Document Type

Journal Article

Department/Unit

Department of Economics

Language

English

Abstract

After nearly four decades, China's rural land tenure arrangement remains by and large how it looked like at the beginning of the economic reform. Rural land remains collectively owned. Peasants contract land from collectives, with their tenure insecure, and their transfer rights restricted. If such an arrangement was deemed a historical legacy at the beginning of the reform, it now looks more and more like a constrained efficient design by historical accident. This article suggests the constraints against which this design may be constrained efficient, and provides a stylised model that matches a wide array of empirical patterns.

Publication Date

11-2018

Source Publication Title

Economic Journal

Volume

128

Issue

615

Start Page

2676

End Page

2710

Publisher

Wiley

Peer Reviewed

1

Copyright

© 2017 Royal Economic Society

Funder

The work described in this article was supported by grants from Hong Kong Baptist University (FRG1/13-14/023) and from Research Grant Council of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government (GRF 14500514).

DOI

10.1111/ecoj.12552

Link to Publisher's Edition

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12552

ISSN (print)

00130133

ISSN (electronic)

14680297

ISBN (print)

00130133

Available for download on Tuesday, December 01, 2020

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