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China's new generation migrant workers and anomie social momentum and modes of adoption

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China's New Generation Migrant Workers and Anomie:

Social Momentum and Modes of Adoption

GAO Chunyuan

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the degree of

Master of Philosophy

Principle Supervisor: Prof. Jack Barbalet

Hong Kong Baptist University

April 2016

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis represents my own work which has been done after registration for the degree of MPhil at Hong Kong Baptist University, and has not been previously included in a thesis or dissertation submitted to this or any other institution for a degree, diploma or other qualifications.

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Abstract

Using anomie theory, in this paper it is argued that the new generation migrant workers (NGMWs) in China are not only receptors under structures, but also a reactive force towards those structures. However, anomie theory has faced theoretical ambiguities, controversies and misunderstandings. It also lacks the power to explain micro-to-macro relationships. For these reasons, anomie theory is first clarified and refined in this study based on its classical roots. It is then further developed by introducing the concept of social momentum to mend its theoretical lacuna. It is argued that anomie naturally reflects structural discoordination at the macro level, and that deviance and normlessness, although typically seen as indicators of anomie, are only its symptomatic presentations. Furthermore, social momentum, determined by the quantity, solidarity and modes of adaption, reveals the capacity of a social category to influence structural relationships.

This study demonstrates that China entered a comparatively anomic age after its economic reform. The NGMWs can be considered as a potential antithesis to anomie in China, as implied by certain qualities of their uniqueness indicated in earlier studies. The NGMWs' social momentum is analysed according to a field study carried out by the author in 2015 in Shanghai and the 2011 Chinese Social Survey (CSS 2011). The data from the survey and study are used to discuss whether the NGMWs will help to remedy anomie. The findings show that (1) the NGMWs' social momentum is strong but segmental and fragile due to the primary level solidarity of them, i.e., they lack a strong identity, and (2) the directions of their social momentum can be narrowed to two undetermined modes. The NGMWs tend to aggravate the symptoms of anomie, as they are weakly attached to cultural norms. However, they have an uncertain and not yet fully formed effect on the essence of anomie.

Acknowledgement

I owe a great debt to my friends, teachers and parents for this work. A number of people have contributed to the writing of this paper in various ways. Professor Jack Barbalet, my supervisor, shared his insights from beginning to end, offering many helpful comments and suggestions and giving me great encouragement. He kindly supported me in finding my own topic and my own ideas. As an MPhil student, writing this non-mainstream and ambitious thesis required courage. This paper, and even its proposal, would not have been possible without Prof. Barbalet.

Professor Ruan Danching, my vice-supervisor, provided me with valuable criticism and advice when writing the paper. Many thanks are also due to Dr Siu Yat-ming and Dr Peng Yini of Hong Kong Baptist University, Dr Chen Huirong and Professor Chen Yingfang of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Dr Xiong Yihang of Shanghai Fudan University and Mr Zhou Haiwang of Shanghai Academy of Social Science. These experienced researchers of migrant workers in China helped me in reviewing earlier studies and searching through data. I am also grateful to Professor Chan Hoi-man of The Chinese University of Hong Kong, who taught me about classical theories in his course and welcomed my questions outside of class.

Words are not enough to express my gratitude to Professor Zhang Xiaoyi of Shanghai Jiao Tong University. As a social welfare scholar, she taught me details about the national and local policies for migrant workers in China. As my mother, she provided me additional financial support and access to her networks in Shanghai.

I expect that this paper will result in constructive intellectual skirmishes and recognise that it contains many limitations. All of its shortcomings are entirely the result of my own efforts.

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Tables and Figures

Introduction

Peasant migrant workers have drawn increasing attention of the Chinese government and academia since the economic reform. Their attraction for researchers can be attributed to their uniqueness. They comprise a unique historical, political and economic product that indicates the dilemma of individual prospects and the dual urban-rural structure of China. At the same time, their number overall and as a proportion of the total urban population is huge and rising rapidly. For some scholars, these migrant workers constitute a problem for urban governance; for others, they represent the poor and miserable in need of social support. Irrespective of purpose, there is a consensus that these migrant workers[1] are worth researching. Although researchers have provided useful data, aspects of the studies of migrant workers in China are criticised in a later chapter.

In contrast to studies that consider migrant workers only as individuals 'in a society' and not 'for a society', this study is based on the strong potential of new generation migrant workers (NGMWs) for social transition in China. Although instinctually aware of this point, some scholars have only vaguely mentioned it without offering a detailed discussion of the 'potential' of these workers. This task, which constitutes an examination of micro-to-macro social change, is the central concern of this study. This study adopts anomie theory to analyse NGMWs' capacity for social change[2] according to China's current situation. The choice to focus on anomie theory is not made out of personal interest. It reflects the unique situation of China, where anomie has grown in significance over the past few decades. It may be better to claim that China has historically chosen anomie theory. In this study, anomie theory is used to reveal facts rather than using facts to test the theory. However, in its current form, anomie theory can hardly be applied directly to China. It is ambiguous and largely misunderstood. Anomie theory in its current form also lacks the power to explain micro-to-macro relationships. For these reasons and from a theoretical standpoint, anomie theory must be

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[1] As some consider 'peasant workers' a discriminatory term, this study uses the term 'migrant workers' when referring to migrant workers from rural areas in China.

[2] According to Lockwood (1992:399), the term 'social change' means 'a change in the institutional structure of a social system'. This study accepts his definition and supposes that a social system represents a unity of various social structures. The concept of social structures is discussed later. At this stage, it is better to simply define social changes as the structural changes of a society.

clarified and its lacuna must be mended before an empirical study of NGMWs can be conducted.

This study consists of three sections. After a critical review of the studies of migrant workers in China, the first section discusses anomie theory. In this first section, anomie theory is reconstructed based on the views of its classical founders and further developed in terms of social momentum theory, which provides a theoretical framework for the study. Social momentum theory is then applied to demonstrate the capacity of a social category to introduce structural social change. Its concepts and logic are constructed based on Durkheim's and Merton's anomie theory and inspired by Marx's class theory. Through the concept of social momentum, classical anomie theory is further developed and the future tendency of anomie and social change in China is partially revealed. The second section demonstrates how anomie characterises migrant workers in China. It shows that anomie in China comes from the discord between structural relationships and explains its influence on migrant workers. The importance and features of the NGMWs are then discussed. The third section applies social momentum theory to the NGMWs, whose capacity for social change and contrasting function to anomie are analysed according to the data results.

Chapter 1: A Critical Review of Studies of Migrant Workers in China

Schools of Migrant Worker Studies

Migrant workers and NGMWs are by no means new topics. Research related to migrant workers in China can be traced back to the 1990s.[3] Based on an examination of more than a hundred leading publications, mainstream studies of migrant workers are categorised into the following schools according to their distinctive focuses and approaches.

Integration Studies

These studies focus on issues such as adaption, inclusion, exclusion, assimilation, acculturation, social distance, marginality and identity, in addition to how migrant workers adapt to new city environments. Although they may adopt different terminologies, concepts and theories, these studies ask similar questions, such as whether migrant workers think of themselves as citizens or peasants or whether they like cities. Examples include Li Qiang's studies of migrant workers' emotion and conflict in cities (1995); Zhu Li's studies of migrant workers' feelings of prejudice and discrimination (2001) and urban adaptability (2002); Yang Juhua's study of migrant workers' social inclusion (2009) and economic inclusion (2012); Wang Chunguang (2001), Zhou Mingbao (2004), Chen Yingfang (2005) and Cui Yan's (2012) studies of migrant workers' identity; Zhang Wenhong and Lei Kaichun's (2008) study of the social inclusion of migrant workers; Lei Kaichun's (2012) study of the interactions between migrant workers and local citizens in Shanghai (2012); and Li Peilin and Tian Feng's (2012) *A Cross Generation Comparison of Social Cohesion Of Migrant Workers in China*. This has always been the most popular and dominant approach in migrant worker studies. Surveys and interviews are the methods typically implemented, and in many cases both are used simultaneously.

Population Studies

Most population studies of migrant workers offer an overall detailed and general

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[3] Scholars such as Zhao Shukai and Zhang Jijiao consider 1993 as the starting point of migrant worker studies in China.

description of migrants' demographic features, including their sex, age, income hometown and period of migration. Studies such as Wei Jinsheng's (2002) *The Situation and Issues of Floating Population in China Cities*, Duan Chengrong's (2008) *Nine Trends in the Dynamics of the Present Floating Population in China* and Yi Zhigang's (2008) *Migration Trends and Behavior of the Floating Population in Beijing* (2008) usually focus on a big topic and conduct simple data analysis. They prefer to make data comparisons between years. A few tend to apply more specific focuses such as residential choice or circuit migration (e.g., Bai Nansheng and Song Hongyuan's (2002) *Return to the Hometown or Move to the City?*). In general, they consider migrant workers as floating populations rather than groups or individuals. They favour census data or large-scale surveys and focus mostly on the demographic features of migrant populations. This approach is favoured by official scholars and is the second most popular approach adopted in academia. Cai Fang, who is the vice-president of the Social Science Academy of China and a deputy of the National People's Congress, is a representative lead official scholar of this approach.

Capital/Stratification Studies

Studies that adopt this approach focus mostly on migrant workers' resources or capital, especially their income and working conditions and social/cultural capital. They try to argue that those factors determine migrant workers' social status, mobility or location in stratification. Zhao Yandong and Wang Fenyu's (2002) *Determinants of the Rural-to-Urban Floating Population's Economic Status*; Liu Linping and Zhang Chunni's (2005) study of the wage determination model; Lin Yi's (2010) *How High Can Male 'Phoenixes' Fly*: *Men's Upward Mobility from Rural to Non-Rural Status in China*; and Chen Yunsong's (2012) *Village-based Networks and Wages of Rural-to-Urban Migrants* are among the studies that adopt this approach. These studies focus on one or more forms of migrant workers' capital. Social network or capital analysis via survey is the major methodology adopted in this approach. Although some studies may not nominally adopt the concept of capital and network analysis (e.g., Tian Feng's (2010) *Study on the Income Gap between Migrant Workers and Citizens* and Wang Yanmei's (2005) *Employment Opportunities and Wage Gaps in the Urban Labor Market*), they ask the same questions as those studies that use explicit network

terminology. Although this approach is not as popular as the previous two, it has exhibited a significant presence over the last 15 years, especially after the leading Chinese researchers of social networks, such as Bian Yanjie and Cheng Cheng, turned their interest to studying migrant workers.[4]

Cheng-Zhong-Cun (Village-in-City) Studies

Many studies are conducted in a *cheng-zhong-cun* (village-in-city) much like others are conducted in factories. According to this approach, a *cheng-zhong-cun* serves as not only a research site, but also the focus of the study itself. Studies belonging to this school may refer to many topics such as integration and social networks, but emphasise the geographical, economic and social uniqueness and functions of the *cheng-zhong-cun*. Studies of Zhejiang-cun, led by Wang Chunguang (1995), were the pioneering studies in this school. Wang provided a comprehensive study of Zhejiang-cun, including its historical political background, industries and social networks and discussed its social cohesion, mobility and even anomie. Wang Hansheng et al. (1997) discussed the formation of Zhejiang-cun and described its various situations. Xiang Biao studied cohesion and confliction in cheng-zhong-cun in Beijing (1998) in addition to the historical development of Zhejiang-cun (2000). Zhou Daming (2001) studied the 50-year historical development of Jingnan-cun. Li Peilin's (2002) *The Tremendous Changes: The End of Villages* investigated *cheng-zhong-cun* in Gaungzhou. The field study, compounded mainly by interviews and observations, is the major methodology typically adopted in this school. Although *cheng-zhong-cun* studies were the leading school of research in the 1990s, well-done *cheng-zhong-cun* studies all but disappeared in the late 2000s, giving way to the rise of capital studies.

Psychological Studies

Psychology studies conducted in China devote most of their attention to students and youth and little to migrant workers specifically. However, a few psychologists, medical doctors and even sociologists have tried to study migrant workers' mental health and other psychological

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[4] Cheng Cheng and Bian Yanjie (2014) published *Social Capital and the Reproduction of Inequality: The Case of Income Differential between Rural Migrant and Urban Workers*.

statuses. Shen Qijie et al. (1998) studied the mental health of young migrant workers in Shenzhen. Li Xiaofang (2004) and Xu Chuanxin (2007) investigated NGMWs' mental health and psychological statuses in Chongqing. Li Liu et al. compared the mental health of migrant workers and urban citizens. He Xuesong et al. (2010) discussed rural-to-urban migration and the mental health of migrant workers in Shanghai. Li Weidong et al. (2013) studied gender differences in psychological anomia between migrant workers. In a special case, Pan Ngai, who paid much attention to migrant workers' emotions, did not adopt any psychological method or perspective in her research (e.g., *Unfinished Proletarianization: Self, Anger, and Class Action Among the Second Generation of Peasant-Workers in Present-Day China* [2010]). Most of these studies applied mental health scales in their surveys. Some of them were published as sociological studies, as migrant workers were a popular sociological topic. However, despite the aforementioned studies, this school of research is unpopular and often deviates from mainstream research, probably because most leading migrant worker researchers lack any background in psychology.

Some studies found outside of the mainstream schools have been quite innovative, such as Gao Minhua's (2012) *The Self-fulfilling Prophecy of Parents' Expectations: Findings from Migrant Workers' Children* and Xiong Yihan's (2010) *Urbanized Children: The Identity and Political Socialization of Migrant Workers' Children*. In contrast, some studies have integrated multiple schools of research that have not yet been formally recognised, such as Bai Nansheng and Song Hongyuan's (2002) *Return to the Hometown or Move to the City?*. All these scholars may deny their loyalty to any school and even the existence of any school. However, the publications associated with each school have mostly adopted the topics, methodologies and references consistent with those schools and do not often refer to others. Some schools of research offer few serious studies or have disappeared altogether. From a political standpoint, studies of collective events or class struggles are the best examples. The school of gender studies provides an additional example for other reasons.

Limitations of Migrant Worker Studies

The process of reviewing migrant worker studies is frustrating and uninspiring. The literature seldom contributes to this study due to the unpopularity of anomie theory and the limitations of previous studies. Yang Juhua's (2012) *Economic Integration of Internal Migrants in China* criticised several of the limitations of migrant worker studies in China, including their (1) disjunction between data and theory, (2) lack of perspectives, (3) lack of comparison between different stratifications and (4) lack of in-depth and systematic examination. Although most of her arguments were sound, she considered only some of the limitation symptoms and failed to see their roots. Several other symptoms are discussed as follows to reveal the roots.

A search for the terms 'peasant worker' or 'floating population' in the CNKI database produces 37,167 results. However, most studies in these results are not contributive. The major problem is that numerous repetitive studies have been conducted during the boom of migrant worker studies in the past 15 years. These studies have adopted similar concepts and methods and arrived at almost the same conclusions and discussions. This is most obvious for integration and capital studies. An ideal type of such study would adopt a concept through a survey and find out that migrant workers cannot integrate well into cities (or provide another expression such as 'they have a marginal status' or 'they lack economic and social capital in cities') due to the Hukou system, culture shock, economic disadvantage, discrimination and so on. A more advanced ideal type of study could then add that it uses a certain statistical method to determine which factor is more important. Such a study may be meaningful to pioneers, but most followers have wasted time reshowing something certain or unimportant. Most of these studies have exhibited no patience in reviewing the literature and been arbitrary and chaotic in their adoption of concepts and theories. Second, in spite of the repetition, lack of innovation and superficiality of these studies, there is a colonisation of quantitative methodology. In the more than 100 migrant worker studies published in *Sociology* and *Sociological Studies*[5] since 2010, only 12 adopted a qualitative method. This statistic should be checked together with the rise in capital studies and the decline in *cheng-zhong-cun* studies.

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[5] The two leading sociology journals in China.

Most of the migrant worker studies published in leading journals in China have favoured large-sample surveys and statistical analysis, especially factor analysis and regression. However, as they care less about sampling methods and pre-assumption tests, their results should be strongly suspected. Despite the many books and papers published over the last two decades, few reviews and almost no critiques or efforts to rethink migrant worker studies have been made.

This context arouses my cynicism when studying migrant workers. Rather than find a favourable path in previous studies, the review presented by this study establishes a new path by refuting previous approaches. It rejects integration studies because they reflect similar logics and conclusions and reveal little more than mercy to a disadvantaged group. It rejects population studies because migrant workers are more than a kind of population. They are people alive, and together as potential active carriers of social momentum. It rejects capital studies, as NGMWs exhibit something more valuable and powerful than economic, cultural and social capital, i.e., their values and solidarity in achieving social change rather than individual mobility. It rejects *cheng-zhong-cun* studies because the uniqueness of the *cheng-zhong-cun* only makes it an important variable in residential places or research sites but not a meaningful topic on its own. It rejects psychological studies because considering only mental health without addressing sociological concerns produces conclusions similar to those of integration studies. Most migrant studies certainly have their respective value. Even a repetitive study can provide new sample data. The findings of these earlier studies do suggest evidence of the social momentum of NGMWs. However, a migrant worker study should do more than provide data or evidence. On itself, if does not totally omit theories, it should contribute to theories but not simply borrow certain concepts for describing data. It should also consider migrant workers as actors in and for a society rather than purely as individuals or a floating population outside of structure. Finally, it should contribute to the explanation of social development. These criteria, which have been lacking in previous approaches, are hopefully met in this study.

Chapter 2: Anomie Theory

Classical Anomie Theory

The word 'anomie' comes from a Greek term used long before the birth of anomie theory. It literally means 'without nomos', i.e., 'without laws'. However, since the time of Durkheim and Merton, the meaning of anomie has been extended into theory. Rather than provide a systematic theory or a clear definition in a particular article, these two classical theorists, especially Durkheim, referred to anomie in a number of works and developed their anomie theories progressively, cyclically and sometimes in contradiction to each other and even themselves. As its founders did not offer a fixed framework, anomie theory is quite unorganised and open to argument, modification, reinterpretation and further development. It is thus not a typical sociological theory. Some consider it a perspective, and some may even deny it as sociological theory. The term 'anomie project' may be better applied than anomie theory, as such a project includes all of the theoretical discussions about anomie advanced by Durkheim and Merton and their followers. Anomie project represents the anomie theory in more dynamic and broad sense. It helps to distinguish itself from only Durkheim's anomie theory or Merton's strain theory. It includes anomie theories which deviate from Durkheim and Merton, and also includes these two fathers' covert or unpopular discussions of anomie. The anomie project also suggests an openness and endlessness, as understanding and coping with anomie is a permanent and varied task that accompanies the march forward of human civilisation.

Although the anomie project never ends, it has its rises and declines in academia. It was born in the 1890s out of Durkheim's *The Division of Labor in Society* and *Suicide,* and its strain approach was founded in 1938 by Merton's *Social Structure and Anomie*. These two fathers of anomie developed their anomie theories as lifetime projects throughout a series of works. In a later section, it is argued that their ideas were complementary rather than contradictory. The strain approach used to be dominated in the criminology field during the 1950s-1960s before, but then entered a period of decline and resurge in the late 1980s-1990s. Agnew witnessed that some criminologists rallied to defend anomie theory (Agnew & Passas,

1997:1). More significantly, his development of general strain theory (GST) in *Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency* (1992) and Messner and Rosenfeld's institutional anomie theory in *Crime and the American Dream* (1994) attracted a great deal of attention. Along with these two authors, leading anomie researchers including Passas, Cohen and Merton himself contributed to *The Legacy of Anomie Theory* (1995) and its companion volume *The Future of Anomie Theory* (1997) during this resurgence. These two books recorded the history and evolution of anomie. Most of the dominant anomie research was reviewed in these two books, and strain theory was re-examined practically. *The Legacy* and *The Future* ironically marked both the epitome of the resurgent interest in anomie theory and the end of this resurgence. After the 1990s, the anomie project re-entered a dark age. As Featherstone and Deflem (2003) demonstrated via data, though citations of Merton's *Social Structure and Anomie* largely increased, the topic of anomie could hardly be found in the dominant social science journals. Scholars typically borrow few points from either Durkheim or Merton's anomie theory for their own research purposes. Despite its poor popularity, anomie theory is not dead yet and will probably one day be reborn from its classic tradition. Some studies such as Agnew's (1996) latter study *A New Test of Classic Strain Theory* and Margaret Farnworth's (2014) *Strain Theory Revisited: Economic Goals, Educational Means, and Delinquency* have started reemphasising the basic variables of Merton's original ideas.

Regardless of the alternative theoretical approaches, the rise and decline of the anomie project has largely been caused by the historical social backgrounds of intellectuals. The academic interest of sociologists usually follows the society we live in and the history we have witnessed without extending beyond the realms of touch or memory. The degree of anomie in both France (for Durkheim) and America (for Merton) was so obvious and severe as to raise the concerns of Durkheim and Merton, respectively. Although revolutions, wars, rapid reforms or sharp social transitions have long gone, the Western world continues to face anomie in various forms. As to China, anomie tends to be extraordinarily apparent as the society is still experiencing the strong influence of economic reform. An overall anomic society has taken shape rather than a collection of independent social problems. Compared with specific micro focuses, the anomie in China is more worthy of examination to understand the whole picture. Now is the time to pick up the legacy and continue the anomie

project in developing countries such as China, where anomie is severe and has rarely been carefully discussed. As Connell (2007) argued in *Southern Theory*, knowledge carries unequal power relations between the global south and global north. In a peripheral position, the social science academics and their interest in China is dominated and led by the Western world. Xiaoying Qi (2014:4-6) pointed out three strategies other than simply complying with Western domination, i.e., rejection, assimilation and integration. However, none of these approaches enable scholars in subordinate countries to be confident in exploring an abandoned theory that does not fit their actual social conditions.

Although this thesis attempts to be a successor for the anomie project, it does not serve as a reading or interpretation of Durkheim and Merton's work. In the following, a brief review of classical anomie theory and its contemporary development is provided, but only as a reminder to readers and to present the major ideas that serve as the focus on this study. The review of previous anomie theorists is far from comprehensive. Although the work of this study on the anomie project is certainly built on the work of both Durkheim and Merton, it is also loyal to neither. A theoretical framework is constructed that more or less deviates from the classical roots, which are blended with the researcher's theories along with thoughts from Marx. Durkheim and Merton's strict followers may disagree with this study in many respects.

Durkheim's Anomie Theory

Durkheim put forward his anomie theory quite paradoxically. Although he confronted us with his theory in the two masterpieces *The Division of Labor in Society* and *Suicide*, he failed to provide a systematic elaboration of the theory itself, despite his concerns about and discussions of anomie across most of his works. In later works such as *Professional Ethics*, *Moral Education* and even *The Elementary Forms*, Durkheim did not stop seeking a remedy to anomie. He considered anomie a life-long project despite that none of his particular works could clarify it. He was often inconsistent across his various works. In *The Division of Labor in Society*, anomie was discussed only at the end of the book over fewer than 10 pages and simply considered as one of several abnormal forms of the division of labour that 'are the

very negation of solidarity' (Durkheim, 1984:291). However, his structural pathological perspective in this chapter formed essential ideas for macrosociological anomie theory.

> In all these cases, if the division of labor does not produce solidarity it is because the relationships between the organs are not regulated; it is because they are in a state of anomie.
>
> But from where does this state spring?
>
> Since a body of rules is the definite form taken over time by the relationships established spontaneously between the social functions, we may say a priori that a state of anomie is impossible wherever solidary organs solidly linked to one another are sufficiently in contact, and in sufficiently lengthy contact. (Durkheim, 1984: 304)

In *Suicide*, Durkheim did not retain meso-level anomie as a form of division of labour. He seemed aware that anomie could be inspected at a more micro level for families or individuals independently from the division of labour and traced to macro social forces such as revolutions or economic crises. He discussed the micro and macro levels simultaneously in the chapter entitled *Anomic Suicide,* which may appears a bit confusing. At the micro level, he described an individual with an 'overweening' personality, an 'insatiable appetite' and a 'fevered imagination' and discussed widowhood and divorce when characterising 'domestic anomie' (Marks, 1974:331). At the macro level, he stated that discipline and regulation could hardly restrain individuals 'when society is passing through some abnormal crisis', and that this was the case 'in Rome and Greece when the faiths underlying the old organization of the patricians and plebeians were shaken, and in our modern societies when aristocratic prejudices began to lose their old ascendancy' (Marks, 1974:331). He also provided examples of economic disasters and 'an abrupt growth of power and wealth' in which individuals tended to fail to adjust: 'When society is disturbed by some painful crisis or by beneficent but abrupt transitions, it is momentarily incapable of exercising this influence'. Durkheim denied that acute social transitions or crises were 'intermittent' rather than 'regular or 'constant' factors. Indeed, he argued that it was in the economic sphere that anomie was 'in a chronic state' (Durkheim, 1951:385-390). At the end of *Suicide*, Durkheim proposed a remedy

in the form of occupational corporation. He later advanced a democratic political solution in *Professional Ethics* and an educational solution in *Moral Education*.[6] However, as all of Durkheim's solutions tended to be oversimplified and optimistic in terms of real-world anomie and obviously inapplicable to China, they are not referred to again in this study.

Merton's Anomie and Strain Theory

Much like Durkheim, Merton was famous for his inconsistency. The widespread misunderstanding of anomie and strain theory may largely be blamed on Merton himself rather than the interpretations of others. However, despite his inconsistency and many reversions, Merton's anomie theory was organised more systematically than Durkheim's. How the whole theoretical framework of anomie forms was mostly established in one paper rather than many separate works: *Social Structure and Anomie*. First published in 1938 in *American Sociological Review* (ASR), a collection of only 10 papers, this paper made Merton's anomie theory. It discussed the structural reasoning behind deviant behaviour and the forms of individuals' deviant or non-deviant adaption and focused less on the nature of anomie itself. Without mentioning Durkheim, Merton's perspective at the beginning was obvious micro or meso, despite his claim that his micro examples were 'microcosmic images of the social macrocosm' (Merton, 1938:675). It is no wonder why this paper became extremely notable in the criminology field and representative of strain theory rather than anomie theory. The later version of this paper was published in 1949 in *Social Theory and Social Structure* (STSS). Although its major content remained the same, most readers such as Featherstone and Deflem (2003) noticed only the new volume entitled *The Role of the Family*. However, this volume provided nothing more than meso-level exemplification, and other hardly perceived modifications were worth more theoretical attention. Understanding Merton's initial thinking became especially important when his later expressions appeared to be revised, inconsistent or ambiguous. In addition to *Social Structure and Anomie*, the 1957 edition of STSS marked a significant step forward for Merton's anomie theory. A chapter

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[6] Marks (1974) provided a good introduction to these solutions in his *Durkheim's Theory of Anomie*.

called *Continuities in the Theory of Social Structure and Anomie* was inserted to provide a more careful discussion of the concept of anomie. This chapter unavoidably referred to Durkheim. It was not until its publication that Merton's strain theory really evolved into his anomie project.

Merton's strain theory is widely known and oversimplified as a typology of deviant behaviour. According to the binary logical acceptance of cultural goals and institutional means, different combinations generate five modes of adaption. Adaption I, 'Conformity', is the most common type in a regular society and indicates conformity to both cultural goals and the means of achieving them. Adaption II, 'Innovation', refers to a kind of deviance, an acceptance of cultural goals and a rejection of the means. Adaption III, 'Ritualism', refers to a rejection of cultural goals and an acceptance of the means. Adaption IV, 'Retreatism', also refers to a kind of deviance and a rejection of both cultural goals and the means. Adaption V, 'Rebellion', is similar to 'Retreatism' and refers to a rejection of both cultural goals and the means and a determination of appropriate replacements. Merton and his followers devoted huge efforts to studying each mode of adaption and the corresponding deviant behaviour, especially for 'Innovation'. However, strain theory reveals more than the typology itself. Indeed, it introduces the brilliant idea of rejecting the 'impulse management' social control perspective. For strain theory, deviant behaviour does not arise from 'man's imperious biological drives which are not adequately restrained by social control', but from a strategic choice made under certain structural conditions. In this sense, strain is a kind of social mechanism rather than psychological pressure. It is determined by the cultural structure and an individual's position in an opportunity structure, such as a class structure.

Although Merton's *Social Structure and Anomie* was magnificent in many respects, both the ASR and STSS versions failed to answer the most fundamental question: what is anomie? Merton either mentioned or hinted at the meaning of this concept four times in the paper.

The technically most feasible procedure, whether legitimate or not, is preferred to the institutionally prescribed conduct. As this process continues, the integration of the society becomes tenuous and anomie ensues. (Merton, 1938:674)

We are considering the unintegrated monetary-success goal as an element in producing anomie. (Merton, 1938:674)

"Many", and not all, unintegrated groups, for the reason already mentioned. In groups where the primary emphasis shifts to institutional means, i.e., when the range of alternatives is very limited, the outcome is a type of ritualism rather than anomie. (Merton, 1938:675)

Whatever the sentiments of the writer or reader concerning the ethical desirability of coordinating the means-and-goals phases of the social structure, one must agree that lack of such coordination leads to anomie. (Merton, 1938:682)

It is obvious that Merton's *Social Structure and Anomie* considered anomie as a kind of social outcome of the inadequate coordination of institutional means and goals. Paradoxically, Merton considered only overemphasised (monetary success) goals and less emphasised institutional means as the sources of inadequate coordination. On the contrary, he did not consider conformity and ritualism as relevant to anomie. In this sense, inadequate coordination seems to only suggest deviation from cultural means rather than goals. However, the question remains: if anomie is produced by deviation, then what exactly is anomie itself? Perhaps aware of his own ambiguity, Merton discussed this question further in the later version of STSS. In *Continuities in the Theory of Social Structure and Anomie,* he referred to Durkheim when observing that 'the concept of anomie referred to a condition of relative normlessness in a society or group' and 'referred to a property of the social and cultural structure' (Merton, 1968:215). Although it is arguable whether Durkheim would have admitted to this oversimplified summary, Merton did sometimes equate anomie with normlessness and used these two terms interchangeably. After distinguishing the sociological

conception of anomie from psychological anomie, he adopted his preceding argument of anomie and normlessness: 'When the cultural and the social structure are mal-integrated… there is a strain toward the breakdown of the norms, toward the normlessness' (Merton, 1968:217). However, despite the theoretical confusion between anomie and normlessness, Merton's anomie theory extended beyond the latter. In *Continuities*, he clearly argued that the sociological concept of anomie lay in structures. Similar to Durkheim's pathological perspective, he presupposed that an equilibrium existed between cultural and social structures under normal conditions. Anomie thus occurs when this equilibrium is broken. Merton also tried to clarify that strain was an effect of structural mal-coordination, which placed pressure on the norm boundary.

Contemporary Development

The era following the 1990s witnessed the contemporary development of anomie theory. It was also an era of invention that involved testing new versions of strain theory. Most of the studies conducted during this period were quite distinctive from Merton's, and Durkheim's work was comparatively neglected. The leading studies can be categorised as (1) General Strain Theory (GST) studies conducted by Agnew and his followers in the criminology field; (2) Messner and Rosenfeld's studies of institutional anomie theory (IAT); (3) education or criminology studies, represented by Liska; and (4) revisionist studies such as Agnew's (2006) later study *A New Test of Strain Theory* and Margaret Farnworth's (2014) *Strain Theory Revisited: Economic Goals, Educational Means, and Delinquency*, which criticised the ignorance of classical theory and attempted to measure strain by reattaching or reemphasising basic variables from Merton's original ideas in the twenty-first century. In relation to classical strain theory, 'ignorance' was the label applied to the first type of study. Although inspired by Merton's strain theory, GST is a fundamentally different theory that focuses on the micro individual states and stimuli that cause deviant behaviour. 'Indigenisation' studies form the second type, as IAT indigenised strain into American intuitions, especially the American Dream. The third type studies were labelled as 'distortion'. These studies measured strain

based on the disjunction between aspiration and expectation rather than Merton's mean-goal model. The fourth type could be labelled as 'return' studies. It is clear that contemporary studies of strain theory 'developed' ironically. Researchers started from the same traditional roots and then deviated away from them in different ways. When all of these deviations became less popular, interest returned to the beginning. However, the path to get there was not a waste of time. In addition to the theoretical innovations provided by the first three types of studies, this path meaningfully showed us the value of the classical. Scholars did not reemphasise the classical by accident, but rather by increasing their criticism of previous strain studies. Some researchers challenged whether statistical evidence supported hypotheses in many strain tests, and others challenged whether strain theory made any difference to control theory. (Passas & Agnew, 1997:42). Faced with these challenges, scholars returned to classical theories in search of answers.

The anomie project, as it is developed in this thesis, returns to Durkheim's and Merton's work and adopts their fundamental concepts and ideas. The exposition here more or less modifies these classical sources, and in doing so may distort and ignore aspects of these theories in attempting to indigenise anomie theory into China's social background. As indicated above, contemporary anomie theories are in significant ways different and disconnected from the classical approaches of Durkheim and Merton. The four contemporary strands of anomie theory, as shown in the preceding paragraph, either ignore or misdirect the classical anomie theory that is developed in this thesis. Indeed, even the forth type of 'revised' contemporary theory, namely 'return studies', is inadequate against the measure of Durkheim and Merton. Because the concepts and notions advanced by this present study are developed through an analysis of and in terms of the direction of the classical theories, it is not necessary to further detail or review contemporary anomie theory in the following discussion.

Anomie and Strain Defined based on Classical Roots

The theoretical task of this study is to redefine the most basic concepts of anomie theory, i.e., anomie and strain. Instead of merely listing the paradoxical arguments of Durkheim and

Merton and leaving readers to imagine real solutions, a clear definition must be applied as the foundation for all of the following arguments. A good definition should draw on the essence of Durkheim and Merton's works, avoid their ambiguities and inconsistencies and refute any misunderstandings. The definition of anomie used in this study is not the only or most correct definition. Indeed, it can be modified, challenged or refuted. This study redefines anomie to make this controversial concept clear understandable and applicable to the framework of this thesis rather than correct. The application of this redefined anomie in other context is a different issue.

Durkheim's essential ideas of anomie lay in his account of structural pathological and historical social transition perspectives in terms of solidarity and division of labour. Merton partially succeeded Durkheim's structural pathological perspective and contributed more to developing strain theory in terms of opportunity structures and deviance. Despite their divergence, the authors would have agreed that anomie was a macro social status associated with structural discoordination. Durkheim did not identify specific structures, instead using the term 'social organs'. Merton observed a disequilibrium between social and cultural structures. He defined the cultural structure as an 'organized set of normative values governing behavior which is common to members of designated society or group' and the social structure as an 'organized set of social relationships in which members of the society or group are variously implicated (Merton, 1968:216). From a social pathology perspective, Merton was reasonable in calling the cultural structure a component of discoordination. However, his identification of the other component, i.e., social structure, was overly broad and ambiguous. Social relationships can indicate almost anything in various structures and are not independent from the cultural structure. This makes further analysis of their structural discoordination less meaningful and hardly manipulated. Lockwood (1992:405) also noticed the ambiguity of Merton's social structure: 'The vital question is, of course: what are the "component elements" of social systems which give rise to strain, tension or contradiction?' As an outcome of this ambiguity, more micro studies focused on strain theory and largely neglected anomie at the macro level.

To deal with this question, this study replaces social structures with political and economic structures as the other two components, which coordinate with the cultural structure and each

other. The political structure may be defined as an organised set of relations that govern social administration and the power/right distributions of a society. The economic structure is an organised set of relations in which production, distribution, trade, consumption and other possible market activities are implicated. The economic, political and cultural structures are embedded in every social activity or issue.[7] Together, they form a coherent system that governs all of the social relations as a functional unit. This view is supported by the absence of the absolute complement of these three structures in the mathematical logic of set theory. This theory makes two assumptions. First, it assumes that no relation in human society is free of these three structures, i.e., every relation is associated with at least one of the structures in the triangle. For example, although not practically possible, if we draw the economic, political and cultural structures out of family relations, such family relations can be considered purely biological rather than social. Second, it assumes that no structure in human society other than these three can be universally embedded in the social realm. At the same time, without denying their inter-structural functions, the functions of these structures in relation to social actors are largely independent. As such, anomie represents discord in the economic-political-cultural structural triangle.

If we adopt Merton's definition of the social structure or other similar definitions, then the social structure is not missing, as it is not parallel to the economic, political and cultural structures. As the social structure involves all social relationships, it should be put at the highest structural level (parallel to the natural structure). In the case of human society, the social structure is hardly considered a structure. All structures are in fact 'social', meaning that there is no non-social structure. Thus, in this study, following the logic of set theory, the term 'social structure' indicates the universal set of human society. Every structure is both the social structure and a subset of it. The social structure thus encapsulates the various structures of a society. The term 'social system' could be used to avoid this confusion, as it does not consider whether purely social relations constitute a structure. In this sense, the economic-political-cultural structural triangle comprises the structure of a social system.

Some may question where to put the institution of the family, ethnic issues, intergenerational issues or other 'social issues' into the structural triangle. It is necessary to

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[7] Some human behaviour can be non-social, i.e., purely natural.

stress that though structures exist at a macro level, they cannot be considered as containers for any issue or institutions. Such a view disconnects structures from the social facts upon which they are based. Structures are embedded in every social factor, being and institution. Certain issues or institutions are certainly more relevant to one structure than another. For example, the government institution is usually part of the political structure. However, the government institution is also relevant to other structures, as any government is also a product of the economic and cultural structures and carries respective economic and cultural functions. Thus, rather than place the government institution solely in the political structure, it would be more proper to say that the political structure is significantly embedded in the government institution.

Unlike the government, family and ethnic issues do not seem to be significantly embedded in any one of the structures in the triangle. They and many other institutions or issues are not commonly used to refer to economy, politics and culture. Common sense should not be the reason for putting these traiangularly unapparent institutions together into a social structure (or for considering them more 'social' than others), which would exclude the structures in the triangle. Rather, like government and law, they function as and are products of multiple structures. For example, family reproduces cultural norms, plays a role in the division of market labour and functions as a unit of political power and right.

Considering anomie as the discord in the economic-political-cultural structural triangle, a non-anomic society is sustained if this triangle remains stable. This presupposition may not always apply to every society. Political or economic forces may play minor roles in some 'deviating societies'. However, this is usually not the case. The dominance of the structural triangle should be valid for most human societies featuring both a market and a state. In China especially, all three of the structures play extremely powerful roles in the daily lives of citizens. In contrast to Merton's work, it is important to clarify that the triangular structural discord is anomie itself instead of the cause of anomie. Normlessness or chaos is only a symptom of anomie, not its nature. Thus, it is anomie that generates deviant behaviour and not vice versa. There may be other symptoms besides crime or deviance. An extremely low crime or divorce rate may also be a symptom of anomie. In such a case, the society may be overly politically or culturally controlled.

In this study, the terms 'discord', 'discoordination' and 'disequilibrium' indicate conflict between the structures. This idea is essentially similar to Lockwood's idea of system integration. Lockwood considered that the problem of system integration focused on 'the orderly or conflictual relationships between the parts of a social system'. He argued that 'the only source of social disorder arising from system disorder is that which takes the form of role conflict stemming from incompatible institutional patterns' (Lockwood, 1992:400). Regretfully, he put most of his efforts into criticising the shortcomings of normative functionalist theories and conflict theories without providing a clear and detailed system integration theory. In spite of the intrinsic similarity between my idea and Lockwood's system integration, there is one distinction. Lockwood emphasised incompatible institutional patterns, i.e. norms and power for him. In this study, a conflicting relationship between structures represents more than an incompatibility between norms, power or other patterns. At a higher and more abstract level, it indicates a negative inter-functioning between the structures, which is the antithesis of mutually supportive functions among structures. Under normal circumstances, structures in human societies interactively generate other compatible structures to sustain themselves. In the structural triangle, one structure can hardly form and sustain itself without enough support from the other two structures. For example, a monarchy coordinates well with asceticism, and a market economy is able to work with democracy. Conversely, a caste system and liberalism produce conflicts, and slavery and an ideology of natural rights are extremely incompatible. However, the advancement of human civilisation disturbs the structural stability from time to time, as in most cases the structures in a society do not develop at the same speed. In other words, one or two structures in the triangle may be unable to catch up to the other(s). A tension thus occurs when an already evolved structure pushes a lagging structure into compatibility, successfully or otherwise, and vice versa when a lagged structure stresses back. Human history has indicated that political structures are the most prone to lagging, as they are more often associated with the privilege of the ruling class, who tend to defend their political structural interests by any means necessary. There are also cases in which the economic and cultural structures lag or evolve simultaneously. For example, monarchical restorations can occur when the cultural ideology of egalitarianism is weak.

As Durkheim's idea indicates, anomie often occurs during rapid social transitions, such as reforms or revolutions. A society requires stability to maintain itself, but cannot advance if its stability is never more or less broken. Thus, anomie is a social status that every society definitely experiences in its development, regardless of human intention. Given the diversity of anomic symptoms and human societies, it is impossible to build an index to measure the degree of anomie in a certain society. Although rates of crime, suicide and divorce could be important indicators in studying anomie, they are far from perfect measurement on themselves. Although not yet measurable, anomie can be severe or slight based on the extent of structural discord. There are almost no absolute anomic or non-anomic societies. Thus, only when the level of anomie exceeds a certain extent can a society be considered anomic. It may not be strongly persuasive to judge whether a society is anomic or not without a clear standard. However, like Merton and Durkheim, who considered America and France respectively, a person who acquires in-depth experience and knowledge of a certain society and is able to analyse both macro structural triangular statutes and massive micro daily interactions may make qualitative assumptions about a society's anomic status, and these assumptions could certainly be challenged. Supposing both sides argue logically, the society's anomic status would be increasingly revealed over the course of debate.

Having defined anomie, strain must be clarified. Strain is mostly a Mertonian concept. Although Merton's strain theory has been widely adopted, the concept of strain itself has received little elaboration. Merton focused on discussing each mode of adaption. In the ASR version of *Social Structure and Anomie*, Merton used the term 'strain' only twice, once referencing as 'toward innovational practice' and again in reference as 'toward dissolution' of the social order (Merton, 1938:678, 681). In the later STSS version, Merton modified the latter usage as follows: 'The social structure we have examined produces a strain toward anomie and deviant behavior' (Merton, 1968:211). In *Continuities*, he considered strain as an outcome of anomie that led to the breakdown of norms (Merton, 1968:217). Merton was correct in stating that strain led to deviance and that the presence of deviance (such as crime) in daily life contributed to the breakdown of norms. However, the breakdown of norms is an on-going social process instead of an instant result of strain. It also contributes to strain when deviance breaks down norms. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, anomie is not a result

but rather the root of strain. In this sense, strain is a meso concept. It is a kind of structural stress that invisibly pushes individuals, groups or classes. Merton used the unequal opportunity structure to elaborate his ideas about structural stress, and found that the lower class was more likely to gravitate towards certain types of deviance due to a lack of legitimate opportunities. However, the opportunity structure is not located outside the structural triangle, but is rather a sub-level structure. The economic-political-cultural structural triangle determines the opportunity structure and position of an individual or a class in the opportunity structure. Thus, opportunity structure can be used as a bridge to study how the macro structural triangle generates strain on micro actors. In terms of one's position in an opportunity structure, people undergo strain differently according to the various social categories they belong to. Some may tend to gravitate towards a certain type of deviance, and others may do nothing to deviate from the norm. In an ideal but unrealistic scenario, two people who undergo exactly the same strain may adopt distinct modes of adaption. Strain functions like a virus carried by a human. Although it incubates in every affected person, only some actually present symptoms of deviance. There could be many indicators, such as social support, psychological status and legal and moral systems that determine whether the strain will finally drive the person to deviance. Control theorists have studied these factors at length. And these uncontrolled factors might be the major reason for the invalidity of strain theory in practical researches. There is no doubt that strain theory is logically valid. No one can deny the existence of such evident structural power, despite its invisibility. Testing the validity of the theory is therefore meaningless. However, testing its strength in defeating people's 'immunity' or social controls could be meaningful. Conducting such complex tests is fortunately not a task of this study.

Refutation of Misunderstanding

As misunderstandings of anomie and strain theory seem quite common, their misuses are briefly refuted as follows, a potentially unnecessary element of this study for careful readers. The first misunderstanding involves the perception that Durkheim's definition of anomie is

irrelevant or contradictory to Merton's. It is widely known that Durkheim argued for the lack of normative boundaries and that Merton discussed the overemphasis of monetary success. Thus, it seems that one theorist focused on the absence of normative boundaries and that the other focused on the presence of a monetary norm. In fact, although their ideas may not be entirely consistent, they are more complementary than contradictory. As previously mentioned, Durkheim and Merton believed that anomie was caused by rapid social transition and a disequilibrium between social and cultural structures, respectively. It is obvious that sharp social transition tends to trigger such disequilibrium between structures. Durkheim's observations of the unregulated relationships between social organs probably carried a meaning similar to Merton's observations of structural disequilibrium. Moreover, both theorists noted the importance of a disordered cultural system. Reconsidering their theories carefully, it becomes more sensible to argue that the absence of ordered or balanced normative boundaries is likely to lead to an overemphasis of certain biased norms.

Secondly, many scholars have exhibited confusion when distinguishing anomie and strain theory (Featherstone & Deflem, 2003:481). They have often used the two phrases interchangeably, although doing so may not cause a significant problem in a less theoretical study. As stated in the beginning, from a rigorous standpoint, anomie theory is a wider framework that includes any theory or theoretical discussion of anomie, regardless of the author. Narrowly speaking, as to Merton, anomie theory at least indicates more than strain theory. In this sense, strain theory is a sub-theory of Merton's anomie theory. Other more careful theorists such as Featherstone and Deflem have tried to disentangle anomie and strain theory. They have considered Merton's anomie theory as a macro theory independent from strain theory, and argued that although strain requires anomie, the reverse is untrue (Featherstone & Deflem, 2003:481). This view is obviously more sensible than others' arbitrary use and helps to avoid confusion. However, digging strain theory out of anomie theory makes the anomie project incomplete. One can hardly attain an in-depth understanding of either anomie or strain theory if the other is left unconsidered.

Thirdly, a number of articles and especially empirical criminology studies have misused, degenerated or neglected the concept of anomie when adopting strain theory. Some have treated anomie as an individual psychological status, such as anomia in the psychology field.

Some have considered it as an outcome of the accumulation of individual alienation. Others have simply overlooked macro structural anomie when looking at strain and delinquency. Agnew was one of the most representative criminologists to adopt strain theory while largely overlooking macro anomie theory. Inspired by Merton's classical strain theory, Agnew (1992) developed GST which focused on the effect of strain on crime, i.e., an individual's response to negative life experience and crime-related events, as did most of his followers, such as Broidy (1997) and Aseltine et al. (2000). For these authors, strain was less a structural concept and more a type of micro individual status. Certainly, research conducted from a GST perspective cannot be judged as misuse. However, these studies have not only theoretically developed traditional strain theory, but also degenerated anomie theory at a macro level. Agnew was aware of this degeneration and tried to return to classical theories in later studies. For example, in *A New Test of Classic Strain Theory* he wrote that 'the central variable in classic strain theory … has been ignored in virtually all tests of the theory'. (Agnew et al., 1996: 683) Nevertheless, the author's ignorance of macro anomie persisted in that study.

Social Momentum Theory

A complete anomie theory should have the power to explain the micro through the macro and vice versa. Although Merton's strain theory provides a macro-to-micro bridge via opportunity structures, the other micro-to-macro connection remains a theoretical lacuna for the anomie project. Mending this lacuna by social momentum is one of the major tasks of this study. The idea of social momentum theory is rooted in the field of physics. This may bring to mind 'social physics', which seems more out of date than anomie theory. However, defending social physics is not the objective of this study. Human society is not equivalent to the physical world, nor should social scientists necessarily imitate nature scientists. This study's idea of social momentum suggests only that social theories may resemble laws of the physical world and that sociology requires imagination.

In classical mechanics, an object's momentum is the product of its mass and velocity. Thus, everything in motion has momentum in certain directions. A larger momentum means that an object requires a larger force to attain a certain speed and that a larger force is required to stop the motion of the object. In other words, a lighter or slower object has less momentum and can be stopped more easily. In human society, individuals are socially active agents who resemble objects in motion. Transitions in the social structure come from the power of individual 'motions'. These motions may refer to daily interactions, life choices and various exhibitions of behaviour. Social momentum is thus defined by people's capacity for social change. The social momentum of one individual alone is usually small and negligible and requires 'mass' and 'velocity' to reach a strong magnitude. Considering it as strength in numbers, we can easily imagine that mass corresponds to the 'quantity' of individuals. However, quantity is not enough in itself, and it is almost entirely meaningless to discuss the social momentum of thousands of people selected at random from around the world. Social momentum is only meaningful when its reference individuals are linked in certain ways. For example, they may live in the same city or share certain characteristics, behaviour or ideologies. In this sense, 'solidarity' is the most proper replacement for 'velocity'. Social

momentum is therefore a meso concept. It is applicable only to a large group,[8] a certain social category or a class, rather than single or totally random individuals. One person may certainly carry a stronger capacity for social change than another. Extreme cases include the great politicians, philosophers, artists and scientists who have significantly changed human history. The contributions of these single individuals have made to social change cannot be denied. By its own definition as a product of quantity and solidarity, the concept of 'social momentum' lacks the power to analyse single individuals.

Solidarity: The Core of Social Momentum

As quantity is certain, the most essential component of social momentum is solidarity. Thoughts about solidarity can be traced back to classical sociologists. Durkheim is a leading scholar on solidarity theory, and his saying that 'society is not the mere sum of individuals' has frequently been cited (1982:129). Durkheim claimed that 'the study of solidarity lies within the domain of sociology' (1984:27). Although he provided no definition of solidarity itself, he conceptualised 'negative solidarity' as a force that detached the different parts of a society instead of linking them together. According to Durkheim, negative solidarity comprises 'the negative aspects of every types of solidarity' (1984:75) and 'brings about no integration' (1984:75). By negating his negation, we can see that Durkheim considered solidarity as a certain mechanism or roots to which individuals became attached and kept a society whole. Although Chapters 2 and 3 of *The Division of Labor in Society* mentioned solidarity, Durkheim did not write much about either solidarity or negative solidarity. Rather, his massive discussion focused on how repressive and restitutory law brought out mechanic and organic solidarity. As Graham (2002:17) noted, 'Durkheim's thesis concerning social solidarity can be seen as a reaction against the various ideas of Comte, Spencer and Tönnies'. Comte held that solidarity lay in the 'separation of functions' that was necessarily connected to a 'combination of effort' (Aron, 1968:97). Spencer considered human progress as a way to

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[8] Although there is no criterion for 'a large number', individual specialties can bias the application of social momentum to an overly small group. This logic is similar to some statistics theories such as the central limit theorem, which can only be applied to a large number of samples (usually at least 30).

achieve greater mutual dependence and individuation. He argued that human society developed from a militant type into an industrial type, with the 'compulsory cooperation' of the former type evolving into 'voluntary cooperation'. In the latter type, common interests bring people together (Spencer, 1868:483). Considering Comte and Spencer's ideas, Tönnies noted the importance of studying what the members of a social group had in common and identifying group boundaries. He highlighted social bounds and ties and believed that their involved interdependence formed the nature of an industrial society (Graham, 2002:16). Like Spencer, Tönnies distinguished societies from 'gemeinschaft' and 'gesellschaft', which roughly translate as 'community' and 'association', respectively (Lee and Newby, 1983:44). According to Tönnies, people in gemeinschaft and gesellschaft are held together by 'real and organic' life and an 'imaginary and mechanical structure', respectively (Tönnies, 1955:37).

Durkheim was aware of the changing presentation of solidarity, but chose to reject and reverse Tönnies's theory. He considered pre-industrial society as no less organic than modern society, as achieving solidarity via similarity was a more mechanical process than achieving solidarity via the division of labour. By way of analogy, he used the term 'mechanical solidarity' to indicate a solidarity in which 'the individual consciousness…is simply a dependency of the collective type', just as 'the object possessed follows those which its owner imposes upon it'. 'Collective (or common) consciousness', i.e., 'the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society', is a central feature of mechanical solidarity (1984:39). Thus, people who are united in mechanical solidarity are 'social molecules… [who] lack any movement on their own, as do the molecules of inorganic bodies'. In contrast, organic solidarity, i.e., solidarity via the division of labour, 'is only possible if each one of us has a sphere of action that is peculiarly our own, and consequently a personality' (1984:84-85). This distinction reveals that individualisation and diversity are not contradictory to solidarity for Durkheim, but only indicate solidarity in a different form. And it can be more or less noticed that Durkheim had a more positive attitude towards organic solidarity due to its organicness and the 'real' interdependence between individuals.

Although Marx rarely used the term 'solidarity', he advanced related ideas when discussing society. Like Durkheim, he argued that an aggregation of individuals was more than the sum of individuals. By rejecting the tenet of liberalism theory that society was external and

independent from the individual, Marx claimed that individuals were both socially determined and generated social consequences (Barbalet, 1983:63). Marx wrote the following in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (1844):

> What is to be avoided above all is the re-establishing of 'Society' as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual is the social being. His life, even if it may not appear in direct form of a communal life carried out together with others – is therefore an expression and confirmation of social life.

It can be seen that even if they may not appear in direct name of solidarity, Marx's words are an expression and confirmation of social solidarity between individuals. Although Durkheim mostly discussed the solidarity of a whole society, Marx (and many feminists) focused on a particular social category: class solidarity. More precisely, Marx's class included and presumed solidarity. In other words, discussing the making of class unavoidably involves solidarity, regardless of his usage of the term. Although Marx noted the essentialness of similarity and common interests, he realised they were not enough. In *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, he described the small-holding peasants as 'potatoes in a sack form[ing] a sack of potatoes', albeit the peasants are the great mass in France under similar conditions. Their self-sufficient mode of production 'permits no division of labor in its cultivation; and 'isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse' or 'entering into manifold relations with each other'. Marx's judgment of these so-called French 'potatoes' seemed contradictory to his own argument that individuals were social beings and producers. This contradiction can be explained by (class) solidarity. Marx believed that peasants could not form a class until they were hostile towards other classes: 'Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests forms no community, no national bond, and no political organization among them, they do not constitute a class' (Marx, 1937:62).

Widespread hostility is certainly one of the most efficient ways to achieve solidarity for a group, a nation or a class, supposing somebody or something can trigger it. However, the mediation that Marx aggressively tried to claim through hostility and struggle tend to actually be class consciousness, though this concept is mostly used by Marx's followers. Class consciousness drives a class from operating 'in itself' to 'for itself'. In the beginning, a class

is only an aggregate of individuals 'with a common situation with common interests', which is the class in itself 'but not yet for itself' (Marx, 1920:188). Class consciousness enables a class to realise its own existence as a class, including the individuals' common interests against any other class and their roles in the struggle. In this way, a class evolves into a class for itself that is conscious of not only the momentary interests of a group of people, but also more permanent and universal class interests (Bukharin, 1921:8d[9]).

Class solidarity and consciousness can be used interchangeably in most contexts, but they are not equal. Class solidarity is more than class consciousness. It also relates to common experiences, interests and other conditions. Marx and Durkheim might not have been aware that they were implying some commonalities in terms of class and solidarity. As mentioned previously, in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, Marx was aware that the absence of a division of labour presented an obstacle to interdependence. For Marx, solidarity via similarity alone, or 'common conditions' in his words, produced only a class in itself.[10] A class for itself requires more organic solidarity, in which case mutual cooperation, dependence and communication should be extended to a larger scale. Through these interactions, firstly, one can recognise a common condition. Secondly, communication of that recognition makes the members of the class mutually aware of the recognition of others. Thirdly the consciousness of a class for itself is formed, which enables the class struggle. In this way, class consciousness is constituted and spread based on organic solidarity. Therefore, Marx might have agreed that organic solidarity and solidarity via class consciousness were advanced levels of solidarity, rather than rejections of solidarity via similarity.

We are now in a position to define solidarity in social momentum theory. Based on Durkheim and Marx's definitions of solidarity and class, respectively, this study blends their ideas together according to their commonalities and more or less modifies their incompatible parts. In this study, solidarity is the most essential component of social momentum. Thus, it is a variable used to represent any social category. People in a social category suggest having at least one characteristic in common so they can belong to that category. A social category can

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[9] His relevant idea can be found in Chapter 8 section d. The page number cannot be provided due to the on-line version I accessed.

[10] Marx denied that the French peasants comprised a class and never explained his reasoning, although they were theoretically a class in itself. He might not have seen any potential in the French peasants to become a class for itself, and thus chose to totally reject them as a class.

be a class, such as the middle or working class, but not necessary a class.[11] Solidarity consists of three parts: similarity, collectivity and identity. Similarity indicates any common or similar characteristics widely shared in a social category. It can include inborn attributes such as gender, age, nationality and race; socially ascribed statuses such as income and occupation statuses; similar experiences such as military service or participation in certain events; or personality, religion, political tendency or sexual orientation. Some similarities may have more social salience than others in different social contexts. For example, ethnicity tends to be more salient than gender in the context of polyethnicity. However, the salience of solidarity extends beyond similarity, which serves only as its foundation. Such salience is more about an identity generated from certain similarities. The concept of identity is discussed in a later paragraph.

A list of possible similarities could be endless, while a social category may only share one or several similarities. More similarities and a wider coverage of each similarity indicate stronger solidarity via similarity. Similarity obviously presumes the sharing by a notable amount of category members, otherwise it cannot be called as similarity. However, its complete coverage in that category is neither a must nor realistic in many cases. For instance, overtime work is a widely shared common experience for factory workers, but is not necessary for every worker. On the contrary, when the number of similarities is too low, the solidarity tends be fragile. For example, the middle and upper classes tend to be more controversial than the lower and working classes in terms of class solidarity. Technically, the middle and upper classes can even hardly to be defined as actual classes according to Marxist theory, but merely designations. One important reason lies in the comparatively lower degree of similarity between the middle and upper classes. Their abundance of working and living choices produce fewer similarities, unlike individuals in the lower class, whose alternatives are quite limited. In this sense, similarity can be considered a voluntary choice, but forced similarities are common in the disadvantaged social category. However, we should avoid equating the negation of similarity to diversity. In many social categories, similarity and

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[11] In many real cases, a certain social category is not called as a class even if it fits class theories, perhaps due to the culture or language custom. Terms such as 'working class' and 'lower class' are in wide use, while terms such as 'women class', 'black class' or 'HIV class' are unlikely to be used. However, defining the criteria for designating and making a class is unnecessary for this study.

diversity are negatively correlated, but more diversity does not necessarily result in fewer similarities. One social category could also theoretically contain both more similarities and diversities than another.

The second part of solidarity is collectivity, which indicates mutual communication, cooperation, integration or any interactions and interdependence. It reflects the activeness and organicness of a social category. Although not necessary, division of labour or other forms of cooperative and interactive divergence can function as positive stimuli for collectivity. When the members of a social category occupy different occupations in different places, they are more capable of exchanging unique experiences and support from different professions. Like similarity, the collectivity of a disadvantaged group is a forced outcome in many situations. These groups are more likely to work and live in a crowded space. In developing countries, people may huddle and chat together in a second-class carriage without taking a seat on the train. In contrast, first-class train passengers or flyers have more personal space and are unlikely to interact with strangers. The situation is similar for those who live in villas as opposed to factory dormitories. Thus, collectivity is related to working conditions, daily life routines and leisure-time activities. It relates to the attributes of a social network, such as its size, homogeneity and density. It also relates to the organisations, associations and clubs in which the members of a category participate. Without collectivity, the members in a social category are isolated, just as the French peasants described by Marx.

The third part of solidarity is identity, which refers to the consciousness of members in a social category which recognising their identity as 'we' and 'one of many' rather than 'I alone'. With this consciousness, members are likely to adopt a common identity for their category to determine which members are 'one of us' and who are outsiders. They exhibit a close social distance and a willingness to care and support each member, even when they have never met the member previously. At the same time, they exclude outsiders, especially those in the hostile or unfriendly social categories. This process reflects segmentation, prejudice or discrimination, but not necessarily class struggle. For example, the population of Shenzhen consists mainly of new migrants from across China. Their identity as Shenzhenese is quite weak. Although Shenzhen is one of the most developed cities in China, it has produced no reports about discrimination. Its official slogan, *Lai Le, Jiu Shi Shenzhen Ren* ('In here, you

are a Shenzhenese'), is posted prominently on the streets. On the other, the identity of local citizens in Hong Kong is strong, and easily identifiable 'outsiders' face daily discrimination. Many Hong Kong people and even the media have referred to the mainland Chinese as 'locusts'. Some local groups have recently been harassing anyone carrying luggage and who looks like they are from the mainland on the street in the name of anti-smuggling.[12] Radical movements such as the street harassment of innocent compatriots are morally questionable. In a morally acceptable way or otherwise, being aware of their common needs or interests, Hong Kong citizens tend to struggle together in the name and for the sake of their whole category.

Similarity, collectivity and identity definitely more or less exist in any kind of solidarity, supposing solidiarity does exist. The relationships between the three are not contradictory or mutually replaceable, as in the case of Durkheim's mechanic and organic solidarity. Like a class in itself or for itself, these three components have an ordinal relationship. Similarity most often serves as the foundation of solidarity. Only when similarity is more or less presumed, i.e., a number of similarities are widely shared in a category, can the collectivity of the category increase and become dense. In other words, people tend to interact more with those who are similar to them, although the division of labour and diversity also contribute to collectivity in the other way. Post-industrial society is marked by the division of labour and diversity, and pre-industrial society is marked by similarity. However, although such a shift is a product of historical social development, it does not reject the symbiosis of similarity in modern society. That is to say, similarity contributes to collectivity, but there are many other more influential factors in a certain social context that determine increases and decreases in similarity and collectivity, such as the mode of production. Identity, which is the highest level of solidarity, is formed on the basis of both similarity and collectivity. A strong identity indicates a strong solidarity, as it assumes its basis. As a result of leaking collectivity, a weak identity such as the French peasants in Marx's article or the previously mentioned Shenzhenese is nothing more than a nominal designation that does not recognise the common interest in struggle.

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[12] 'HK Indigenous' is a typical local political group advocating local priority against travellers, dealers and migrants from the mainland. Refer to the following website for more information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Kong-Mainland_conflict

Modes of Adaption: The Direction of Social Momentum

Social momentum is not very meaningful to social change if only quantity and solidarity are given. Although we may roughly predict the magnitude of social momentum, i.e., to discuss whether a social category is socially influential, we are unable to argue how these people influence the society. To answer this question, we must know the directions of the social momentum. Any motion of an object definitely has its direction. However, human subjects are more complicated than objects. The directions of people may be multiple, confusing and inconsistent. In a single day alone, we say many words, exhibit countless types of behaviour and make many decisions. Furthermore, in Goffman's view, we are all good actors. Our behaviour changes and often does so in contradiction to our personalities, depending on the situation. Therefore, it is an overly complex if not impossible task to measure the directions of people's social momentum according to their behaviour. Such a task may require an extremely lengthy survey such as the MMPI and people with the patience to complete it. For this reason, another more feasible and consistent way to determine the directions of social momentum must be adopted. Merton's modes of adaption fit the requirements, not denying other measurements may suffice as well.

This is not to say that people's modes of adaption never change. However, the modes of adults who are not experiencing rapid life changes are usually comparatively stable over a long period. Like personalities, many people adopt only one mode in their lives. However, modes of adaption are not personality, though it may relate much to personality. As previously discussed in the review of strain theory, modes of adaption are more akin to sociological concepts that reflect individual strategies under the strain from the social structure. People can certainly adopt different modes according to different situations, but just like their personalities, their overall modes are usually consistent. Thus, modes of adaption are consistent (although imperfect) locators of the directions of people's social momentum. This neglects but does not deny the existence of 'split modes'.

Conformity is known as the 'type I' mode of adaption. Merton considers it the most common type, fitting those who conform to both cultural goals and the means to achieve them. The people in this mode tend to embrace social rules, customs and morality in terms of their

goals and means. In China, students seek to achieve high scores in school by studying hard and listening to their teachers carefully. They seek to acquire a high degree to find a well-paying job. They date and get married with their parents' emotional and economic support. They want to get rich, as the society promotes, but they will not commit deviant acts unless such 'deviance' is common. Although they may suffer from frustrations and social inequalities, they believe their honesty and hard work will improve their future. People in this mode appear to be harmless to society, for they serve as the basis of social stability and harmony. However, an overly harmonious society lacks the momentum for social change. Conformity only maintains the current social orders and structures, as this mode never challenges the normal but only rejects deviance. For an anomic society in particular, conformity is more an obstacle to re-attaining non-anomie than a merit of stability. On the other hand, conformity does alleviate the symptoms of anomie. In an anomic society, overemphasis of momentary success and other forms of strain drive more people to deviate from normative means. Violations of morality and law thus increase as symptoms of anomie. For this reason, conformity decreases the extent of these symptoms by obeying norms. It makes an anomic society appear more superficially nomic while essentially sustaining the anomie. In this sense, advocating conformity to sustain social harmony in an anomic society is similar to taking opium to disguise a disease.

Innovation is the 'type II' mode. For Merton, innovation is a mode of deviance. People in this mode accept cultural goals but reject the means to achieve them. In a typical case, they may cheat on their exams to obtain higher scores, plagiarise papers to graduate from university or be willing to bribe someone for a promotion. They believe that the end result is most important and that the rightness of the means matters less. At the same time, they are no less committed to cultural goals than those in the conformity mode. In an anomic society, the innovation mode is common because structurally suppressed people who lack legitimate opportunities are pushed to break social norms. To achieve cultural goals and especially monetary success, they violate laws, customs or morality if doing so is worth the risk. In other words, in a society where opportunity is more equally distributed or people are tightly bounded to norms, the innovation mode is adopted less often. If pursuing equality is human nature, then a less anomic society has not to be an equal society, but a more unequal society is

more likely to become anomic, as the disadvantaged category tends to challenge the original structure. Regardless of the level of social equality, the lack of emphasis on norms definitely contributes to the innovation mode. As innovation mode leads to deviance and crimes, it enhances the symptoms of anomie, making the society appear chaotic. At the same time, like the conformity mode, as the innovation mode also promotes cultural goals, it sustains current anomic structures and does not benefit social change. Some may argue that innovation, as a mode of deviance, challenges the cultural structure. It is true that innovation challenges normative boundaries so that anomic symptoms become more severe. However, there is no reason to suggest that such challenges structurally interfere with the essence of anomie. When cultural goals granted, simply challenging the means of accomplishing cultural goals can even hardly challenge an existing cultural structure, because a culture structure is embedded more in cultural goals than means. Thus the innovation mode does not tend to recover the equilibrium between structures, but only maintain its discord. For an example in micro, attempting to obtain a master's degree via plagiarism does not contribute to changing the cultural emphasis on competing higher degrees or stopping the overproduction of postgraduate degrees (of low quality) for a society's economic and political needs. In fact, it only enhances these facts. However, this is not to say that the innovation mode is totally useless or negative for social development. It can be beneficial in many indirect ways and especially important to commerce and scientific discoveries. But, it is a negative mode in terms of healing anomie.

Ritualism is the 'type III' mode. It rejects cultural goals, yet accepts the cultural means. It is true that everyone has goals they want to achieve. As to ritualism, the importance of goals ranks only behind the means. People in this mode are highly moral or conservative and consider obeying rules, customs, morality and laws as a must. They value the process and means much more than the end. Ritualism is common in a very traditional or disciplined society. Prototypes of people in the ritualism mode include a person who stops in front of a red light after midnight despite a lack of cars passing by, a student who studies hard to prepare for the college entrance exam despite knowing he or she has no chance of passing or a researcher who tests a hypothesis despite the obviousness of the outcome. Compared with the conformity and innovation modes, ritualism leaves goals behind and therefore has no

significant effect on the structural essence of anomie. Like conformity, it alleviates the symptoms of anomie. If conformity is a kind of drug, ritualism is more a side-effect-free painkiller for anomie.

Retreatism and rebellion are the 'type IV' and 'type V' modes, respectively. As these two modes reject both cultural goals and cultural means, Merton also considered them modes of deviance. Not as common as the other modes, the people of retreatism and rebellion appear under-socialised. They care less about the judgments of others. People in the retreatism mode retreat and escape from society and live less like social beings or form subculture groups. They appear passive and inactive in certain aspects of their daily lives, as they lack goals and are unwilling to put effort into common pathes for their lives. Examples of the people in these modes include students who quit school, graduates who do not seek jobs and middle-aged women who do not want to get married. The distinction of rebellion lies in whether the people's new goals are adopted as replacements for the rejected cultural goals. Rebellion does not refuse deviant means when establishing new goals. Less common than people who exert effort to seek wealth or take care of family, these people may be artists who seek beauty in their own ways instead of studying hard at art school. They may be Christians who seek the will of God without going to church or reading the Bible. They may also be social activists or terrorists who pursue democracy or independence at any cost. People in the retreatism and rebellion modes aggravate the symptoms of anomie due to their unwillingness to go the normative way, and as such are likely to be mistaken by the government or masses as the causes of anomie. Infact, they are not the problem, but the solution for society to regain its structural balance. By setting up deviant goals, rebellion is the only mode that truly challenges the original social structures. This is not to say that every individual in the rebellion mode makes positive functions to cure anomie. Some of their goals may be significant to social change and others may not. Some may adopt effective means and others may not. As innovation can be beneficial for society in some ways, terrorism, i.e., attacking civilians, is an example of rebellion that is harmful to humanity. However, pioneers in every social movement, reform and revolution in history have exhibited positive cases of rebellion. Putting moral judgments aside, rebellion is the foundation of the force towards social change. It rejects current social orders and challenges the current social structures, regardless of what

is considered right and wrong in the society. Thus, taking human judgments into consideration, rebellion can be harmful for a healthy or highly advanced society and beneficial to an anomic or underdeveloped society. Retreatism, which is just one step away from rebellion, can be considered as pre-rebellion or an early stage of rebellion. As people in the retreatism mode have a much greater potential to become rebellious than those in other modes, the two modes must be discussed together. By analogy, retreatism and rebellion are similar to the immune mechanism of the human body. They may cause metaphorical fever and coughing, but they are the only modes that can essentially heal anomie.

In sum, based on Merton's modes of adaption, this study creates a typology of the four directions of social momentum. Through quantity, solidarity and direction, the concept of social momentum mends the micro-to-macro theoretical lacuna for the anomie project. This reconstructed anomie theory further enables discussion of the capacity of a social category to structurally change and remedy an anomic society. The following figure shows the reconstructed theoretical framework for this study.

Figure 1: Reconstructed Theoretical Framework of Anomie Theory

Anomie and Migrant Workers in Post-Reform China

Anomie in Post-Reform China

Having constructed the theoretical framework for anomie theory, the anomic social status of China in the post-reform stage is elaborated in this section. There is no definite criterion for judging post-reform China as anomic. However, there are reasons and phenomena to suggest that post-reform China is much more anomic than pre-reform China. Shocking news stories are increasingly considered 'normal' on a national scale. In 2011, a two-year-old girl in Guangdong was struck three times by two cars. Within seven minutes of the accident, eighteen people passed by without trying to help until a junkwoman took the severely wounded girl and found her mother.[13] In 2014, a teenage girl in Shandong was attacked and killed by six people brandishing a stick at a McDonald's because she refused to give them her cell phone number, when many people were surrounded and watching.[14] In 2015, a 49-year-old woman fainted on The Great Wall while surrounded by many people, none of whom offered to help. After more than 10 minutes, her friend arrived and took her to the hospital.[15] On one popular Chinese online forum, the great majority of people discussing the event supported those who did not help the woman, citing the potential fraudulence of her actions.[16]

This list is only a small sample of such events. It is true that crimes and accidents are common in countries all over the world, especially those with large territories. The focus here is not the abnormal individuals or criminals directly involved in the incidents, but the 'normal' public masses who did not intervene. Establishing comparisons with other countries may be a complicated task, but it is easy to imagine that the public reaction to these cases would have been totally different had they occurred in pre-reform China. If we reconsider all of these striking but frequently reported news stories alongside various other facts, such as the more

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[13] The video record of this event can still be found on-line. Refer to Wikipedia for a brief description: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Wang_Yue
[14] http://news.qq.com/a/20140530/035223.htm
[15] http://help.3g.163.com/15/0424/13/ANVHSHCP00963VRO.html
[16] http://comment.163.com/3g_bbs/ANVHSHCP00963VRO/ANVJS165.html

than 100,000 babies abandoned every year[17] and the severe food security problems in China, it seems more sensible to suspect an anomic society rather than the actions of certain individuals in separate cases. Just like a person exhibiting the symptoms of a number of diseases must exam his or her immune system and the functionality of his or her organs, we should check the structural coordination of a society if it exhibits incredible deviance on a large scale.

The focus should be transferred from various deviances to their root cause: structures. China's economic reform formed the watershed of its anomic status, as it directly triggered structural disequilibrium in the country. The word 'triggered' is significant for several reasons. First, as many factors served as the contexts or profound causes of the economic reform, the reform itself was not wholly responsible for the anomic status. Second, there is no denying that the pre-reform structures were more or less challenged. Otherwise, the CCP would not have carried out the reform. Third, neither the reform nor the collapse of the structural equilibrium occurred instantly. The triggering marked the beginning of this progressive process, which in 1978 presented a great shock to the structures. Fourth, although the reform triggered the structural discoordination, more intensified shocks to the social structure might have occurred had the reform not been carried out.

Although it would be difficult to elaborate on the structural triangle in pre-reform China, the contemporary structural triangle has unique patterns compared with that in the post-reform age. The pre-reform political structure was marked by a strong one-party system, indicating that both schisms inside the party and challenges outside the party were rare and not tolerated. Meanwhile, the party totally governed the political structure and was ruled mostly by one party leader. Many refer to the pre-reform age as Mao's age. In short, the party was the state and the party leader was the party. Any deviance in the 'theme' and any signs of disloyalty to the party, i.e., 'political incorrectness', were punished severely. These repressive patterns became extreme after 1966, when the cultural reform began. Although there is no record of the number of political persecutions that took place in the pre-reform age, publications and oral histories have referred to countless cases involving civilians and the

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[17] A rough number for 2010, openly disclosed by government official Ma Xu in 2015.
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2015-03-04/165031567618.shtml

highest CCP leaders alike. Repressive action usually results in reaction, but such reaction tends to be eliminated when the repressive force is overly powerful. The pre-reform political structure determined who was left, i.e., those who conformed totally to the social order. These included the culture and economic structures, which were highly politically determined (or colonised) in the pre-reform age. Challenging the dominant cultural ideology or economic institutions was considered the same as political disloyalty. It was easy to label and punish 'capitalist roaders' for even slight critiques of the economy or culture. The political structure in pre-reform China sustained not only itself but also the cultural and economic structures, as it strictly prevented any social changes.

The economic structure in the pre-reform age was marked by a planned economy in which the production, investment, consumption and distribution of resources were highly collective and determined by the central government. Private property was not recognised. The nature of the planned economy required the foundation of a strong centralised government that fully controlled the whole state. The one-party system comprising the CCP provided this condition. An economy completely operated by the government also sustained centralisation and the one-party autocracy. The economic structure thus sustained itself by operating the power of the economy. On the other, under planned economy, challenges to the political structure lacked domestic economic foundation. In terms of the cultural structure, the collective mode of production provided the foundation for a cultural ideology of collectivism, i.e., the major pattern of official Marxism in pre-reform China. At a micro level, individual labourers who were distributed by the state, who lacked free choices and whose regional, industrial and monetary diversities were minimised were sharing similar work experiences and a consciousness of 'one of many'. According to a saying of that time, each person represented a screw of socialism.

The pre-reform cultural structure was dominated by so-called Marxism (or Maoism). More precisely, different from its academic meaning, official Marxism was marked by collectivism and nationalism. It advocated altruism and denounced egoism and individualism. It advocated belonging, contribution and sacrifice to the collectivity, especially to the party and state. To embrace Marxism was a civic obligation for everyone, and to doubt, abandon or interpret Marxism differently were actions both culturally and legally banned. In academia, it was the

only discipline allowed to exist in both the philosophy and social science fields. No room was permitted for other forms of cultural ideology to spread. Although Marxism is currently considered a living corpse, it maintains a presence in the Constitution and in governmental orders and documents.

Article 24:

The state advocates the civic virtues of love of the motherland, of the people, of labor, of science and of socialism. It conducts education among the people in patriotism and collectivism, in internationalism and communism and in dialectical and historical materialism, to combat capitalist, feudal and other decadent ideas.

Constitution of the People's Republic of China

This article in the Constitution indicates how culture could be mobilised to sustain the political structure through education and propaganda. Meanwhile, in the name of 'combating capitalism' and 'decadent ideas', the planned economy was culturally provoked and protected as the most advanced form of economy in human history. In sum, it is obvious that the pre-reform structural triangle was comparatively stable, as the structures were interrelated and mutually sustaining.[18]

The post-reform age witnessed the collapse of the stability of the structural triangle. Triggered by the economic reform, the planned economy rapidly transformed into a semi-market economy, termed as such because it remained far from a free market. The government continued to exert a strong influence and capacity in manipulating the market, a strategy similar to that of state capitalism. However, compared with the planned economy, the semi-market economy totally transformed the position of the government from the only operator to a powerful overseer and a strong participant in the market. The wave of state-owned enterprise bankruptcies and the rise of private and overseas-funded businesses in the early post-reform age both confirmed the effect of this sharp economic transition.

Despite the rapid transition of the economic structure, the reform was not supposed to touch the political and cultural structures. However, the inter-structural relationships

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[18] The pre-reform economic and cultural structures were also highly politically colonised.

inevitably changed along with the changing economy. Instead of sustaining the other two structures, the semi-market economy came to be comparatively incompatible and conflicted with the one-party system and official Marxism. The CCP should have been aware of this and carried out a minor covert political reform along with the major overt economic reform. This mostly indicated the increasing tolerance of the dissent. However, it is necessary to point out three things. First, this minor covert political reform was not essentially a democratic reform, as it never argued against the one-party system. It represented only an adjustment of the ruling strategy to avoid the counterforce of overly strict dictatorships. Second, as a kind of adjustment, such tolerance or civic freedom had not been steadily increasing since the economic reform. It was highly conditional. Although the overall freedom of speech had been increasing in the post-reform age, the tolerance of street protests had been decreasing since the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protest, and accessibility to overseas websites has been decreasing. Third, although the one-party system had shifted from ruling strictly to ruling 'wisely', the political transition was too minor to coordinate it with the economic and cultural transitions. Therefore, this covert political reform could not fix the structural disequilibrium. To a certain extent, it conversely contributed to the collapse of the stability of the structural triangle.

Challenges to the original cultural structure comprised the most socially apparent pattern of the reform and were commonly presented as ideological confusion or a 'loss of belief'. More and more people raised doubts about and reconsidered official Marxism. Once officially denounced, the market and private wealth were suddenly legitimised in the name of Chinese socialism. The rich came out and showed their success not by their political loyalty but by their business. At the same time, the importation of Western goods and especially cultural products such as music, books, TV programmes and movies carried new cultures that stood in contrast to official Marxism. They promoted individualism rather than collectivism, private rights rather than national responsibility, romantic love rather than love for nation and scepticism rather than loyalty. Furthermore, the diversity and high quality of the imported commercial goods suggested that the material capitalist life was far superior to the socialist life in China. The mass media correspondingly played dramas, movies, cartoons from South Korea, Japan and the US in which the actors and stories were much more attractive than those

seen in the old socialist movies, shows and TV programmes. These cultural carriers challenged the old cultural structure to adopt a new and advanced form. In terms of the political structure, the release of political prisoners after the reform secured the civic right to think and speak differently to a certain extent. On the academic side, numerous Western disciplines such as philosophy, economy and sociology were allowed to be studied in universities. In the news sector, the 'south faction' represented by newspapers and magazines owned by commercial groups or the right-wing municipal governments in south China, such as *Southern Weekend*, *Southern Metropolis Daily* and *South Winds*, published articles that praised democracy and denounced the political system in China, (yet never challenged the highest CCP leadership). Alongside the disintegration and underdevelopment of China's socialist brothers in the Soviet Union and North Korea, official Marxism collapsed entirely after the reform. Pre-reform China established official Marxism as the state religion by diminishing any other religion or ideology. When it collapsed, no ideology or religion was influential to be a nationally accepted replacement. It is sufficient to say that China comparatively entered a cultureless status in the post-reform age. The current cultural structure is comparatively more diversified in terms of its patterns or institutions, but also weak in terms of its national influence on individuals and other structures.

The worship of monetary success accompanied the loss of belief, as it was the only remaining widely accepted criteria for valuing a person. Although no data directly prove the rising emphasis of monetary success, various social circumstances suggest as much. The first is the overpopulation of business majors in universities. Economics, finance and business administration became the hottest majors and required the highest scored for admission. *People's Daily*, an official media outlet of the central CCP, published a ranking of the most favoured majors for the '*Zhuangyuan*' in the 2014 college entrance examination, i.e., the students who achieved the highest scores in their districts. Economics ranked first with 19.39%, business administration ranked second with 19.06% and information engineering ranked third with only 6.87%.[19] For another example, Wang Sicong, the only son of the richest person in China, gained the nickname 'people's husband' numerous young women frequently called the bachelor their 'husband' on their microblogs. In bookstores, we can

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[19] See http://edu.people.com.cn/n/2014/0703/c1053-25234014.html

observe that popular books no longer praise and tell stories about political leaders, but worship most successful merchants, such Ma Yun and Ma Huateng.

The transformed economic and cultural structures do not sustain the political structure as they once did. Instead, they introduce conflict to the political structure when people are more economically independent from the political structure and more unwilling to sacrifice personal interests. These conflicts can be presented as dissent in words and more fiercely by 'collective events'. Although no official definition of collective events has been published, the Chinese government uses the term in reference to any activity that threatens social stability. The event may involve a dozen of people to tens of thousands of people and usually refers to petitioning, protests and riots. Typical cases include petitioning the central government to re-examine unjust cases or violent land acquisitions by a local government, street protests against the construction of a pollution industry or riots resulting from an abuse of power by police or *Chengguan*.[20] For instance, the 2012 Qidong protest against a proposed wastewater pipeline was one of the largest collective events. Thousands of people took to the streets, occupied City Hall and captured the mayor. Collective events have increased since the reform, although the exact number remains a secret. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the number has exceeded 100,000 each year since 2010 (Lei Peilin et al., 2012). Non-official sources estimate an even higher number. Sun Liping, a sociology professor at Tsinghua University, claimed that the collective events staged in 2010 totalled over 180,000.[21] As mentioned previously, minor and covert political reforms are far from able to eliminate inter-structural conflicts. To address these intensifying conflicts, post-reform China has gradually entered into an age of 'stability maintenance'[22] in terms of the political structure. This refers to a complex political system and the various institutions formed to prevent and repress collective events and speech in public and on-line. The stability maintenance data are quite limited, but it has been officially recognised that the national expenditure on 'public security' exceeded 700 billion yuan in 2012. This number is widely misinterpreted as indicating that China's expenditure on stability maintenance has exceeded the military

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[20] *Chengguan*, literally translated as 'city administrators', refers to officials of the Urban Administrative and Law Enforcement Bureau, who are famous for their violent enforcement in China.

[21] According to *South China Morning Post*, http://www.scmp.com/article/992519/pen-subject-sword

[22] In its official use by the government, *Wei Wen* literally means 'keeping stable'.

expenditure because public security obviously has a larger coverage. However, it does imply that the stability maintenance expenditure has a surprisingly large up-limit. As *Southern Metropolis Daily* reported in 2011, in Xufeng village in Jiangsu province, it took 12 people each working 8 hours a day to monitor a 'family of petitioning'.[23] In 2009, *People's Daily*, the most influential official newspaper of the central government, reported that the provincial government had announced that a cadre would be disqualified from promotion if a severe stability problem occurred in his territory.[24]

The inter-structural relationships have become increasingly discordant and conflicting since the reform, indicating the essential nature of the anomie in post-reform China. In the cultural structure, anomie is presented as a loss of belief and an emphasis of monetary success. In the political structure, the climbing number of collective events indicates severe tension. Anomie is also visible in countless different symptoms, such as devalued norms; increases in deviance, crimes and mass emigration; and the distrust pervading the nation. Although anomie in China is not entirely responsible for every deviance, its effects are embedded in every aspect of social life and incubated even in non-deviant circumstances.

Migrant Workers in Post-Reform China

Like anomie, migrant workers are a product of post-reform China. Since 1987, an increasing number of migrant workers have being moving from villages to cities. The total number reached 14.7 million in 2005 and climbed to 23.6 million in 2012. Before the reform, the possibility of domestic migration was strictly limited, as the government planned everyone's work. In the post-reform age, it has become politically possible, though it may not be totally legal to migrate to a place that offers more working opportunities and higher incomes. Under the dual urban-rural structure, this pull effect is extremely strong for peasants in undeveloped rural areas, who are enticed to move to rapidly developing cities. One month of the lowest income in Shanghai, Beijing or Guangzhou alone could be worth more than a whole year of planting income in poor villages. A comparison of the per-capita yearly

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[23] http://news.sohu.com/20110514/n307537833.shtml
[24] http://news.163.com/09/0527/04/5A9U2V0I0001124K.html

disposable income of Shanghai residents and per-capita yearly productive farming income of Guangxi peasants exemplifies this point. In 1995, the incomes totalled 7,172 Yuan in Shanghai versus 594 Yuan in Guangxi. In 2013, they totalled 43,851 Yuan in Shanghai versus 2,007 in for Guangxi.[25] The gap between the farming income in villages and wages in big cities has become larger in terms of both amount and percentage. At the same time, the census data for every province indicate that the yearly expenditure of rural families exceeds their farming income. In other words, peasants require working opportunities in cities with higher incomes than are provided in the rural agricultural industries to satisfy their increasing family needs. At the same time, post-reform cities also require huge amounts of labour power to achieve rapid economic development, especially in terms of the construction, manufacturing and services sectors.

Broadly and literally speaking, any person who works in a place other than his or her own hometown is a migrant worker. However, for the sake of convenience, the meaning of 'migrant worker' in this study is narrowed from its literal meaning to include those with rural Hukou. These workers or their parents usually come from rural areas and are commonly known as *Nongmin Gong* (peasant workers)[26] regardless of whether they used to live in rural areas or participate in agricultural production. The term 'peasant' refers more to an ascribed social and hereditary status than an occupational or regional status. This point is demonstrated in a later paragraph. Here, it is sufficient to claim that 'migrant worker' is both a culturally and legally discriminated disadvantaged social category in the city. After entering the city, these workers live and work closely to the urban people, including those who have totally different tongues, manners, hobbies, social networks and life standards. These 'noble' urban people are born with cultural, economic and legal advantages. They claim to be the owners of the city, and refer to migrant workers as outsiders or villagers with either sympathy or arrogance. Although it may not be always true, when looking at public images in the city, migrant workers are considered to have poor education, income, manners, residential conditions and appearance.

Official attitudes towards migrant workers are complex. One with a deep understanding of

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[25] Refer to Shanghai Statistical Year Book 2014 and Guangxi Statistical Year Book 2013.
[26] The term 'migrant workers' rather than 'peasant workers' is used in reference to workers with rural Hukou, as many of whom find the latter term discriminatory.

Chinese politics would understand that these official attitudes are multiple, contradictory and changeable according to the level of government and have special conditions. Scholars from Hong Kong and abroad could misunderstand these attitudes. For example, Linda Wong's *Chinese Migrant Workers: Rights Attainment Deficits, Rights Consciousness and Personal Strategies* (2012) claimed that the government became increasingly friendly to migrant workers according to the documents sent by the central government. Although her evidence was correct, her conclusion was problematic. Her evidence mainly comprised documents issued by the State Council, so it was sensible for her to claim that the official attitudes towards migrant workers became positive. However, the attitudes provincial and local governments exhibit towards migrant workers tend to be more negative. They are more likely to consider migrant workers as troublemakers who are responsible for collective events and crimes and trouble in the welfare system. At the same time, the central government never forces the local government to apply friendly policies to migrant workers. Instead, it merely offers general opinions about migrant workers, mostly to sustain its public image, disregarding de facto outcomes. Using several cases related to migrant workers' labour rights and children's education, Wang Chunguang (2010) identified a huge gap between national policies and local operationalisation. It is clear that actual political exclusion is exhibited by the local government and not by the central government. Most of the knowledgeable scholars interviewed for this study, such as Chen Huirong and Xiong Yihan, admitted that the official exclusion of migrant workers in cities has been increasing over a decade in general and extremely strongly in recent years. Even Cai Fang (2000), a leading official researcher of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, criticised the local-level government for applying over-exclusive policies to migrant workers. Although migrant workers are treated nominally better now than they once were, examples of their exclusion include constraints of the issuance of necessary certifications and demolishing *cheng-zhong-cun* (villages-in-city) and schools for their children. The official designation of migrant workers has changed from 'blinded flow' to 'brothers of peasant workers', and the term 'temporary residence permit' has been changed to 'residence permit'.

Special conditions usually indicate the holding of national or international activities that lead to the massive expulsion of migrant workers. Such expulsions result from the demolition

of slums where migrant workers work and live in the name of the city's environment and from the constraint of resident permit issuances. The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and Shanghai World Expo are the two most representative cases. Although in the media the Beijing government promised not to limit the non-native Hukou population, the *cheng-zhong-cun* in urban Beijing were routinely demolished until the end of 2007, including the widely known Zhejiang-cun, which provided workplaces and residences for more than 100,000 migrant workers.

New Generation Migrant Workers (NGMWs)

As stated in the beginning, this study focuses on new generation migrant workers (NGMWs) as its research subjects due to their uniqueness and potential. Some of the NGMWs are children of the first generation migrant workers, and others are children of pure peasants. Some were born in villages and came to the city after middle or high school, and others were born in cities. Despite the diversities of these workers, studies have found that different samples share special qualities. Compared with the first generation migrant workers, the NGMWs comprise an entirely new social category. They participate in little agricultural work in the rural areas. One study of 132 NGMWs in Wuhan circa 2005 suggested that 89.4% of the workers did not know how to do agricultural work. Contrary to the previous generation, the NGMWs never experience starvation (Liu Chuanjiang & Chen Jianlin, 2008). They have weaker attachment to villages and a lower willingness to return to villages (Wang Chunguang, 2001). They are keen on living in first-tier cities rather than small or middle-sized cities. They prefer stable work and residences rather than changing jobs and cities.[27] A study of 4,673 migrant workers in North China in 2007 conducted by China Youth & Children Research Center indicated that more than half of the NGMWs wanted to settle down in the city[28] and that most of the old generation considered returning to their hometowns a certainty (China Worker Movement Institute,[29] 2011:10). They consume, play and even dress like urban

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[27] Source: 2013 Report on China's Migrant Population Development. China Population Publishing House. P4-7.
[28] See http://www.cycs.org/kycg/201504/t20150423_67292.html
[29] China Worker Movement Institute publishes studies in the name of the institute. It never provides authors' names.

people. They are better educated and socially active. They tend to be more familiar with the Internet, especially social network software and on-line forums. They also carry new values. They care about news and politics. They tend to place more value on life standards, equality and personal rights. They are sensitive to discrimination, and they are more likely to collectively struggle for their interests (China Worker Movement Institute, 2011:79-81; Pan Ngai, 2010; Shen Yuan et al., 2012). A study of migrant workers conducted in Pearl River Delta showed that 45.5% of NGMWs chose to collectively complain or appeal, a number 17.6% higher than the old generation (Cai He et al., 2009). A national study conducted by All-China Federation of Trade Unions in 2009 suggested that 52.4% NGMWs were willing to participate in collective activities relevant to their own interests, and that only 41.0% of the old generation were willing to do so.[30]

Although these images of NGMWs are widely accepted, this study neither presupposes that all of the preceding findings can be universally applied in China nor tests these findings. Few scholars have argued for contradictory findings from other samples. For example, Ye Pengfei (2011) denied a significant generational difference in the choice to 'settle down in the city' by conducting a survey in seven provinces. In terms of this study, these earlier findings do not provide definite assumptions, but rather communicate a message: NGMWs may have a strong and unique social momentum.

Roughly speaking, the NGMWs comprise young migrant workers. Although age is not the central but other qualities previously mentioned, for the sake of technical convenience, it is a commonly accepted demarcating line for the new generation. In this study, the term 'new generation' refers to migrant workers born in or after 1980 who are also usually known as the post-80s or second-generation migrant workers. The year 1980 is selected mostly because it has served as an official definition by most of the relevant studies. According to this definition, the NGMWs numbered 5.98 million in 2005, comprising 40.6% of the total number of migrant workers. This number rapidly increased to 11.8 million in 2010, comprising over half of the total. This migration trend indicated not only a rapid increase in the total number of migrant workers, but also a decrease in the workers' average age. In that five-year period, the

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[30] See China Worker Movement Institute's *New Generation Migrant Workers: Problems, Researches and Suggestions*. China Worker Publication. 2011, P10.

new generation became the majority of migrant workers. Assuming the economy and Hukou policy remain steady, the new generation is estimated to comprise approximately 90% of the total number of migrant workers in 2030.[31] Thus, the new generation not only currently represents more than half of the migrant workers, but also may comprise the entire migrant worker population in the future.

Strain on NGMWs

The NGMWs' unique attributes differentiate them from the first generation. However, like the first generation, their opportunities are structurally suppressed by anomie. As for the political structure, the Hukou system is the most significant factor limiting their opportunities. One's peasant status, determined by his or her rural Hukou, is a hereditary social status passed from one generation to the next. Thus, a son of a peasant will always be a peasant regardless of whether he was born or lived in a city. Before the adoption of a points-based residency permit system, it was almost impossible to transition from a rural Hukou to a big city without marrying someone in an urban Hukou. After 2010, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen gradually adopted the points-based residence permit system. A migrant worker can apply to a local Hukou only when he or she accumulates a certain amount of points. These points are based on dozens of indexes. Level of education and local investment carry the major weightings, and age, occupation and number of years spent paying local taxes are also important. This points-based system actually serves as an admission scheme for talents, professionals and entrepreneurs, not ordinary migrant workers. In addition, acquiring a local residence permit is a prerequisite for applying to a local Hukou. However, it has become increasingly difficult for migrant workers to apply for residence permits in first-tier cities. In the twenty-first century, both central and local governments have issued announcements and orders to constrain the populations in the biggest cities. *The New Urban Planning of the State* issued by the State Council in 2014 strictly ordered local governments to constrain the populations and residence permits of cities exceeding populations of 5 million. In this study,

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[31] Source: 2013 Report on China's Migrant Population Development. China Population Publishing House. P4.

only one out of twenty-one respondents successfully applied for a residency permit to Shanghai. The others either failed or did not know how to apply. Even those who had acquired high levels of education and lived in cities for decades with their own businesses found it extremely difficult to relocate their Hukou to Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. Compared with these three cities, the Hukou of Shenzhen (which is the youngest first-tier city) and other second-tier cities[32] such as Nanjing and Suzhou tend to be more accessible to those who are younger, have attained higher levels of education or have abundant assets. Thus, being admitted by a first-rank university seems the only possible way for a migrant worker born in an ordinary family to apply for a city Hukou as a migrant worker. However, it is quite rare for an ordinary peasant to enter a university.[33]

The Hukou system is also hierarchical in terms of the unequal rights attributed to the urban and rural Hukou. Before the reform, this inequality was covert because people in the rural and urban areas were comparatively isolated from each other. The inequality became more overt when migrant workers came to the cities after the reform. The inequality was based on the right of residence in a city. In the post-reform age before 2003, without Hukou, migrant workers had to apply and carry residence permits in the city. If they did not do so, they were likely to be arrested and sent back to their hometowns according to the administrative procedures of Custody and Repatriation. Even those migrant workers who had residence permits and worked for registered corporations were still frequently stopped and interrogated on the street by police because they looked like migrant workers and had to submit to room checks at any time if they lived in the *cheng-zhong-cun* (i.e., the slum). Due in large part to the case of Sunzhigang[34] in 2003, Custody and Repatriation were officially abolished under massive pressure from the public. The frequency of street interrogations and room checks also decreased. In this study, all of the respondents interviewed reported undergoing identity and

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[32] Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen are considered the first-tier cities. Other big cities are defined as second- or third-tier cities according to their population and GDP.

[33] Although the NGMWs are better educated than the first generation, most of them were only able to finish high school.

[34] Sunzhigang was a migrant worker from Hubei province. He came to work in Guangzhou but did not acquire a residence permit. On the night of 17 March 2003, he was stopped by the police, who checked his residence permit on the street. Lacking both this permit and his identity card, he was arrested by the police. Although his friend brought Sunzhigang's identity card and the necessary bail to the police station after being contacted by phone, the police refused to release Sunzhigang due to his 'disrespectful' attitude and sent him to a detention centre, where he was found dead three days later. This case received massive attention on the Internet.

residence permit checks by the police in recent years.[35] One respondent had been forcedly sent back to his hometown in 2001, with all of his belongings and cash confiscated. Since 2010, home purchase restrictions have been issued in all of the first-tier and most of the second-tier cities in China. Even if a migrant worker has accumulated sufficient savings to purchase an apartment, he or she cannot make the purchase in a big city due to the Hukou system, no matter how long he or she has worked in that city.

Even if migrant workers were allowed to purchase houses in a big city, only a few of them would be able to afford small apartments in the suburban areas. Purchasing an apartment has even been quite difficult for middle-class individuals with urban Hukou. Therefore, practically, Hukou system refers more to unequal social welfare for migrant workers. The social welfare system in a city mainly covers medical, pension, work-related injury, unemployment and maternity insurance in addition to minimum subsistence security. Migrant workers with rural Hukou are totally unable to receive minimum subsistence security, unemployment insurance or maternity insurance in a city. Determined by the local government in each province, the medical and pension insurance for migrant workers are assigned according to an entirely different system from that of the local Hukou residents. In Shanghai, this system was known as Comprehensive Social Security for Migrant Workers (or 'Comprehensive Security') before its abolition in 2011. Under the medical and pension system, migrant workers and their employers were required to pay less than the local Hukou residents and received far less coverage and restitution. Under Comprehensive Security in Shanghai, both payment and restitution were 60% of their levels for urban Hukou residents. The medical insurance covered only the expenditure for hospitalisation, much less than that for urban Hukou residents, which covered most ordinary diseases that did not require hospitalisation. Welfare for migrant workers in the city was quite unfriendly towards those who were willing to stay in the city for a long time or permanently. Since 2011, most of the big cities[36] in China beginning with Beijing and Shanghai have gradually adopted migrant workers into the same medical and pension insurance systems as local Hukou residents. Although the intention is good, this

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[35] Those who look 'decent' or 'local' are unfamiliar with this experience. The prejudice behind this type of legal enforcement is clear.
[36] Shenzhen is a special case in that it applies the same medical and pension insurance system to migrant workers from the beginning due to its status as a young city created by migration. Almost every resident in Shenzhen is a migrant or was a migrant at one point.

seeming improvement has aggravated other more severe problems for migrant workers. Medical and pension insurance receives payment from three sources: the government, employers and the migrant workers themselves. The government/employer payment comprises the major percentage, and the personal payment is minor. However, only the personal payment is nationally valid. Most part of a migrant worker's insurance becomes useless if he or she returns to his or her hometown or works in another city. At the same time, the employer payment is actually deducted from the wage of the migrant worker. In this sense, the equalisation of medical and pension insurance is de facto unfriendly to migrant workers due to their high mobility.

Childcare, child education and elderly care are also critical examples of the inequality in the Hukou system. Without local Hukou status and a residence permit, migrant workers' children do not have the right to receive any care or education from public institutions, and the expenditure for private school is unaffordable for most migrant workers. Even those who successfully acquire the residence permit have very limited choices in applying to care centres and schools for their children compared with urban Hukou residents. Schools and even kindergartens in big cities are very captious towards students and discriminate against migrant workers. As such, their children are only able to attend so-called 'bad schools'. It is almost impossible to find a student with rural Hukou status in 'good schools'[37] in the city. More importantly, the children of migrant workers cannot take high school entrance examinations in most cities or college entrance examinations in almost any city. In Shanghai, a migrant worker must currently acquire a residence permit and exceed 120 points in the point system to allow his or her children to take high school and college entrance examinations in Shanghai. As mentioned previously, migrant workers already have a difficult time applying for residence permits, and 120 points is a further criterion for 'talents, professionals and entrepreneurs'. The children's inability to take high school and college entrance examinations makes their schooling in the city more meaningless, as they must return to their hometowns to take the exams. This is not simply a matter of taking a round trip. First, education in China is

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[37] People in China refer to good public schools with high-standard environments, equipment and teachers as 'zhongdian schools', which literally translates as 'emphasised schools'. The list of zhongdian schools is officially decided by the government. Private schools usually have reputations equivalent to those of zhongdian schools, which tend to accept students from comparatively rich families.

largely exam-oriented, and exams differ from province to province. Thus, a child can hardly adjust to the exams in his or her hometown if he or she takes schooling in a city outside the province. Second, as universities admit far more students from developed provinces than they do from less developed provinces, it is far easier for one to gain admittance to a university if he or she takes the college entrance examination in the big city. Even in Guangdong, one of the most developed provinces in China, an examinee must achieve much higher ranks than a Shanghai examinee to gain admittance to the same university.

In terms of the economic structure, migrant workers' strain comes from the dual urban-rural system and the world factory export-oriented economy that relies on cheap labour. The unequal and over-centralised development of China strictly limits working and investment opportunities in villages and leads to the underdevelopment of the entertainment, medical service and education sectors. Migrant workers would rather be considered as the cheapest labour in a city than as peasants in a village. With their opportunities and welfare constrained in both the urban and rural areas, the dual system produces and reproduces migrant workers as cheap labour from one generation to the next. Due to the insufficient education and economic opportunities offered in the villages and unequal rights in the cities, the children of migrant workers are unlikely to move upwards in terms of social stratification. However, this mechanism of producing cheap labour satisfies the needs of both the world factory and rising service sector in the cities. In 2014, 84% of migrant workers belonged to the industrial and service sectors, and nearly half of these workers worked in the industrial sector (Li Peilin et al., 2014:142). In other words, migrant workers' opportunities are economically suppressed to sustain the post-reform economic structure. If the rural and urban areas were developed more equally and migrant workers were treated more equally in the cities, the cost of labour would rise significantly and destroy the basis of the world factory and city service sector, probably creating a severe economic crisis. Migrant workers, i.e., cheap labourers, are the most productive natural resource for the economy of post-reform China. As a reproducible resource, unlike normal labourers, they create a greater percentage of surplus value that decreases the cost of economic development. It would not be novel to suggest that China's rapid urbanisation and increasing GDP, like the construction of the Great Wall, are based on the exploitation of migrant workers.

In terms of the cultural structure, migrant workers are the victims of prejudice and exclusion. In the cities, the locals, media and government view migrant workers as cultural outsiders and labourers rather than as owners and citizens. More than that, migrant workers are seen as poor, irrational, uneducated and uncivilised labourers who threaten the public security and environment. In addition to the previously mentioned 'blind flow' designation, numerous news articles have used the terms *Zang*, *Luang*, *Cha* ('dirty', 'chaotic' and 'bad') to describe the places where migrant workers live. Official documents and orders tend to use the terms 'manage', 'supervise' or 'oversee' in relation to migrant workers. For example, the National Bureau of Statistics publishes its *National Supervisory Report on Peasant Workers* every year. Many locals have become accustomed to adopting certain disrespectful terms for migrant workers. In Shanghai, elder locals prefer to call migrant workers 'villagers', and a great deal of young and middle-aged locals prefer to call them *Yang Pan* (which literally translates as 'the hard disk'). All of these cultural forms of discrimination not only enhance the suppression of the economic and political opportunities of migrant workers, but also make 'migrant worker' a culturally stigmatic social category.

The official names of rural and urban Hukou are 'agricultural' and 'non-agricultural' Hukou, respectively. Efforts to abolish the difference between agricultural and non-agricultural Hukou began in 2003. In 2014, the State Council officially announced the abolition of that difference. As such, a police station can no longer label Hukou as agricultural or non-agricultural. However, one can still distinguish rural and urban Hukou based on addresses. The Hukou reform also failed to change the preceding de facto inequalities and restrictions.

It can be seen that the strain on NGMWs comes from stable institutional sources in the structural triangle. On the one hand, the structural circumstances for their modes of adaption are probably unchangeable. On the other hand, as discussed previously, strain acts much like a virus carried by a human. Although two people may undergo exactly the same strain, they may adopt distinct modes of adaption. As such, although NGMWs have being experiencing strain similar to that of the old generation, that are likely to have very different reactions in terms of their modes of adaption. Their weaker attachment to the village and stronger attachment to the city only make their strain inevitable, as there is no real hometown to

provide an escape from such strain, even if they were to return to it eventually. For the old generation, strain is temporary, even if they have worked in a city for a long time. Their 'real life' is in the village, which includes their partners, closest networks, family reputations, customs and emotions. For this reason, strain is a reality for the old generation, but it is also something otherworldly. However, the 'real life' of the NGMWs is in the city, not the village. Many NGMWs may eventually return to the village for practical reasons, but they constantly experience strain because they both work and live in the city. In this sense, their modes of adaption, as a reactive choice when confronted with strain, involve a long-term way of life rather than a temporary strategy for working. Their social momentum is a life-long product of the entire social category rather than a temporary accumulation from their working period.

Measures and Samples

The major concepts discussed here are the modes of adaption of NGMWs, which are determined by their values in terms of goals and means, and their social momentum, which is determined by their quantity, similarity, collectivity and identity. Most migrant worker studies have posed insufficient questions for discussing these concepts. The study of migrant worker acculturation in China conducted by Yongxia Gui et al. (2012) was an exception, as it combined three scales. Many of that study's data are relevant to this study. Unfortunately, the data do not distinguish NGMWs from the old generation and are therefore invalid for this study. Other empirical anomie studies that have attempted to measure strain, anomie or normlessness on an individual level have not only misunderstood anomie theory as considered in this study, but also oversimplified it in terms of their measurements.

Zhao Ruohui's (2009:175-202) *Determinants of Anomie* reviewed these measurements. She listed 19 scales over the course of a 27-page table in the appendix, including Srole's (1956) 5-item anomie scales and Dean's (1961) 6-item normlessness scale, which were frequently adopted in the 1960s-1970s. Despite the theoretical inadequacy of these short scales, all of the measurements conducted from the 1950s to 1990s were overly hasty in their calculations of a complicated theory based on simple scores. As Merton's polite comment on Srole's scale reflected, 'this effort to develop a scale of anomie has various limitations and some inadequacies, but does furnish a beginning toward a standardized measure of anomie' (Merton, 1968:219). Although Merton was correct about the scale's limitations, the past 50 years have only served to show that a standardised measure of anomie theory for individuals is beyond our ability and necessity. There is no sufficient reason to support any standardised form, number of questions or score weightings for those questions. Moreover, no attempt to operationalise the concept of anomie has been able to justify how individual-level data can be applied at a macro level. As Zhao Ruohui (2009:44) concluded, the common logic of these attempts holds that '[t]he aggregation of individual anomie can be a good indicator of social anomie'. It is obvious that such logic is theoretically problematic in terms of both theorising anomie and the process of 'aggregation'. Even so it is hard for scholars to reach a common understanding of anomie theory in the first place.

Without applicable data from earlier studies, the data used to discuss these determinants in this study came from two sources: a field study conducted in Shanghai that consisted of both interviews and a survey and the 2011 Chinese Social Survey (CSS 2011). Some of the questions in the survey may appear similar to those used in Srole's scale or others. However, the survey administered in this study differed in three ways. First, it did not attempt to standardise a scale or to score any concept. Second, it did not measure the concept of anomie based on individuals, as anomie is not measurable by such way. Third, contrary to many ealier studies which usually examine each concept by a single question, it posed various questions to measure each determinant. As measuring one's overall mode of adaption and social momentum can be complicated, an attempt was made to reach an in-depth understanding of the individual respondents. Indeed, it may be better to use the term 'discuss' rather than 'measure'.

Interview and Survey

Both semi-structured interviews and a survey were administered to 20 respondents. With assistance from researchers at Shanghai Jiao Tong University and the Shanghai Academy of Social Science, executives in different companies offered their corporation during the field research. The respondents answered questions in a closed meeting room, one by one. The interviews were not audio recorded and the names of the companies which employ the respondents remain anonymous. Each interview lasted for approximately 40 minutes, and each survey took about 30 minutes to complete in most instances. After completion, each respondent was paid 100 yuan although they were not advised prior to their participation that they would be provided with a payment. The respondents were selected on the basis of three criteria: they had to be (1) born after 1980, (2) currently working and residing in Shanghai and (3) in possession of a rural Hukou status. Subject to these three criteria and their availability, more or less equal numbers of respondents of both genders were selected in order to avoid gender basis. The 20 respondents who provided information for this study met all of these criteria and were available for access by the researcher during the period of field investigation. Six of the respondents were selected from an office building in a downtown area of Shanghai while the remaining fourteen worked in a suburban area. Four were selected

from a warehouse owned by a food-packing company. Another four were employed in a distribution centre which was in charge of food quality inspection. The remaining six were selected from a water bottling plant.

The survey contained 103 questions categorised into 5 parts. Part I referred to the value of the respondents' goals and means of achieving those goals. It investigated the respondents' modes of adaption by asking questions about success, wealth and cultural norms. Part II referred to the respondents' identity, including questions about their designations, impressions and adaption in Shanghai. Part III referred to the respondents' social interactions, activities and networks, based on which their collectivity could be discussed. Parts IV and V inquired about the respondents' working conditions and personal information, respectively. Most of the questions posed in these two parts served the discussion of similarity. Each interview was structured in basically the same way. The respondents were allowed and encouraged to talk openly and freely. The interviews were conducted not only to confirm the respondents' reliability, but also to understand their detailed experiences, values and feelings so that any potential validity problems presented by the survey could be mended. Arguing the representativeness of the 20 cases was not the purpose, but to qualitatively discuss how modes of adaption and solidarity appeared in different individuals. Thus, the survey had no index to score any such concept. Each case was checked jointly using both the survey and interview.

Table 1

Sample Profile (Shanghai)

	Frequency
Gender	
Male	12
Female	8
Total	20
Age	
21-25	8
26-30	6
31-35	6
Total	20
Education	
Elementary School	1
Junior High School/Equivalent Technical School	4
Senior High School/Equivalent Technical School	7
Junior College	6
College	2
Total	20
Income (Yuan)	
2,000-2,999	3
3,000-3,999	10
4,000-4,999	4
5,000-5,999	2
6,000-6,999	0
7,000-7,999	1
Total	20

Source: Author's Survey

Chinese Social Survey (CSS 2011)

Rather than tell a story, the data seek to present a whole picture. The CSS is an ambitious nationwide survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. CSS 2011 sampled 19,440 households in 28 provinces in China. Each selected household provided one respondent. Of these 11,438 respondents, 1,377 were migrant workers and 401 were NGMWs. The CSS is extraordinarily long. It has 38 pages and over 500 questions. To serve as a database for different social science subjects, it seeks to ask questions about everything from Hukou to properties, work, families, social network, habits, personal values and opinions. Due to its national probability sampling and comprehensiveness, the CSS was used in this study to quantitatively discuss the attributes of the NGMWs, which the small sample in Shanghai could not represent. However, the CSS was not designed for this study in particular and therefore did not contain all of the required questions. For example, it lacked the questions necessary to discuss the respondents' attachment to cultural goals.

Table 2

Sample Profile (CSS 2011)

	Frequency	Percentage
Gender		
Male	166	41.4
Female	235	58.6
Total	401	100.0
Age		
16-19	18	4.5
20-24	144	35.9
25-29	175	43.6
30-34	64	16.0
Total	401	100.0
Education		
None	3	0.7
Elementary School	44	11.1
Junior High School	172	42.9
Senior High School/Equivalent Technical School	119	28.9
Junior College	40	10.0
College	26	6.5
Total	401	100.0

Source: CSS 2011

Analysis and Discussion

Modes of Adaption

As shown in Table 3, one question was posed to examine the respondents' general attachment to normative means, and five questions were posed to check their specific attachment to traditional cultural norms. Correspondingly, one question was posed to examine their general attachment to cultural goals, and five questions were posed to examine their attachment to monetary goals. Cultural norms certainly cover much more ground than these questions could address. The first three of these five questions were posed because they were the most representative of the type of Chinese traditional morality known as *San Gang*,[38] and the latter two, which were related to attitudes towards sex and marriage, were universally applicable to all of the respondents. As human values were too complicated to be fully examined by simple questions, no definite index was constructed to measure the mode of each of the 20 respondents in the field in Shanghai. Instead, their survey answers were considered in tandem with the information they shared and presented in their interviews. The respondents were encouraged to discuss their attitudes towards success and their experience with achieving goals to determine which modes applied to them.

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[38] *San Gang*, which translates literally as 'three obligations', is the most famous Confucian ideology. It indicates obligations to one's father, husband and king.

Table 3: Questions Relevant to the Modes of Adaption

Attachment to Normative Means	
General	
Q1. As long as the goal can be achieved, the means of achieving it are not important.	Agree/Disagree
Cultural Norms	Agree/Disagree
Q15. Children should listen to their parents.	Agree/Disagree
Q16. A wife should listen to her husband.	Agree/Disagree
Q18. People should listen to the government.	Agree/Disagree
Q19. Premarital sex is not right.	Agree/Disagree
Q21. If a marriage is painful, divorce is an option.	
Attachment to Cultural Goals	
General	
Q2. As long as the means are right, the end is not important.	Agree/Disagree
Monetary Success	
Q6. Money is the most important criteria for measuring one's success.	Agree/Disagree
Q9. No matter what one seeks to achieve, he or she should have money in the first place.	Agree/Disagree Yes/No
Q12. Are you going to try hard to make yourself very rich?	No/Yes->
Q13. Does anything cause you a large financial burden?	Specify:
Q14. If do not have a financial burden, do you still want to try hard to be very rich?	Yes/No

Source: Author's Survey

Cases 8 and 9 are the two most typical cases of conformity. Both involve comparatively older NGMWs who had lived in Shanghai for quite a long time. Case 8, Hong, was a 35-year-old woman from Henan with an elementary school education. After following her husband, she had been in Shanghai for 10 years and at the time of the survey worked as a vegetable packager. Case 9, Wang, was a 32-year-old male and unskilled labourer, also from

Henan. He had finished junior high school and been in Shanghai for eight years. The respondents disagreed with both Q1 and Q2, indicating that they valued the importance of both means and goals. Furthermore, their attachment to traditional cultural norms and monetary success was strong. They both showed a normatively positive[39] value in four out of five questions. Hong agreed to all five of the questions about cultural norms, and Wong agreed with Q15, Q16 and Q19.[40] Meanwhile, both showed a positive value for all of the questions related to monetary emphasis. They agreed with Q6 and Q9, and answered 'Yes' to Q12 and Q14. During the interviews, Hong equated success with 'having money, a house and a car' and Wong similarly equated success with 'having a car and a house'. When asked about the standard of 'a house', Hong thought a house should be worth 1-2 million yuan, and Wong thought it should contain at least two rooms. Having a house in Shanghai was the ultimate goal for both respondents, though they were still far from achieving this goal according to their Hukou status, savings and the housing prices in Shanghai.

In addition to the respondents' ages, their high satisfaction with life provided another interesting finding. In the survey, they both answered 'Yes' to Q33 (i.e., 'Are you satisfied with your life in Shanghai?'). The interviews also reconfirmed their satisfaction with life despite having low incomes. Neither respondent had a house in Shanghai, and both met with difficulties in applying for residence permits. Hong's responses seemed especially ironic. Her monthly income was the lowest of any of the cases at only 2,200 yuan, and her family had been treated the worst by the Shanghai government. Before she came to Shanghai, her husband had worked in Shanghai and arrested by the police in the name of Custody and Repatriation in 2001. Unable to attain a residence permit, her husband was forcedly sent back to his hometown, and all of his money and belongings were confiscated. Although Custody and Repatriation had been abolished by the time Hong arrived in Shanghai, she said that the police in Shanghai had stopped her numerous times to check her identity card or residence permit. When applying for a residence permit, she had to bribe the cadre of the

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[39] 'Normatively positive' means that the respondents provided answers that reflected values identical to the cultural norms.

[40] The answers to Q21 carried a reversed value in terms of normative attachment. That is, 'Agree' indicated a negative response and 'Disagree' indicated a positive response.

neighbourhood committee with several packs of Zhonghua cigarettes[41] to obtain a necessary document. She also said that her landlady was a mean person who did not tolerate even a one-day delay in paying the rent. When asked whether she felt unpleasant or angry about these experiences, she answered as follows: 'No, almost not at all. The police were not personally against me or my husband. He could go back to Shanghai after being sent back to his hometown. Our lives have been getting much better since we came to Shanghai. Much better than in our hometown, certainly'. Although he did not talk as much as Hong, Wong commented as follows when talking about his satisfaction with life: 'Life is very good in Shanghai, as Shanghai is very good, big and full of opportunities to earn money'. It is clear that the respondents' satisfaction with life mostly came from their comparisons of Shanghai and their hometowns. They did not compare their lives with those of other migrant workers or Shanghai locals, but only to the lives they had experienced in their hometowns. The significant improvement of their income in Shanghai and modern life in the big city allowed them to overlook their actual misery social status in this city. They communicated no worries about either their children's education or their parents' elderly care, which they considered issues already made much better by their economic improvement. For Q11, they both identified 'Hard working' as the most important factor to one's success. The life improvement they experienced suggested that their hard work was the only reliable way to success, rather than any short cuts such as deviance. Studies have argued that NGMWs tend to demand more and become angry or unsatisfied more easily than the old generation (China Worker Movement Institute, 2011:79-81; Pan Ngai, 2010). This generational difference may also reflects the age difference between NGMWs, as a generation is only a subjective variable used to categorise age.

Case 12, Zhang, was the most typical case of innovation. He was a 30-year-old male working as a food quality inspector. He had been living in Shanghai for 19 years after moving out of his hometown of Zhejiang. Zhang was a unique case because he had just acquired Shanghai Hukou one month before his interview, technically disqualifying him based on the sampling criteria. He was included on the name list by mistake because he did not inform his boss of his Hukou transition. After the interview, he was considered a valid case whose

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[41] Zhonghua is one of the most expensive brands of cigarette in China. A single pack costs 50-80 yuan.

uniqueness made him more important when discussing the innovation mode for NGMWs. To begin with, Zhang's identity was ambiguous; he did not even confidently consider himself Shanghainese.

I: Before the interview, I want reconfirm that you are a post-80s migrant worker and that you do not have an urban Hukou.

Zhang: I have Shanghai Hukou, in fact.

I: That's strange. Sorry, you should not be on the name list, because this research studies migrant workers only, not locals.

Zhang: Em… I think I am still qualified. I just got my Shanghai Hukou one month ago. You see… I am still a migrant worker.

I: But do you think you are Shanghainese?

Zhang: Em… (thinks for a while, and then in a unconfident voice) Maybe… I should now be counted as Shanghainese, right? My mom is Shanghainese, but I was not born in Shanghai. I came to Shanghai during my elementary school years. Are you Shanghainese?

I: Yes, we are kind of similar. I left Shanghai after high school.

Zhang: It is quite different. You were born in Shanghai with local Hukou and you can speak Shanghainese, right? That makes you a local, no matter whether you left Shanghai. For me, Shanghai is not my hometown.

I: Yes. Can't you speak Shanghainese?

Zhang: No. I can understand Shanghainese, mostly, but far from speak it well. My parents don't speak Shanghainese in the family.

…

I: What about your leisure activities on weekends or holidays?

Zhang: Singing or play cards with friends.

I: Do you go downtown to play, eat or shop, or take a trip to some place?

Zhang: No. Prices are too expensive downtown. Trips are expensive as well. These are for Shanghainese.

The preceding conversation reveals that Zhang was confused about his identity not only because he had his Shanghai Hukou for a short time, but also due to his non-local father, language, leisure activities and birthplace/hometown. When he said 'these are for Shanghainese', he was obviously excluding himself from being Shanghainese. In addition, during elementary, middle and high school, Zhang was always assigned to classes for migrant workers' children. At the time of the interview, almost all of Zhang's co-workers and friends were migrant workers; only his superiors were locals. In Q48, Zhang indicated that only one of his five best friends in Shanghai had Shanghai Hukou. Zhang sometimes felt prejudiced against by locals. If his identity had to be dichotomous, the evidence suggests that he was much more a migrant worker than a local.

Zhang agreed with Q1 and disagreed with Q2, suggesting that he emphasised his goals and deemphasised the means of achieving those goals. Correspondingly, he exhibited a strong attachment to monetary success and a weak attachment to cultural norms. He gave positive answers to all of the questions about monetary success ('Yes' to Q6, Q9, Q12 and Q14) and negative answers to all of the questions about cultural norms ('Agree' to Q15, Q16, Q18 and Q19 and 'Disagree' to Q21). During the interview, he observed that pirating software or movies was not a problem, as legal copies were too luxurious for poor people. He equated success with being a boss or a manager. As his parents had purchased an apartment for him after he obtained Shanghai Hukou, his next goal was to buy a car, and his ultimate goal was to be the boss of his own small business.

Although Zhang's income was moderate compared with the other cases, i.e., 3,500 yuan per month, his overall capital should have been the highest. In addition to his Hukou, his parents had purchased an apartment for him in Shanghai. He was the only case who did not need to rent a house. His parents also had another house in Shanghai. Furthermore, he was an only child, suggesting that he was well supported by his parents. According to Zhang, 'I never worry about supporting my parents because they can support themselves well, and my parents always support me'. However, Zhang answered 'No' to Q33 (i.e., 'Are you satisfied with your life in Shanghai?'). During the interview, he said, 'My life is so-so. I am not quite satisfied, not as I expected. I want what others have'. He then complained that his apartment was small and too far away from downtown. He wanted a nice car, a better cell phone and a better

computer. According to his desires and concerns, it is obvious that his reference to 'others' are Shanghai locals. Although he had lived in his hometown for 11 years, he no longer compared his life to his countrymen. Instead, he expected a decent life like a real local Shanghainese. In this sense, Zhang was in stark opposition to Hong. His high expectations and low satisfaction contributed to his innovation mode, and his unique identity stimulated his expectations and determined the reference group for comparison. Although Zhang was a rare case, we can anticipate that younger NGMWs who attach more importance to cities than to their hometowns, who want to become one with the city and who 'want what others have' may turn into other Zhangs in the innovation mode.

Cases 1 and 13 were the two most typical cases of the ritualism mode. Case 1, Fang, was a 23-year-old woman working as a telemarketer. She came from Anhui province and had lived in Shanghai for a year and a half. Case 13, Dong, was a 28-year-old male food quality inspector who had lived in Shanghai for 5 years. They both disagreed with Q1 and agreed with Q2, indicating that they strongly emphasised the means of accomplishing their goals yet weakly emphasised the goals themselves. At the same time, their attachment to cultural norms was significant, and they comparatively did not value monetary success. Both Fang and Dong provided positive answers to four of the five questions about cultural norms, agreeing with Q15, Q16, Q18 and Q19 (obedience of children to parents, wife to husband, people to government and the incorrectness of premarital sex, respectively). For Q6 and Q9, they both disagreed that money was the most important criterion for measuring success and disagreed about the versatility of money, respectively. Although they answered 'Yes' to Q12, they answered 'No' to Q14, suggesting that their desire for money came from their actual economic burdens. For these respondents, money was only a desirable medium for solving certain difficulties rather than the goal itself. During their interviews, they reconfirmed this value when discussing success. According to Fang, 'Success means to do what one should do, and get recognised by families, relatives and friends'. According to Dong, 'A successful man should not worry much about money, but it is not necessary to have a lot of money'.

Out of all 20 cases, Fang and Dong's strong concern for their families was most impressive. Although Fang's parents were healthy, she often worried about them as they were getting older. She went back to her hometown to visit her parents every weekend. Although she

wanted to work in Shanghai as long as possible, she said that she would give up her job in Shanghai and go back to her hometown immediately if her parents experienced any health problems. Dong also showed worry over the elderly care of his parents. As a married man, he worried more about his child's education. As his child could not take the college entrance examination in Shanghai, he wondered when to send his child back to his hometown: 'The education is not good in my hometown, but the education in Shanghai cannot prepare him for the college entrance examination. It is a difficult decision to send my child away to receive an education in an underdeveloped village. The latest time to send my child back to his hometown will be when finishing junior high school'.

For Q33, Fang and Dong both answered that they were satisfied with their lives in Shanghai. However, during their interviews, when they were asked about their life satisfaction, they offered answers such as 'It's okay' and 'Not bad'. Compared with Hong, Wong and Zhang, their satisfaction or dissatisfaction was not quite apparent. If satisfaction and dissatisfaction come primarily from economic comparisons with a reference group, such as people in their hometowns or Shanghai locals, ritualism disvalues cultural goals and mainly monetary success, making life satisfaction less overt as others. In Fang's words, their life satisfaction came from 'doing what one should do'.

As argued in the theoretical section, retreatism and rebellion are discussed together as follows. Case 7, Cao, was a typical case of the retreatism and rebellion modes. Cao was a 26-year-old male who worked as a warehouse keeper. He came from Jiangsu and had lived in Shanghai for seven years. Like the two conformity cases, Cao disagreed with Q1 and Q2. However, after considering his attachment to cultural norms and monetary success together with what he shared during the interview, it became clear that his disagreement with Q1 and Q2 did not indicate opposition to the literal logic of the questions. In fact, Cao disagreed with the questions themselves. Instead of emphasising both means and goals, he emphasised neither. Cao provided negative answers to all five of the questions about cultural norms ('Disagree' to Q15, Q16, Q18 and Q19 and 'Agree' to Q21). As for the monetary success questions, Cao disagreed with the statements of Q6 and Q9 and answered 'No' to Q14. Like those in the ritualism mode, he disvalued monetary success. For Cao, being rich was only meaningful in that it would allow him to alleviate financial burdens. It was not the goal itself.

Unlike those in the ritualism mode, Cao did not show much concern for his family during the interview. He lived with his wife, child and parents in Shanghai. He realised that he fell far short of the criteria for applying for a residence permit, so sending his child back to his hometown was inevitable. He said that he would not worry about this inevitability, and he had not yet considered elderly care for his parents. When talking about his goals and success, Cao said, 'I do want a house and a car, but I know it is difficult. I will not push myself on that'. Although Cao did not mention any clear goals like retreatism, he was the only respondent who had seriously developed personal hobbies, on which he had spent much effort, time and money. He was interested in fishing and photography and spent all of his weekends on these two hobbies. He had even taken a photography training programme and was a member of a fishing club in Shanghai. He provided a link to his blog, where he had posted a number of the photos he had taken and discussed fishing with his friends. Although he was an amateur in his hobbies and did not necessarily consider them life goals, it does suggest that Cao had not simply retreated from any pursuit. Well-developed personal hobbies could indicate the beginning of developing non-normative life goals. In this sense, Cao was in the process of transitioning from retreatism to rebellion.

There could be many profound factors that made Cao the only typical retreatism and rebellion case of the 20 cases. However, looking at only these 20 cases, Cao's most overt attribute was his income. Cao had the second highest monthly income at 5,700 yuan per month. (Case 11, who made 7,000 yuan per month, gained such a high income from overtime work and part-time jobs.) In this sense, as Cao seldom worked overtime and never took part-time jobs, his salary was actually the highest and did not require an extraordinary amount of hard work. In addition, Cao said that he and his parents had saved enough money for him to make a down payment on a house. This suggests that Cao's comparatively better economic condition did not stimulate him to pursue monetary success, but on the contrary released him from the pressure of monetary pursuit. His economic foundation provided him the basis for developing his fishing and photography hobbies, which required time and money. Unlike cheap and unskilful leisure activities such as playing cards or karaoke, Cao's hobbies required him to purchase equipment and develop training skills. Although he had no expensive professional equipment, he had purchased a DV and a cell phone with a high-resolution

camera. Furthermore, Cao answered 'No' to Q33, which asked whether he was satisfied with his life in Shanghai. During the interview, when asked about his life satisfaction, Cao did not use the word 'unsatisfied', nor did he mention being particularly unsatisfied in any way. He just repeated a sentence twice: 'Life is still a little lacking… life is a little lacking'. It may be hard to prove that Cao's dissatisfaction came from a perceived lack of goals and means. However, it is sensible to argue that Cao, in the retreatism and rebellion mode, was unable to attain satisfaction from normative goals such as conformity or from cultural means such as ritualism.

To sum up the findings of these typical cases, the characteristics of the different modes are concluded in the following table. Several points are worth noting. First, although these characteristics more or less explain or can be explained by each mode, they are insufficient to fully determine or be determined by each mode. Second, each mode may have other characteristics that were overlooked in this study. Third, these characteristics apply only to the very typical cases of each mode. In other words, these typical cases are ideal types or the exact embodiments of the theory.

Table 4: Characteristics of Each Mode

Mode of Adaption	Characteristics
Conformity	Older age, lower economic status, makes comparisons with village, less concern for family care, high level of life satisfaction
Innovation	Higher economic status, makes comparison with city, less concern for family care, low level of life satisfaction
Ritualism	More concern for family care, moderate level of life satisfaction
Retreatism and Innovation	Higher economic status, less concern for family care, low level of life satisfaction, personal hobbies

Almost half of the 20 cases discussed here could not be readily located in a particular mode of adaption. There are two possible reasons for this. First, it is possible that a respondent could not be clearly classified by mode because they provided insufficient information to

clearly identify their orientation in terms of the modes of adaption used in this study. Only cases with sufficiently detailed responses are therefore discussed here. For example, the survey answers for Cases 2 and 3 tend to suggest that they belong to the Conformity mode, but what they said during their interviews was insufficient to confirm that determination. Only cases 8 and 9, namely Hong and Wong, were discussed here as they provided more details and indicated their feelings in answering questions during the interviews. A second reason why cases could not be discussed here is that they were hard to categorise into a specific typical mode because of their ambiguity or self-contradiction. These cases could be considered to be 'unformed' or 'in process' in the sense that they had not resolved a mode of adaptation in their own development. Case 6, 7, 10 and 16 all expressed such complexity. Case 6, for example, provided answers which emphasized goals while deemphasizing means in relation to questions 1 and 2, but at the same time he showed a strong attachment to cultural norms in response to questions 15 to 21. In contradistinction to this situation, cases 7, 10 and 16 emphasized means in response to questions 1 and 2 while at the same time indicating weak attachment to cultural norms in responding to the latter questions. During the interviews, none of these respondents presented strong evidence permitting their being categorized into a single definite mode while at the same time excluding them from the other modes of adaption.

There are at least two possible explanations that can be applied to such cases, assuming the reliability of the data. First, regarding respondents whose answers exhibited features from more than one mode, it is possible that their orientation may lie between two of the modes identified in this study. There may be theoretical value in such cases beyond the objective of this study in so far as they may suggest a revision of Merton's original typology in such a way as to provide a place and label to such cases. In the current stage of the present study, however, the purpose has been to adopt the original typology developed by Merton for the treatment of typical cases. At the present time the construction of further categorizations beyond the modes of adaption discussed here would contribute a certain arbitrariness and unnecessary theoretical abstraction. It is likely, on the other hand, that a larger sample would lead to a situation in which a bigger proportion of cases would exhibit similarities corresponding to typical cases of Merton's typology. A second and empirically important consideration is that the NGMWs in this study are young and still processing recent experiences. It is reasonable to

assume, therefore, that many of the respondents in this study have not yet formed clear values that permit their ready categorization into one of the modes of adaption identified here. In that case, rather than examining their values in a static mode based on a single time-period, as in the present study, a longitudinal study would be a suitable mode of investigation of their value changes over an extended period of time.

As the CSS does not include question about goals or monetary success, the exact mode for each case cannot be revealed, but only partially discussed. Fortunately, it does provide data that refer to the respondents' attachment to cultural norms, concerns for children and the elderly, income and personal hobbies. Table 5 lists the relevant questions.

Table 5: Relevant Questions in the CSS

Attachment to Cultural Norms
G3.1 When opposed by their parents, children should argue if they think they are right.
G3.10 A wife does not need to obey her husband in every case.
G2.2 People should obey the government, as the subordinate should obey the superior.
G3.7 As long as the people love each other, pre-marital sex is acceptable.
G3.2 If a marriage is painful, divorce is an option.
Income
D5a Your personal income in the last year was: _____
Hobby
F3 What leisure activities do you take up on weekends or holidays? (multiple choice)
01 I go out for movies, dramas, shows or concerts.
02 I go out to watch sporting events.
03 I play sports (please specify:_____).
04 I play cards or mah-jong.
05 I read books or newspapers.
06 I go hiking or fishing or participate in outdoor activities.
07 I travel.
08 I play computer games or surf the Internet.

09 I go to discos, karaoke events or bars.

10 I visit friends to chat.

11 Other (please specify:_____).

12 None.

C8a Do you participate in the following groups?

05 Entertaining associations.

Concern for Family Care

F4 Do you face the following problems?

02 Children's education payments are high and difficult to afford.

03 It is difficult and tiring to discipline children.

08 Supporting the elderly creates too much of a burden.

Source: CSS 2011

As for attachment to cultural norms, though not completely identical, five selected questions in the CSS resemble questions in the survey conducted in Shanghai. As shown in Table 6, of the 401 cases in CSS 2011, 61.1% gave normatively positive answers to no more than 1 question, 86.1% gave normatively positive answers to no more than 2 questions and only 3.7% gave normatively positive answers to more than 3 questions. More specifically, 19.0% of the cases gave normatively positive answers to the question about children's obedience, 10.0% gave normatively positive answers to the question about a wife's obedience, 47.9% gave normatively positive answers to the question about obedience to the government; 36.7% disagreed with premarital sex and 15.7% denied that divorce should be considered. No significant relationship was found between attachment to cultural norms and age, perhaps because the age variation was already largely limited by the definition of NGMWs. However, the relationship between the number of normatively positive answers and income was significant (Table 7). The Spearman correlation coefficient equalled -0.271, suggesting an apparent negative relationship between attachment to cultural norms and income.

Table 6: Number of Normatively Positive Answers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid (%)	Cumulative (%)
Valid	0	88	21.9	25.0	25.0
	1	127	31.7	36.1	61.1
	2	88	21.9	25.0	86.1
	3	34	8.5	9.7	95.7
	4	11	2.7	3.1	98.9
	5	4	1.0	1.1	100.0
	Total	352	87.8	100.0	
Missing	System	49	12.2		
Total		401	100.0		

Source: CSS 2011

Table 7: Correlation between the Number of Normatively Positive Answers and Income

			Number of Answers	Income
Spearman's rho	Number of Answers	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.271**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000
		N	352	320
	Income	Correlation Coefficient	-.271**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.
		N	320	363

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: CSS 2011

The preceding data show that the NGMWs' attachment to cultural norms tended to be weak

overall. However, their political obedience was comparatively conservative relative to other cultural norms. Those with higher incomes also tended to be less attached to cultural norms. This finding was identical to the field finding in Shanghai, as the typical cases of innovation, retreatism and rebellion modes were wealthier than others. A usual explanation is that people who disregarded norms would obtain more economic opportunities. Although this explanation may be applicable to some cases, Zhang and Cao's cases revealed that it was not a lesser degree of attachment to cultural norms that improved their economic status, but rather their being born into families with economic advantages. Not denying exceptions and the partial effect of subjective effort, the economic status of most NGMWs was more an ascribed status determined by their birth and less an achieved status. Thus, an argument for reverse logic can be made. The data actually indicate that one's economic foundation released him or her from a cultural or moral burden. People with better economic status may be more confident and exhibit a lower risk of deviance.

In terms of concern for family care, according to the CSS results, only 11.7% of cases worried about their children's educational expenditure, 13.7% felt that disciplining children was tiring and difficult and 8.7% felt overburdened by their support of the elderly (Table 8). When only those who had at least one child are considered for the former two questions, the percentages increase from 11.7% to 16.1% and from 13.7% to 22.1%, respectively. Although the increase is large, the percentage is still quite low for parents who are NGMWs (Table 9). It is clear that the NGMWs' concern for family care was weak overall.

Table 8: Answers to Family Care Questions (Frequency/Percent)

Question No.	Yes	No	Missing	Total
F4-2	47 (11.7%)	353 (88.0%)	1 (0.2%)	401 (100%)
F4-3	55 (13.7%)	345 (86.0%)	1 (0.2%)	401 (100%)
F4-8	35 (8.7%)	365 (91.0%)	1 (0.2%)	401 (100%)

Source: CSS 2011

Table 9.1: Question F4-2

Whether the Case Has Children			Frequency	Percent
Does Not Have Children	Valid	No	172	93.5
		Yes	12	6.5
		Total	184	100.0
Has Children	Valid	No	181	83.4
		Yes	35	16.1
		Total	216	99.5
	Missing	System	1	.5
	Total		217	100.0

Source: CSS 2011

Table 9.2: Question F4-3

Whether the Case Has Children			Frequency	Percent
Does Not Have Children	Valid	No	177	96.2
		Yes	7	3.8
		Total	184	100.0
Has Children	Valid	No	168	77.4
		Yes	48	22.1
		Total	216	99.5
	Missing	System	1	.5
	Total		217	100.0

Source: CSS 2011

As for hobbies, the most popular leisure activity was playing computer games or surfing the Internet, with 49.6% of the NGMWs selecting 08 on question F3 in the CSS. Visiting and chatting with friends ranked second at 37.4%. The third highest was playing cards and mah-jong at 19.0%. Only a few of the NGMWs participated in other activities (including reading books or newspapers [15.5%], outdoor activities [12.5%], watching movies, dramas, shows or concerts [11.5%], going to discos, karaoke events or bars [9.0%], playing sports [8.5%], travelling [6.2%] and watching sports [1.0%]); 17.5% of the NGMWs chose 'Other', with 8.8% specifying watching TV and 3.3% specifying window shopping. In addition, four NGMWs specified looking after children; two specified stitchwork; and one person each specified listening to music, visiting parks and visiting art exhibitions. Forty-one NGMWs (10.2%) chose no leisure activities at all (Table 10).

It is clear that the NGMWs lacked sophisticated or skilful hobbies. Indeed, it is difficult to consider chatting and watching TV, movies and shows as hobbies. In other words, the NGMWs participated in these leisure activities mostly for entertainment purposes and seldom because they also offered a kind of pursuit or achievement. Although one could be an expert in card games, movie appreciation or other hobbies, this was rarely the case for the NGMWs. First, the answers to question C8a-05 indicate that only 10.5% of the respondents participated in entertainment associations. Second, even low-cost skilled hobbies such as chess or Go were not found in a single case. The data do not reveal how much skill or attachment these cases had in terms of their leisure activities. However, the number of activities had a significant relationship with income. The Spearman correlation coefficient equalled 0.164, suggesting a significant positive relationship between the number of leisure activities and income, although not a strong one (Table 11). Thus, it can be argued that economic status provided the foundation of leisure activities based on both the quantity presented by the CSS data and quality suggested by Cao's case during his interview in Shanghai.

Table 10: Answers to Hobby Questions (Frequency/Percent)

Question No.	Yes	No	Missing	Total
F3-01	46 (11.5%)	335 (88.5%)	0	401 (100%)
F3-02	4 (1.0%)	397 (99.0%)	0	401 (100%)
F3-03	34 (8.5%)	367 (91.5%)	0	401 (100%)
F3-04	76 (19.0%)	325 (81.0%)	0	401 (100%)
F3-05	62 (15.5%)	339 (84.5%)	0	401 (100%)
F3-06	50 (12.5%)	351 (87.5%)	0	401 (100%)
F3-07	25 (6.2%)	376 (93.8%)	0	401 (100%)
F3-08	198 (49.4%)	203 (50.6%)	0	401 (100%)
F3-09	36 (9.0%)	365 (91.0%)	0	401 (100%)
F3-10	149 (37.2%)	252 (62.8%)	0	401 (100%)
F3-11	71 (17.7%)	330 (82.3%)	0	401 (100%)
F3-12	41 (10.2%)	360 (89.8%)	0	401 (100%)

Source: CSS 2011

Table 11: Correlation between the Number of Leisure Activities and Income

			Number (of Leisure Activities)	Monthly Income
Spearman's rho	Number	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.164**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.002
		N	401	363
	Monthly Income	Correlation Coefficient	.164**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.
		N	363	363

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: CSS 2011

According to CSS 2011, as shown in Table 11, the mean of the NGMWs' monthly income was 2,433 yuan. Although the representativeness of the CSS is arguable, its monthly income data are reliable because they are almost identical to the data presented by the National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) of China (i.e., 2,535 yuan in 2011). Furthermore, both the CSS 2011 and NHFPC data show a median of around 2,000 yuan, a large deviation and positive skewness of the NGMWs' income.[42] Compared with the figures in the National Year Book 2012, the NGMWs' average income exceeded the average income of urban residents, which was 1,817 yuan per month. However, it is important to note several points. First, the NGMWs were more attracted to big cities than small cities, so comparisons with the national average may be a little biased. For example, in 2011, the average monthly incomes of urban residents in Shanghai and Guangzhou were 3,019 and 2,869 yuan, respectively. The average income of the NGMWs tended to be higher in the big cities. Second, the median is a better reflection of the actual average income than the mean. As we can see from the large positive skewness and standard deviation, a small part of the comparatively high-income NGMWs pull the mean up. Thus, the actual average monthly income should be about 2,000 yuan, not much higher than the national average urban income. To sum up, the NGMWs' incomes were not over low, which explains the foundation of their weak attachment to

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[42] NHFPC opens only very limited parts of its data in its reports. In '2013 Report on China's Migrant Population Development', the NGMWs' average income in 2011 and a corresponding histogram can be found on pp. 57-58, although exact median, deviation, range and skewness are not shown. However, the median, deviation and skewness can be roughly estimated from that histogram.

cultural norms. However, their incomes were still comparatively much lower in the big cities. Furthermore, a small part of the NGMWs achieved much higher incomes than others. In CSS 2011, 10.0% of the NGMWs had incomes in excess of 4,000 yuan per month. This number doubled the median in 2011 and remains a very satisfactory income for today's migrant workers in big cities.

Table 12: Monthly Income (CSS)

		Statistic
Monthly Income	Mean	2,433.9031
	Median	2,000.0000
	Variance	3,086,913.270
	Std. Deviation	1,756.96137
	Minimum	250.00
	Maximum	12,500.00
	Skewness	1.970

Source: CSS 2011

The preceding CSS data show that the NGMWs had an overall weak attachment to cultural norms, weak concern for family care and insufficiently developed hobbies. Accordingly, it can be expected that only a very small part of the NGMWs occupy the conformity and ritualism modes, probably less than 5%. However, this does not definitely suggest that the majority of the NGMWs occupy the innovation, retreatism and rebellion modes. Their weak attachment to cultural norms and weak concern for family care only suggest that they are closer to the innovation, retreatism and rebellion modes than to the conformity and ritualism modes. A large percentage of NGMWs may tend to be ambiguous about modes. They may partially adopt cultural goals or adopt new goals while refusing to reject monetary success. As the income of the NGMWs may not be sufficient to act as the foundation of these three modes, only part of the majority may clearly and completely adopt these modes. Some of the migrant workers achieved higher economic status. Although their percentage was not large (around

10%), their number was huge from a national perspective. The NGMWs totalled 125 million in 2013,[43] 10% of which is 12.5 million. No data suggest whether these high-income NGMWs occupied the innovation or retreatism and rebellion modes. However, the hobby data may imply that more occupied the innovation mode than the retreatism and rebellion modes, as non-monetary goal can hardly be found. That is to say, more NGMWs overall tended to occupy the innovation mode rather than the other three modes, and more tended to occupy the retreatism and rebellion modes than the conformity and ritualism modes. More importantly, if a large uncategorised percentage of NGMWs were still in the process of forming their modes, they were more likely to eventually occupy the innovation or retreatism and rebellion modes, supposing their attachment to cultural norms was less likely to change than their attachment to goals.

Solidarity

Similarity is the first issue examined when looking at solidarity. If only the basic variables are examined, the NGMWs appear to be more diverse than the old generation. First, the new generation includes both genders rather then only males. The sixth nationwide population census showed that the sex ratio of migrant workers aged 16-35 was nearly 100 while more than 120 for those workers aged above 35 (Wang Peian, 2013). Second, according to the 2013 Report on China's Migrant Population Development conducted by the Department of Services and Management of Migrant Population, over 40% of the new generation had acquired at least a senior high school education and most of the last generation completed only elementary or junior high school (Wang Peian, 2013). Third, the 2009 Monitoring Report on Peasant Workers conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics revealed that 56.4% of migrant workers (including the NGMWs) worked in the construction and manufacturing industries. According to the 2013 Report on China's Migrant Population Development, in 2010, only 50.6% of the NGMWs worked in these two industries. Compared with the last generation, in addition to gender, educational and industrial diversity, there might have been other 'basic' variables in the official reports that suggested the diversity of the NGMWs. However, this diversity was based on comparison. As argued previously, diversity is not a

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[43] Refer to the 2013 National Supervisory Report on Peasant Workers by National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC.

refutation of similarity. If we only discuss the NGMWs on themselves, the majority of them acquired junior and senior high school educations. At the same time, 46.0% of the NGMWs still worked in the manufacturing industry, much higher than the 15.1% who worked in the second most dominant industry.

If we examine other variables in terms of their values, status and experience, the similarities of NGMWs become more obvious. Some similarities have already been discussed previously, such as the weak attachment to cultural norms, weak concern for family care and leisure activities. CSS 2011 revealed other similarities in terms of property, migration experience and views on restrictions of migrant workers in the city. First, 91% of the NGMWs did not own houses in either a city or a village. 81.0% of their families had one house or fewer, and 85.4% of their families did not own a private car. Second, 81.4% of the NGMWs left their hometowns on their own instead of together with their families. Third, the majority of the NGMWs opposed any restriction to migrant workers in the city. More specifically, 69.3% opposed restrictions on working in the city, 73.8% opposed restrictions on buying houses in the city and 84.5% opposed restrictions on children's education in the city (Table 13).

Table 13.1: Views on Restrictions of Migrant Workers Working in the City

	Frequency	Percent
There should not be any restriction as long as one wants to come.	278	69.3
Allow migrant workers only if there are enough working opportunities.	116	28.9
The number of migrant workers in the city should be strictly controlled.	7	1.7
Total	401	100.0

Source: CSS 2011

Table 13.2: Views on Restrictions of Migrant Workers Purchasing Houses in the City

	Frequency	Percent
There should not be any restriction as long as one wants to buy.	296	73.8
Allow migrant workers to purchases houses only if they have stable jobs in the city.	99	24.7
Migrant workers' house purchasing in the city should be strictly controlled.	5	1.2
Migrant workers should not be allowed to purchase houses in the city.	1	.2
Total	401	100.0

Source: CSS 2011

Table 13.3: Views on Restrictions of Education of Migrant Workers' Children in the City

	Frequency	Percent
There should not be any restriction as long as one wants to study in the city.	339	84.5
Migrant workers' children should be allowed to attend public school in the city only if their families meet certain requirements.	56	14.0
Migrant workers' children should only be allowed to attend special schools designed for them in the city.	5	1.2
Migrant workers' children should not be allowed to attend school in the city.	1	.2
Total	401	100.0

Source: CSS 2011

The second issue to examine when considering solidarity is collectivity. Most respondents in the Shanghai field study claimed that they would gather with friends or co-workers from time to time. On the survey, 10 of the respondents indicated they would 'Sometimes' gather with friends and 4 chose 'Often'. However, as a group concept by definition, collectivity

emphasises organisational or associational interactions rather than individual interactions. In Q45, 15 of the 20 respondents said that they 'Never' attended any social group, association or club activity, 4 chose 'Occasionally' and only 1 chose 'Sometimes'. Other than Cao, who joined a fishing club, the interviews revealed that no one else had ever participated in any social group, association or organisation or knew of any fellow countryman association. The CSS reconfirmed this result. Of the 401 NGMWs, 80.5% did not participate in any form of community or association.[44]

Although the preceding data suggest weak collectivity in terms of organisations and associations, the truth is that the NGMWs' collectivity takes a different organised form. The NGMWs do not formally organise their social networks by establishing organisations in 'real life'. They prefer to do so on-line. QQ and Wechat are the two most widely used types of social networking software in China. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' 2015 China New Media Development Report, QQ and Wechat play important roles in collective activities. (Unfortunately, the CSS does not pose related questions.) Thus, the survey conducted in this study included questions related to their use. Of the 20 respondents, 16 used QQ every day, 3 used it occasionally and only 1 never used it. At the same time, 16 of the respondents used Wechat every day, 1 used it every several days, 1 used it every week and 1 used it occasionally. All of the respondents used Wechat with some frequency. The survey also explored the use of specific group-level communication functions in QQ and Wechat, including QQ Space, QQ group, Wechat Friends' Circle and Wechat Group. Table 14 briefly introduces these functions. Of the 20 respondents, 9 used QQ Space every day, 2 used it every several days, 1 used it every week and 6 used it occasionally, and only one never used this function. Furthermore, nine of the respondents used QQ group every day, two of them used it every several days, three used it every week and three never used it. Sixteen of them used Wechat Friends' Circle every day, one used it every several days, one used it occasionally and one never used it. Seven of them used Wechat Group every day, one used it every several days, two used it every week, six used it occasionally and two never used it. All of those who used

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[44] Tsinghua University published a report named 'The Organized Trend of the NGMW' in 2014, claiming that the NGMWs were very likely to form organisations or associations. This opposing finding comes from their study of gangs in Dongguan, the largest centre of prostitution in China and notorious for violent crimes. Due to this special industry (which is illegal in China), the findings from Dongguan were unique and inapplicable to any other place.

QQ group or Wechat Group had joined groups of more than 10 people. It can be seen from the data that most of the NGMWs used on-line communication frequently and actively participated in group-level communication on-line. The only respondent who never used QQ or Wechat was Case 8, Hong, the 35-year-old typical conformity female discussed previously. Such cases should be rare due to marginality of her age and mode.

Table 14: Group Communication Functions of QQ and Wechat

	Function	Accessibility (set by user)
QQ Space	Functions as a blog; mostly used to publish stories, thoughts, travel experiences and sharing others' articles.	Open to the public/all QQ friends/selected QQ friends.
QQ Group	Function as a chat room; can be established by any user for a specific topic or circle.	Any user can join without verification/ every user can join after verification by the establisher/only invited users can join.
Wechat Friends' Circle	Functions as a microblog; mostly used to publish photos of daily lives with short text.	Open to all Wechat friends/selected Wechat friends.
Wechat Group	Functions as a QQ group chat room with a different rule of accessibility.	Any member can invite other users to join the group.

Identity is the third issue. Both the Shanghai field study and CSS suggested that most NGMWs considered themselves as rural instead of urban people. Only four of the respondents in Shanghai considered themselves as urban people, including Zhang, who had just attained Shanghai Hukou. Seventeen of the respondents still considered themselves as rural people. The CSS presented a similar result: only 21.9% of cases considered themselves as urban people, 71.3% considered themselves as rural people and 6.2% found it difficult to

say (Table 15). It is worth noting that 'rural person' is not an identity adopted by migrant workers to represent themselves, but more a kind of admittance of their birth status. In this sense, the preceding data do not suggest that the NGMWs had any strong identity. In the Shanghai field study, although most of the respondents indicated disagreement with their designation as 'peasants', they did not reach any common agreement on other designations (Table 16). Meanwhile, none of the respondents mentioned any idea or term referring to the social category of migrant workers during the interviews. If antagonism is considered as a presentation of identity, 12 of the 20 respondents in Shanghai showed a friendly attitude towards Shanghai locals and chose the 'Like Shanghai locals' option, even though 15 of the respondents or their relatives and friends had experienced discrimination. In the CSS, only 10.9% of the cases were unwilling to talk with urban people, 9.7% were not willing to work with urban people, 12.0% were not willing to be the neighbours of urban people and 13.7% were not willing to be close friends with urban people. Suffice it to say, the identity of the NGMWs has still not quite formed yet, and these individuals remain far from establishing their consciousness as a unity or one of many.

Table 15: Question C2b. Urban/Rural Identity (CSS)

(As to your current situation, do you think you are an urban person or a rural person?)

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Urban Person	88	21.9
	Rural Person	286	71.3
	Difficult to Say	25	6.2
	Total	399	99.5
Missing	System	2	.5
Total		401	100.0

Source: CSS 2011

Table 16: Acceptance of Designations/Identities (Shanghai)

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Peasant	2	8.7
	Peasant Worker	1	4.3
	Stranger	6	26.1
	Migrant Worker	9	39.1
	New Shanghainese	5	21.7
Total		23	100.0

Source: CSS 2011

Conclusion

Having discussed the NGMWs' solidarity and modes of adaption, it is now possible to draw conclusions about their social momentum based on the preceding findings. First, the NGMWs' social momentum is strong overall due to their large quantity and strong solidarity in terms of their similarity and collectivity. They are a powerful social category whose members are similar, interact collectively at the group level and number 125 million. Second, the NGMWs' social momentum is strong only at the primary level, as they do not form a strong identity in terms of their solidarity. Without a strong identity, their solidarity tends to be self-centred, i.e., almost solely constructed by their own social networks, and does not include the consciousness of a whole unit. In this sense, the NGMWs lack universal social momentum as a social category across China. Their social momentum could be powerful at the factory or close-regional levels, where many of their social networks are cross-linked. However, their primary social momentum tends to be less powerful when their geographical distance apart increases. For example, we can hardly expect thousands of NGMWs distributed across 50 provinces and thousands of districts and numerous factories to have much of a social momentum. Furthermore, such a primary social momentum is difficult to accumulate across a long period. People move and die, but consciousness of a common identity lives much longer than any generation and extend solidarity beyond one's social network. The lack of identity makes the social momentum difficult to pass on to the next generation, even in a small region. For this reason, the NGMWs' social momentum may easily rise and decline according to certain conditions at specific times. That is to say, their social momentum is segmental and unstable.

Third, the directions of the NGMWs' social momentum continue to be largely undetermined. However, this is not to say that it lacks direction. Rather, the NGMWs are still in a process of forming directions for their large social momentum. The data suggest that the directions are more likely going to be innovation, retreatism and rebellion, rather than conformity or ritualism. Thus, although this study is unable to argue which direction would be more dominant, the NGMWs' social momentum could mainly function in two directions in the future. The first direction is that of innovation, through which the NGMWs will sustain

both the essence and symptoms of anomie in China. In this direction, as the NGMWs accept deviance and the pursuit of monetary success, we can expect that chaos or normlessness will increase in China and that the structural discoordination will remain unchallenged. Regional strikes or social movements may occur in the innovation direction as well due to the strong social momentum. However, when emphasizing cultural goals, the highest purpose will exceed neither private nor small-scale interests and therefore not contribute to universal benefit or structural changes. The other direction is retreatism and rebellion, through which the NGMWs will sustain the symptoms of the anomie while helping to repair it. Although the NGMWs will continue to embrace deviance, they will tend to pursue new goals other than monetary success in this direction. Their non-normative pursuits may be political, such as Hukou reform, which would bring direct challenges to the lagged political structure. They could mount strikes or movements just as they would in the innovation direction, but they would have a higher calling than meeting private and instant interests. Their goals may also be non-political, be cultural, such as artistic or religious goals. These goals could change the cultural structure and may function indirectly to the political structure in the same time. In fact, non-normative political and cultural pursuits are presented together in many cases of rebellion mode. We can notice from history that artists and novelists often play important roles in political transition. Ai Weiei, a Chinese contemporary artist and activist, is a lived example. Although retreating from the normative goals may not definitively lead to new goals which directly related to political and cultural transition, retreatism and rebellion mode does provide the very foundation of this possibility. Even without new goals, simply retreating from the overemphasised monetary pursuit would challenge both the cultural emphasis of monetary success and the current economic structure. For example, if the NGMWs were unwilling to work overtime, the employer would have to slow production, increase overtime payments to make overtime more attractive or hire additional labourers. Any of these options may significantly change the current labour market and world factory system.

This example only indicates a possibility, but not actuality. The actual results of taking either direction will depend on numerous factors, such as the magnitude of the social momentum. Without a higher-level social momentum, i.e., a social momentum without strong identity, it may be hard for the NGMWs to have enough of an effect to change the structures,

even if the direction of rebellion is taken. Other social categories in China will also have effects, and forces outside China will also exert an influence. Although the NGMWs' social momentum influences Chinese society, it cannot determine any definite social outcome by itself. Therefore, even if more explicit data related to the NGMWs' social momentum were provided, it would be impossible to foresee the future of anomie in China. However, by analysing their social momentum and understanding how this important force may influence anomie, we are one step closer to estimating future possibilities.

Still far from a futures study, this study is only the beginning of analysing NGMWs' capacity for social change at a group level. The findings based on its data are doubtlessly limited and imprecise. Yet, these findings should be meaningful for rethinking the commonly held beliefs of two types of people: (1) those who believe the NGMWs have potential or are the future, but are unable to clarify their level of potential and potential for what, and (2) those who believe that NGMWs are the definite hope for social change in China or a new well-organised class that participates in strikes or other collective activities.

In terms of the first belief, this study suggests that the NGMWs' identity and the orientation between the innovation or retreatism and rebellion modes hold potential for their social momentum. If they could fulfil their potential by distinguishing their modes and forming their identity, then their capacity to create social change would be clarified and significantly increased. We would then be able to analyse whether they could serve as a remedy to anomie. The second belief has been presented in many articles, frequently taken as a presumption. Although it may hold true in some cases or factories, it is still too early to be overly optimistic about the NGMWs' capacity for creating social change across China. Due to their weak identity, it is also too early to consider the NGMWs as a class. It is true that the NGMWs have been involved in many collective activities. However, if most of the participants struggle only for their immediate interests, such as raising the wage, it may be insufficient to consider their collective activities as class struggles. In *Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx (1920:Ch.2) recognised that 'the first aim of resistance was merely the maintenance of wages'. He also suggested that 'the maintenance of the association becomes more necessary to them than that of wages' later on in the class formation process. Even for few strikes in the name of all peasant workers, they can hardly be class struggles if most NGMWs do not admit the identity of "peasant

worker".

This suggestion recalls the question of why an identity is absent from the NGMWs' solidarity. We should consider this question along with their corresponding absence of association. Looking at post-reform structures, the economic structure in China provides conditions that contribute to the NGMWs' solidarity in terms of their similarity and collectivity, as it strongly limits their opportunities. That is, the modes of production and income make NGMWs work and live collectively in similar conditions. However, although similarity and collectivity provide the basis for forming an identity, the political structure suppresses the formation of the NGMWs' association. Maintenance of this association is hardly possible in the case of China. The Chinese government imposes strict restrictions on the establishment of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Even in Guangdong, the most politically liberal province in China, NGOs can only legally be founded under the name of a government department or the official trade union. In this context, no migrant worker association can be formally registered as an NGO. At the same time, the de facto migrant worker NGOs lack sufficient funds and workers. They are essentially not associations of migrant workers, but rather associations of lawyers, scholars and philanthropists who offer social support to migrant workers (He Jingwei & Hui Huang, 2008). Such organisations do not offer an interactive function to migrant workers. They contribute no organic solidarity. In addition to the strict censorship of the media and publications, migrant workers lack their own channels of communication. Although they can communicate in factories, in restaurants or on-line, these spaces neither belong to nor operate only for those workers. They cannot access freely as guests or customers to others' spaces, nor can they talk freely in a totally public place when being observed. Without associations and spaces for organised communication, their communication cannot spread collectively empowered information or ideology. Therefore, migrant workers can hardly form a widely and strongly accepted identity.

The cultural structure also does nothing to benefit the NGMWs' identity formation. Marxism and class struggle are no longer glorified or legitimate in this socialist country during the post-reform age. Ideas of class and struggle are considered out of date. Moreover, largely due to the shadow of the Cultural Revolution, such ideas have been linked with tyranny and anti-humanism. NGMWs have only a negative cultural stimulus to consider

themselves as a class. At the same time, culture in the post-reform age encourages individualism and denounces universal benefits. Although individualism contributes to the NGMWs' defence of their own interests, it presents an obstacle to struggles for a higher solidarity to their universal benefit, which demands more of individual cost. When we consider names or designations as evidence of solidarity in identity, in these contexts, the NGMWs even hardly find a name to represent themselves. In their view, the current designations such as 'peasant workers' are mostly stigmatic labels frequently used in a discriminatory context. The NGMWs refute these stigmatic designations and are unable to establish a name for their own identity due to the lack of a communicative channel to discuss or announce such a name.

The structural obstacles confronting identity formation do not suggest that the NGMWs will never reach an advanced level of solidarity. As written in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, 'Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living' (Marx, 1937:Ch.1). The NGMWs make choices under structural stress, which conversely may destroy these obstacles and reconstruct the social structures. That is to say, the NGMWs can choose to either surrender to these obstacles or on the contrary use their disadvantaged position in the structures as a stimulus for forming a solid identity. Structural obstacles to the making of the NGMWs' identity conversely may cause reactive force to overcome these restrictions, depending on whether and how the NGMWs recognize these obstacles and the necessity of their own solidarity. Although perhaps not quite appropriate, romantic love provides an analogy in this case. (Identity also requires a love of 'similar others' and is more or less an emotional concept.) Obstacles to romantic love, such as parents or social strata, may extinguish that love, but can also serve to conversely strengthen that love. Structural obstacles therefore are only powerful to the forming of identity when the NGMWs are unconscious and unintentional to the making their identity. These obstacles could be overcome when the NGMWs' value the importance of becoming a unity.

According to the findings related to their modes of adaption, the NGMWs have already abolished the traditions of past generations. Although their goals remain uncertain, we can try

to deduce them in an attempt to help them recognise their common identity. For example, transmitting the knowledge of the NGMWs' common interests and giving them a non-discriminatory designation may benefit their solidarity. A strong identity may allow them to form new goals for their universal benefit. In this sense, this study not only reveals what is lacking in the NGMWs seeking to achieve remedial social changes, but also encourages social scientists to partially participate the make of social changes according to the research findings. The impetuous practice of Marxism in China has warned that social theories should be put into practice with caution. (It goes without saying that socialist practice in China deviates largely from theories.) However, academia should not retreat wholesale from participating in social change, supposing diminishing anomie is beneficial and social scientists are able to contribute to this remedy process. When studying the NGMWs, we must be conscious that we are also a social category who can choose to merely observe or ally with them based on the knowledge we carry.

This study has another implication related to the theoretical application of anomie and social momentum theory. For a long time, anomie theory has been considered as a meso theory disconnected from structures in current societies and inapplicable to individuals. This study falsifies the practical uselessness of anomie theory. It continues the anomie project by redefining anomie theory, developing the concept of social momentum and applying it to the NGMWs in China. If its attempt is not fundamentally nonsense, future studies that adopt this approach, certainly in modified and advanced versions, could also focus on other social categories and anomie in different societies. In contrast, various social contexts may further contribute to the development of anomie theory by their respective attributes. At a more mature stage of the anomie project, the social momentum of various occupational or geographical categories in a society can be studied simultaneously on a map. More precise estimations of social changes may rely on analysis of the social momentum of influential categories and their inter-category relations, by which the dynamics of social momentum in a society may be revealed.

However, the intention of making estimations by social momentum is not to creating a new futurological approach from sociology. The future of social structures is not predetermined, but always in a process of creating by the social momentum of various categories. If social

science is indeed able to provide more precise estimations of social changes from data, the knowing of these estimations should further be used to interfere with social actors in the current society, e.g. to ignore, to prevent, to accelerate or to deal with the "estimated facts" in other ways. Thus, the actual future is not how it is being estimated by social theories and studies (supposing a valid estimation), but depends how social actors utilize the knowledge from such estimations. Therefore the practical intention of social momentum theory in this study is not to foresee the future, but to provide a foundation of discussing actions and strategies for the current society.

This study contains many limitations and shortcomings that are the result of the researcher's own efforts. From a theoretical aspect, it mostly reviews classical works while overlooking many contemporary and potentially relevant theories, such as action theory in terms of structural relations and rational choice theory in terms of goal acceptance. It does not provide a careful review of some highly relevant works such as *The Legacy of Anomie Theory* and Lockwood's *Solidarity and Schism*. Moreover, the sample of NGMWs taken from Shanghai might have had unexpected regional attributes. For example, more than half of the respondents were from Anhui, one of the nearest provinces to Shanghai. Regional differences thus are also not considered in this study. The representativeness of the CSS remains arguable. Although the CSS may be one of the most randomly sampled surveys in China, it is technically impossible to totally achieve a random sampling assumption due to the many restrictions involved. Meanwhile, any randomness would certainly decrease after reducing the sample to 401 NGMW cases. For this reason, the use of any statistics that require a random sample assumption is avoided, albeit determining how much these data reflect the NGMWs remains a problem. International factors are also not much considered in this thesis. The global system obviously plays an important role in making social structures in China. Furthermore, this study may contain disputable paradigms or assumptions. For example, China is assumed in a heavy anomic status. (Analysing evidences and reasons can only suggest but cannot testify its existence.) Along with my critical review to migrant worker studies in China and anomie theory, many assumptions and arguments can be extended and constitute a separate paper, albeit only jointly can they elaborate the application of social momentum on the NGMWs. This thesis thus might be a little hasty and over ambitious for the

current stage. It, of course, is subject to revision by the author.

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