that distributive justice is a right that people only have when they join together in a political society under strong centralized control. Principles of justice are subject to the system of collective authority only; these principles do not apply to the action of each individual citizen.

Nagel’s argument has two important points. The first is about the coercively imposed power of a state. Nagel argues that justice should only apply to people who join in a strong and coercively imposed political institution because justice can only be assured through laws and centralized authority. He thinks that citizens of a state are putative joint authors of the coercively imposed system who are also subjected to its norm. Nagel’s idea comes from Hobbes’ idea that there can be no justice if there is no government. According to Hobbes, people cannot assure justice by themselves; sovereignty is required to assure justice in a society because everyone is self-interested, and so a single force is required to assure justice or any collective self-interest (Hobbes, 1651, Chapter 13). People may not agree with Hobbes that the foundation of justice is collective self-interest. Nevertheless, regarding what moral motivations individuals have for justice, sovereignty is required to confer stability on political institutions because justice can only be assured through laws and centralized authority. The whole idea implies that a government with coercively imposed power is special and necessary to assure justice (Nagel, 2005, pp. 115–117).

Another point in Nagel’s (2005) argument is that citizens join their own state involuntarily. He writes: “A sovereign state is not just a cooperative enterprise for mutual advantage. The societal rules determining its basic structure are coercively imposed: it is not a voluntary association” (p. 128). Nagel thinks that justice is a rise in exclusive obligation with a broad associative range, and so justice depends on the contingency of involuntary rather than voluntary association. He also thinks that a sovereign state is obviously not a voluntary association. Since
joining a state is usually involuntary, it should meet a higher standard than voluntary combinations, which are governed by standards of equality.

Coercion and involuntariness assure that states have special authorities and special responsibilities to their citizens. It is in the nature of sovereign states to create special demands for justice; thus, the principles of justice are designed specifically for them. Those principles of justice are subject to the system of collective authority and justification as a whole only; they are not subject to any particular citizen. Citizens, of course, have responsibilities to their states as well. For example, citizens should try their best to assure that their governments consider and decide public policies based on the principles of justice. However, the individual actions of each citizen do not need to follow the principles of justice. Indeed, the principles of justice are not designed according to any individual moral rule, and so it is not applicable to any individual’s choice and action (Nagel, 2005, p. 123). In summary, Nagel agrees with Rawls that individuals are free to pursue their own personal ends, and the principles of justice apply only to the society as a whole. In other words, individuals are not expected to be governed by these principles of justice.

**MURPHY’S MONISM**

Murphy (1998) describes monism like this: “Any plausible overall political/moral view must, at the fundamental level, evaluate the justice of institutions with normative principles that apply also to people’s choices” (pp. 253–54). He does not think that normative principles for political institutions should be fundamentally different from the principles for individuals. He argues against different versions of dualism in his paper, and his main argument for monism is that only monism can reasonably explain what a person should do to assure justice. He writes:

It seems to me that any political theory that accepts Rawls’s bifurcation of the normative realm into one set of principles for institutions and another for people will yield an implausible account of
what people should do in nonideal circumstances. Thus there is a general reason to reject dualism (p. 279).

Murphy notes that the core part of dualism is that there are politically normative principles that do not apply to individuals, and individuals should at most only support and promote just institutions. When individuals can assure justice without political institutions in some situations, there is no reason not to extend the principles of justice to personal conducts. He argues that there are some non-ideal situations that can illustrate his view. Now let me explain his argument in depth.

Dualists hold a view that there should be two sets of normative principles, one set for political institutions and another set for individuals. Dualists think that some moral rules require individuals to assist in the establishment of just institutions, but individuals do not need to act according to the content of the principles of justice. Murphy disagrees with dualists. He argues that if we believe that a society should have distributive justice, then we should assure justice by both institutions and individuals. Distributive justice is about the fairness of property distribution in a society; if we believe that justice as fairness is a good virtue, and we believe that principles of justice can justify and distribute property reasonably, then there is no reason for us to stand aside and do nothing. He writes:

If people can do more to promote the aims of justice[,] a view that refuses to extend the principles of justice to personal conduct is prima facie deficient . . . If people have a duty to promote just institutions, why do they lack a duty to promote whatever it is that just institutions are for? (pp. 279–280)

Murphy neither thinks that principles of justice should only apply to individuals nor that political institutions have nothing to do to assure justice. He admits that sometimes the most effective way to assure justice is to promote just institutions. He also agrees that a state government that has sovereign power can assure justice effectively, especially in an ideal situation. But this is, at most, a practical reason for individuals to assure
justice by political institutions, and it does not grant any *fundamental* normative role to political institutions. It also does not exclude the moral role of individuals to assure justice at all.

Murphy thinks that his idea can be shown clearly in some non-ideal situations. One can imagine many reasons why political institutions cannot assure justice. For example, a country in a civil war may have a government (or governments) that is too weak and does not have enough coercive power. A tyrannical state may have a lot of corrupt government officers, and they are usually the reason for unfair distribution of property. Some may also argue that global institutions (e.g., WTO, IMF) cannot assure justice. Under these circumstances, Murphy argues that there is no reason for us to believe in dualism. He claims that dualism does not require a person to assure justice even if that person could do more to assure justice than to promote or reform the political institutions. Murphy thinks that this is absurd. If billionaires can donate their money directly to hospitals or schools to reduce inequality in a society, then it is not necessary for them to use the money to form other political parties or to set up political action committees to assure equality of medicine and education (Murphy, 1998, p. 282). Again, the point here is that politics may not always be the best way to assure justice, especially in a non-ideal situation. Murphy thinks that dualists only want to assure justice through political institutions, while monists can use whatever available means they have to promote justice. Assuring justice through political institutions is, of course, one of the means, but it is never the only option for monists.

In summary, Murphy thinks that justice is a virtue that every society requires, and so we should assure justice by both institutions and individuals. He does not deny that principles of justice can apply to political institutions, but he thinks that these principles can also apply to individuals, provided that individuals can assure justice better than political institutions in some circumstances. Normative principles for political institutions, at the fundamental level, do not have any unique role independent from other normative principles for individuals. Therefore, he thinks that monism is better than dualism because monism allows people to assure justice by both institutions and individuals.
In this section, I first discuss some advantages and disadvantages of Nagel’s and Murphy’s arguments, and then I argue that both suffer from the same problem. I discuss Nagel’s argument first. The most significant idea from Nagel is that sovereignty is very important in the domain of justice. Nagel tries to prove that sovereignty is a necessary condition to assure justice. In other words, Nagel thinks that there can be no justice if there is no sovereign power. Although this position is controversial (Murphy definitely disagrees with it), at least Nagel has provided an account to explain why sovereignty is so important and effective in assuring justice.

Nevertheless, Nagel fails to explain why normative principles for nation-states are fundamental and independent from normative principles for individuals. It is a big jump from the claim that “sovereignty is important (or even essential) in assuring justice” to the claim that “principles of justice for nation-states are fundamental.” Even if sovereignty is such an important factor or even a necessary condition for assuring justice, sovereignty is still not a sufficient condition for assuring justice. In other words, a state with sovereign power does not guarantee that the distribution of property in the state is just. For example, a tyrannous state may have absolute sovereign power to its citizens, but the distribution of property can be seriously unjust (e.g., all property is controlled by the tyrant). However, the most serious problem is that it is unclear why sovereignty can become a threshold to support the claim that normative principles of political institutions are not related to the normative principles of individuals. Nagel is correct in saying that a sovereign state has coercively imposed power on its citizens, but this does not imply that the normative rules for a sovereign state have no relationship to general ethics. My point here is not that sovereignty definitely cannot be a reason to support dualism. I just simply want to claim that there is no such implication at face value, and the inference from Nagel is not clear. More clarifications are required before one can justify his version of dualism.
The weakness of Nagel’s argument is the starting point to discuss the advantage of Murphy’s argument. Nagel cannot explain dualism without further clarification, and Murphy would reply that there can be no explanation for dualism. An advantage of Murphy’s argument is that he does not need to deny the importance of sovereignty for justice. He can agree that in an ideal situation, the best way to assure justice is to promote political institutions. However, he disagrees that there can be no justice when the situation is non-ideal. His assumption is that justice is good and it is a fundamental moral value; thus, we should assure justice by all means.

However, justice as a fundamental moral value is an assumption that requires further verification. Why is justice so good that we need to assure it by both institutions and individuals? Why is justice not only a problem for political institutions? Dualists, of course, need to provide an answer to the latter question, but Murphy also needs to answer why justice is a fundamental value. Another problem for Murphy is that it is unclear how one can apply the principles of justice to individuals. In his paper, the principles of justice he evaluates are from John Rawls, but Rawls’ principles are explicitly designed for political institutions. For example, Rawls has a difference principle in his principles of justice, and this difference principle requires that economic inequalities are arranged so that they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of the society (Rawls, 1999, p. 266). It is quite unclear how this can be a normative principle to guide personal conduct. Does it mean that I need to benefit the least advantaged members of my society when I want to buy a car? Murphy owes us an explanation here.

Both dualists and monists have their own motivations to support their positions, and motivations from both sides are reasonable. Dualists want to separate normative principles for politics from individuals because they find that combining them may bring more problems than solutions. For example, on the one hand, dualists may think that it may not be easy—or that it may even be impossible—to apply Rawls’ second principle to individual conduct. On the other hand, monists also have a reasonable motivation. Intuitively, if justice or other social values are so good and are required in our society, we should try to assure justice by all reasonable
means. So, it is reasonable to wonder why we cannot consider morality as fundamental, and why we need to separate normative principles into two sets.

Both Nagel and Murphy limit their discussions to distributive justice, but they admit that their views can apply to a more general discussion of the relationship between politics and morality. Although their motivations and reasons are not absurd, it is especially unclear when they use the term *fundamental* to discuss the relationship between politics and morality. On the one hand, when dualists consider political principles as *fundamental*, what they really mean is that political principles are not applicable to individuals. However, it is unclear why political principles need to be fundamental so that they are not applicable to individuals. On the other hand, monists such as Murphy (1998) claim that “[w]hat monism rejects is any defense of such a [political] principle by appeal to a *fundamental* one that does not also apply directly to people’s conduct” (p. 254; my italic), and monism does not reject any political principles of a *non-fundamental* kind. Why and how can non-fundamental kinds of political principles apply to individuals? The word “fundamental” and the relationship of politics and morality should be explained further as it is essential to evaluate the arguments between dualism and monism. All we need is a more concrete concept for this discussion. I think this concrete concept is *supervenience*, and this is exactly what I am going to discuss in next section.

**SUPREVENIENCE**

The concept of supervenience has been well developed in contemporary analytical philosophy. This term probably first appeared in ethics and the philosophy of arts, but later it also became a core concept in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. Supervenience is a concept about relationships, and philosophers usually use it to discuss the relationship
between two sets of properties, \(^2\) A and B. Generally, supervenience can be considered as a relation of dependency between A and B. If B supervenes on A, then the basic idea is that B depends on A, or A determines B. If A determines B, then it is not possible that A is fixed while B can still vary. A set of B supervenes upon another set of A when two situations cannot differ with respect to B without also differing with respect to A. In other words, there is a covariant relationship from A to B. If two possible situations are indiscernible with respect to A, they are also indiscernible with respect to B. Chalmers (1996) writes the definition like this: “B-properties supervene on A-properties if no two possible situations are identical with respect to their A-properties while differing in their B-properties” (p. 33).

Different philosophers divide the general notion of supervenience into different ways.\(^3\) It turns out that not every detail of supervenience is related to our discussion about Nagel and Murphy, and so I will only discuss the relevant details here. Among those philosophers who have discussed supervenience, Chalmers (1996) has a useful division of supervenience for the debate in this chapter. He divides supervenience further into conceptual supervenience and empirical supervenience. Empirical supervenience is more useful for the purpose of this chapter. If B empirically supervenes on A, then it is empirically necessary that no two empirical situations can differ with respect to B without also differing with respect to A (or simply, B cannot vary with the same A). Conceptual supervenience is a stronger notion than empirical supervenience. Indeed, Conceptual supervenience implies empirical supervenience, but I think empirical supervenience is already enough for the sake of my argument in this chapter. Nagel’s argument is about sovereignty, and Murphy’s argument is about non-ideal

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\(^2\) The meaning of properties here is totally different from the word property in the discussion of distributive justice. Justice requires us to distribute money and other resources (i.e., property) in a reasonable way. But the concept of properties in the discussion of supervenience is a metaphysical notion and roughly includes the attributes, qualities, features, or characteristics of things.

\(^3\) For example, Kim (1993) has also discussed different notions of supervenience such as global, strong, and weak supervenience. However, since his notions of supervenience are not directly related to the debate in this chapter, I do not discuss his notions of supervenience in further detail here.
political situations. Neither of their arguments is related to other possible worlds. For example, Nagel does not argue that sovereignty is a necessary condition for assuring justice in every possible world. He simply argues his idea within our actual world. Some philosophers may discuss dualism or monism in a conceptual level, but neither Nagel nor Murphy had done so in their own arguments, and so here I also do not discuss conceptual supervenience, which is a harder and more complicated notion of supervenience. Therefore, while dualists and monists argue whether politics and morality are fundamental or not, I am going to limit the discussion to empirical supervenience but not conceptual supervenience.

How can we put supervenience into the debate between dualism and monism? The answer is that supervenience can be a standard to justify the basic positions of dualism and monism. Moreover, supervenience may even provide a third position other than dualism and monism. Below is an in-depth explanation of each of these answers.

Although supervenience has been mainly used in the discussion of properties in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics, it can also be used for any kind of relationship, such as facts, laws, and principles. Supervenience is a useful concept here because it is also a useful tool to define the relationship between politics and morality. It seems that dualists consider that the relationship between politics and morality is somewhat weaker than supervenience while monism is stronger than supervenience. Dualism should be a view that politics and morality are two different entities; political principles should not apply to individuals and moral principles should not apply to political institutions. According to this inference, dualists probably believe that political principles should not supervene on moral principles and moral principles should not supervene on political principles. Instead, there should be empirically possible situations with identical moral principles but different political principles, or different moral principles but identical political principles. They should be independent from each other. This would be a reasonable interpretation of dualism.

Monism requires a stronger relationship between politics and morality. Monists think that there should only be one set of fundamental principles
applying to both individuals and political institutions. Putting supervenience into monism, the correct interpretation is that political principles should supervene on moral principles and moral principles should supervene on political principles. In other words, there should be no two possible situations with identical moral principles but different political principles, and there should be no two possible situations with different moral principles but identical political principles. This is a bi-supervenience relationship; that is, the supervenience relationship goes in both directions (from political principles to moral principles and from moral principles to political principles). Perhaps monism requires an even stronger relationship between politics and morality (e.g., an identical or reductive relationship) than bi-supervenience does, but this bi-supervenience relationship is sufficient for the sake of our discussion.

Traditionally, dualism and monism seem to be mutually exclusive. Only one of them can be right, and it even appears that one of them must be right (i.e., they cannot both be wrong). However, if the interpretation above is correct, then there is at least a third alternative—one may argue that only political principles supervene on moral principles. Indeed, I think that this is the correct option. For the remainder of this chapter, I am going to discuss how we can use supervenience to justify Nagel’s and Murphy’s arguments and why the third option (political principles supervene on moral principles) is better than dualism and monism.

If political principles supervene on moral principles, then there are no two possible situations with identical moral principles but different political principles. However, since the supervenience relationship moves in only one direction, there can be two possible situations with different moral principles but either identical or different political principles. In other words, if two situations have different moral principles, then no restriction will apply to those political principles. There are two important points in this interpretation. First, when political principles supervene on moral principles, it means that political principles depend on moral

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4 There is another logical alternative, which is that moral principles supervene on political principles. However, I am not going to discuss this option here and I do not recognize anyone who believes in this option.
principles, or moral principles determine political principles. Technically, this determination means that when two situations have the same kind of moral principles, then the political principles cannot be different. This is a view similar to monism because it takes moral principles as fundamental in terms of supervenience. In other words, it is a technical interpretation of the fundamental relationship between politics and morality. Second, the relationship of supervenience is not strong enough to require that political principles are also applicable to individuals.

Here is an analogy. Chalmers (1996) argues that biological properties supervene on physical properties. He writes, “For instance, biological properties supervene on physical properties insofar as any two possible situations that are physically identical are biologically identical” (p. 33). However, we still consider biology and physics as two different subjects. For example, we definitely do not think that evolutionism can explain and apply to any physical problem in quantum mechanics. On the other hand, although we do not think that physical properties can explain biological properties, we think that biological evolution cannot violate physical properties. No matter how a species evolves, we do not expect that the species can violate, say, general relativity. The reason is because biological properties supervene on physical properties.5

Chalmers (1996) does not argue that biological laws supervene on physical laws because he thinks that the claim is too strong. He writes: “I am not suggesting that high-level facts and laws are entailed by microphysical laws . . . That would be a strong claim, and although it might have some plausibility if qualified appropriately, the evidence is not yet in” (p. 71). Nevertheless, the analogy here is about the supervenience relationship itself, not about properties or laws. Thus, I consider that this analogy is still an appropriate example. The point of this analogy is to show what a supervenience relationship should be—if B supervenes on A, then B cannot violate A, even though A cannot explain B. Applying this reasoning to the debate in this chapter shows that moral principles cannot

5 More precisely, biological properties supervene on physical properties globally and logically. Although I am only trying to argue for an empirical supervenience relationship between politics and morality, I do not think that these details will affect the analogy here.
explain political principles as well, but every political principle cannot violate any moral principle. This interpretation respects both ideas that there are fundamental moral principles and independent political principles.

Why should this supervenience interpretation be the correct approach to explain the relationship between politics and morality? The reason is that when we compare the supervenience interpretation with dualism and monism, we find that it has all of their advantages but none of their disadvantages. Murphy would probably argue that Nagel fails to explain why we should not assure justice by all means if we think that justice is such a good virtue. Nagel would probably contend that Murphy fails to explain how he can apply the principles of justice to personal conducts. But the supervenience interpretation does not have these two failures. We can agree with Murphy that justice is a fundamental value and we should assure it by both institutions and individuals. However, this does not mean that we can only allow one set of principles to assure justice. Similar to Nagel, we can still allow that there is a set of just principles for political institutions and there is another set of principles for individuals, and neither set of principles applies to the other. The difference between the supervenience interpretation and dualism is that even though principles of justice are designed to apply in non-ideal situations, the supervenience interpretation can still allow some other compensation from other principles for individual conducts. It is simply that we do not require that principles of justice apply directly to individuals. For that, Murphy is applying an overly strong requirement for justice. To assure justice, it is not necessary to require that principles of justice apply to individuals as well. All we need is that principles of justice for political institutions do not violate any individual moral principle. In summary, the supervenience interpretation allows people to assure justice by both institutions and individuals and there can be different sets of principles for political institutions and individuals. In other words, compared with dualism and monism, this supervenience interpretation has its advantages but not their shortcomings. Therefore, the supervenience interpretation should be the best approach in a practical and pragmatic sense. Instead of dualism or
monism, we should define the relationship between politics and morality by this supervenience interpretation.

Although integrating supervenience into political philosophy is a new enterprise, I believe that some philosophers’ positions are similar or near enough to my interpretation. They do not use the concept of supervenience, but they think that justice is an ultimate or fundamental moral concern, and they think that there should be separated normative principles for political institutions only. Pogge’s (2002) institutional cosmopolitanism is one of them. He argues that each individual should have a moral concern for global justice, but he also argues that there should be some normative principles for political institutions (for both states and global institutions). He even argues that our current world is a non-ideal situation, and so first world people, such as citizens of the United States, should compensate other victims who are living under unjust institutional regimes. Murphy (1998) seems to agree with Pogge’s (2002) solution, but he categorizes Pogge as a dualist, and so he thinks that Pogge fails to defend institutional cosmopolitanism because it is incompatible with dualism (Murphy, 1998, p. 283n76). I think Murphy categorizes Pogge on the wrong side. Institutional cosmopolitanism can be interpreted as a view that political principles (for both states and global institutions) supervene on moral principles. For that, it is perfectly reasonable for Pogge to argue his view in the way I have just described. In short, the supervenience relationship of politics and morality can be developed as a view to support Pogge or other similar positions.

I admit that the idea discussed in this chapter can be developed further. For example, I realize that there are many other versions of dualism and monism that I have not discussed in this chapter. The papers from Nagel and Murphy are, at most, an example of dualism and an example of monism. I also have not discussed other notions of supervenience (e.g.,

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6 “Cosmopolitanism holds that all persons stand in certain moral relations to one another. We are required to respect one another’s status as ultimate units of moral concern—a requirement that imposes limits on our conduct and, in particular, on our efforts to construct institutional schemes . . . It concerns the nature of the moral constraints to be imposed. An institutional conception postulates certain fundamental principles of social justice. These apply to institutional schemes and are thus second-order principles: standards for assessing the ground rules and practices that regular human interactions” (Pogge, 2002, pp. 169–170).
global and local supervenience, strong and weak supervenience, and conceptual supervenience). Nevertheless, I have provided the first step of integrating supervenience into the debate between monism and dualism and my argument works *prima facie*. McLaughlin and Bennett (2014) think that supervenience “has been invoked in almost every corner of the field [in analytical philosophy],” but the list they provide does not include any item in political philosophy. The idea I have argued in this chapter can be considered as an additional item on their list of the application of supervenience.

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