Counter-terrorism – a comprehensive approach. Social mobilisation and ‘civilianisation’ of security: The case of the United Kingdom

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Counter-terrorism – a comprehensive approach.

Social mobilization and ‘civilianization’ of security: the Case of the United Kingdom.

by

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Abstract

The global war on terror and 9/11 have brought to our attention the perpetual problem of freedom versus security. The more governments strive to provide security, the more they tend to curb the freedoms of their citizens. ‘Stop and search’ procedures, 28-day detentions of terrorist suspects without charge or new body scanners at the airports are just the ‘tip of the iceberg’ in a long list of the state’s encroachments into our private lives. This paper departs from such a seemingly inescapable predicament. It analyses the role of the public in preventing, protecting and preparing for terrorist attacks under the British government’s counter-terrorism strategy known as CONTEST. It explores two social phenomena that are being increasingly promoted by official authorities in the United Kingdom, namely, mobilisation of society and what the author terms ‘civilianisation of security. The latter is defined as a notion relating to non-military, voluntary organisations and the business/private sector. engaged by government but acting in its own right against terrorism threats. ‘Civilianisation’ of security is also conceived of as a potential tool to bridge the gap between two incompatible worlds of state security and personal freedoms.

Introduction

Terrorism dates back to ancient times. Europeans have experienced terrorism in many forms in recent decades. Meant to be a comprehensive and cooperative response on the part of
governments, counter-terrorism seeks to combat this menace. Dating back to the end of the nineteenth century, contemporary counter-terrorism has included a wide range of short- and long-term measures exercised at home and abroad.

There are volumes of research on counter-terrorism, with a number of authors who present various methodological approaches when analysing this phenomenon. In the 1980s, Marc Calmer asserted that ‘antiterrorism actions are designed as defensive measures to prevent the occurrence of terrorism as opposed to counterterrorist measures, which are offensive in nature and are designed to respond to a terrorist act’ (1987, p. 13). Yet, after 9/11 the evolution of counter-terrorism seems to have falsified such a simplistic dichotomy.

Contemporary counterterrorist strategies are comprehensive, multilayered and holistic responses. Consequently Robert Art and Louise Richardson (2007) make a fine point dividing counterterrorist measures into three groups: political, legislative and judicial and security (2007, pp. 16-17). A widely used typology of defensive and offensive measures includes physical protection of different levels from individual sites to entire country, diplomacy, financial control and intelligence (defensive), law enforcement and military force (offensive) (Pillar 2008, pp. 376-388).

Martin van Creveld (2007, pp. 157-174) and Rohan Gunaratna (2007, pp. 175-200) represent another approach, emphasising the need for an integrated path in counter-terrorism policies. Analysing the examples of Israeli counter-terrorism, van Creveld postulates the importance of defensive measures such as security fences. Gunaratna, on the other hand, stresses the importance of international co-operation against both domestic and international terrorism. Others analyse the feasibility of particular counter-terrorist measures by studying the roots of terrorism. Rob Imre challenges the notion that it is possible to pinpoint simple causality within a sociopolitical phenomenon such as terrorism (2008b, pp. 7-18). He analyses four concepts (outside religious issues) that are pertinent to political violence such as terrorism,
namely, poverty, evil, statecraft and modernity. Ben Clarke, writing in the same edited volume (2008, pp. 19-57), focuses on the legal context of terrorism, and claims that it is often caused by the violation of human rights and the rule of law. Other legal aspects embrace the failure of states and International Organizations (IOs) to cooperate and produce a just resolution to conflicts. The legal approach emphasizes general compliance with the international rule of law, international human rights norms and international cooperation in the implementation of the Security Council’s resolutions on counter-terrorism. Bolz et al. when analysing US counter-terrorist responses, distinguish three discrete levels: local, state and federal (2002, p. 11). Each of them elicits responses from various participants such as medical personnel up to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Anne Speckhard takes civil society as the main point of interest and emphasizes its capacity not only to absorb but also to address the roots of terrorism as having ‘the best chance of defusing the bombs that may go off by robbing the terrorists of their basis of existence’ (2005, pp. 113-123). Along similar lines, Frank Gregory writes about the private sector and its role in counter-terrorism activities (2007, pp. 321-330). He asserts that the so-called private sector has a vital role to play as a potential contributor of human resources to the counter-terrorist response.

This paper explores the topic of counter-terrorism from a similar perspective. In contrast to many studies, including those mentioned above, the aim of the author is to emphasise the role of the public in preventing, protecting and preparing for terrorist attacks. The first part lays down premises and a rationale for such an approach. The second, third and fourth parts provide particular examples supporting such tenets in the case of the United Kingdom. Later, an overall theoretical framework is developed in order to support the feasibility of such an approach.
**Terrorism – new quality, old problem**

A recent report published by The Centre for Social Cohesion, titled ‘Islamist Terrorism. The British Connections’ examines the scope of British-linked Islamism-inspired terrorism threats worldwide since 1993. The authors of the report explicitly state, based on grounded research, that 60 per cent of IROs (Islamism Related Offences) carried out in the UK between 1999 and 2009 were perpetrated by individuals holding British nationality.¹ That leaves no doubts about the need to tackle the problem differently than classic measures of counter-terrorism would dictate. Our attention is also drawn to the relationship between international terrorism and UK’s seemingly domestic matters. Again, according to the above mentioned report, more than a quarter of those who committed IROs in Britain have Pakistani origins. Even more alarming, the majority of those had no direct link to any terrorist organisation and did not attend any terrorist training. In other words, they are individuals acting in their own right on religious and ideological grounds. This presents British authorities with dire challenges, as it diminishes the efficacy of responses by central organs of the state.

The terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and the coordinated bombings on three underground trains and a bus in London on 7 July 2005 with a follow-up attempt on 21 July 2005 have brought into sharp focus the threats that Europeans face in the post-Cold War era. One of the most important differences between the old, ‘European’ terrorism and the new international one is that the old one was limited in scope and goals, typically challenging a particular state only. The new terrorism is global in scope and unlimited in its goals. It challenges the very foundations of the international system, as some strands of Al-Qaeda or the Taliban are fighting for a new order based on Islam.

¹
Being the target as well as the main US ally in the fight against international terrorism, UK makes a very interesting and important study case. There are a number of questions pertinent to British experience with terrorism. This paper focuses on one: is there anything special about the UK and its response to sub-state terrorism that could be learned from and perhaps even applied universally? A study of available materials seems to reveal two interrelated phenomena that are being initiated and supervised by British authorities in this regard as having potential to effectively address the threat of international terrorism, namely: mobilization of society and ‘civilianization’ of security.

Before we turn to specifically British example, there are two general remarks to be made about the nature of contemporary international environment. Firstly, there is a proceeding declining of a state accompanied by privatization of warfare. The Bush administration’s 2001 proclamation of the ‘Global War on Terror’ corresponds well with a general transformation of the characteristics of war. As Martin van Creveld observes, today a ‘Clausewitzian perspective on war is outdated… the period of nation-states and, therefore, of state conflict is now ending, and with it the clear threefold division into government, army, and people’. Clausewitz’s ideas were wholly rooted in the fact that, ever since 1648, war had been waged overwhelmingly by states (van Creveld 1991, p. 41). Writing at the very beginning of the 1990s, van Creveld seems to have made the right point about future wars that are decreasingly fought by regular armies and increasingly by terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers. Urban crime may, as he asserted, ‘develop into low-intensity conflict by coalescing along racial, religious, social, and political lines’. As small-scale violence multiplies at home and abroad, state armies will continue to shrink being gradually replaced by a booming private security business, as in West Africa, and by urban mafias, especially in the former communist world, who may be better equipped than municipal police forces to grant physical protection to local inhabitants. ²
In another of his books, The Rise and Decline of the State (van Creveld 1999, p. 336), he attributes the emergence and long existence of states to one prevailing purpose - the waging of wars: ‘Had it not been for the need to wage war, then almost certainly the centralisation of power in the hands of the great monarchs would have been much harder to bring about… Had it not been for the need to wage war, then the development of bureaucracy, taxation, even welfare services such as education, health, etc. would probably have been much slower.’

Such ideas may arouse certain polemics but it is hardly questionable that in many respects the ‘retreat of the state’ is a fact, whether it is voluntary due to economic hardships or involuntary caused by economic, technological and cultural forces, often termed as globalisation. The thriving of international terrorism, organized crime and insurgency completes a bleak picture of the future.

Second, contemporary terrorism tends to discriminate among target types. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) - A Centre of Excellence of the US Department of Homeland Security at the University of Maryland - has been running a long-term project under the name ‘The Global Terrorism Database (GTD)’. According to its creators, GTD contains information on over 87,000 terrorist attacks and is currently the most comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist events in the world.³

Sorting data by target type reveals one of the darkest characteristics of terrorism. Majority of terrorist attacks target private citizens and private property. The year 2007 alone saw more than one thousand two hundred incidents and the aggregated number since 1970 tops seventeen thousand in that respect. Compared to other targets, private citizens and private properties have over the last years also seen the biggest increase in incidents per year. Second in the same category comes business with a sharp decrease in the number of incidents over the last couple of years (only one hundred attacks in year 2007). Third is government, (both
general and diplomatic), somewhat declining over the years and showing a slight decrease in tendency between 2006 and 2007.

A detailed analysis of the Global Terrorism Database exposes a number of interesting patterns. Yet one of the most important characteristics of terrorism speaks for itself: civilians take the brunt of terrorism in all its manifestations. Consequently, if we subscribe to the idea of war on terrorism or with terrorists, whether we like it or not, as civilians we are engaged in it. In other words, civilians already take part in that war more often as victims. The enemy as we know it is very much decentralised, or scattered (terrorists work in loosely connected cells usually of five or fewer). Central authorities cannot effectively conduct this war simply because the physical limitations of both government agents and the military make them unfit to tackle terrorism, As Robert Imre rightly observes, ‘modern and postmodern bureaucracies are very limited in their capacity to deal with the terrorist phenomenon’ (2008, p. 181). He also asserts that most counter-terrorists laws: ‘are ineffective and relying on a legal position to challenge a socio-political problem will result in possible post fiwto punishments of groups or individuals engaged in violent conduct, but will act as a deterrent measure for these groups in only a very limited manner.’

Whatever the character of new terrorism, its effects are always also local. According to ‘London Prepared’ major incidents such as 9/11 have profound impact on local businesses. Consequently, 80 per cent of businesses affected by a major incident close within 18 months. 90 per cent of those businesses that lose data from a disaster are forced to shut within two years. 58 per cent of UK organizations were disrupted by September 11, one of eight being seriously affected (Gregory 2007, p. 322).

Social mobilization
The following is an account, by no means full, of some of the initiatives run by the British authorities and aimed at tackling terrorist threats with a non-classic/non-state approach.

On 29 June 2006, the London Metropolitan Police Authority (LMPA) started hearings under the programme called ‘Counter-Terrorism: The London Debate’, a plan designed to foster community engagement to counter-terrorism. As the LMPA website reads: ‘Keeping Londoners and others safe from terrorism is not a job solely for governments, security services or police. If we are to make London the safest major city in the world, we must mobilise… the active support of the millions of people who live and work in the capital. We must all work together… to deter people from within our own communities from becoming terrorists.’

This short extract reflects the main idea increasingly promoted in the UK and consequently analysed in this paper: should counter-terrorism prove effective, civilians need to be engaged. Official documents provide many examples of declared accommodation of civilians into counter-terrorist activities on the part of the government. In the eyes of the authorities, the private sector - including voluntary and community organisations, education and youth groups, arts and media as well as academia - is an indispensible element in effective counter-terrorism.

In recent years, most major terrorist incidents have involved not the seizure of hostages and threat of inflicting harm on them but instead the direct and unprovoked killing of innocent people, usually with bombs. Therefore, since negotiating with Jäit accompli is impossible, the efforts of governments have logically shifted to prevention.

Since 2003, the British Government has had a counter-terrorist strategy that goes by the name ‘CONTEST’. (In March 2009, the first major revision of this strategy was published.) ‘CONTEST’ consists of four key elements: Pursue to stop terrorist attacks: Prevent to stop
people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism: Protect to strengthen protection against terrorist attacks; and Prepare — where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact (HM Government 2009b). All of these key elements have to be realised overseas as well as at home; that is, within the borders of the UK.

**Prevent**

At home it is much easier to operate for the obvious reason of political conditions sovereignty. ‘Prevent’ is by far the most important part of the British counter-terrorism strategy. About £140m is being spent annually on ‘Prevent’ programmes, many of them administered by local authorities. Some more sensitive projects come under direct Whitehall control.

‘Prevent’ is about preventing people from supporting violent extremism and the ideology that fuels terrorism. This part falls under the traditional British approach of engaging communities. In the UK, communities are viewed as an important resource for tackling social problems like crime, anti-social behaviour or unemployment.\(^6\) As Rachel Briggs rightly observes: ‘It is true that the terrorist threat comes from a tiny and marginal minority, but these individuals are integrated within their communities and not, on the whole, loners working on their own. This is why communities need to play a central role in many different areas of the counterterrorism strategy. a principle that is now implicit within government policy. (Briggs 2010, p. 972).’

From that perspective, communities in general and Muslim communities in particular might appear to be well suited to act against radicalisation, especially of young British Muslims (Report on Wilton Park Conference WPSO6/5 2006). The main idea here, which some call wishful thinking, is that ‘Prevent’ is basically a challenge to win minds and hearts. If so, Muslims are expected to be much more trusted by other ‘brothers’ in faith than the ‘infidels’ ever would be. In that respect the ‘Prevent’ strategy identifies one of its objectives as ‘Increasing the capacity of communities to resist violent extremism’.\(^8\)
There is a wide variety of projects in which local communities are currently engaged. They include such activities as: helping young people build their confidence and leadership skills through sport, allowing young Muslim men to air their views and debate issues such as radicalisation and extremism, promoting understanding and acceptance of shared values and dialogue and engagement between Christian and Muslim communities, increasing the engagement of young Muslims, working towards shared citizenship, creating spaces to learn about Islam and differentiate religious and cultural values and ideals from concepts of political and religious extremism and violence. Therefore, apart from the Office for Security and Counter-terrorism, Communities and Local Government (CLG), a government department that promotes community cohesion and equality, is equally important in that matter. In 2006, the CLG took responsibility for the Preventing Extremism campaign (renamed Preventing Violent Extremism [PVE] in 2007) under the ‘Prevent’ element of CONTEST (House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee 2009-2010). Former head of the Anti-Terrorist Branch, John Grieve, explicitly warned that it was communities that would defeat terrorism and not the police working alone.9

Two community projects in the fight against terrorism are the Iqra Mentoring Programme and the Channel Project. The Iqra Mentoring Programme has been heralded by the Home Office as one of the working examples in this effort.10 Iqra is a scheme designed to challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices, disrupt those who promote violent extremism, support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment or have already been recruited by violent extremists and increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism as well as address the grievances that ideologues exploit. The Channel Project is a state-funded programme that engages families, community leaders and teachers who, along with police officers, look for impressionable young Muslims who may exhibit signs of extremism through their actions or ideas. Once flagged, these individuals enter a
‘program of intervention tailored to the needs of the individual’, which ranges from family discussions and outreach talks with local imams to police intervention (HM Government 2010d).

**Protect and Prepare**

For the purpose of this paper the ‘Protect and Prepare’ elements of CONTEST should be analysed together, since they deal with terrorist attacks as such and are in reality somewhat indistinguishable. ‘Prepare’ means ‘to mitigate the consequences of an attack’ and ‘Protect’ means ‘to strengthen the defence against an attack’. Without good preparation for counter-terrorism, there can be no protection. So ‘Protect’ is not only a precondition, but to a large extent can only be measured against ‘Prepare’.

Of the four strands of the counter-terrorism strategy under ‘Protect’, three are particularly pertinent to the initiative of ‘civilianisation’ of security analysed in this paper: (I) protecting key utilities, (2) making the public transport system safer and (3) protecting crowded places. These are areas where the private sector is being increasingly engaged as a partner with government bodies. This relates also to the infrastructure that the Home Office refers to as the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and includes nine sectors: Communications, Emergency Services, Energy, Finance, Food, Government, Health, Transport and Water. The so-called private sector; i.e. private companies, is greatly involved in managing CNI.11

Likewise, crowded places get a fair share of attention. As Jim Coaffee puts it: ‘Protective counterterrorism in urban areas is no longer just a police and security services issue: many professional and practice communities, and the general public, are being enrolled in the fight against terrorism. Arguably, in that sense we are all counterterrorists, engaged in the development of a more resilient and robust urban landscape. Moreover, if we consider that the UK government sees counterterrorist protective security as a collective concern, this
poses a series of questions for a host of built environment professionals tasked with implementing this agenda. (2010, p. 953)’

One example of this is engaging architects and planners to design future buildings and public places that are safer and better protected. Industry in general is involved in designing improved materials, ranging from tougher glass that stops broken pieces from flying in an explosion, which is a major cause of injury and deaths, to bollards and barriers that can withstand the impact of a speeding truck (HM Government 2010c). According to the government response to the consultation document on crowded places, greater partnership is required in the future at the local level. Also, in the long-term, developers are expected to respond positively to the challenges of including counter-terrorist measures at the earliest stage of the design process (HM Government 2010b).

The Office for Security and Counter-terrorism recently launched a competition to encourage student architects and designers to find new solutions to deal with the threat of vehicle-borne terrorist attacks.\(^\text{12}\) Apart from the early stages, such as design, much more is being done with regards to helping the private sector develop its own responses to terrorist events. Project ‘Argus’, to use an example, is an initiative that encourages hotels to develop their own bespoke counter-terrorism security plans. The programme helps hotels prevent terrorist attacks, handle their response should an event happen and recover from it afterwards.\(^\text{13}\)

Another example is the recently expanded ‘Preparing for Emergencies website’, which provides a single portal for advice to business and the volunteer sector on emergencies, business continuity and other issues.\(^\text{14}\) The Thames Valley Chamber of Commerce Group holds joint seminars with Thames Valley Police under the project called ‘Griffin’, designed as a tool for businesses to help protect their staff and local communities from terrorism.\(^\text{15}\)

Resilience in this context is a key word. As a notion borrowed from applied science and
adopted by psychology, it denotes the ability to recover from a trauma or crisis, including a terrorist attack. Since terrorists target both symbolic and important venues, the London Resilience Partnership (LRP) serves as a good example here. As a broad public institution, LRP is responsible for planning and preparing for potential emergencies. The London Regional Resilience Forum, which sets the work plan for the partnership, is supported by a number of panels including business, volunteer; utilities and faith sectors.

Finally, there’s a place for science. Experts in behavioural and social sciences as well as applied science cooperate with the Home Office in combating the threat of international terrorism under all strands of CONTEST. One of its manifestations is the work of Dr James Ferryman, who leads the Computational Vision Group (CVG) in developing technology capable of analysing by computer CCTV footage to spot potential terrorists.' All these examples correspond well with what Frank Gregory calls ‘broadening the stake-holder base in counter-terrorism’ (2007, pp. 321-330).

Counter-terrorist activities have inevitably spread to the Internet, whose ‘virtual’ environment has revolutionised relations between people and their governments. As an equality platform, it provides similar opportunities to individuals and governments. The Internet has already broken the monopoly of state media on providing information (people have become so-called prosumers), and it has further undermined the role of states as providers of security. Increasingly, states, including the United States and United Kingdom, are realising the importance of the Internet in their national security strategies. Because the infrastructure of Internet systems is predominantly in the hands of the private sector (in the United States 85 per cent of the critical infrastructure is not in governments), governments have to contract a huge number of civilians employed in private companies to work as providers of national security (House of Lords, European Union Committee 2009).

The British situation is no different. The Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom,
issued last year; declares a strong commitment to a public/private partnership. Likewise, the latest National Security Strategy of the UK identifies tier one priority risks, among which ‘hostile attacks upon UK cyber space by other states and large scale cyber crime’ takes second place right after international terrorism (HM Government 2010a). Under a new scheme currently on trial in London, owners of cyber-cafes are to monitor the websites their customers view and pass on any suspicious behaviour to the police.

‘Civilianization’ of security

Peter Singer points out: ‘Traditionally, at least in modern states systems, the government provides all its citizens with certain services, which are generally paid through taxation. This takes place in what is known as the public sector. In contrast, in the private sector, individual citizens, now known as consumers, purchase needed goods and services in the open market, paying with their own discretionary funds. This market is made up of private firms motivated by profit. Thus, the distinctions between these two sectors are the sources of funding, the nature of the relationship between provider and user, and the employment of the deliverers. (2003. p. 7)’

The private sector has for years cooperated with national governments in different countries and to different extents on national security measures. The phenomenon referred to as ‘privatisation of security’, whereby governments transfer some of their public responsibilities to the private sector; indicates the role of Private Military/Security Companies/Privatised Military Firms in realising military aims or military related aims of public policies. That is different from what is meant in this paper by ‘civilianisation’ of security within the context of counter-terrorism.

This paper proposes the term ‘civilianisation’ as a notion relating to non-military, voluntary organisations and the business/private sector, engaged by government but acting in their own
right to prevent, protect and prepare in the context of a counterterrorism strategy. It is a phenomenon by which ordinary civilians act as providers of their own security in a specific new kind of war; that is, war against terrorism. In this context ‘civilianisation’ on the one hand appears to be an initiative on the part of the UK government. On the other; society is presented with a certain potential to effectively address the threats of terrorism.

As earlier given examples clearly indicate, there is, at least in the case of the UK, a tendency to think about ‘burden sharing’ between security institutions and civilians, whereby beneficiaries become providers. Such developments follow the argument that traditional providers of security (i.e. public institutions) will never be able to fully and effectively deliver in a world where there are so many existing and potential ‘terrorists’, who increasingly are British, continental European or American passport holders. Surveys carried out by YouGov point out that ‘32 per cent of British Muslim male university students believe that killing is justifiable only if religion was under attack’ (YouGov/Centre for Social Cohesion Survey Results 2008). The increase in the Muslim population in Great Britain, attributed to immigration, a higher birth rate and conversions to Islam is in turn pertinent to a ‘beefed up’ sense of identity among British Muslims as a reaction to the Western response to the war on terrorism. Just as Michael Boyle challenges a popular view, at least among many politicians, that counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency are strategically and operationally not much different and one may actually contradict another; so do many experts point to ‘side effects’ of counter-terrorism, collateral damage being the most obvious example (2010. pp. 333-353).

At the other end of the spectrum, there is the question of home security. As the general truth goes, one cannot have security and freedom at the same time, so we encounter the need to balance trade-offs between the two. Obviously, tighter security measures, such as ‘stop and search’ procedures, 28-day detentions of terrorist suspects without charge or body scanners at
airports. may make many feel that their freedom is compromised. Arguments referring to a genuine need of policing and intelligence institutions with ‘extended powers’ to provide the quality of services they are supposed to provide, lead contemporary societies to the ‘state of emergency/ exceptionalism’ or what Didier Bigo terms as ‘the ban-opticon dispositif’ (2008, p. 31). We can disagree about the extent of the limitations to our freedoms, but the essential paradox seems to be inescapable. There is no simple way out of this predicament. Therefore, ‘civilianisation’ of security, at least as far as counterterrorism at home is concerned, may present policy-makers with a chance to mitigate the harsh effects of having to choose between security and freedom.

There are a number of reasons for which civilians would be quite well suited for the task of acting against terrorism, perhaps better than a public institution, First, public institutions are quite immobile. Usually understaffed, underinvested and underequipped policing and to a lesser extent intelligence agents cannot prevent, prepare and protect civilians effectively in case of terrorist threats and attacks. No matter how sophisticated technologies get, how strict controls at the airports are and how engaged and devoted agents may be, full security remains unattainable. Penitentiary systems, for that matter, often result in contradictory effects, where those released from prison may constitute a greater threat to society than they did before serving time or who are at best no better for society after serving time. This is why recently the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) announced that it was going to publish online details including pictures, of drug traffickers, fraudsters and money launderers and encourage the public to monitor them and possibly even try to prevent them from offending again.

Findings recently published by the HM Chief Inspector of Prisons indicate that ‘the number of Muslim prisoners has increased rapidly over the last 15 years’ (2010). According to the 2001 census, there were about 1.6 million Muslims (2.7 per cent of the population) in the UK.
In December 2008, there were 9975 Muslims in English and Welsh prisons, constituting 12 per cent of the prison population. This compared with 2513 (5 per cent) in 1994 and 6571 (8 per cent) in June 2004. Muslims now constitute the third largest religious group in prison, after those with no religious affiliation and Christians. The report carries mixed signals. It explores reasons behind conversions and relates to publicly held views that Muslim prisoners are potential extremists and that prisons may in fact be ‘breeding houses’ for Islamic radicalisation. One of the key findings seems to be that no matter what the reason of conversion in any given case, regardless of ethnicity, those who accept Allah with time truly identify themselves with the new religion.

Pertinent to criminology issues is David Garland’s ‘responsibilisation’ strategy an attempt to extend the reach of state agencies by linking them up with actors in the ‘private sector’ and ‘the community’ (2001. pp. 124-127). As he asserts, one of the characteristics of the new crime prevention in the United States and the United Kingdom in the last two decades of the twentieth century included addressing crime in a more indirect way. Instead of engaging police, courts and prisons, this new approach increasingly promotes actions by non-state organisations and actors. That is to say, the state alone is not and cannot be responsible for preventing and controlling crime, in this vision, the role of the state is to ‘augment and support’ multiple actors and informal processes. ‘Responsibilisation’ is not to command and control but rather to persuade and align, to organise other actors, property owners, retailers and individual citizens, to play their parts.25

In the context of counter-terrorism, the general public may, at least in some cases, have higher chances of disrupting terrorists and their actions. This appears to be the reasoning behind the UK government’s initiative. More specifically, those who are engaged in communities and in intercultural dialogue seem to have a good chance of preventing others from becoming extreme. The burden of prevention, therefore, is likely to be shared by
members of society, who are in turn concerned with issues such as tolerance and the will to ‘live with others under the same roof’.

Paradoxically, public institutions may do a very bad job in this regard, making newcomers from different cultures feel unwelcomed. Adding the aforementioned effects of Western reactions to international terrorism, which have become more and more identified with Islamism and Islam and you have a recipe for failure. \(^{26}\) In this regard, immigration policies have become one of the focus points. In general, net migration to the UK since the mid-1990s exceeded 100,000 people per year (Somerville and Cooper 2010, p. 124). In the first quarter of 2008, according to the Labour Force Survey, Indians and Pakistanis constituted the third and fourth largest groups of foreign workers, respectively. The main drivers of migration to the UK include: strong economic opportunities, family reunions, studentships and asylum seeking. As Somerville and Cooper suggest, there has been substantial public anxiety about immigration in the UK, often fuelled by media attention.

The New Labour government of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown between 1997 and 2008 considerably changed immigration policy. Liberalisation of the economic migration system, an increase of restrictions for asylum seekers, more strenuous controls against unauthorised migration and reorientation of the official position on ‘reintegration’ have, among others, greatly contributed to the current picture. Consequently, the focus of immigration policies has also shifted from multi-culturalism to integration, under which refugee integration policy, a new focus on community cohesion, active promotion of citizenship and emphasis on equality play major roles. \(^{27}\) All of this stands amidst vocal criticism pointing to concerns that a large-scale migration has distorted ‘Britishness’. Conversely, the 2005 London terrorist attacks emphasised the delicate nature of ethnic relations and immigration policies. Although the government has paid more attention to Muslim communities, focusing on their integration into the society, some groups (e.g. second generation Pakistanis) have generally
underperformed in terms of immigrant outcomes. Hence, the promotion of mainstream Islam
coupled with an enforced emphasis on social cohesion has to be balanced with economic
benefits that the UK economy has been enjoying for years, on top of the inevitable
‘securitisation’ of British immigration policies.\textsuperscript{28}

Second, greater engagement of civilians may increase their sense of responsibility and
identity within communities in which they reside and even more importantly with their
country. In this aspect, the ‘civilianisation’ of security may bring citizens closer to the State,
an argument worth bringing up especially in times of widespread public dissatisfaction with
many governments and their policies. A sense of shared security at a basic level (i.e. the
individual level) has the potential to augment what was raised some years ago by scholars
such as Barry Buzan and described as a security of ‘human collectives’, where sharing the
burden really means sharing values and norms. That in turn would make it easier for public
institutions to operate and fulfil their duties along the lines of traditional counter-terrorism
methods.

Third, traditional counter-terrorism measures, defensive as well as offensive, have serious
limitations. Defensive measures are expensive. The costs include money spent directly on
methods and equipment, as well as less measurable costs imposed on business that may be
hindered by all sorts of security provisions. ‘Civilianisation’ cannot eliminate such costs
altogether but may, if properly understood, mitigate them to some extent.

Of course, defensive measures are limited and not everything can be protected. This may
cause many experts to conclude that terrorists will always have the advantage of ‘being
ahead’ and can choose what, where and when to attack. Because of this, alert civilians,
widely engaged in counter-terrorist practices may constitute the ‘last line’ (or indeed perhaps
the ‘first line’) of defence by either foiling attempted terrorist attacks or at least complicating
terrorist planning where perimeter security is not feasible.
Last, but by no means least, the UK has educated the public that terrorist attacks could become a normal part of life, while at the same time conveyed the idea that a ‘permanent state of exception’ or ‘emergency’ is both omnipresent and justified (Bigo 2008, p. 31). This indicates that we are experiencing a slow transformation of representative democracy and its erosion in favour of the development of governmental politics without checks and balances. The current state of transnationalisation of bureaucracies of surveillance and the omnipresence of high-tech surveillance techniques add to the problems rather than solve them (Bigo 2006, p. 56).

The ‘natural’ focus on prevention mentioned earlier in the text brings therefore a risk of wading through apocalyptic visions often presented as a credible future by a considerably small group of experts and bureaucrats in order to justify the suspension and destruction of individual security and freedom (Bigo and Guild 2007, p. 117). Perhaps, ‘civilianisation’ as understood in this paper is not a government’s response to these problems, since it is the UK government that is also responsible for its creation. Yet, ‘civilianisation’ of security should be conceived of as an opportunity for society to counter-bureaucratic encroachments, and by constant engagement and partner-like participation within counter-terrorism policy, to normalise the emergency as a technique of ‘government by unease’. That could also help to differentiate between those who are not against being monitored against danger and groups of people considered as dangerous ‘others’.

**Can Curative and preventive methods work?**

The rising Muslim population in Europe in general and in the UK in particular may serve both as a catalyst of ‘civilianisation’/privatisation of counter-terrorism policy and as an obstacle. A catalyst in the sense that a greater number of participants from among Muslim communities will need to be involved in activities under ‘Prevent, Protect, Prepare’. An obstacle in the sense that the failure to engage may ultimately result in social rejection and
greater polarisation within British society. This last point seems to have been taken mostly by the critics of CONTEST, who claim that the strategy alienates Muslims in Great Britain and who often point to official statistics to support that claim. According to the London Metropolitan Police, racist and religious hate crimes are on the rise in the area of London, with a 1.2 per cent increase last year.

On 30 March 2010, a cross-party committee (Communities and Local Government Committee) issued a report based on a 6-month investigation into ‘Prevent’, claiming that ‘the government’s anti-radicalisation programme is doing exactly the opposite of what it was meant to do’. One should also add that both social mobilisation and ‘civilianisation’ of security within the context of counter-terrorism may possibly bring negative effects in the realm of immigration policy and social cohesion, despite an effective response on the part of the private sector. The constant alertness and engagement of private stakeholders runs the risk of not only lowering the quality of counter-terrorism measures, but over time the omnipresence of danger may eventually lead to weariness among the members of society, who will grow tired of a constant state of emergency/exception and may start to disregard the need for genuine involvement.

Rachel Briggs, in her article on community engagement for counter-terrorism, puts forward three significant suggestions: (1) community engagement is not something that can or should indeed be done half-heartedly, (2) one of the most important limiting factors for success is the extent to which the local authority understands and has solid relationships with its local communities and (3) the lines need to be drawn more clearly between activities aimed at preventing violent extremism and those seeking to achieve broader aims in order to guard against the creeping securitisation of all manner of areas of policy (Briggs 2010, pp. 980-981). She asserts that community development workers, teachers, social workers and mental health practitioners are not counter-terrorism practitioners, although they undoubtedly have a
contribution to make. Indeed this paper also contradicts the idea of ‘creeping securitisation’ of everyday life activities. As first outlined by Ole Wæver, securitisation is a process in which an actor declares a particular issue, dynamic or actor to be an ‘existential threat’ to a particular referent object (1995). If accepted by the relevant audience, this enables the suspension of normal politics and the use of emergency measures in responding to that perceived crisis.

On the contrary, ‘civilianisation’, if understood and promoted properly, is far from ‘securitisation’ of everyday life activities. Since it emphasises the need to include vast parts of society into coordinated actions against perceived threats, in this case terrorist attacks, the danger of ‘suspension of normal politics’ is mitigated. By engaging civilians in some aspects of counter-terrorist measures, governments may not only boost a sense of burden sharing but also open themselves more to the criticism and control of the public. Enlarging the stakeholder base will in this sense bring more transparency to public policies and, therefore, potentially more accountability.

Leaving the disputes between the proponents of the Copenhagen School of constructivist tradition and the so-called Welsh School of critical security studies behind, this paper alludes to a simple, yet powerful concept of emancipation (Booth 1991, p. 319). ‘Civilianisation’, understood as the engagement of non-military, voluntary organisations and the business/private sector by governments to prevent, protect and prepare in the context of counter-terrorism strategy, is a form of emancipation in the sense that Ken Booth wrote about in the early 1990s. Booth asserted that: ‘Security means absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely chose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on.’
We cannot but notice that terrorism, as political violence, clearly does constitute one of those physical and by all means, human, constraints. If ‘civilianisation’ can give societies a sense of security through greater engagement, then we should agree to perceive it as ‘freeing’. Departing from such a concept, it logically follows that ‘civilianisation’ of security in the context of counter-terrorism implies thinking about individuals as ultimate security referents. If this is so, then it further conduces to the notion that ‘civilianisation’ may be conceived of as a means to achieving ultimate and relatively full security of human beings in a world where ‘world order’ between people is more fundamental and primordial than that of states.

**Conclusion**

There is a fundamental distinction between ‘civilianisation’ of security (as envisaged by the British government and analysed in this paper) and civil defence. The latter is widely understood as the organisation and training of civilians for the protection of lives and property during and after attacks in wartime. Recently the notion of civil defence has been evolving. The term ‘civil protection’ is currently popularly used within the European Union to refer to government-approved systems and resources tasked with protecting the non-combatant population, primarily in the event of natural and technological disasters. In recent years, there has been a considerable emphasis on preparedness for technological disasters resulting from terrorist attacks as well. In most countries, however, civil defence is a government-managed activity.

Having said that, we must note first that ‘civilianisation’ of security refers not only to protection but also to prevention. Second, the activities under ‘civilianisation’ are not entirely managed by the government but rather initiated and coordinated. In that sense ‘civilianisation’ denotes a situation where civilians are engaged in the conduct of actions traditionally carried out by states and where the actual realization of the tasks and initiatives tends to shift considerably to non-official civilians in the private sphere. Paraphrasing David
Garland, the aims and benefits of such initiatives are not merely the off-loading (‘hiving off’) of troublesome state functions, or the privatisation of counter-terrorist measures (2001, p. 127). Rather along the lines of responsibilisation’ strategy in the field of crime control, ‘civilianisation’ is to be understood as spreading new forms of ‘government-at-a-distance’.\textsuperscript{34}

Finally, some methodological remarks are in order. This paper did not aim at determining how far or to what extent the UK public mobilised themselves to tackle terrorist threats and even less so at attempting to measure it in any way. for obvious reasons ‘civilianisation’ as a social phenomenon escapes easy measurement. For that matter, it requires rather a qualitative approach. Since terrorist threats at the level of prevention are hard to spot, it seems logical to assume that the only plausible and workable solution will also be hard to measure. In that sense, a strong social/ community based response appears to be the best way to address ‘the menace of the twenty-first century’. In this form of counter-terrorism, it appears that the role of governments is evolving in the direction of encouraging the environment in which such a civilian-based response might grow and flourish.

On the other hand, only time will tell how much ‘civilianisation’ is a living trend within British society or just another of government’s ideas feasible at times of great peril but ‘petering out’ once the public feels safer.

Notes

2. See also: Kaplan (1994).
3. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world since 1970 (currently updated through 2008). It includes information on more than 38,000 bombings, 13,000 assassinations, and 4000 kidnappings since 1970. It also includes information on at least 45 variables for each case, with more
recent incidents including information on more than 120 variables. It is supervised by an advisory panel of 12 terrorism research experts. See more at: http://www.start.umd.edu/datarivers/vis/GtdExplorer.swf

4. See more: Metropolitan Police Authority.

5. ‘The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. Security in an independent world’, includes large parts of CONTEST. As such, it explicitly states that ‘The work of Prevent will only succeed with the active participation of the widest cross-section of society’. Likewise ‘A strong Britain in an age of uncertainty: The National Security Strategy’ identifies a ‘need to build a much closer relationship between government, the private sector and the public when it comes to national security’.


7. The Muslim community in the UK is a very youthful one; 37 per cent of Muslims are aged 16-34 (and a further 34 per cent are under 16).

8. There are five objectives altogether. See more at: HM Government (2009a). The document stresses that funding should go to a wider range of faith and non-faith-based organisations to support activities that lead to shared values and build the cohesion of local communities.


10. Iqra is the 96th sura or chapter of the Qur’an. The first five verses of this sura are believed by nearly all sources, both traditional and modern, to be the first verses of the Qur’an to be revealed to Muhammad.


15. See more at: http://www.thamesvalleychamber.co.uk/702/

16. See more at: http://www.londonprepared.gov.uk/lrp.jsp


18. See more at: http://www.vision.caltech.edu/


22. In January 2010, the powers were ruled illegal by the European Court of Human Rights. The new coalition government has said it is reviewing their use as part of a wider overhaul of anti-terror legislation. See more at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/politics/10283701.stm [Accessed 20 January 2011].

23. According to Police Federation, possible police cuts as a result of the coming Comprehensive Spending Review may mean ‘reduction in police officer numbers of anything up to 40,000 in the lifetime of this coalition government’. Source: http://www.polfed.org/mediacenter/A7CDD617BFC740489648A62F50A8017C.asp.asp [Accessed 20 January 2011].


27. Ibidem, 130.

28. Latest proposals of the coalition government introduced by Home Secretary Theresa May include cutting the number of migrant workers coming to Britain from outside the EU. David Cameron’s cabinet has recently pledged to cut net migration from 196,000 to tens of thousands by 2015. On immigration and asylum and counter-terrorism see Makarenko (2007).

29. The Home office publishes threat levels aimed at keeping the public informed about the level of threat the UK faces at any given time. At the time of writing of this paper the threat level from international terrorism was ‘severe’, meaning that is highly likely. Since the introduction of the threat level system in 2006, it dropped to ‘substantial’ (an attack is a strong possibility) only once in July 2009. It has been labelled ‘critical’ (an attack is expected imminently) twice so far: in August 2006 and June 2007. See more at: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/threat-levels.html [Accessed 20 January 2011].

30. According to the Office of National Statistics, the number of Muslims in Britain has grown by more than 500,000 to 2.4 million in 4 years. The population multiplied 10 times faster than the rest of society. In the same period the number of Christians in the country fell by more than 2 million, the newspaper reported. See more at: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/focuson/religion/ [Accessed 20 January 2011].

31. Some experts see that the 4 per cent of Muslims in the population today will increase to roughly 8 per cent by 2025 and roughly 10-15 per cent by 2050: http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=734 [Accessed 20 January 2011].


33. On the unintended consequences of Prevent see: House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee (2010, 18-20). On the other hand, Maajid Nawaz, the Director of Quilliam a counter-extremism think tank founded by former ideologues of UK-based Islamist organisations, strongly disagrees with such claims. See more at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/

34. That links with the idea of a ‘Big Society’ introduced by the new coalition government of
David Cameron aimed at ‘the biggest, most dramatic redistribution of power from elites in Whitehall to the man and woman on the street’.

References


