Department of Computer Science
Core-selecting auctions for dynamically allocating heterogeneous VMs in cloud computing
© 2014 IEEE. In a cloud market, the cloud provider provisions heterogeneous virtual machine (VM) instances from its resource pool, for allocation to cloud users. Auction-based allocations are efficient in assigning VMs to users who value them the most. Existing auction design often overlooks the heterogeneity of VMs, and does not consider dynamic, demand-driven VM provisioning. Moreover, the classic VCG auction leads to unsatisfactory seller revenues and vulnerability to a strategic bidding behavior known as shill bidding. This work presents a new type of core-selecting VM auctions, which are combinatorial auctions that always select bidder charges from the core of the price vector space, with guaranteed economic efficiency under truthful bidding. These auctions represent a comprehensive three-phase mechanism that instructs the cloud provider to judiciously assemble, allocate, and price VM bundles. They are proof against shills, can improve seller revenue over existing auction mechanisms, and can be tailored to maximize truthfulness.
Auction, Cloud Computing, Virtual Machine
Source Publication Title
Proceedings of 2014 IEEE Seventh International Conference on Cloud Computing
Anchorage, United States
Link to Publisher's Edition
Fu, Haoming, Zongpeng Li, Chuan Wu, and Xiaowen Chu. "Core-selecting auctions for dynamically allocating heterogeneous VMs in cloud computing." Proceedings of 2014 IEEE Seventh International Conference on Cloud Computing (2014): 152-159.