Department of Mathematics
The efficiency analysis for oligopolistic games when cost functions are non-separable
By deriving an upper bound of the so-called 'price of anarchy', this paper analyses the efficiency of oligopolistic games in networks with non-separable and asymmetric cost functions, splittable flows and fixed demands. The new bound is determined by the optimal objective function values of some optimisation problems. In particular, for some special cases, the bound turns out to be explicit in the sense that it is representable explicitly by the number of players, and the constants measuring the degree of asymmetry and non-linearity of the cost function. Copyright © 2010 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
Equilibrium, Non-separable, Oligopolistic games, PoA, Price of anarchy, System optimum
Source Publication Title
International Journal of Mathematical Modelling and Numerical Optimisation
Link to Publisher's Edition
Han, D., Yang, H., & Yuan, X. (2010). The efficiency analysis for oligopolistic games when cost functions are non-separable. International Journal of Mathematical Modelling and Numerical Optimisation, 1 (3), 237-257. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJMMNO.2010.031751