Globalization, Terrorism and the Future of East-West Studies

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The author welcome comments from readers.

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Abstract

The Asia Pacific region has significantly changed in the past five years, with both economic and physical security issues coming to the fore. These changes make international cooperation more important, but international cooperation requires strong and effective nation-states as the basic building blocks of the global order. Some Asia and Pacific nations are firmly established as nations, but others still lack a strong sense of national identity. Virtually all the states in Asia are relative new, having been created in the past 5 to 6 decades, and many basic constitutional and institutional issues have not been fully resolved. Globalization further challenges Asia’s evolving nation-states. The terrorist threat has added to insecurity in the region. Several root causes of terrorism can be identified, and there are a number of other aggravating factors. In seeking to address problems relating to international cooperation, weak nation-states, globalization and terrorism, East-West studies become even more relevant and problem- and policy-oriented.

I want to express my gratitude to Hong Kong Baptist University and its David C. Lam Institute for East-West Studies for inviting me to join you for this important conference on East-West Studies. The mission of the Lam Institute – to promote East-West cultural dialogue – is nearly the same as that of the mission of the East-West Center, which seeks to build understanding and relations across and around the Pacific through cooperative study, training and research. For that reason alone, it is very valuable to come here, both to explore with you the broader field of Asia-Pacific studies and to

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1 A Keynote address given at the International Workshop on East-West Studies, produced by the David C. Lam Institute for East-West Studies (LEWI) and the Wing Lung Bank International Institute for Business Development (IIBD) at Hong Kong Baptist University on 21 November 2002.
discuss ways in which we can work together more closely in achieving important common objectives.

To some, our missions of building East-West understanding may sound old fashioned in an age of globalization, when many of the differences across nations are being fuzzed over by a globalizing economy, by growing networks of international norms, rules, and practices, and in the popular conception at least by the acceptance of cultural convergence. But I concur with the basic premise underlying this conference – that globalization makes intercultural research and dialogue all the more relevant and challenging. The rise of international terrorism, an aspect of globalization, only reinforces this conclusion.

A World Transformed

Let me began with some historical context. I want to turn back the clock, but not very far – just to the eve of Hong Kong’s reversion of sovereignty in 1997. This was only a little more than a half decade ago, but in those five and a half years our world has significantly changed. The Asia Pacific region was then enjoying the sunny side of globalization as capital flowed in and exports poured out, resulting in double digit or near double digit growth in many East and Southeast Asian economies, with the notable exception of Japan. While there were some prominent opponents of globalization, the political balance of forces generally favored continued freer trade and capital movements and projects. In 1994, the region’s leaders had committed themselves to APEC’s Bogor Vision calling for creation of free trade and investment in the region by 2010 for developed countries and no later than 2020 for all countries, and the forward movement
of APEC continued with the 1995 Osaka Action Agenda and the 1996 Manila APEC Plan of Action.

The Asia Pacific security outlook also appeared relatively benign as indicated by the smooth transition in Hong Kong. Sino-American relations had their ups and downs in the mid-1990s, but there had been a significant warming trend following the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis. In fact, a then senior Pentagon official now heading Harvard University’s Kennedy School, Joseph S. Nye, expressed concern that the peoples of the region might be a little too complacent about their security. Security is like oxygen, he warned, you don’t think about it until it disappears. There was a threat of terrorism, but at least in Asia and the Pacific, it seemed locally nurtured and locally focused.

I mention this time only to show how much our world has changed in only a few short years. In 1998 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft published *A World Transformed*, an account of the end of the Cold War in the 1989-91 period. The world was transformed then, but it was continuing to transform almost as dramatically even as Bush and Scowcroft were writing their book. In Asia, the most important transformations did not come with the end of the Cold War, but afterwards.

Only hours after Hong Kong’s sovereignty reversion, the Asia economic crisis began with the floating of the Thai baht. The economic crisis, like the bubble that preceded it, was a crisis of globalization. World capital fled even more quickly than it had rushed in, and suddenly Asia was experiencing the dark side of globalization. The economic crisis also let much of the air out of the APEC balloon. At the November 1997 APEC leaders meeting in Vancouver, Bill Clinton optimistically described the crisis as a “blip” that should not affect the success of the Asian economies or of APEC. In fact,
APEC and other forms of international cooperation were important in ensuring that the crisis did not get worse and did not unravel the free trade gains that had been made in earlier years, but there is little talk today about the Bogor vision. While many in Asia were disappointed with APEC’s performance and looked for other venues for cooperation, each of the alternatives also had its own problems.

Politics and security were also affected. The economic crisis caused a loss of confidence in government, the most significant casualty being the Indonesian government of President Suharto, which collapsed in 1998. The collapse precipitated the destruction and independence of East Timor, an upsurge in ethnic conflict throughout the archipelago, and heightened violence in the long-simmering provinces of Aceh and West Papua. But Suharto was not alone. In the first two-three years following the crisis, a number of the region’s other leaders faced serious political challenges. Some, such as Thailand’s Chavalit Yongchaiyadh and the Philippines’ Joseph Estrada, were removed from office, while others, such as Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamed and Taiwan’s Chen Shui-bien, survived.

Extremists also sensed and sought to exploit the weaknesses of the established governments, a fact which has recently become increasingly evident. Only a year ago, according to the participants at our Asia Pacific Security Outlook annual workshop, many in Asia thought of the war on terrorism as America’s war, as not directly affecting them, although indirectly affecting them through the reaction of the United States. But this year’s workshop, held two weeks ago in Kuala Lumpur, showed that following the Bali bombing, there is a strong belief that terrorists may strike in any vulnerable location. If it were true that security is like oxygen, oxygen is not taken for granted today.
Some countries have been more insulated from the economic, political and security turbulence than others, but none can be totally isolated. Recent events confirm the reality of globalization and the fragile interdependencies that connect our world. Who would have thought that a policy decision by a central bank in a medium-sized Asian economy, Thailand, could have touched off a region-wide crisis and threatened a global economic bust? Certainly not the U.S. government, which initially regard Thailand’s difficulties as local in nature and which did not bother to contribute to the first economic rescue package. Who could have imagined that the terrorist network, based in the ruins of Afghanistan, could have engineered the most destructive attack on American soil in sixty years using the most primitive weapons to commandeer airplanes? Certainly not the American authorities. Further, who could have thought that those attacks in New York and Washington would kill nationals of more than eighty nations, including several hundred Muslims? Certainly not the terrorists.

**Asia Pacific Nation-States**

Globalization, whether of trade, of capital, or of terror, requires an unprecedented degree of international cooperation. As in any cooperation, international cooperation requires reliable partners, partners who can make commitments with confidence and who are able to implement their pledges. In the international arena, the decision-making and implementing units are nation-states; unless these units are strong and effective, international cooperation will be weak.

When we read or hear the name of a country in our media – China, the United States, Thailand, Indonesia – they sound very much alike. Indeed, in the crudest forms of
the realpolitik model of international relations, nation-states are likened to billiard balls. They may be of different weights and sizes and be placed in different locations, but all have hard shells and are essentially similar. In the real world, we know that nations are porous and very different from one another in many ways. Looking at the nation-states in our region provides some insights into some of the political and international cooperation challenges of Asia and the Pacific.

It is useful to consider the concepts of nation and state separately. A nation is a group of people with a strong sense of shared history, a common identity, and often some highly visible, distinctive cultural characteristic such as ethnicity, language, or religion. In Asia Pacific, we find such nations mainly in Northeast Asia and the mainland parts of Southeast Asia. Japan, Korea, China, Vietnam, Thailand – are all countries where the majority populations have forged a strong sense of historical identity and cultural and ethnic unity. Japan and Korea are among the most ethnically homogeneous countries in the world, even though the Korean nation is currently divided into two competing states. In China and Vietnam, ethnic minorities occupy large portions of the national territory, but they represent only small proportions of the populations.

Although much newer as nations and having multicultural populations, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States also have strong senses of national identity and pride. Educational and political institutions have played a critical role in building this identity, and the largest minorities do not have strong territorial bases. Canada is somewhat different, with a large, territorially based French-speaking minority.

Most of the other countries of South and Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands are still building nations. The geographical boundaries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, India, East Timor, Papua-New Guinea and Fiji, to cite a few examples, were established by colonial powers. Upon independence, such unity as existed was frequently quite superficial and based on narrow elites whose common interest consisted of throwing out the imperialists. The basic challenge has been to forge a sense of nationality among the peoples living within the bequeathed territories, something the colonial powers rarely sought to do. Some of these countries have been remarkably successful, but others appear to be coming undone. It is not so much that they are falling apart as that they were never really knit together from the beginning.

As problematic as are some of the nations are in this region, the states may be even more fragile. Even the century-old nations of Asia are relatively new states, often created in a burst of enthusiasm for western democratic or authoritarian models. The oldest states in their present forms are found in Japan, India, and China, all with constitutional arrangements dating from the early years following the end of World War II. Most others are much newer. South Korea and Taiwan had martial law or military-dominated political systems until the mid-1980s, as did the Philippines from the early 1970s until the mid-1980s. Thailand’s current constitution dates from 1996; Fiji’s from 1997; and while Indonesia’s 1945 constitution is one of the oldest in the region, the real political system of Indonesia is in fact one of the newest and most dynamic, having been dramatically altered after 1998.

All states, of course, are evolving, but in Asia the basic social contract underlying many states is still being contested. Fundamental issues remain unresolved, such as: the role of the military, the role of religion, the powers of executive, legislative and judicial authorities, the power of local governments, and minority people’s autonomy.
Moreover, where system changes have been made, the institutions needed for the longer-term consolidation of these systems are usually not in place. In new democracies, political parties typically remain the creation of individual politicians rather than being institutions that bring talented individuals to the fore of political life. Being personality-based, they frequently crumble and reinvent themselves in new forms. The media becomes free before it becomes responsible. Driven by intense competition, it is frequently characterized by unconfirmed rumors and speculation without context or solid analysis. Civil society institutions are under-funded, under-institutionalized, and frequently, highly fragmented.

Finally, the electoral provisions of many Asian states are such that their leaders come to office without strong national mandates. The democratic systems tend not to provide for run-off elections, meaning that when three or more candidates split votes, the winners typically have less than forty percent. Chen Shui-bien, Joseph Estrada and Kim Dae-jung won with between thirty-five and forty percent of the votes in their respective elections, while former President Fidel Ramos of the Philippines won with only about a quarter of the votes. Former Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid was elected by Indonesia’s national assembly even though his party had received only about eleven percent of the votes in the national elections. It is even more difficult to ascertain the legitimacy of the mandate in the more authoritarian states, because the will of the people is never truly ascertained.

So the nation-states of Asia are facing challenges ahead that have been largely, although not always, resolved in the Western world. While building nations and states,
the societies of Asia are simultaneously grappling with globalization issues that even the most firmly established and prosperous Western countries find daunting.

These issues include high rates of urbanization and migration, rapid changes in competitive advantage, and the spread of new or re-emerging dread diseases. But among the many aspects of globalization, there is one – the spread of new political concepts and cultures – that is probably the most traumatic for the Asian governments. In many areas – cuisine, art and design, economic and technological concepts – there have been reciprocal if not necessarily symmetric impacts of West on East and vice versa. In contrast, in the political arena, the relationship has been almost entirely one way. Western political concepts such as written constitutions, individual rights and liberties, elections, political parties, and government of, by and for the people have proven very attractive to Asians. But there has been no reverse flow of Asian political concepts to the West. Like the global economy, which tends to intensively affect some enclaves before spreading out to the broader populations, the political concepts also spread differentially, affecting urban and educated populations first. Political values, aspirations and practices may thus become quite different in the Bangkoks, Manilas, and Jakartas of the region than they are in the vast rural hinterlands. Freewheeling political groups, NGOs, and the media set high standards of competition, performance, and accountability. Yet, since the countrysides still contain the majority of votes, a leader may be elected largely through traditional means, only to face an unsuccessful term in office due to a highly critical and hostile population in the capital city. Casualties of the urban political elites come readily to mind in Thailand and the Philippines.
International Terrorism

Despite the picture of immense political challenges I have sketched, I am basically quite optimistic about the countries of Asia and the Pacific. Great strides have been made, particularly when compared to Africa or the Middle East. But we must add one more challenge to the above list. The basic fragility of many of our nation-states has coincided with the rise of another aspect of globalization -- international terrorism. Terrorism is a problem for Asia and the Pacific, not only because there are local terrorists, some of very long standing, and not only because of the actual and potential spill over from terrorist networks in the Middle East. It is also because the question of how the war on terrorism should be prosecuted is a serious source of global tensions. It is highly relevant to intercultural studies, and therefore, of concern to us here. The basic issues are these: What is terrorism? Why is there terrorism? What can be done about it?

Terrorism has several clear characteristics – it is violent, it is purposeful, and it involves innocent, anonymous victims, people with little or no connection to the grievances of the terrorists. But there is no international consensus on a comprehensive definition of terrorism, nor is there likely to be. This is partly conceptual because, as for other broad concepts such as “crime” and “war,” terrorism involves many disparate kinds of behavior. Moreover, as a practical matter, many nations have sanctioned or supported terrorist activities, thus in some way participating in or excusing terrorism.

The “why” question is also often overlooked in the public debate, particularly when the emphasis is on action against a particular group of terrorists. Confronted with the horror, cruelty and seeming irrationality of terrorism, people reach for simple explanations – terrorism is a matter of religious or ethnic fanaticism, the result of
economic deprivation, or of misanthropic but charismatic leaders such as Adolph Hitler or Osama bin Laden, or simply a matter of pure hatred. Such “explanations” raise more questions than they answer.

We know that terrorism is not confined to any specific period of history or any specific ethnic group, specific religion, specific social segment (such as the poor), or particular structure of the international system. At the same time, it is not simply random. Terrorism is a social phenomenon; there are patterns, and these can and need to be analyzed as the basis for any effective policies to counter terrorism. The big challenge lies in identifying and understanding the conditions that give rise to and sustain terrorism over time in the historical, geographical, and cultural contexts where it occurs. In no situation, however extreme, does the majority of the population become terrorists, but some do and many others may sympathize with the grievances expressed by the terrorists, if not with their tactics. It is this silent support group that sustains and to some degree legitimizes the activities of terrorists in their own broader communities.

I can only make a primitive list of conditions that are likely to be associated with sustained or non-random terrorism. Terrorism is most likely to be found where:

- Widespread political grievances, particularly those of minorities, are being dealt with through repression with little opportunity for legitimate expression of such grievances or their redress.

- Societies are going through rapid socio-economic changes and where a significant number of people feel that their well-being and value systems are being threatened by these changes.
• Where there are deep-seated historical grievances and prejudices, but where these are seen not just as historical but are reinforced by interpretation of contemporary events.

• Where governmental authority has broken down or where the government has lost legitimacy.

Any one of these situations may not necessarily give rise to terrorist movements, but where they are found in combination, there will almost surely some extremist elements and the use of terrorism.

These conditions are root causes. But there are also aggravating factors that can accentuate terrorism when root causes are present.

States have encouraged, financed, and armed terrorist groups. Since inter-state conflict by armed military groups has high risks, many states have preferred to carry out proxy warfare against their enemies by encouraging terrorism against them. This may have seemed a low risk strategy until last year.

Modern technology has made it literally possible for a single individual to kill hundreds of thousands of people. Fortunately this has not yet happened, but the September 11 attacks remind us most forcefully of the tremendous devastation a small number of dedicated terrorists can cause.

Modern media certainly does not intend to aggravate terrorism, but it may do so by projecting highly emotive images in the absence of balanced context. We have in fact different media appealing to different audiences and presenting quite different pictures of what is going on in places like Palestine or Kashmir. This aggravates tensions,
misunderstandings, and bitterness and gives substance to the notion of a clash of civilizations.

    Given these causes and aggravating factors, how can we wind down terrorism?

    There needs to be clear international laws criminalizing terrorist activities. Even in the absence of a comprehensive definition of terrorism, terrorist acts such as hijackings, poisoning water supplies, spreading viruses, attacking power plants, carrying out suicide bombings are or should be criminalized. As Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has said, “These are acts of terror and anyone committing these acts must be regarded as terrorists by everyone irrespective of the causes they are fighting for, irrespective of their religion, race or creed.”

    Dedicated terrorists and terrorist organizations committing those criminal acts must be brought to justice. Coddling, condoning or excusing terrorist actions are unacceptable to modern civilization. The killing of innocent people is criminal and cannot be excused.

    The mistakes of terrorists should be exploited. In my mind, September 11 was a miscalculation by the terrorists because it was so egregious and devastating that it was universally condemned by countries all over the world, with the single exception of Iraq. This has resulted in an extraordinary degree of international cooperation relating to the identification and prosecution of terrorists that otherwise would have taken years to negotiate. But unless the campaign against terrorism is carefully planned, articulated and rationalized to all our publics, the balance of sympathy may again tip to the terrorists. Arguably, it already has in some parts of the world.
Finally, and very importantly, the passive or active support base of the terrorists must be undercut by addressing the root issues. Terrorist organizations will not survive over time without an active set of grievances to feed them. People often forget that the 1960s and 1970s spawned some very vicious militant gangs in Western countries and in Japan. These groups disappeared in part because the way was open for less violent, less costly ways of expressing and getting action on the grievances that helped spawn them.

The way ahead is not simple. Outsiders cannot simply undercut the support base of chronic terrorism and address legitimate grievances in a short time. But as the September 11 attacks so clearly demonstrated, outsiders cannot ignore these tasks, hoping they will be resolved on their own by local parties. The international community must be proactive in the situations that are generating so many of the grievances animating or being exploited by terrorists in the world today. Clearly we need to develop as much of an international consensus as possible on what should be done and to share the burdens of doing it. Intercultural education is a key, vital part of the struggle against terrorism.

**International Education**

I now turn to “East-West studies” and their place in a globalized world frightened by terrorism and the prospect of war. What do “East-West studies” mean, and how are they relevant? As used by the Lam Institute and by the East-West Center, the terms “East” and “West” are intended to indicate our focus -- the rich traditions and societies of Asia on one hand and those of the Americas and Europe on the other. I believe also that by placing East and West side by side and by connecting them with a hyphen, we are indicating that we compare and contrast, seeking to understand each better with reference
to the other, and that we identify and analyze their interdependencies. The terms “East” and “West” help enhance these aspects of our work, but as with any term that groups multiple phenomena, they also have limitations. I would note some caveats.

First, although East and West are directional terms, just as in the case of “North-South” studies, the geography can be perplexing at best, or diverting at worst. North-South generally refers to rich and poor countries, but we also had some highly developed economies, like those of Australia, New Zealand well to the south, and these have been joined by economies such as those of Singapore and even Hong Kong, which are to the south of many lesser developed countries. With the rise of modern, rich cities in many developing countries, there are “northern” pockets in the south, just as decaying or bypassed rural areas and urban ghettos in the developed world may be pockets of the “south” in the north.

In the case of East-West, where there are no geographical poles, there is no starting or ending point of east and west, and thus the directional references are all relative. For Europeans, the traditional dividing point of East and West was at the Aegean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean Sea, placing what they called the Near East or Middle East in the East, while Europe was in the West. This traditional dividing line, which roughly separates the world dominated by Christendom and that dominated by Islam, has again received global attention as a key civilizational divide.

During the Cold War, another East-West dividing line was evident. At that time, there were multiple East-West institutes of one sort or another, and many still remain, but these referred to the two Cold War sides – the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries. The book by Bush and Scowcroft that I mentioned earlier refers to leaders of
East and West, but the authors were referring to the Cold War division. Then, as I said earlier, there is our definition with the West referring to North America for the East-West Center and to North America and Europe for the Lam Institute. We also have somewhat different definitions of the “East,” but we both focus on Pacific Asia. So the world has multiple Easts and Wests.

There is another way in which the terms “East” and “West” may be misleading. Like all groupings, the terms “East” and “West” can give an artificial unity to the many rich variations and cultures within both East and West, while at the same time suggesting too strong a dichotomy between them.

There is yet another cautionary note in an age of globalization -- our focus can be limiting. Today, many of the issues that affect East and West are not region-specific. Arguably at the present time, the biggest East-West security issue is what should be done about Iraq; the biggest East-West economic issue may relate to the global financial architecture, and our biggest health issue may be HIV/AIDS.

With globalization, with the profound and growing impacts of Eastern and Western societies on each other, and with the continuing uncertainty over which “East” and “West” one may be speaking of, the terms East and West become less geographical and more metaphorical. Therefore, perhaps each institution can define “East-West studies” more or less to suit its own purposes. Nevertheless, I think several broad trends are inevitable and should be encouraged. I note these trends mainly in relation to my own institution, the East-West Center.

First, as just implied, the issues of concern within “East-West studies” are less and less confined to a geographical area and are increasingly manifestations of global
issues. This, in theory, has always been true of the East-West Center. The purpose of the research at our Center was not so much to study Asia or the United States, but to bring the wisdom of East and West to issues of common concern whatever the scope of those issues. In the past, many though certainly not all, of these issues were regional, because it was in the region that the intersection of American and Asia-Pacific interests was set. But increasingly, as the countries of the region enlarge their interests and move to the forefront of intellectual and policy thinking on broader issues, the topics we study will be out-of-area or topical. This could include, for example, our respective views on global issues, such as global warming, the international financial system, or the best way to promote peace in the Middle East. For the Center, this is not simply a reaction to interests but a conscious effort to promote global dialogue and research among thinkers through the region. In this sense, East-West research, at least for our Center, needs a broad context more and more separated from traditional area studies.

Second, and this is much more prescriptive, it seems to me that East-West studies should not be just an academic enterprise. We should be proactive in addressing issues of contemporary and future concern to our region. As developments have occurred reflecting longer-term problems or weaknesses in our region, the East-West Center has sought to shape new activities to help address these problems. For example, following Fiji’s second coup two years ago, we established a dialogue program among political and religious leaders in that country. Following the terrorist attacks in the United States, we have sought to increase outreach to Muslim communities, and we have developed a set of activities designed to strengthen links between Muslim populations and other populations in Asia and the Pacific.
The terrorist attacks, and other manifest dysfunctions of our age including failed states, widespread poverty, growing income gaps, and exploitation, have also prompted us to begin another policy-oriented inquiry. We have just hosted a small group of world educators at the East-West Center to explore new paradigms in education. The basic premise was: in a world of accelerating change and globalization, our educational establishments (whether in East or West, North or South) have failed to keep pace. The huge investments in education have only partially paid off in some countries, and have had little or no payoff at all in others. While these investments have sought to address economic developmental challenges, much less attention has been given to building social capital, in particular the skills needed for developing respectful and cooperative relationships among individuals and communities rooted in vastly different cultural, economic, and professional backgrounds. Further, our premise was that investments in the same systems of basic education or such systems as modified by new technologies will not fundamentally help. Some deeper shift is needed. At this point, we are only asking questions and do not pretend to know the answers. But we are quite sure that if answers exist, they will not simply arise out of the Western scientific tradition, but will depend upon a fusion of various cultural and intellectual perspectives.

Third, and related to the above, our studies will increasingly be called upon and should want to connect in a very real way to the policy world. In a more complex and more dangerous world, there is a strong need for sound and balanced research and analysis providing context and conceptual tools much too rare in policy circles. Many of the public and policy analyses of the greatest issues involving East and West, including
the rise of China, the collapse of Indonesia, and the impetus for terrorism, lack the sophistication that the academy can provide.

Fourth, again a related point, it is very important to inform public debate, not simply through interaction with policymakers but also through working with journalists and public intellectuals. We find huge gaps in public understanding, East and West, of the causes of the economic crisis, the terrorist threats and many other issues.

Fifth, and this is a task for education generally, it is not enough to simply provide information and analysis; we need to build up society’s capabilities to deal with contemporary and future issues. This does not involve only the training of specialists in the fields we work in, as much as those are needed, but also implies the need for a kind of general literacy in East-West studies within the disciplines and professions relevant to its concerns. At the East-West Center, we provide scholarships for advanced degree training, but also we have short-term intensive seminar activities for journalists and younger political leaders and a new one or two semester Asia Pacific Leadership Program for people seeking general literacy in professional and leadership skill training.

Finally, there needs to be an overarching purpose or vision for what we do. Why do we have East-West studies? Obviously, there is value in simply understanding better our histories, cultures, societies, and issues. But I believe that our ultimate enterprise is to build an Asia-Pacific community that is one part of a global community. What is an Asia-Pacific community, and why is it important? I am certain that an Asia-Pacific community will not be like the European Union, where major elements of sovereignty are being given to common institutions. A more fitting analogy is the Atlantic community, of which the EU is a part. For North Americans, and perhaps even more so for
Europeans, the Atlantic community is an absolutely remarkable achievement, perhaps the most significant international relations achievement of the 20th century. The powers of this region fought two world wars in the first part of the last century at the costs of tens of millions of lives. Today, it is unimaginable to young people growing up in the United States, Canada, Germany or France that their countries might ever be in violent conflict with one another, whatever the tensions over trade, or policies towards Iraq. There is no defense planning by any of these countries against each other. This is in fact a new paradigm of relations that makes war among these countries unimaginable.

In my mind, building the same kind of community across the Pacific to join the Atlantic community in a vast zone of peace is the ultimate purpose of East-West studies. Our task is just the opposite of the terrorists’. It is rooted in the future and it is to build civilization, a civilization that honors and respects past traditions but also uses them in new and exciting way to address the issues of tomorrow.

The David C. Lam Institute for East-West Studies (LEWI) consortium, consisting of twenty-eight universities in the East and in the West, is ideally placed to carry out these tasks. Yesterday I was speaking with Professor Chan Kwok Bun, Director of LEWI, about migration and culture. Under the old paradigm when a person moved from one place to another, he or she assimilated to the culture of the new home. Nothing was added, it was just movement. Under the new paradigm, fostered by advances in transportation and communication technologies, a person can simultaneously be a creature of both the old environment and the new one, in other words, a “hybrid.” The hybrid is qualitatively transformed because the fusion of past and present creates something new that is more than the sum of its parts.
When you think of the power of fusion of East and West in a single individual, you can imagine what a consortium of twenty-eight universities programs can do. The trick, of course, is to get a full commitment from each of the components to a truly cooperative program of education and studies, thus creating a hybrid that can do what none of the components could do on its own and something that is more than the sum of its parts.
LEWI Working Paper Series

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10. George Xun WANG (University of Wisconsin Parkside), CHAN Kwok Bun (Hong Kong Baptist University), and Vivienne LUK (Hong Kong Baptist University), Conflict and its Management in Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures: A Review, English/34 pages, March 2003.


19. 鄭宏泰 (香港大學亞洲研究中心)，黃紹倫 (香港大學亞洲研究中心)，移民與本土：回歸前後香港華人身份認同問題的探討，共 35 頁，2003 年 12 月。

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